نشریه اخلاق پژوهی
پیاپی 12 (پاییز 1400)

Seyyed Mohammad Hosein Tabatabai is one of the scholars who contributed to A Collection of Essays in the Memory of Mulla Sadra, published in 1340 SH. Abdoljavad Falatouri, an Iranian professor living in Germany, offered a critique of the three articles in this book, criticizing them due to their methodology and inattention to the standards of the ethics of research and citation. Allameh Tabatabai, and others provided some answers to which Falatouri gave others. The scholarly debate lasted two years, and more than 10 articles were published by the parties to the debate. The review and analysis of these writings, as more than 60 years passed since they were published, clearly show two different approaches to the ethics of the advancement of science, criticism and research. The author has tried to systematically examine these writings and to highlight their various moral aspects. This controversy between them can be seen at three levels: the level of criticism, the level of research and research methods, and the major level, which expresses two approaches to the ethics of science. Although it is apparently easy to recognize the first level and it is possible to see the second level with accuracy, the third level, nonetheless, seems to have been ignored. At this level, the two approaches can be identified by analyzing the published texts in order to use them to advance science and extend the scholarly atmosphere.

There are a considerable number of psychological research studies which explore moral phenomena (moral judgment, moral behavior, and so forth). Among the recent theories in this field is the "social-cognitive domain theory". While this theory is developed by some unsympathetic responses to Lawrence Kelberg's views, it is now supported by a wide range of empirical enquiries. In the present paper, reviewing its central claims about moral knowledge and moral development, the ambiguities or drawbacks of the theory are examined and explained based on empirical views and theoretical considerations. The basic claim of this theory is that the three domains of "morality, contract, and personality" are set apart in infancy, and each goes through its own growth path. This theory emphasizes the lived experiences of children for moral development, and it refers to the factors such as interaction with peers, interaction with parents, and interactions between the domains. The process of the child's interaction with the environment (including parents) is seen dialectically. Despite its strengths, this theory suffers from serious disadvantages which include "rational understanding of morality and moral judgment", "inadequacy of criteria for distinguishing between realms", and "insufficient conception of religious norms".

It is necessary to take account of the theoretical foundations of ethics and their role in moral instructions. Moral epistemology deals with the epistemological foundations of ethics. To be more precise, in moral epistemology, moral judgments and propositions are explained and justified while the sources and processes of acquiring moral knowledge are analyzed and evaluated. In this article, relying on Feyḍ Kashani’s works and ideas, we seek to explain the epistemological foundations of ethics and the extent to which moral knowledge is influenced by them. Reason, revelation, senses, and intuition are considered to be the important sources of moral knowledge by Feyḍ Kashani. He regards reason as superior to the other sources of knowledge because they take their validity from it. Feyḍ Kashani believes that the perfect rationality is peculiar to the prophets and saints, and others have to prefer revelation to reason because revelation explains not only general matters but also the issues in detail, and therefore, one can realize the unique role of revelation in recognizing moral obligations and in the ability to fulfill them. Feyḍ Kashani explains and analyzes the epistemological foundations of ethics, on the assumption that senses and reason are next to revelation and there is a close connection between them. This outlook can have an impact on various areas including ethics.

Basing ethics on an evolutionary foundation which proposes the idea of a "moral zeitgeist", Richard Dawkins, who is a British evolutionary biologist and one of the major proponents of modern atheism, sought to deny the moral functions of religion. By contrast, defending the moral functions of religion, Alistair McGrath, who is a contemporary biologist and theologian and one of the most prominent critics of new atheism, has criticized Dawkins's atheistic approach and positions. McGrath considers Dawkins' approach to cultural and moral evolution to be a continuation of the ideas and claims of Edward Wilson. He thinks that reductionism is not justified, and that Dawkins’s theory contains the defects of disregarding the element of human intentionality and failing to provide a conclusive argument. In this article, I aim to draw a distinction and contrast between the views of these two philosophers. After indicating the origins and foundations of Dawkins's ideas and McGrath’s objections to them, I critically assess their approaches and attitudes towards each other. It is remarkable that although McGrath's critiques are, in general, useful and effective, he has not offered sufficient and comprehensive explanations in some cases.

Moral philosophers hold that virtue is a character trait that can be considered as a model for the moral agent’s behavior. Michael A. Slote, a contemporary moral philosopher, viewed virtue from a different perspective and presented a new account of virtue ethics. He adopted a comprehensive attitude towards explaining virtue. Criticizing and modifying the ethical conceptions of philosophers such as Aristotle, he has analyzed the nature of virtue and the relationship between virtues in the different situations from different moral and rational perspectives. In this article, after indicating Slote’s moral thoughts and his agent-based version of virtue ethics, the foundations and constituents of his account of virtue are discussed. He holds an ontological view to present the relativity of virtues, to identify them, and finally to resolve the conflicts between them. He maintains that the function of virtues can be interpreted in terms of psychological cognitive, conative, and affective aspects. In his view, the virtues of "flexibility" and "practical reason" are two qualities which can both bring about the unity of virtues and resolve the conflicts between them.

In the Glorious Qur'an and tradition, a huge emphasis is put on the need for practicing moderation in worship, and worshiping too much has been strongly condemned. Muslim mystics think although worship is one of the most basic pillars of Islam, it is forbidden to worship excessively and it has been recommended and emphasized to show moderation in worship. The present article analytically examines the views of Islam and Islamic mysticism on the subject of extremism and moderation in worship, and finally shows that these views are compatible and consistent as a result of this comparative study. In verses and hadiths, as well as in the works of Muslim mystics, the necessity of showing moderation in worship has been emphasized and people have been warned not to fall into the abyss of extremism in worship. In view of the teachings of the Glorious Qur’an and the hadiths of the Imams (a), and in view of the works and doctrines of Muslim mystics, we may find that excessive worship does not lead to human spiritual progress, but rather can provide the ground for the error and darkness of the human heart.