فصلنامه ذهن
سال بیست و سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 90، تابستان 1401)

Efficient Islamic humanities, in order to solve objective problems and dilemmas that are generally multidisciplinary, cannot be stopped in the disciplines and requires the use of an interdisciplinary approach. While interdisciplinarity is a new approach among Western scholars and suffers from paradigmatic ambiguities and a lack of fundamentals, using this method in the paradigm of Islamic science is not possible without considering its implications and fundamentals. This article uses a descriptive and analytical method and uses library resources and tries to clarify the proximity and relation and connection between interdisciplinarity and the paradigm of Islamic science in three steps: Does this paradigm have the capacity, ability and competence of interdisciplinary studies or not?

The method of discovery in this issue is biblical and the method of evaluation is rational analythic.

In the first step, while examining the proportion and relation between "System" and "Interdisciplinary", it tries to extract and introduce the main epistemological, methodological and ontological foundations of interdisciplinary. Understanding complex facts and systems is only possible through interdisciplinary methods and in the other hand Interdisciplinarity is itself a systemic approach to research. There are many similarities between the systemic approach and the interdisciplinary approach, which reinforces the two-way relation and connection between the two. Therefore, interdisciplinarity and systemic approach are two sides of the same coin. The subject of interdisciplinary studies is always a "system"; especially complex systems and not simple and linear. In fact, multidimensional subjects can be modeled with complex systems. One of the main epistemological foundations of the interdisciplinary approach is "coherence". "Methodological multiplicity" is also the most important methodological basis of the interdisciplinary approach. The ontological foundations of interdisciplinary studies are also the "systematization" of phenomena and their complexity.In the next step, by presenting and comparing these principles to the paradigm of Islamic science, the acceptance of this paradigm from the principles of interdisciplinary becomes clear. The advanced epistemological system of this paradigm does not negate coherence and efficiency and is not without them; rather, in the context of foundational theory, it supports and recommends them as secondary criteria. In methodological foundations, the multiplicity of tools and consequently the multiplicity of methods are accepted in this paradigm. This basis provides the basis for a comprehensive study of the facts and his logical conclusion is that an interdisciplinary approach should be used in cognition and study. Also, the Islamic paradigm not only accepts systemic thinking based on the systematization of phenomena and their complexity, but also expresses this thinking about the whole system of existence as a macro system and extends it to all other facts.

In the third step, it is shown that this paradigm somehow enhances these principles that targets the "superior interdisciplinary" and does not stop at the level of the common interdisciplinary. The paradigm of Islamic science has not only accepted the theoretical foundations of the interdisciplinary approach, but has also mentioned them more comprehensively in its paradigmatic foundations. Presenting "coherence" in the context of "matching theory" implies closing the way to epistemic idealism in cognition. The increasing complexity of the system of existence emphasizes the need for a comprehensive study of facts.

During the recent decades, several works have been published concerning the two theological schools, namely the philosophical and Tafkiki ones. The present issue studies the methodological similarities and dissimilarities of the above mentined schools. This comparative model of study is useful to evaluate the outcomes and shortcomings of each of them and indicates the stage of their success in purity, depth and development of theological knowledge.

The method of discovery in this issue is biblical and the method of evaluation is rational analythic.

The main finding of this issue is examining better efficiency of contemplative rationality than the Tafkiki,s one in theological studies, and exposition of shortcomings of the latter.

Philosophical theology is more successful than Tafkiki,s one, likewise the latter is defeated by the followins objections: 1. Lack of coherence and justifiability, 2. Disability in fulfilling the main functions of theology, such as deduction, explanation, justification and defence of religious beliefs, 3. It, somehow, causes contradiction between ration, science and religion, 4. It has no success in the purity of religious knowledge.

Mystical knowledge is two types: Intuitional knowledge and the knowledge of the spiritual wayfaring (sulūki). One of the methodological foundations of the practical mysticism is the knowledge of the spiritual wayfaring. what is this knowledge and its components? Is it fallibleness? this article wants to answer to questions.

The method of discovery in this issue is biblical and the method of evaluation is rational analythic.

The knowledge of the spiritual wayfaring is a direct knowledge that has a Identity of Encompassing, Non-Narrator, Union and practical and it accrues to heart deeds such as inner states and waystations of wayfaring. The knowledge of the spiritual wayfaring has two characteristics: general characteristics and special characteristics. General characteristics are such as: No need to conceptual mediator, union with heart, correspondence of knower with cognition, manifestation for knower, infallibility, unquestionability, nontransferability to others and emotional. but special characteristics are such as: Internal, Contextual, Combined, Formative, and intensifiable.

In the philosophy of wayfaring science, in addition to the outlines of this science and its relationship with other sciences and categories, explaining the affirmational principles is of special importance, one of which is the methodological foundation of wayfaring science and basis of the methodological foundation is wayfaring knowledge. This article deals with the nature and components of this knowledge. This knowledge is not obtained from the type of acquired knowledge but from the type of presential knowledge and is obtained only in the world for those who have the power of cognition. Since in this knowledge, the known is nonessential of the universe and requires the mediation of perceptual powers for its perception, it is a non-essential present knowledge, since in this knowledge, the known is non-essential of the knower and requires the mediation of perceptual powers for its perception, it is a non-essential presential knowledge, and because it is known that heart actions and wayfaring homes are the state of the heart, it is in the essence of the knower and knower is aware of it within itself and surrounds it, it is a hearty Surrounding knowledge, Since the known has no indicative aspect in the knower, the present knowledge is non-indicative, and since the known is one of the characteristics issued by the rational soul and is united with the soul, the present knowledge is union, and since the known from the type of sensual and spiritual actions, the present knowledge is practical, and since those actions are of the type of heart actions such as circumstances and homes, the present knowledge is wayfaring. The wayfaring presential knowledge has several general and specific characteristics. Common characteristics are: 1) conceptual immediacy; 2) Unity; 3) infallibility; 4) non-transferability; 5) Emotional; 6) Proportion between the knower and the known (perceptual appropriateness); 7) The emergence of known for the knower (perceptual emergence). Specific characteristics are: 1) internal, which indicates the existential belonging of behavioral facts to the heart; 2) a context that informs about the influence of wayfaring experiences and knowledge on the sufi disciple (salek) mental beliefs; 3) a compilation that informs of three wayfaring times in wayfaring knowledge; That is, cognition with the burden of wayfaring musts, cognition with the burden of belonging to the wayfaring action, cognition with the burden of behavioral feeling; 4) genetic, that is, knowledge that is existentially resulting in the entanglement of three aspects: monotheistic, human and practical; 5) gradation, which means the advancement of the power of cognition in the layers of a wayfaring reality.

Arguments in favor of dualism (and against materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's (1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s conceivability argument. According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers" are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers" occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity. According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the (metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility. Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics for the connection between epistemological and modal premise.

In this article, first-hand and original sources have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the conventional method of philosophical reasoning.

In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2) Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes this transfer for granted.

Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of separating physical states from phenomenal states. Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.

Following the principle of "I think, then I am", Descartes put forward an argument to prove the originality of the soul. The contemporary philosopher of religion, Swinburne, after recounting this argument speaks: “This argument only proves that the soul is a 'sufficient condition' for my existence, not a necessary condition”.

The method of discovery in this issue is biblical and the method of evaluation is rational analythic.

Swinburne offers an account of Descartes's Argument, which, in his opinion, also proves the "necessary condition" of the existence of the soul. But this recounting also still faces problems and ambiguities; For, first, the inherent or inseparable nature of "thinking" for the "I" has not been proved; Secondly, in this recounting, the external realization and occurrence of a thing is concluded from the mere conceivability of that thing. This conclusion is incorrect. In this article, Swinburne's recounting is examined analytically, then Ibn Sina's argument "floating man in space" is introduced and then, inspired by what Ibn Sina said in this regard, an argument is proposed to prove the originality of the soul that is safe from the mentioned complication. This argument begins, first, not with the inseparability of "thinking" for "I," but with an evident proposition, that is, "my selfawareness." Secondly, in this recounting, the occurrence of a thing is not inferred from its mere conceivability, but it is based on a situation in which, in certain circumstances, one can actually experience this state in oneself.

Descartes's argument for the originality of the soul, based on the conceivability of the soul without the body, is incomplete. This argument only proves that the soul is a "sufficient condition" for the existence of the "I" and not a “necessary condition”. Swinburne's new recounting of it, although it removes some of the complication involved in it and shows that the soul is also a "necessary condition" for the existence of the "I", leaves some of the complications entered into it; For, first, the inseparability of "thinking" for "I" has not been proved; Secondly, in this argument the external realization and occurrence of a thing is concluded from the mere conceivability of that thing. This conclusion is incorrect. But Ibn Sina's argument "floating man in space" is a precise and profound argument that tries to show the immateriality of the soul and the difference between the soul and the body based on the presential and intuitive knowledge of man. In this article we have shown that Ibn Sina's expression can be reconstructed in a new form and in a stronger argumentative way than Descartes and Swinburne's argument in such a way that it is safe from the fault entered into them. This argument begins, first, not with the inherent nature of "thinking" for "me," but with the evident proposition, "my self-awareness." Secondly, in this argument, the occurrence of a thing is not inferred from the mere fact that it is conceivable, but it is based on a situation in which, in certain circumstances, one can actually experience this state in oneself..

The relationship between rationality and morality is one of significant issues in philosophy that has been discussed since a long time ago. The spread of moral relativism and belief in instrumental rationality challenge this basic principle that nothing is given priority -or should be given priority- unless it has some merit to be prioritized. The present article is a research study on the philosophical attempts made by Nicholas Rescher to defend rationality of ends against instrumentalist views of rationality.

In this research study, besides data collection and extracting relevant information to the subject under study, research fiches were accurately made and then analyzed using comparative classification and thematic coding. The method of data extraction is library research and the analytic-argumentative method was used for inferring the results and answering the questions.

Rescher believes that inattention to rationality of evaluation results in an impaired understanding of rationality and leads to part/whole fallacy. To him, rationality is of three types: rationality of beliefs, rationality of actions, and rationality of evaluations. In addition to having an instrumental aspect, rationality of actions also includes an evaluative aspect that determines the appropriateness of ends. The comprehensive concept of rationality coordinates and integrates these two aspects in a coherent manner. Although Rescher acknowledges the importance of the gap between reality and value, he believes that this gap can be overcome via appealing to self-evident truths without necessarily adopting an instrumentalist view towards rationality. In Rescher’s view, having a relativist view towards rationality is logically impossible. By demonstrating the aims and fundamental principles of rationality, he argues that rationality is universal. At the same time, by introducing a normative hierarchy to obtain a rational solution for a specific problem in a real-life situation, he acknowledges that rational decisions do depend on situational conditions. In other words, he recognizes that rational relativism is inevitable in the lower levels of the normative hierarchy. Despite Rescher’s accuracy and deliberation in presenting ends rationality and overcoming many challenges in this regard, there are various arguments on serious components of his conception that need further reflection.

According to Rescher’s view, since all virtues are not equal and comparable, their achievement requires optimization that is making a balance between means or instruments for achieving ends in the best way so it simultaneously concerns efficiency and teleology. If rationality requires the optimization of incomparable and contradictory virtues to reach self-actualization, moral virtues should be combined with nonmoral virtues to get balanced. Therefore, the inconsistency between rationality and unconditionally general moral values and obligation to an absolute moral system becomes evident. Rescher’s definition of humanity and existential commitment to understanding oneself are among other controversial subjects Rescher should attribute people’s moral disagreements either to irrationality or oddness of some individuals and deny moral and rational disagreement among people; while it is improbable. Based on the findings of the current research, some of the elements of Rescher’s conception of rationality such as optimization, humanity, existential commitment to understanding oneself, and the relationship between reality and value are subject to serious challenges and criticisms. In this article, we will discuss these challenges and criticisms thoroughly. Ultimately, we are going to demonstrate that Rescher’s conception of rationality with its broad and novel perspective has set the stage for further philosophical and moral deliberations.

Using conceptual metaphors, the Koran employs a tangible and perceptible language to make such intangible and imperceptible concepts as the Hereafter perceptible for the human being; thus, it is pivotal to use these metaphors to better perceive the Koranic concepts. A review of Koranic conceptual metaphors in a cognitive linguistic context not only provides a way to perceive the imperceptible concepts of the Koran like “the Hereafter” in a very context of experienced concepts such as “competition”, but is also a way to get into the deeper semantic layers of the supernatural concept of the Hereafter; as the association of the intangible concept of the Hereafter in mind in the form of a transparent image of a competition opens another window of intertwined Koranic knowledge for the happiness-seeking humans who aspire for a more perceptible understanding of the eternal world.

The research is basically descriptive-analytical and based on library sources. This research builds on the cognitive semantics approach and employs the conceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff and Johnson. The researcher reviews and examines the Koranic texts to extract evidence of the concept of “the Hereafter is a competition” and relevant examples, and cites the Arabic texts of the verses to analyze the conceptual metaphor and infer the relevant appellation. All the verses that were inferred to include the appellations related to the Hereafter were gathered. Those verses which did not contain a metaphorical concept were removed, whereas the ones that somehow described the appellation of “the Hereafter is a competition” and involved a metaphorical context were taken as samples. It should be stated that the data analysis method was not only based on a cognitive-descriptive context of metaphor, as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson, but also quantitatively examined in the form of diagrams the conceptual metaphors by identifying and analyzing the systematic correspondence of the Origin and Destination.

The appellation “the Hereafter is a competition” reveals a number of systematic correspondences between components of two realms of origin and destination which helps us outline a diagram of the origin realm over the destination realm. Some of these appellations include the following : Apostles correspond to competition instructors; human conducts correspond to the action in the competition; sealing on the mouth of the protesters (evil-doers) and the testimony of the limbs correspond to the end of the opportunity to protest; the Heavens corresponds to the reward of the winners; reception of the record of deeds by the right or left hands corresponds to the announcement of the results and meeting with God corresponds to the finish line.

The research found that the identification of systematic correspondence between the concept of the Hereafter and the clear concept of the competition reveals a large number of tangible dimensions of the transcendental life after death. This is also feasible by resorting to delving into the deep layers of the Koran. The association of the unknown concept of the Hereafter in the competitive context establishes a stiff and critical competition in the material human mind by which he can change his mundane lifestyles and gain knowledge of the events after death, add to his decent deeds and learn major skills in the preliminary stage of the world to become victorious in the long and breathtaking competition that is to be held in the Hereafter.

Evidence in epistemology is good reasons that are indicative of the truth concerning the proposition that is the object of the doxastic attitude. We will see that believers in different views in epistemic justification must answer the question of when a person has good evidence. In this study, we seek to determine under what circumstances a person has a evidence; In other words, the purpose of this article is to explain and evaluate the views of epistemologists on what having a evidence is. It seems that any view in which one's evidence interferes with justification in any way must answer this question. All epistemologists who believe in internalism in justification must answer this question explicitly; Because all internalist believe that epistemic justification depends on the evidence one has. In my opinion, both foundationalists and Coherentists should address this issue. In addition, some externalist theories of epistemic justification also say that a person's belief is justified or reasonable if it is based on evidence. So they also have to look at the circumstances under which a person has a evidence.

In this article, we first state what the characteristics of an acceptable account of having a evidence should be. Then we will mention the different account on this problem, then we will express the arguments and problems they face and finally we will adopt an acceptable account.

In this article, we examine the circumstances under which a person has evidence. As we can see, among the three accounts of evidence possession, the only one that can respond to its own problems and yield the intuitively correct results is the MVP * account. Therefore, this account is accepted in having a evidence. So, from this point of view, in answer to the question of what it is like to have a evidence, we can say that S has p available as evidence relevant to q at t iff at t S is currently aware of p or S is disposed to bring p to mind when reflecting on the question of q’s truth.

Different theories of epistemic justification are bound to answer this question that under what conditions one has evidence. There are three important views concerning the nature of possessing: inclusive view of evidence possession, restrictive view of evidence possession, moderate view of evidence possession. In this paper, we come to this conclusion, after explanation and assessing reasons of these three views about the nature of evidence, that on the one hand inclusive and restrictive views of evidence possession are indefensible and on the other hand an account of moderate view of evidence possession is defensible. We will see that this view is also free from the problems of its rival, so we can agree according to this view in possessing evidence that S has p available as evidence relevant to q at t iff at t S is currently aware of p or S is disposed to bring p to mind when reflecting on the question of q’s truth .