نشریه آموزه های فقه عبادی
پیاپی 2 (بهار و تابستان 1400)

The intention (Niyyat) of sincerity (not hypocrisy) is the condition for the correctness of compulsory obligations and the condition of rewarding for any behavior. But is the intention of sincerity in action and avoidance of the material distractors of hypocrisy directly under the control of the individual, or are only the grounds and preconditions at the discretion of man? This research, which is formed by library method and descriptive-analytical method, tries to answer this question. The findings of the research show that the intention of sincerity, or the opposite point: hypocrisy and worldly vices (distractors), arise from the inner goals and desires of the individual, and these goals and desires, in turn, are the product of self-made moral structure and penetrated dispositions into his or her soul. As a result, the realization of the intention of sincerity (Purity of faith) can only be achieved through a positive moral structure (schema) and the goals and desires based on it. Therefore, it is impossible to merely imagine the intention of sincerity without providing the ground for it, and in this sense, the intention of sincerity is not under the control of man, and only its preliminaries and grounds are at the discretion of the individual.

The traveler’s prayer is one of the obligatory duties, which is recited in the form of shortening (Shortened, Qaṣr Prayer, two Rak'ats, Arabic: صلاه القصر) with the necessary conditions. There are two important points about prayer shortening (Taqṣīr aṣ-ṣalāh) of the traveler. According to one view, the shortened prayer is permissible during travel. For reasons such as the superiority of the full prayer (Tamām); the optional (alternative) obligation between Qaṣr and full prayers; shortened in the quality of prayer. This view for some reasons is flawed; because the acceptance of this view requires arbitrary interpretation (An interpretation by opinion, Eisegesis). But another view about traveler’s prayer (Arabic: صلاه المسافر Ṣalāt al-Musafir), unanimously knows the view of shortened (Qaṣr) prayer in a travel as a strong and most potent evidence, and as a result, they have found the evidence of the obligatory of the shortening (Qaṣr) of the as a persuasive evidence. The present study based on the analytical and descriptive method, examines the nature of traveler prayer by jurisprudential arguments, the opinions of jurists and fundamentalists (theoretician in law), and the obvious features of the shortening of prayer and has come to the conclusion that the ruling on the traveler’s prayer is in the form of departure, and the obligation to say (offering prayers) prayers shortly even in today’s travels that travel is very easy, is a definite and a religious obligation.

Well-known (dominant) jurists have ruled that (letting thick dust reach one’s throat) is invalidating (breaking the fast), and most contemporary authorities consider it as an obligatory precaution. However, this issue has different arguments and branches, due to which the opinions of jurists also differ. The first branch of the problem is the concentration of dust or its absoluteness and the second branch is the addition of smoke and steam to the dust. Apparently, the narration of Soleiman Marvazi, among the evidences was the main reason for this verdict. However, the existence of the principle of the absoluteness and the conflict between the narration of Amr ibn Saeed and the narration of Soleiman Marvazi, creates two important challenges in the meaning of the narration of Soleiman. It has an effect on the issue to consider or not to consider attaching concentrated dust to the throat (letting thick dust reach one’s throat), to the main invalidating (breaking the fast, things which make a Fast void) eating and drinking. It seems that the verdict of obligatory precaution by the jurists is a way for better precaution and to get rid of these ambiguities. We have come to the conclusion by examining these arguments and branches that although the obligatory precautionary verdict for dust, smoke and steam is known as an independent breaking dominantly, but it is very difficult.

Paying property or things in the way of Allah (in the cause of Allah) such as Zakat (Arabic: زکاه, that which purifies), khums (Arabic: خمس, literally one fifth), infāq (almsgiving), sacrifice (Udḥīyah or tadḥīyah Arabic: اضحیه, تضحیه), waqf (endowment, Arabic: وقف) or vow is of special importance according to the Qurʾān and Ḥadīths (aḥādīth), and it is clear that each of these has specific uses that must be consumed and spent in that way. In the meantime, a form of spending wealth in the way of Allah (in the cause of Allah) as a vow is common, which is generally believed that not only is this vow recommended by the religion, but its use (consuming the vow) is also mustaḥabb (Arabic: مستحب‎, lit. recommended) or has a religious preference. The concern of this article, which is organized by referring to library sources and by descriptive-analytical method, is the study of the recommendation (Arabic: استحباب) or religious preference of using the vowed (vows) of others. The findings of this article show that what is sought and recommended by religion is the payment of property or performing deeds in the cause of Allah as a vowed (vow), but not only there is no religious reason to recommend using the vows of others; but also, its use is permissible only for designated cases or the needy.

In verse 184 of Surah (chapter) Al-Baqarah (Arabic: البقره, lit. The Heifer or The Cow), according to the phrase: “And those who are not able to do it may effect a redemption by feeding an indigent person” (Arabic: وعلی الذین یطیقونه فدیه طعام مسکین), the suspicion of the permit of fasting or feeding the indigent people for the mukallaf (obligee, obligator) has been raised. Some people claim that the word (those who are not able to do it, Arabic: یطیقونه) means those who are able to fast, and Allah has decreed that even for able-bodied (capable) people, if they do not want to fast, they can feed the poor indigent people. They have given evidence for their claim as narrations in which the infallibles (al-Maʿṣūmīn, Arabic: المعصومین), wherever they have used the capability root (Arabic: إطاقه) and have chosen the meaning of inability and powerlessness, have brought a negative word with it. According to the research findings, it is true that (those who are not able to do it, Arabic: یطیقونه) means ability, but in addition to power, there is qualification extreme hardship and hardship in its existence, which causes distress and constriction (Arabic: عسر و حرج). Explaining the meaning of hardship along with ability in (those who are not able to do it, Arabic: یطیقونه) is possible by analyzing the same narrations and order of verses 183 and 286 of Surah (chapter) Al-Baqarah. Therefore, all those who are able to fast with great difficulty will be excused and fasting is not obligatory on them. The present article has been written using library resources and analytical-descriptive method.

The legitimacy of non-representation in acts of worship is one of the controversial issues in the jurisprudence of religions. Among the acts of worship, i'tikaaf (Arabic: اعتکاف also i'tikaaf or e'tikaaf), which is a collection of several acts of worship, that is, i'tikaaf also includes fasting as a condition for its validity, has been discussed on behalf (representation, niyabah) of others. The obligation (necessity) of i'tikaaf worship in the case of vow (nazr or nadhr) has caused most jurists to have a skeptical view in the issue of representation (on behalf) from the living. Therefore, it is necessary to examine this issue, because the dominant of jurists have resorted to the illegitimacy of representing for the living person in such acts as i'tikaaf. The fundamental question of this research is what evidence can be found to legitimize such representation (on behalf of, to hire somebody to do a worship). It seems that due to the mustaḥabb (Arabic: مستحب‎, lit. recommended) of i'tikaaf itself, and that the vow does not cause i'tikaaf itself to become obligatory, but it is due to make the vow that this i'tikaaf has become obligatory and not that i'tikaaf itself has changed from istīḥab to obligation and also, the ancillary duty (obligation), even if the vow has been made, from the point of view of Imami jurisprudence, the legitimacy of this act by living person can be considered, although the four religions agree on the impermissibility.