فصلنامه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 33 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

One of the main issues of moral philosophy is ethical ontology, and the main theme of ethical ontology is Moral Realism and moral anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste, agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality; however, anti-realism does not consider any reality for the morality other than an order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement.The influence of Farabi on the creation the Islamic civilization is obvious to the thinkers; he made an extensive attempt during his life to Islamize the sciences. Important works have been written about Farabi's moral views, But Unfortunately, none of these works has addressed the topics of Moral Ontology that is considered the main topic in Moral Philosophy.Farabi has stated at least four arguments to prove realism. Sometimes Farabi gains help from the aesthetics, and he also proves reality sometimes through the semantics of moral concepts and felicity, through achievement of ultimate perfection on occasion, and also at times through determining the recognition path. The present research attempts to present the ontological subjects of Farabi's ethics in a new form so as to familiarize the researchers with the helpful method employed by Farabi in Moral Philosophy in order to prepare a ground to make a greater use of the method and content potential of Farabi's discussions of Moral Philosophy by Farabi. It seems Farabi does not address a number of ethical issues that need to be addressed to them because of the power of reasoning for realism, such as the rational explanation for human proportional perfection and how the way of happiness is the knowledge of the disability. Also, Farabi's attention to the separation of ethics from customs will eliminate the relativistic charge from him.

Farabi, like the early thinkers before him, did not author an independent book in the field of Moral Philosophy because the Moral Philosophy had not branched out then as a separate knowledge, but there are some discussions of Moral Philosophy dispersed in some of his works. We can gain some of his novel attitudes on Moral Philosophy through the examination of his writings. So this article uses analytical philosophical method and It takes its materials from the library way.

It is possible to propose numerous statements about the realist nature of Farabi proving that he is a moral realist. In the present research we only explain the following arguments indicating the Moral Realism that can be inferred from the sayings of Farabi.Proving the Moral Realism through Aesthetics. One of Farabi's arguments used to prove the morally realist nature of Farabi is that he considers ethics as a beautiful subject (Farabi, 1992; P.243; Farabi,1992: P. 65) and he also considers beauty to be equal to existential perfection (Farabi, 199a: PP.42-43). Therefore, Farabi considers ethics as the existential perfection, and the existential perfection is the same as existential enjoyment, that is, it is real.Proving realism through finalism. Farabi is a finalist scholar and he believes in the real ends and finalism is considered one of the realist schools, so Farbi is a realist. Farabi believes that the goal of ethics is to enable human to achieve the real felicity and he considers the real felicity and goal of ethics as an existential object (Farabi, 1995a, PP.101-103). Regarding the definition of Moral Realism, where the title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality (Ahmadi, 2017: P.118), many Muslim thinkers are moral realists.Proving Moral Realism through semantics of moral concepts. Farabi defines the concepts indicating the moral predicate that can be interpreted as predicate concepts, as existential and real and when the moral concepts are real, the proposition formed by the moral concepts will be real and thereby the Moral Realism will be proved.Proving realism through Epistemology. If Farabi did not believe in any reality for ethics, then it had been senseless to introduce wisdom as a method to recognize ethics, while Farabi has determined multiple ways like wisdom to recognize the moral reality (Farabi, 1995b: P.42).

Farabi explained his absolutism through dividing goodness into absolute goodness and non-absolute goodness. The absolute goodness explains human's ultimate perfection and real felicity and the non-absolute goodness explains the relationship between the action and ultimate perfection1. Farabi also offers a particular innovation in defining and explaining wisdom because he believes that wisdom in a special sense means that the wisdom reason out the best things through the best knowledge. The best knowledge means the permanent knowledge and knowledge of essence that is imperishable and presential that is considered the best knowledge2 and he explains about the wisdom of divine proximity and human's needs for God's blessings even in acquiring the ultimate perfection. Then he explained about the path to the ultimate perfection in Moral Philosophy by defining wisdom in a novel way.Another innovation of Farabi was to determine the instance of the real felicity that none of his preceding scholars had completed and Islamicized the Greek moral theory so accurately that he did. He accepted the divine proximity theory as a supplement to the moral theories of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and enriched it through explaining the features of divine proximity degrees.Despite all the innovations of Farabi, but it seems necessary that Be explained The following content, such as rational explanation for the appropriate perfection for humans, and for relation between knowledge of the caused to its need from Cause and the true perfection of the caused, as well as the separation of ethics from customs.

The approach is the attitude and style that the researcher relies on to seek closer to his hypothetical project. In fact, the approach refers to the angle of view or direction that the researcher takes. Collectively, how to deal systematically with a particular issue or situation is called an "approach." In modern literary criticism and analysis, the research is based on a set of approaches based on which the researcher seeks to know and understand, interpret and criticize the texts. Research approaches that have a methodological and sometimes interdisciplinary nature are unique theoretical and methodological frameworks that seek to analyze texts in an epistemological process.

The extent of Sufism and mysticism as teachings, experience, art, thought, practice, knowledge, and its schools and practices has led to broad approaches to it. Sufism and mysticism have had many functions, contexts, and influences, both due to their buoyancy in definition and due to their continuous presence in the cultural history of Iran; Therefore, the scientific confrontation with this Iranian phenomenon requires various approaches, so that it is not possible to recognize and analyze Sufism from a fixed perspective. Sufi scholars, especially Western mystics, have used various approaches such as phenomenology, mythology, linguistics, hermeneutics, etc. to recognize and discover the symbols and basically what and how Sufism is.Although the orientalist approach has a long history, it has no background in recognizing and analyzing the approaches with which Western mysticism has explored Sufism. . Due to the study gap, apart from the present study, there is no independent and comprehensive research that has examined the necessity of the methodology and research approach of Orientalists in mystical studies in general, and Louise's mysticism in particular.The basis of the present study is a reflection on the research of Leonard Lewisohn (1953-2018), an American mystic who, in comparison with many orientalists, has analyzed Persian mystical texts with structured methodologies and approaches. This Sufi scholar has used different approaches in his Sufi studies depending on the context and time of the subject. In this discourse, due to the necessity of his mystical approach, he has studied and analyzed Lewisohn's research from this perspective, and we have come to the conclusion that he has well understood that looking at mysticism from a perspective is a component.Or a particular feature, causes the subject to be seized, reduced, or ideologized; Therefore, by choosing both aesthetic and historical-social approaches in his mystical studies, he has sought a more comprehensive and realistic cognition of Sufism.

In his mysticism, Leonard Lewisohn has explored Sufism with specific approaches such as aesthetic, historical, social, and comparative approaches. What the Orientalist's methodological analysis shows is that the socio-historical aspect is more analytical than his other approaches, and his aspects of Sufism no longer have the depth of this approach Lewisohn's aesthetic view of mystical texts is, above all, corresponding to mystical symbolism and its interpretation and literary artistic functions. He considers the aesthetics of Sufism to be inspired and discovered, and calls it the "aesthetics of taste." According to Lewisohn, the aesthetics of Sufism depends on the knowledge of the cognitive metaphors of Sufism, the origin of which is "science". Lewisohn considers the interpretation and decipherment of mystics' allegories as a work of art and believes that interpretation is the discovery of exemplary meanings and the understanding of the relationship between property and kingdom, which is possible by passing through the word and reaching the world of example.Another aesthetic aspect of Lewisohn's research is the discovery of artistic symbols of "infidelity." Lewisohn's explanation of this is not focused on the classification and interpretation of these symbols, but rather on the explanation of the political and social components of infidelity and the transgression of taboos. According to him, infidelity is the secret of esotericism and confrontation with the demonstration of the official religion, which reveals the totalitarian belief of the Sufis. Lewisohn has viewed the literary tradition of blasphemy and superficiality necessarily and exclusively from the socio-political dimension and function of transgression; While this kind of look is a reduction of the subject.History is the basis of Lewisohn's research; In such a way that he has never neglected the socio-historical approach in recognizing Sufism. According to his historical analysis, Sufism has had a wide and continuous function in the intellectual life of Iranians, so much so that he considers Sufism to be the "institutionalized religion of the masses." Examining this aspect of Lewisohn's research, we have come to the conclusion that the most important aspect of his historical approach is the conflict between jurists and Sufis; As far as he believes, the "historical evolution of the Sufi-Mullah transition" is very important for the flow of Sufi thought. The pivotal history of Lewisohn Behnik has revealed the background and time of Iranian Sufism; But sometimes, seeing merely historical matters of spirituality, has caused him to fall into the conflicts of jurists and Sufis and not be able to reveal and introduce the spirituality captured in history and society. The historical approach to the study of Sufi texts, for all its value, sometimes fails to discover the spiritual spirit of mysticism, and the spirituality trapped in history and society becomes merely ideology.

Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as theological, logical, natural and mathematical works. He also discusses pleasure in relation to the perception and the perceptual faculties of the soul. In addition, an important and significant part of Avicenna's discussions about pleasure is devoted to pleasure of the arts, especially the representative arts.Since the work of art is considered sensible, the question arises as to which perceptual faculties of man the pleasure of the work of art depends? Does the mere fact that a work of art is a sensible thing, means that the pleasure of a work of art is considered a sensible pleasure? Do other perceptual faculties, including the internal sensory faculties and the rational faculties, also contribute to the perception of the work of art, and does the pleasure of the work of art also depend on them? In the case of each of these faculties, including the external and internal sensory faculties and the rational faculty, the question can be asked how important and effective they are in perceiving the beauty of the work of art? In the present article, an attempt has been made to answer these questions from Avicenna's point of view. Methods and Materials:The research method of this article is fundamental. This research was conducted using a library research method, and the method of describing and analyzing information in this research is qualitative. The claim of this research is that according to Avicenna's views, the pleasure that is obtained from works of art, as a kind of sensible things, is not merely sensory pleasure and dependent on the five external sensory faculties.

To examine this claim, the characteristics of aesthetic pleasure and its subjects as well as the epistemological status of this pleasure are studied and the pleasure of the arts of poetry, painting and music is explained from Avicenna's point of view. Finally, it is shown that the aesthetic pleasure of works of art is first of all a rational pleasure and depends on the faculty of reason and then, respectively, is an imaginary pleasure and depends on the faculty of imagination, and finally, is a sensible pleasure and depends on the perceptual faculties. Among the faculties of external perception, the faculties of sight and hearing have the greatest ability to obtain aesthetic pleasure from the arts, respectively.

The findings of this study show that from Avicenna's point of view, each of the external and internal sensory faculties, and to a higher degree, the rational faculty, have their own aesthetic pleasure. External sensory faculties, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, each have limitations. In this way they can only enjoy what they can comprehend. But the range of pleasure of the internal faculties is much greater than the pleasures of the external faculties. Because all the sensory forms perceived by the external perceptual faculties are grouped together and interconnected, there is more pleasure for the internal faculties. This is why the imaginative faculty enjoys the perception of images preserved in the imagination. For example, the imagination, by preserving and storing sensible auditory forms of musical notes, makes it possible that the audience's pleasure is not limited to single notes and sound type, but can understand the sequence of musical notes and enjoy them. Ultimately, it is the faculty of reason that in the strict sense of the word can enjoy the pleasure of perceiving beauty. Because from Avicenna's point of view, beauty lies in features such as proportion, composition and symmetry, and although the audience first perceives data from a sensible object through sensory perception, but the perception of features such as proportion is specific to reason. Accordingly, aesthetic pleasure is at its highest dependent on rational perception.According to Avicenna, irrational pleasure is a pleasure that is aroused, but without thought and reflection, and is appropriate to nature and the senses, but hearing and sight give pleasures to the soul that are not merely by nature, but are rational, because they refer to nonsensible meanings, for example, when one sees a beautiful work of art, one is drawn to it and tends to liken it.The results of this study show that according to Avicenna, since the external and internal senses present the works of art to the human intellect and the intellect recognizes their beauty, the perception of beauty encompasses all levels of human cognitive faculties. Also, since aesthetic pleasure follows the perception of beauty, the perception of beauty produces different levels of pleasure, at least as much as it involves perceptual levels.

A model for the epistemology of religious belief is Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology. It evaluates religious beliefs in terms of intellectual virtues such as understanding, wisdom (phronesis), and doxastic characters. A belief is stable and valid if its subject possesses intellectual virtues. We might embark on evaluating religious beliefs, particularly monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes based on virtue renderings of intuitions and illuminations. Intuitions and illuminations are processes through which one achieves rational flourishing in light of wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski draw on intellectual virtues, particularly wisdom, to account for religious beliefs. In such an evaluation, instead of beliefs, believers are evaluated. Zagzebski’s account gives way to two readings: in terms of understanding and in terms of wisdom. This article deals with the role of wisdom in evaluating religious beliefs. This reading might be thought of as a version of Suhrawardī’s view of religious beliefs, particularly the belief in God. In a recapitulation of his view, Suhrawardī insists that attainment of genuine knowledge is enabled through theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom, intuitions and revelations, and possession of moral and intellectual virtues (Suhrawardī 1993, vol. 2; also see Zagzebski 1996, 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2011). There has been research on religious beliefs in Iran in the last decade, but none of these studies has talked about the rationality of religious belief in the light of wisdom with all its aspects and independently. Therefore, the present research is novel in this connection, and its main contribution is its discussion of the virtue of wisdom according to Suhrawardī and Zagzebski.

The method of this research is descriptive-analytic. It is based on Lakatos’s research program. The research is focused on wisdom and its role in choosing beliefs. Its positive strategy is the epistemic authority of the self and others in choosing beliefs, and its negative strategy is the critique of rival theories such as radical fideism and strong rationalism.

This article begins with an overview of the epistemic foundations of Suhrawardī and Zagzebski:(a) Intellectual virtues as modeled upon virtue ethics, (b) rational faculties or powers are not the only belief-forming powers. Indeed, moral faculties or powers play a reciprocal role in the formation and reception of beliefs, (c) an epistemic subject has both epistemic and moral duties, (d) just as we have an epistemic trust in our own rational and moral faculties, we have an epistemic trust in other people, (e) the will or motivation to attain the truth is as relevant to moral virtues as it is to intellectual virtues, (f) giving up on the scientific-empirical model of epistemology and tuning to the specialized model of religious epistemology, (g) extension of objects of religious beliefs from propositional to non-propositional facts, (h) taking into consideration the external and internal dimensions of knowledge-conferring character of non-epistemic factors in attainment of genuine knowledge, (i) special consideration of wisdom in reception of genuine knowledge, instead of explanation or justification of beliefs. A wise person is one who possesses moral and intellectual virtues, through which he or she decide under certain circumstances what is the right thing to believe or to do. Intuitions are crucial to the process of attaining wisdom. A wise person deploys intuitions, particularly rational intuitions, to make proper decisions about accepting or denying a belief or act.

There have been different versions of rational evaluation and stability of religious beliefs, including foundationalism, coherentism, and fideism. What matters is that the believer possesses moral and intellectual virtues to attain the beliefs that are proper to wise people. To take a wise person as a role model can pave the path for attainment of valid beliefs. In their virtue-theoretic framework, Suhrawardī and Zagzebski propose that a wise person, possessing spiritual virtues, is a superior model for those who seek genuine knowledge so that they can attain wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski begin with reflective reasons, and then turn to theoretical reasons. The highest degree of belief in monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes can be attained in light of wisdom.

One of the most significant issues in anthropology is the relationship between two major aspects of human life: soul and corpus. A review over philosophical texts from the early Greek era to the present time reveals the fact that soul’s relationship with the corpus is and has always been concerning philosophers. However, over time, separation of sciences and their narrowed down branches brought made it particularly interesting for other branches of science like embryology, psychology, parapsychology, etc. The main focus of this study is human genesis since his presence in the material world which is scrutinized through philosophical views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra and comparing their views with embryological theories of Thomas W. Sadler as a prominent theoretician in the field. Conception and order of formation of body organs, parents’ influence on embryo and their relationship, the time of acquiring soul and the issue of protective and exhaustive are among the points discussed in this study in order to make a better evaluation of the issue under study.Several theories have been developed on the formation of the first organ by eminent thinkers all of which could be culminated. If veins and nerves are considered as organs, they will be the first ones; otherwise, the heart is the initiator of embryogenesis. Ibn Sina concords with the second part of medical theories; however, regardless of the differences in views of Mulla Sadra on the genesis of the first organ, if the liver is the beginning point for veins and nerves, then, he will go with the first theory. For Ibn Sina, heart is the first organ for he believes that it is the origin of heat. Nevertheless, in some of his works, Mulla Sadra states the heart to be the first organ; yet, if the criteria for his selection is an overall look at his works, brain has to be considered as the initiator of embryogenesis due to its inherent priority and since liver as the origin of veins is formed earlier. Both of these approaches, however, contradict with the ideas Ibn Sina had on this issue. In the case of formation of other body organs, there seems to be almost no difference in views of these two philosophers on chronological order and for both of them, the other one’s first is the second one. Yet, Mulla Sadra’s views are supported more strongly by medical views of the modern world. This is due to the fact that, Ibn Sina puts the formation of veins and nerves two steps behind compared to the findings of modern medicine.Regarding the method and time of attachment of soul to the embryo, Ibn Sina takes the time when heart is completely formed as the time when embryo gains the intellective soul. Yet, based on his own principles, Mulla Sadra believes that when the embryo is formed, the fetus is of signs of "plant life”. In other words, the fetus at this stage eats and grows; however, it lacks sense and movement as the signs of “animal life” and intellectual perception as the main sign of “human life”. As the embryo evolves inside its mother’s womb, its aptitudes are realized and this gives it an animal soul and later on other human life traits are gradually flourished. Embryology findings of modern medicine reveal that fetus receives the essence of life from its parents and it is the beginning of birth and growth of a new creature.  Thus, fetus is a living creature of life right from the conception. This concord well with the trans-substantial motion theory of Mulla Sadra. Accordingly, acquisition of soul from Mulla Sadra’s point of view and medical perspective coordinate well considering their views on the first organ of primary stages of soul and life even in their faintest forms. Views and ideas of these two philosophers on creation of soul and the protective and exhaustive factor are different. Ibn Sina believes that soul of parents is vicariously protective and exhaustive so that at first, the soul of mother is the collection of elements and creator of nature, then in the middle, mineral face or the born soul is exhaustive and protective with the aid of mother’s soul and finally the born soul becomes independent. Mulla Sadra denies this and believes that delegation in various affairs is in contractual affairs and not in real and inherent ones. For him, exhaustiveness of body organs is neither the souls of parents nor the soul of embryo but is the nutrition substances which collect the necessary and required components in its essence due to the trans-substantial motion and inherent perfection and is even more perfect and transforms as time passes and this is the plant soul of the embryo which protects it until the time comes for it to be qualified to gain the potential to show animal behavior beside above-mentioned deeds and behaviors. At this moment, human body is evolved and becomes legible to acquire intellective soul with which not only mineral deeds are conducted along with plant and animal behavior, but contemplation and perception also occur as the intellectual soul. Modern medical findings solve the problem of exhaustiveness of the embryo since they take fetus as a living creature; however, the concept of protectiveness as it is discussed in philosophy is of no ground in embryology and the only mention of it is made about the role the mother and her body has in protecting the fetus conceived in her womb.  Mother’s body acts as a home and a system feeding and protecting the fetus and since it is the site for the nurture of a creature named human, her temperament and spiritual state will have their influence of the embryo.In conclusion, an overall evaluation of these views reveals that ontological principles of Mulla Sadra to elaborate on embryogenesis and the life of human embryo concord much better with modern findings of embryology as a science in comparison to the ones developed by Ibn Sina.No study has investigated the relationship between soul and corpus from this point of view. The method utilized in this study was documentary analysis using library resources. The references used in this study were all original texts including The Canon of Medicine, Book of Knowledge for Ala al-Dawla, Soul, etc. by Ibn Sina, The Transcendent theosophy in the Four Journeys of the Intellect, etc. by Mulla Sadra and Langman's Medical Embryology by Thomas W. Sadler.

This research deals with Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (māhuwī), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardī and philosophers before him had just discerned the difference between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed concepts, placing them respectively into objective and subjective categories, and until Mullā Ṣadrā’s time, the division was restricted to first intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-ūlā) or quiddity-based concepts and secondaryintelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniya) or logical concepts, and the place of philosophical concepts was not clear.Accordingly, Suhrawardī subsumes concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, and colorfulness under constructed concepts without drawing a distinction between logical and philosophical concepts. This was mainly because there is no distinction between these concepts in the external world, and because repetition and vicious regress would follow if infinite attributes coextensively existed.In addition to his critique of Suhrawardī for having distinguished concepts into subjective and objective, Mullā Ṣadrā challenged Suhrawardī’s views of each of these concepts.

This research adopts a fundamental descriptive-analytic method and relies on Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentaries on Suhrawardī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Exposition of the wisdom of illumination) to elaborately deal with Suhrawardī’s remarks concerning constructed concepts and Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to these views. Data of the research have been collected through a library method, and cases were extracted by indexing. Finally, by drawing on the intellectual method, the indexed contents were analyzed and criticized, and the views were critically analyzed and considered.

Here is a summary of findings of the research:A major contribution of Suhrawardī concerning concepts was a division of concepts into subjective and objective, by which all philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, colorfulness, and relation are subsumed under purely constructed concepts, without corresponding to anything in the external reality.Suhrawardī’s main reason for the negation of external distinction in the case of philosophical concepts is that the coextensive existence of infinite attributes implies vicious regress and repetition, since in his Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī proposes a criterion for the distinction between the subjective and the objective and for the impossibility of the distinction in the external world, according to which everything whose occurrence implies repetition and regress counts as constructed.Major objections raised by Mullā Ṣadrā against Suhrawardī’s account of constructed concepts, which serves as the foundation and tenet of the rest of his objections, are as follows:Absence of any distinction between philosophical and logical secondaryintelligibles Confusion between concepts and their instances Failure to take account of the organic composition (al-tarkīb al-ittiḥādī) between quiddities and existences Conflation of the name and what is named Confusion between primary essential predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-ṣunāʿī). Given these findings, the obstacles, problems, and proposals of the research are as follows:While most of Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections are accurate and based on his insights into the problem of intelligibles, some of his objections are not plausible because of their anachronistic nature. Although in some cases, Suhrawardī’s remarks are attacked and even undermined by Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections, in some cases it is open to us to criticize and adjudicate the two parties and even offer novel contributions to the debate since Mullā Ṣadrā has rested content with Avicenna’s views, among other predecessors, and did not offer an alternative account.

God as the creator and lord of humans, and as All-Provider (razzāq), is in charge of providing for human primary basic needs, as in the Qur’an God promises to make basic provisions for everyone. The promise led some people to think that humans have a right to receive provisions from God, expecting that God should optimally and fully provide for human needs. For this reason, the difference in people’s provisions has led to questions concerning divine justice.The problem with which this paper is concerned is why God has allotted different amounts of provisions to different people, instead of giving different people equal shares of provisions. Moreover, if allotment of provisions is attributed to God, why is it emphasized that people try hard to gain provisions?These questions have frequently been raised in religious milieus throughout the history, often with the intention of casting doubts on religious beliefs by questioning divine justice, since different provisions for different people are thought to be at odds with God’s justice.A number of papers in the field of Quranic sciences have been written about this problem, which are based on the views of Quranic exegetes, on which we draw in this paper. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a philosophical consideration of the problem in terms of Avicenna’s philosophy, particularly his essay on provisions (Risāla fi-l-arzāq). It is noteworthy that the problem was not tackled by any other Muslim philosophers. In Islamic philosophy, God’s attribute of All-Provider is mentioned in passing as an attribute of action—it is at most defined and reduced to divine attributes of essence such as knowledge, wisdom, and power. Avicenna deals with the problem of provisions in his Risāla fi-l-arzāq. This is an essay attributed to Avicenna. Over 20 manuscripts of the essay are available in libraries, and its attribution to Avicenna has not been a matter of dispute.The essay is concerned with questions about divine justice and how to treat people’s differences in their provisions in these terms. Avicenna explicitly deals with the problem in terms of a debate. In line with his Peripatetic framework, he considers different aspects and possible results of the question, as illustrated with numerous examples. In this paper, I provide an account of Avicenna’s remarks here given his general theoretical framework as explicated in other works of his. I also offer criticisms of his account. Taking account of the views of Quranic exegetes concerning the problem, I offer my own account of the problem.

In order to reconcile two groups of Quranic verses in one of which the allotment of provisions is attributed to God and in the other the attainment of provisions is conditioned upon the human labor and efforts, one might offer the following account: in a monotheistic view, provisions are ultimately allotted and distributed by God, but this is in terms of unchanging traditions in accordance to the divine wisdom. In the best or optimal order and the dynamics of the universe, human wills and the amount and quality of their labors and efforts play roles in the expansion or diminution of one’s provisions. For obtaining a desirable provision, a set of conditions should be satisfied and certain grounds should be prepared.Given one’s material and spiritual possessions, which are in turn from God, every person tries to obtain provisions by drawing upon one’s insight, intelligence, as well as spiritual and material capitals. The better one performs in utilizing one’s opportunities the more provisions one attains, and the more negligent and indolent one is in using one’s existential and material capacities and the more vulnerable one makes oneself to unpredictable economic circumstances the more deprived one will be and the more futile one’s efforts will turn out to be, in which case one will have a diminished provision. In this way, God the Wise has established laws and traditions in the creation in such a way that everyone can attain his or her own share of provisions with their mental and physical capacities, without there being any injustice.In his “Essay on provisions” Avicenna has dealt with the problem of the difference in people’s provisions and its bearing upon the divine justice. In this essay, he tries to rely on divine wisdom and grace to correct wrong conceptions and establish divine justice in the measurement of people’s provisions. Through an articulation of the contradictions involved in different aspects of the problem, Avicenna shows that the idea of exactly equal provisions leads to an impossibility or the human destruction.

Having rooted in Islamic doctrines and Greek philosophy -specially Plato and Aristotle-, Al-farabi gave central role to Happiness in his philosophy, locating it at the heart of his political thought. His unflagging effort to conceptualize the notion of happiness ended up bringing to the scene a new theoretical view on happiness, which has been circulated throughout the Islamic philosophy by his disciples. In this paper, I would tend to reconsider this key concept in Al-Farabi’s philosophy, by looking at it in relation to Imagination. The key question, therefore, would be “what is the role of imagination in the process of achieving happiness”; in other word, “How Imagination can participate a role in the attainment of happiness?”. To approach this question, first, I will look at how Al-Farabi deals with the notion of happiness in his works and how he puts this notion at the heart of his political view. Thereby, it will be discussed that happiness is being attained through existing in the society (virtuous city), which means, happiness can be attained collectively, not individually. Finally, by exploring Imagination in Al-Farabi’s happiness theory, I will discuss the significant role and statue of artists, who deal with the public’s imagination, in the virtuous city.

The views of Al-Farabi on the subject in question have been discussed to some extent in books such as Al-Farabi, Imagination, and Artistic Creativity and Al-Farabi and Conceptualization of Religious Art. In addition, in Al-Farabi, a Strange Philosopher, Nasrollah Hekmat tries to open new horizons in this field, criticizing dominant readings of Al-Farabi’s views. In third section of this book, titled “Philosophy of Imagination in Al-Farabi’s thought”, author introduces the notion of “imaginary rationality” that plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s prophecy theory and paves the human way towards happiness. Going beyond a merely explanatory view, The Political Thought of Al-Farabi by Reza Davari Ardakani, provides a comprehensive reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing connections between the notion of happiness and his political views. Moreover, in Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi, Miriam Galston considers relations between Politics and Excellence in a broader philosophic context. And finally, it is totally worth to talk about Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, written by Muhsin Mahdi, that deals with key concepts of Al-Farabi’s philosophy through reading his works.

Gathered the information from Al-Farabi’s own books, as well as the second literature and commentaries on his works, this paper is completely library research. Firstly, I made an outline to keep our research focused. After gathering information, in the second step, I would be able to narrow down the research area. By analyzing, deducing, and reconsidering data, in the last phase, the study would come to conclusion.

Although Al-Farabi enumerates theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts as conditions of possessing happiness, according to his works, theoretical contemplation is a necessary condition of reaching happiness. The theoretical contemplation, however, is the property of the elect, and the vulgar are deprived of this activity. Since he is aiming at happiness for all citizens of the society, Al-Farabi appeals to a faculty that is common between all human beings: Imagination. What is important in this context is that, in Al-Farabi’s view, Imagination- which contributes to his prophecy theory- has the capacity of imitating not only the sensible, but also the intelligible. (this latter function of Imagination -imitating of the intelligible- has not been considered in his antecedents, specially Plato and Aristotle, and seems it is his own innovation). The supreme ruler of virtuous city (philosopher-prophet) and the elect -specially the artist among them- can project the representations of the intelligible on the public’s minds which are able to imitate them. It gives the opportunity to the public that find their way to happiness. In other word, Imagination -its ability to imitate the intelligible- paves the way of happiness for all citizens of virtuous city.

In a way of conclusion, Happiness plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s political thinking, in a way that he articulates his political theory around this notion. As we mentioned above, while the theoretical contemplation is necessary for reaching happiness, this ability merely belongs to the elect. By taking advantage of their Imagination, which is capable of imitating abstract concepts, the public can reach the highest good, the happiness. Since the artists, among the elect, deals directly with the public’s imagination and can project theoretical virtues on their minds, Al-Farabi puts a high value on them in the second highest level of virtuous city (His view stands in stark contrast to Plato who believed artists -specially poets- must be banished from his ideal society).

This study aims to investigate the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality based on Quranic reading and tries to reject the rival theory and the hypothesis of "establishing a relationship between unity and plurality based on the personal unity of existence" based on studies and analyzes. Examine the basic Qur'an. The body of research consists of: explaining the personal unity of existence and critique of rival theories and reciting and explaining the Qur'an the chosen theory. By studying the relative interactions of the world of plurality with the world of unity, several studies have been conducted, including: the article "The possibility of personal unity of existence in transcendent wisdom" by Hossein Suzanchi; The article "A method and in proving the content of the personal unity of existence" written by Vahid Vahed Javan et al .; Article "Unity and plurality of existence in transcendent wisdom and mysticism" by Seyyed Hamid Reza Hassani; The article "Reflections on the Evidence of Personal Unity of Existence" written by Mohammad Ali Mohiti Ardakan and Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari. Although these articles have somehow dealt with the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality and the analysis of the personal unity of existence, they have never targeted the basic and documented reading of the Qur'an, which is the mission of this research.

The present research is a research, theoretical and its method is descriptive-analytical. The research approach is also qualitative; Qualitative research requires identifying sources related to the research topic, studying texts, understanding the meaning of the text and extracting the desired content from these sources, establishing a relationship between the content and describing and analyzing them, and discussing and concluding the collected information.

Based on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence" called "personal unity of existence" Is summarized. There are many verses to prove this mystical approach in relation to the world of plurality and the world of unity. With the mystical analysis of the relevant verses, the strategic statement "Existence is unique in the Almighty and the world of possibilities is its manifestations, manifestations and events" was extracted, which can be the basis for further research on the system of Qur'anic mysticism.

In mystical ontology, how the world of plurality relates to the world of unity is one of the main axes. The relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality has long been the subject of controversy among philosophers and sages. Different views are presented in this regard. What has been considered most of all is the theory of the personal unity of existence in these proportions. Mystics try to develop this theory with rational and intuitive analysis and base it on other scientific theories. Based on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence".

The question of the role of knowledge in the realization of the known is crucial to philosophical and mystical theological studies. Mystics and Sadraean philosophers have adopted different views of the efficacy or inefficacy of knowledge in the known as well as their account of how knowledge affects the known. The goal of this research is to uncover the view of Islamic mysticism and Transcendent Wisdom concerning the issue.

This research draws on the method of analysis and comparison to provide an analytic comparative consideration of the mystical and Sadraean view of the issue. Moreover, it was carried out based on library data.

When it comes to the semantics of the relation between knowledge and the known in the mystical approach, we might discern three different positions in the words of mystics. First, the known is not made by knowledge in the sense that God’s knowledge does not play a role in how Immutable Entities (al-a‘yān al-thābita) are. Indeed, God knows such entities as they are, without making or changing them. By an analogy of our knowledge of the impossible, Ibn ‘Arabī explicates the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, in that it is not our knowledge that makes it impossible, nor can it stop it from being impossible. The second notion of subordination is the correspondence between knowledge and the known. That is, what is original is the known entity as it is present an Immutable Entity, and it is knowledge that corresponds to it, although the ontological subordination of the known with respect to knowledge is a well-acknowledged fact in Islamic mysticism. This remark by Fanārī is in obvious conflict with the first view concerning the semantics of the subordination of knowledge with respect to the known according to which the former is posterior to the latter. Such differences in the semantics of subordination indicate that there is no consensus over the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, as it shows that the dispute is not merely verbal. The third notion of subordination refers to that of the relation to its relatum. Moreover, on the Sadraean view, knowledge’s subordination to the known is accounted for in the third mystical sense. To illustrate, we should note that by the known here we mean the essentially known, which consists in the Immutable Entity or the epistemic form. Accordingly, for knowledge to be knowledge it needs to belong to a known entity, where belonging is a relation that needs, and is posterior to, its relatum, although the posterity is hierarchical rather than temporal, and thus it does not lead to the occurrence of events in God’s essence. Furthermore, when he deals with the problem of knowledge’s subordination to the known, Mullā Ṣadrā often distinguishes active and passive knowledge, tethering the response to the question of knowledge’s subordination of the known to the varieties of the distinction. That is, since knowledge is the origin of the instantiation of the external known entity, it cannot be posterior to the known, but in passive knowledge as such, the knowledge in question is necessarily posterior to the external known entity. What is more, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn provides a significant research concerning the differences between the views of Muslim mystics and Mu‘tazilī theologians, in which he notes the differences between the two views, referring to epistemic and objective (concrete) obtainment (or immutability) as two varieties of obtainment. He accounts for the view of Muslim mystics that Immutable Entities obtain prior to their concrete or objective existence in terms of epistemic obtainment. In this connection, he also points to the mode of existence of Immutable Entities. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, since such entities exist by God’s existence, they are not created by God, which is unlike the existential condition of existential objective entities that are made and created by God.

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, knowledge’s subordination of the known corresponds to the third mystical sense. Moreover, relying on his principle of the primacy of existence, Mullā Ṣadrā tends to believe that the known is not made by knowledge, with knowledge not contributing to the known. Sadraean and mystical accounts agree over the idea that Immutable Entities are essentially determined, non-made realities, which is why the divine knowledge does not affect such entities in God’s essence.

Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem.

The question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.

 Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). Intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).

All of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of Intellect.

Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to suggest, in a humorous manner, that the history of philosophy lies completely out of the realm of real philosophy. If taken seriously, philosophy would have nothing to do with the history of philosophy. I argue in this article that Professor Quine and others of his mindset are wrong in that they mix up things that should be discriminated.As is well known, attitudes toward philosophy may be categorized in a variety of ways, among them is the familiar division of schools of “Analytic” and “Continental” in the Western philosophy, and the schools of “Peripatetic”, “Illuminationist” and “Transcendental” in the Islamic tradition of philosophy. In the same line of drawing contrast between different modes of philosophical thought and according to their relation with the history of the enterprise of philosophy, this article differentiates between two kinds of philosophizing, namely “trendy” and “historical”.Those loyal to the trendy way of philosophizing see their professional practice as independent from philosophy’s past, and rely solely on the ability of their “presentist” reason to address the currently existing challenges. This may be called a memoryless way of philosophizing, as there would be no need from this outlook to be concerned with philosophy’s past or to keep a memory of what has already happened in the enterprise. Philosophy as expected to be practiced now may be said to be detached from philosophy’s past, just as is the case in sciences. Those people who may be interested in the historical issues may of course refer to the history of philosophy, but this would not be philosophy proper. One could regard the contemporary Analytic philosophy which is the mainstream in Anglo-American circles as an exemplar of this attitude, whose pioneers give a demeaning look at the history of philosophy. As Wittgenstein has put in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” If this is the case, why should philosophers bother themselves with the history of philosophy at all?Adherents of the historical way of philosophizing, on contrary, turn to philosophy’s past seeking philosophical truth, and shape their philosophy in exchange with it. According to this outlook, history of philosophy is like a precious mine of problems and ideas that were explored partially by some brilliant minds in the past. We may take benefit of their efforts by taking their philosophical concerns serious and move forward the enterprise by engaging with their problems and ideas. Many updates from different aspects would be needed for sure, but the essence of philosophical problems remains the same through the history of ideas. We would therefore need to do philosophy historically, that is to master the past as the key to understand the present. This type of philosophizing seems to have been realized by Islamic philosophers, who typically position themselves within a lineage of preceding thinkers. Just take the example of Mulla Sadra’s Asfar, a masterpiece in transcendental school of Islamic philosophy, and see the vast amount of discussions devoted to the thought of past thinkers.The way of philosophizing adopted by the advocates of each camp would have crucial impacts on their philosophy’s pedagogy and writing style, as well as on their historiography of philosophy. Especially, both are very susceptible to historical anachronism, namely to shape a distorted narrative of the past as viewed from the supposed vantage point of the present. Moreover, each attitude has also its peculiar characteristics. On one hand we see that the writings of trendy philosophers are typically overwhelmed with philosophical jargon; i.e., expressions that have gained very specialist and narrow meanings. On the other hand, the relations of ideas explored by historical philosophers and their development over centuries are usually very complicated to be captured, so the need for long years, even decades, for a scholar to be able to enter the circle of interlocutors.The present article characterizes trendy and historical ways of philosophizing separately, details their implications, and finally put them in comparison against each other. This problem falls within the scope of what is usually called metaphilosophy, and would make salient some features in the enterprise of philosophy that otherwise would have remained obscure. Another metaphilosophical issue is the probable unnoticed effects of the history of philosophy on the work of philosophers, whether trendies or historicals. This issue remains to be investigated further in a subsequent research.