فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال دوازدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 47، زمستان 1400)

The present paper basically hypothesizes that the recent Neoplatonic philosophy is entangled with Christian and Jewish traditions. Accordingly, it would be possible to match Dionysius’ thoughts with those of Illuminationist and mystic philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī, in the world of Islam. In spite of their different religious and gnostic backgrounds, both Dionysius and Suhrawardī present the same metaphysical system that is based on the mysterious concept and creative role of light. The present study, while relying on the principles of this system, focuses on the similarities between their philosophies in three respects: metaphysics, psychology, and structures that lead to explaining the theorem of the illuminated universe. The author, on the one hand, intends to explain the core of this similarity based on the creative identity of light in order to reveal the emanated identity of the world and the effusion of light. On the other hand, he wishes to demonstrate the basis of their mutual metaphysical and Illuminationist relation to cosmology and fundamental principles of psychology and intuition. Based on the three-fold similarities of these two systems, three conclusions can be derived: 1- origination of the system of the world through emanation in divinity, 2- the reliance of the dynamic structure of the world on Illuminationist action in the whole world, 3- psychology of intuition as the basis of the deiformity of the soul in the world of lights. Nevertheless, the author shows that there is an obvious difference between the two thinkers’ metaphysical systems regarding the way the soul can attain devotion and deiformity.

In Aristotle’s view, an ideal tragic hero must be neither a villain nor a virtuous man but a character who stands between these two extremes based on a conscious process of choice. In order to explain ethos, the study inquires about the roles of conscious ethical choice, external virtues, and the similarities between the hero and the addressee in the unity of action and hero in Aristotle’s view. Moreover, it asks about the basis upon which the historical reflection of this unity can be studied. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of tragedy and philosophy of ethics and its historical reflection relying on the relationship between act and moral character in his Poetics and the related sections in his other treatises. Here, the author demonstrates that action and hero in a tragedy together present some imitations of the essence and ethical nature of the world. The historical reflection of Aristotle’s ethical approach to tragedy can be studied based on the theories related to the principiality of ethics and the relationship between art and ethics. This qualitative study has been conducted following a descriptive-analytic method.

During the Safavid era, at the time of Mullā Ṣadrā and upon the rise of court-jurisprudents and pseudo-mysticism, true sciences such as jurisprudence, philosophy, and gnosis were in seclusion. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a religious scholar who was familiar with the philosophical and gnostic ideas before him, tried to eliminate philosophical confusion from the scientific society and oppose this fallacious approach. Hence, he established a new philosophical system in order to bring all previous thoughts together in a consistent manner. In fact, he aimed to clarify the place of true knowledge and the ways of attaining it for society through establishing his own school of philosophy. The classification of sciences is one of the fundamental problems in any philosophical system. However, it is emphasized that each system of philosophy and the collection of its problems are influenced by the social conditions of their time. Similarly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s classification reflects his social concerns and has been developed in response to the social needs of his time and directing them towards true sciences. He has provided a specific classification of sciences in each of the three periods of his scientific life. He followed a peripatetic approach during the first period, an Illuminationist approach during the second one, and a transcendent approach during the third period, which reflected the height of his philosophical maturity. This paper aims to investigate Mullā Ṣadrā’s classification of sciences during each of the three periods of his scientific life and demonstrate how each was influenced by the social conditions of his time, and how each responded to the existing societal needs.

The present paper examines Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s cultural role in interacting with Hulagu Khān and the other elements involved in this cultural agreement. It also aims to explain how, through a correct perception of the cultural features and symbols of the Mongol ethnic group, Ṭūsī managed to overcome them in a cultural battle. At the same time, he exploited the Mongols’ interest in astronomy, which was a part of their culture, and strengthen the Imāmīyyah kalām regarding its epistemological dimension and the status of Shi‘ism in the political structure of Hulagu Khān’s government. The presence of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī meant that Imāmīyyah Kalām had now a representative in the political structure of the time after many centuries, and even some Mongols became interested in Islam. With the downfall of the caliphate of Baghdad, whether Ṭūsī played a role there or not, one of the supporters of Ash‘arī kalām disappeared, and Imāmīyyah groups were revived.

Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different occasions in many of his works. He has conceived of knowledge sometimes as pure quality, sometimes as quality possessing relation, and sometimes as pure relation. Moreover, he has interpreted knowledge as abstraction from matter in some of his works. Such a diversity of interpretations has given an excuse to some people such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī to criticize and question Ibn Sīnā’s view of the truth of knowledge. In different places in his works, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s view of knowledge was divided, and he failed to attain a single standpoint concerning the truth of knowledge. The present study, which was conducted following an analytic-descriptive method and a critical approach, firstly presents Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim and, then, evaluates its truth. Next, the authors delve into his other works to examine the definitions of knowledge in his view. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although there are some fundamental problems in Ibn Sīnā’s view, his words are based on his own principles, are solid, and can be reduced to a unitary view. However, Rāzī’s words on this problem are inconsistent.

The doctrine of “natural law” is one of the oldest and most famous and efficient subjects of practical wisdom in Western philosophy. This theorem is employed in various fields of human sciences such as philosophy, anthropology, ethics, law, political science, education, and sociology. Unlike Muslim philosophers, Western thinkers have provided several theories about this doctrine. According to their most famous interpretation, natural law is a system of law based on the orders of practical wisdom regarding the behaviors of human beings in order to attain happiness. The purpose of this study is to investigate modern empiricists’ philosophy concerning the natural law and explain the defects of their views following a rational and critical approach and based on philosophical arguments. The interpretation of the thinkers of the modern period (17th and 18th centuries), such as Thomas Hobbes and John Lock, of the rational doctrine of the natural law is an empiricist one. According to this interpretation, since the spirit of positivism dominated the thoughts of empiricists, the immateriality of the human soul was generally unacceptable to them. They only observed the human nature in order to explain the natural law and did not go beyond the satisfaction of human natural and material desires. They neglected the social interests of human being while the natural law always reinforces the orders of practical intellect for the development and progress of the humankind in all material and spiritual, personal and communal, and social affairs. The outcome of their approach to the natural law only directs people towards moral and material joys and delights and closes their eyes to everything that pertains to their everlasting and spiritual life in the hereafter. Therefore, the right to life and freedom, which is one of the concomitants of the natural law in the empiricism of modern Western civilization, mainly targets only material life and freedom. This approach results in ignoring a large part of the world of reality, that is, metaphysical affairs. This philosophy paved the context for the vast dominance of positivism over all aspects of human life in the 19th century and granted an empirical nature to all sciences. As a result, rational discussions, particularly those in relation to the natural law remained dormant for more than a whole century.

Perception of time is of an intellectual nature, and the human mind can easily divide it into seconds and minutes, for example, and measure it. However, when speaking of the truth of time, one is in fact faced with a complex and difficult mystery. The attempts at disambiguating this mystery has resulted in wide-spread disagreements among philosophers and thinkers so that some of them hold that time exists while some others deny its existence. Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, a contemporary Iranian thinker, conceives of time as an ontological entity. He has reanalyzed and reinterpreted the views of several thinkers regarding time and believes that everything in the world of being is manifested and emerges through the channel of human consciousness. He emphasizes that the relationship between Man and time is so strong that its rupture is meaningless. Dinani maintains that time has two dimensions: one is the material dimension, which is realized in the material world, and the other is the Ideal dimension, which is indeed perceived as a path towards the world of meaning. The latter, while being material, is of an Ideal nature. In his view, time in its material dimension is the same as the measure of motion, and time in the world of thought is identical with the form of human perception.