فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و ششم شماره 4 (پیاپی 104، زمستان 1400)

For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities—which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theoretical reason in acquisition of moral virtues goes beyond what is claimed by naturalistic readings. Indeed, happiness is fundamentally a theological property. Secondly, we outline two senses of self-sufficiency (the dominant end, and the comprehensive end) to suggest that the second sense enables us to reconcile the two notions of “being secondary or subsidiary” and “being done for its own sake,” in which case a proper reply might be yielded for the problem of contradiction.

Because of the practical intention, Aristotle in the Ethica Ninomachea studies the principles of action of them some part are the virtues which practices aimed to and another are interior foundations including soul’s parts and humankind identity as a ethical agent. The main question about the foundations of action is the connection between soul’s parts and the virtues as they leads to ethical action. In present article firstly described every parts of the humankind’s soul in virtue of its role in realization of action and their internal relationship so as to study their connection with virtues as the final causes of the moral practice. On the practical anthropology of Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics action is the conclusion of the rational and irrational parts’ interaction of the soul. Any practice is the consequence of Desire and understanding’ combination which intend virtues as the final goal. Action therefore is an occurrence emerge from complicated and continual interaction among the rational and irrational parts of the soul on the one hand which has mutual connection with final virtues. Because of this relationship between desire and understanding Aristotle says that the Vices destroy the foundations of virtues.

Some Muslim and Christian thinkers, using narrative and rational arguments, denied the celibacy of the soul and assumed that man was merely a one-dimensional and material being. However, Muslim and Christian Physicalist, belief in the doctrine of the resurrection has not disappeared, and there has always been an attempt to reconcile physicalism with the resurrection.By studying the works of Seyyed Morteza and Hick as two physical theologians, we will make a comparative study of the resurrection in the Islamic and Christian atmosphere.The result is that both have paid attention to the epistemological source of reason in proving the possibility of resurrection; However, the differences in the fields of tendency towards physiognomy caused Seyyed Morteza to move from the physiognomy of the resurrection to the monotony of man and not from the monotony of man to the resurrection of the body.Despite the similarities in some anthropological and ontological human principles, there is a difference of view on components such as the nature of death and reliance on quotation, in matters such as the definition of purgatory, the eagle in purgatory and the torment in the last house, despite differences. Unlike Hick, Seyyed Morteza tries to reconcile his views with religious teachings.

The socialist view of sharing economy never expires, just like other economic and political theories that are based on philosophical grounds. That is, they can be adopted as grounds for the management of the society under all circumstances. For instance, given the current situation of the world after the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to grave economic problems, undermined many businesses, and increased unemployment rates, some theorists recommend a return to versions of socialism. In this paper, we aim to examine and assess the validity of the theory of sharing economy from an ethical point of view. Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand have offered analyses of socialism and sharing economy, discussing the ethical repercussions of the theory. In their ethical critique of sharing economy they point to components such as violations of individual rights and freedom in socialism as well as the destruction of people’s individual identities. In this research, we gather data in the manner of the library method, trying to analyze and assess the data. Our findings suggest that Rand criticizes the ethical principles of socialism and the theory of sharing economy from a deeper, more philosophical perspective, while Hayek is more focused on its moral and social consequences.

Similar to other economic and political theories which are based on philosophical foundations, communist economy which is mainly rooted in socialistic ideas of Karl Marx has no expiration date and can be considered as an important management option under every circumstance. As under current circumstances where COVID-19 pandemic has led to severe economic problems and increasing unemployment, many theorists believe that capitalism and liberalism are not efficient now and recommend a return to some narratives of socialism. In this article, we try to study communist economy from the viewpoint of moral criticisms of Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand. To morally criticize communist economy, these two thinkers have considered items such as violating the individuals' rights and freedom in socialism and destruction of the individuals' identity. Rand takes a deeper and more philosophical approach to criticize moral foundations of socialism and the theory of communist economy while Hayek considers moral and social consequences of this viewpoint on the society.

Existentialist therapy is a new method of psychotherapy aimed at an identification and resolution of human concerns. Two prominent scholars of the field are Irvin Yalom and Viktor Frankl who, despite their disagreements, pushes the boundaries of this new-fangled field of psychotherapy with their remarkable research. Yalom believes that, on the existentialist approach, meaning should be created in life, whereas Frankl as the founder of the method of logotherapy believes that the nature of humans is religious, and the meaning of life should be found or discovered, and not created. However, this meaning is either momentary and subjective or universal, which is the super-meaning. Drawing on the descriptive-analytic method, we try in this paper to consider the views of these psychotherapists, identifying their weak and strong points. It turns out that while Yalom sees religion and tradition as proper sources of the meaningfulness of life, he never allows them into his own theory. In contrast, Frankl makes much of the institution of religion and God in the human life, clarifying his spiritual tendency with the theory of super-meaning and the possibility of there being a super-world. We conclude that, despite their prima facie differences, the meaning-making and meaning-finding views are not contradictory. Instead, they can be reconciled and rendered supplementary.

After the decline of positivism and the rise of values, the issue of the meaning of life found its way into philosophy as an independent problem. However, the meaning of life was a constant ordinary concern of man. Modern people often live in metropolises, and the meaning of life for them is affected by metropolitan structures. Accordingly, the pursuit of a meaning for the modern life should consider how humans are affected by such structures. In this paper, we turn to architecture as a major component of metropolitan life, which has tremendously transformed the appearance of cities. After an examination of developments and characteristics of three architectural elements—house, street, and glass—we grapple with the question: What characteristics does modern architecture have, and how do they affect the meaning of life? The method of our research is library and analytic. Our findings suggest that semantic elements of each component are extremely shared or belong to a shared ancestor. In this way, it turns out that modern architecture in metropolises tend to have similar properties, which direct challenges about the meaning of life at self-alienation, objectification, loneliness, superficiality, anxiety, and loss of safety.