فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال هفدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 66، تابستان 1400)

What is the Truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy? This is the main problem of the present article, in the light of which an attempt has been made, within the framework of the requirements and limitations of this article, to provide an introduction to the discussion of presenting a monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception of Nietzsche. In this regard, first of all, as the introduction, the crisis facing any form of Nietzschean research will be briefly mentioned in order to provide possibilities for formulating the main idea of the article. Then, focusing on Nietzsche's various functions of truth and his dualistic (negative/positive or critical/supportive) encounter with this concept, we will address his main critiques of truth in three ways: 1. Critique of dualism; 2. Critique of essentialism; and 3. Criticism of stability. Finally, with the help of the results of these discussions, a preliminary outline of Nietzsche's monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception will be drawn at the end of the article.

Allameh Tabatabai has repeatedly mentioned Etebar matters and wishful thinking and has put them in front of real things. Etebar matters are irregular ideas that are dependent on human will, but after their will, nothing is added to the outside world. Allameh Tabatabai believes that idealism - denial of certain perceptions according to reality - entails the arbitrary of all ideas and consequently, the irregularity and chaos of all human behaviors. This article, by rejecting the mismatch between an idea's intentionality and its non-dependence on man, has shown that the division of things into real affairs and Etebar affairs is not based on belief in realism and certain perception according to the reality and maybe idealists based on Allameh Tabatabai's foundations. We proved that even In Allameh Tabatabai's Interpretation of Idealism we can be logically idealists and at the same time divide things into Etebar affairs and real affairs.

The twentieth-century French philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), in her philosophical work, distinguished between "decision" and "mystery", the interrelationship of love from the mysteries of mystery. In his view, "mystery" is something that cannot be solved by common methods in science and the realm of early thought; rather, it must be acknowledged that it must be considered in the realm of a secondary thought. In Marcel's view, too, the secret of love belongs to the realm of "being," not to the realm of "having." In this article, in a descriptive-analytical way, we have tried to express the general lines of his thought in this regard and its epistemological implications from the perspective of human relations and acceptance of the existence of others in the romantic network between human beings and acceptance of the existence of a transcendent being in supernatural love. Let us also discuss the negation of skepticism and the proof of the existence of the world and the abandonment of Descartes' belief in subjectivity and subjectivism.

Husserl in his method of phenomenology casts a new light on the discussion of experience through a new definition of cognition and avoids the error of preceding philosophers, classic empiricists, in particular; thus the cognition is no longer based on the immediate experiences of the world but it is based on intentional experience which relies upon immediate intuition of objects. The result of this perception is a live experience. Therefore, for Husserl, knowing the world around us is based on the lived which is based on the intentionality of consciousness. For Husserl, talking about this intentional world happens through ideal meanings and this group of meanings rests around the axis of a transcendental ego which is the center of intentional actions and moods. Therefore, the analysis of the speech act of this “ego” is done through semantics and based on transcendental logic and it is separated from syntactic theory. Husserl makes this new change to move the transcendental subject into the intersubjective world. In the present research, the objective is to analyze the effect of logical semantics on speech and transition to the intersubjective world.

We and our world are caught in the last period of nihilism. The remarkable point is the durability of this situation, and that the time for the end of this situation is unclear. The concern of this article is understanding the nihilism, especially its last kind, understanding of the nihilism in order to provide the possibility of the thinking about the conditions of the liberation from that. For this purpose, we should understand three kinds of nihilism: negative, reactive, and passive; Understanding these three kinds, especially its last kind, which is the property of the present situation. For the explanation of this step of nihilism, we will resort to a Nietzschean-Deleuzian concept and then try to transmit the affective aspect of this concept to the reader in order for the necessity of the liberation from our nihilistic situation to be sensed affectively. At this point of the analysis, the argument is ready for thinking to the next step, which proceeds by understanding the distinction between the last step of nihilism and the condition of liberation from that. Therefore, the trajectory of the article is like this: explanation of kinds of nihilism: 1) negative. 2) reactive. 3) passive. 4) and the liberation from nihilism.

Jacques Derrida was one of the few philosophers who seriously became involved with architecture. Despite his innermost desire, Derrida seems to have never made a proper connection with architecture. As soon as Derrida's theory of deconstruction was developed in architecture, it was thought that a practical way to translate and represent an idea was found. Concerning the output of the deconstruction style, the feedback of that opinion in the design of architectural spaces demonstrates that it was a complete failure. It showed the reflection of Derrida's idea on architecture was based on a poor understanding. The aim of this study is how accurate and complete the style of deconstruction in architecture represented Derrida's opinion on deconstruction? Derrida entered the deconstruction style project in architecture to show that arts are the best objectives to represent the manifestation of deconstruction. Although other studies accepted the formation of the deconstruction style in architecture as the fact of Derrida’s deconstruction, Parc de la Villette’s project really contradicts his hypothesis. Not from an architectural point of view, but from a philosophical point of view instead, this study emphasizes the philosophical basis of Derrida's views on deconstruction according to his thought on texts. Accordingly, as a strong and steady connection, Derrida's deconstruction is a kind of exposure to our relationship with the world, while the architecture's deconstruction style breaks the connection and even disrupts our relationships with this surrounding world.

This survey has been done to illuminate and explain Sadra’s ontological viewpoint on the entity of the inborn and innate love in the existence of non-human animals using the analytic and descriptive method (library documentary). In the sight of Sadra, in the whole universe, from the lowest beings to the highest ones, love permeates through the entire world of existence. From Sadraii's wisdom viewpoint, animals are one of the creatures in the essence of existence that possesses their own perfect attributes. Animals have souls, the effects of which are life, perception, free choice, and love. Love is one of the hallmarks and perfections of existence in animals. Animals have an order for their existence, and they are attributed with perfection to the extent of their intensity and weakness. That is to say, all animals are not at the same level. Their perfection is also the same as their existence. There are life, perception, and love in animals, but depends on their proportion of existence. All animals are in love, but every animal having the highest share of its rank enjoys more love. Mullah Sadra's ontological principles in proving the existence and flow of love in animals are that the existence is “original”, “non-composite”, “equivocal” and “coextensive” with life, conception, and love, and “God, the Almighty, is the true Beloved of all beings including animals’ souls.” Evolutionally, animals can only move to the point where the humanity of human beings.

The prevalent conception about Plato’s philosophy is that, by differentiating sensible things from the realm of Ideas, he has made a step toward establishing Metaphysics. From Plato’s viewpoint, ideas form the essences of sensible things. Ideas are the condition of both the existence of sensible things and their recognition. Now, considering this original ontology and epistemology, some important issues arise: how do sensible things relate to Ideas? To what extent is Aristotle’s viewpoint regarding the separation of Ideas and sensible things acceptable? What effect does the existence of Ideas have on our conception regarding human beings (Dasein) and her/his practical life? In this paper, we attempt to consider these questions from the viewpoint of two German philosophers, namely Martin Heidegger and Hans Georg Gadamer. While Heidegger believes that Plato by proposing the doctrine of ideas began oblivion of truth in the meaning of unhiddenness and disconcealment and also resulted in the oblivion of Being, Gadamer believes that Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato and the whole history of Metaphysics was under the influence of Aristotle’s criticism. On the one hand, consulting to dialogues of Plato, Gadamer clearly explains the relation of ideas and sensible things but on the other hand, he emphasizes that the Good while being transcendence and concealment is present in all of our actions.