نشریه هستی و شناخت (نامه مفید)
سال هفتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 14، پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Hegel’s absolute knowing is an immanent subjectivity since all the knowledge and human history are included within it as the absolute subjectivity. Some Hegelians stressed the sufficiency of the absolute’s totality; contrariwise, others interpreted absolute’s immanent openness in terms of ongoing negativity, which renders human history an ongoing movement. The article attempts to propose a new conception of the absolute knowing in which there is a totality of conceptuality and openness to the future not only as negativity but also as a prospective totality. It would be entitled “open totality of the absolute knowing”, and the article explains the two characteristics focusing on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s Science of Logic in addition to some crucial and prominent commentaries. My interpretation of Hegel’s absolute knowing is based on the openness of the knowing process, which is a part of my PhD thesis entitled Hegel’s Absolute: Suspension of Perspectives.

Jürgen Habermas is one of the constructivists who believes that moral facts do not have an independent existence and sees them as the result of discourse in an ideal situation. Of course, in his view, it is not that moral matters are arbitrary and that anyone can say anything, but that a moral proposition is true when we agree on moral norms in idealistic terms and in relation to action. We can also justify moral matters according to those ideal conditions of discourse and communicative action. The present study tries to explain, analyze and critique Habermas' theory of discourse ethics in the form of a model of moral constructivism. In this case, he first states the nature and conditions of the realization of the ethics of rational discourse in Habermas' view, and then examines the necessary rules for the participants in the moral discourse. Finally, he presents a critique of this model of moral constructivism, which is in the form of discourse ethics.

In his book, From Bacteria to Bach, Daniel Dennett offers a special understanding of consciousness. According to Dennett, consciousness among other phenomena must be examined by physical sciences. To achieve this goal, Dennett tries to show that the formation of consciousness is the result of non-intelligent processes in the design of organisms. The most important non-intelligent design process is evolution by natural selection. In addition to biological evolution in the design of the brain, the design of human culture and language is also done in what Dennett calls “cultural evolution”. According to Dennett, consciousness is an illusion created by these design processes. In this article, we will first explain Dennett's views and arguments in his book then, his views on consciousness will be evaluated and criticized. The main point of this critique is to emphasize on the irreducible properties of consciousness to physical properties. It will also be noted that in Dennett's theory, cultural evolution cannot be occurred without the intervention of consciousness. Thus, it follows that in order to have a complete picture of the universe, the phenomena of consciousness cannot be removed as an illusion from the set of the entities of the universe, and that is still needs to be explained.

It’s a critical question that is existence of natural law a reason for natural legitimacy? This paper intends to show “natural judgment” is not exactly “pure natural sciences judgment”. It is shown that there are some criteria for differentiation between “natural judgment” and “pure judgment”, The first step is to discuss natural data and its system; the next step is feasibility of the judgment. The feasibility performs by “continuous analysis” concept that is somehow “subject-predicate” analysis of the judgment. In the final step it discusses natural judgments system and natural rule: Is there natural rule? Is the world generally legitimate? Discussion about “computability possibility” is vital in all the parts. Therefore, it is expected that discuss “possibility” and “episteme based on statistics” and try to clarify its position; At the end, it discusses that is “possibility” “natural rule” or “rule of the nature”? Altogether, this paper has a logical approach on natural issue because it deals with “natural judgment” with regards to “continues analysis” and our “access” on judgment truth, empirical content of judgments and also our relative access to judgement resulted in random analysis method. analytic continuation of “the nature” on predicate and totally on analytic continuation of the judgment reflect the nature. In result, it can offer a parameter as differential factor of “natural judgment” from “pure judgment”

It is well known that Eckhart avoided calling God "existence" to the end. This issue -which many of his commentators considers it insignificant -should be considered important; because it can be the key to a comprehensive understanding of his thought, especially his theory of knowledge of God. Eckhart knows very well that if God is a kind of "existence", he is the subject of philosophy. Therefore the philosophy includes everything, and this leads to the dogmatism of philosophers. Eckhart philosophically objects to the dogmatism of philosophy in his time by calling God as something beyond "existence". According to Eckhart, God's freedom from existence is not only negative, but on the positive side, Eckhart seeks to introduce the idea of a god that is more compatible with the God of the Bible. Therefore, he uses words such as love, knowledge, detachment, logos, etc. to introduce God. Finally, by giving a mystical interpretation of the Bible, he considers mysticism to be the only way to know the God of Bible. This article is an attempt to shed light on Eckhart's transition from philosophy to mysticism for the knowledge of God.

This article examines critically theory of Immanent consolidation and seeks to provide a clearer explanation as possible. In this regard, first here are examined the nature of the soul and its relationship with its forces and while analyzing the category of perception from Avicenna’s point of view, the short comings of this theory are explained. Accordingly, it seems that Avicenna' s theory of Immanent consolidation which is based on obtaining forms and their impressions in the soul, faces serious challenges. According to Avicenna’ s principles for the realization of sensory perception in terms of quality and also how to achieve the form in the sensory powers, cannot be found a consistent and reasonable aspect, because the quality of impression as well as creating a form similar to a sensible form and its exact process is not positively and clearly mentioned and in addition, due to the fact that in this system the problem of the abstract soul and its relationship with material forces lacks a clear coherent explanation, so obtaining a perceptual form for the soul and its immanention in the soul cannot be explained. Therefore, it seems that the theory of perception based on Avicenna' s Immanent consolidation does not have necessary coherence and adaptation and is not effective in explaining how to achieve sensory, imaginary and intellectual perceptions.

Abu Nasr al-Farabi, while literally a philosopher and in a way the founder of Islamic philosophy, is a reporter and exponent of philosophical ideas before him, including Aristotle and Plato. It is also used as an excerpt for philosophy after him, including Bu'ali, and consequently Islamic philosophy in the East and scholastic philosophy in the West. Therefore, the study of Farabi's philosophical views is of special importance. In his epistemology, Farabi has divided knowledge into sensory, imaginary, illusory and intellectual. The nature of each type of cognition has given rise to many philosophical debates. In particular, rational cognition, the truth of which is accompanied by a kind of added ambiguity and complexity, and which has a great influence on the formation of sciences (which are organized by general concepts and propositions). In this article, based on the works and texts of Hakim Farabi, we have examined the nature of rational cognition and how it evolved, and we have tried to ask him questions such as what kind of knowledge is rational cognition and how it is studied. And what level of cognition does objects bring to human understanding, and what is the difference between it and sensory cognition?

In Farabi's thought, the speech and imagination faculties play the greatest role in the inspirational perceptions. Farabi considers the divine inspiration as a result of the connection of Prophet's speech intellect to the active intellect and receiving rational ideas from it. Furthermore, he believes that through paving the rational positions, the prophet can receive the rational images from the active intellect. However, in another expression, he emphasizes on the instrumental role of imagination faculty in the imitation of rational ideas, general facts of divine inspiration and objective and immediate perception of trivial facts of divine inspiration. This research aims at presenting a description, analysis and epistemological elaboration of divine inspiration from the Farabi's viewpoint. Using the descriptive-analytical method, this research deals with the quality of connection of imagination faculty to the active intellect, the method of conversion of general and trivial rational ideas into each other in prophet and sage and method of receiving the divine knowledge in Fabari's epistemological system. This research has led to this understanding that the difference which exists in Farabi’s thought on the method of effusions of the active intellect to human and the role of imagination intellect indicates that Farabi does not degrade divine inspiration into prophet’s imagination intellect, but due to the presence of weakness in humans’ souls,

Man's voluntary actions are the subject of practical philosophy, which is considered to be a part of real beings. Voluntary actions, as real beings, bring man to true perfection. In order to know these actions, a method must be used that reveals the reality and introduces them to human beings as they are realized abroad. Argument is the only way to provide man with the knowledge of the facts as they are. On the other hand, if the acquired knowledge which is the source of man's voluntary actions is real and in accordance with reality and is so-called proof, it will have the possibility of realization outside as it is in the mind, and after the realization outside the real and expected real effects Will update itself. Therefore, in practical philosophy and any science that is related to human voluntary actions, the method of argument must be used.To confirm this, one can find a lot of evidence in the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina, in which the argumentative nature of practical philosophy is mentioned. By confirming the argumentative nature of practical wisdom, research on human voluntary actions (common humanities) can lead to the use of argumentative method and expect researchers to achieve real results and the essence of the matter in this area

When we want to examine the discussion of "epistemology of nature" in the intellectual apparatus of Mulla Sadra, despite his positive approach to Plato's parable, which is the basis of instinctual perceptions, we get a different result; Because Mulla Sadra believes in the a posteriori nature of perceptions based on substantive motion and does not accept pre-sense affirmations.He believes that According to the ranks of intellect that the lowest rank of which is pure talent and devoid of any perception, the soul and consequently nature, due to their hierarchical nature, have both indestructible affairs (rank of completely immaterial intellect) and have perishable affairs (ranks of solid, vegetable and animal).Allameh Tabatabai considers the obtaining of perceptions both through external senses (five senses) and through internal senses (faculties of soul) and believes that obvious perceptions such as "neediness of caused to cause" although not obtained through external senses, but thay are rooted in the internal senses; Because our inner faculties need the soul, and this suggests the concept of "causality."Therefore, according to the views of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabai, knowledge is a establishment, not a reminder. On this basis, we are allowed to redefine "nature" and deny the a priori existence of obvious perceptions, and to believe that innate perceptions mean: all perceptions, assuming they are a posteriori.

Peter van Inwagen, despite of his influence in the contemporary philosophy, not in spare places, does argue and analysis contra to the accepted ways and jargon of the contemporary analytical philosophy. This has led him to adopt some unusual positions. For these perplexities we believe that his methodology and metaphilosophy need to be reconsidered. In this paper, we try to make clear his view about philosophy and its appropriate method. To do this, we will directly go through his philosophical works and try to spell out the components of his metaphilosophical puzzle: how to argue, how to define, how to analysis philosophical jargons, how to do metaphysics, what is the philosophical intuition, and metaontology. Putting all of these together will provide a complete picture of his metaphilosophy. Therefore, each section of this paper investigates one of these metaphilosophical questions. Without taking this picture to the consideration, we believe that will be impossible to understand his philosophy and its arguments properly.