فصلنامه اندیشه دینی
پیاپی 83 (تابستان 1401)

The necessity is one of the most important topics in logic and philosophy. And the correct expression of the concept of necessity plays an important role in solving many philosophical problems. And the correct expression of its meaning plays an important role in solving many philosophical problems. In Kant's Analytic Philosophy and after the Copernican Revolution, Necessity was used in a linguistic sense related to propositions. Kripke critiques traditional theories about the concept of necessity And provide new ideas in this regard, he was believed that some aspects of necessity (such as metaphysical necessity) are metalanguage and transmental. In this paper, the concept of necessity from Kripke's point of view Will be compared with the views of Allamah Tabatabaie. Both Kripke and AllamAh Tabatabaie consider the concept of necessity as a metaphysical and philosophical concept, And they take the concept of necessity for granted But they have different views on determining instances and types of metaphysical necessity. Kripke considers metaphysical necessity to be valid only in limited cases, such as the necessity of the same Similarity theorems and propositions containing intrinsic attributes, But Allamah Tabatabaie considers all beings in the universe to have a metaphysical necessityphilosophical system. The views of the two philosophers, despite their similarities, are fundamentally and paradigmatically different.

A change in the philosophical foundations of logic requires a change in the approach to dealing with its problems, and sometimes a change in the problems themselves. One of the important issues of logic is the structure of the definition and the role of various “genus” and “differentia” in the “limit definition” and how they are arranged. According to the theory of the primacy of existence, this article rereads and explains Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view on the “limit definition” and analyzes how he deals with the views of most philosophers. An analytical study of this issue led to the conclusion that the theory of the primacy of existence and its derivatives has led to a different approach in Mūllā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in which the “last differentia” provides the true unity of composite quiddity and the former genuses and differentias in the form of simplicity and In short are included; accordingly, Mūllā Ṣadrā has explicitly stated that in “complete limit” it is not necessary to observe the order between the components of quiddity, but it is a matter of admiration. In this innovative approach, the “limit definition” of quiddity is merely the last differentia, and each of the earlier genuses and differentias in detail with multiple realizations, as most philosophers have drawn, are not part of the object and are outside its truth; as a result, the mention of previous genuses and differentias in “limit definition” is superfluous to the truth of the object.

Attention to the types and levels of intellect as different tools of cognition in philosophy and mysticism has been proposed for centuries. In the meantime, Rumi has emphasized the position and importance of intellect and the distinction of its types. Carefully in Masnavi it can be seen that the partial and general intellect bears a striking resemblance to the primary and secondary reflection proposed by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel. The present study has been done in a descriptive-comparative manner and the And the results show that Rumi and Marcel, through two different perspectives, the first mystical and the second philosophical, have realized that transcendental truths can be obtained through experience and intuition, and these issues are not solvable issues; They have to be confronted and they are ultimately astonishing. There are also two types of divisions for knowledge, moral effects and results, which of course Marcel's goal is the same moral and spiritual functions, but for Rumi the goal is to reach and join the truth, and moral action in the path of knowledge to the transcendent is a means to achieve this truth. Is. In these divisions, Rumi and Marcel criticize philosophers for their use of material means to understand the transcendental; However, regarding the transcendental affairs, Rumi believes that in the path of the path, one should resort to an old man to reach knowledge; But such a problem is not found in the thought of Marcel, the philosopher.

Gratuitous evil is an instance of evil that an omniscient and omnipotent being could prevent it without thereby losing some greater good or creating some equal or greater evil. William Rowe believes that the existence of gratuitous evil is a serious threat to theism. Peterson argued that the two are compatible by use of free will. According to Hesker, Patterson's strategy on gratuitous evil is not effective. Hasker's answer falls into the category of compatibilist answers, but his view indicates an important difference, i.e. theism and the existence of gratuitous evil are not only compatible, but also the existence of gratuitous evil is necessary to believe in God with all the main divine attributes. Hasker uses the concept of "significant morality". In his opinion, in order for human choices to be morally significant, morality must not be undermined. According to Hasker, this answer_ unlike the libertarianism respond_ is useful when one encounters gratuitous natural evil, because there are many moral virtues that can be realized in the face of natural suffering and Goods such as awareness, foresight, courage, caution, cooperation, etc. In this article, we examine Hasker's argument and some of the criticism that follows it.

Although Plotinus and Ibn Arabi are two separate and independent schools of thought, their ideas about God are very similar. In such a way that some aspects of the similarity of Plotinus's unity refer to descriptive unity and others to intrinsic unity. For this reason, from both of them, the nature of God is not recognizable and does not become known to man or any other being; Also, the essence of God has true unity and other beings have unreal unity. Despite these similarities, there are also differences between the principles and ideas of these two thinkers. Plotinus considers the knowledge of one to be purely negative, and in his view positive perception is generally excluded. Ibn Arabi, on the other hand, proves positive cognition as a unit by distinguishing between descriptive unity and unity. This article is innovative in terms of examining and analyzing the differences and similarities expressed between Plotinus and Ibn Arabi's school.

Evil is one of the issues that has been used to deny God. The theory of the non-existence of evil is one of the answers that Islamic philosophers have proposed to solve this problem. On the contrary, some have rejected this theory and criticized it; Including the citation to the creation of death, the lack of criteria for distinguishing between non-existent and existential matters, the invalidity of the a priori and a posteriori arguments of the theory, the uselessness of the theory, the return of evil to pain. The question is whether these criticisms are acceptable or not? The findings of the research by descriptive-analytical and critical methods indicate that these critiques are incomplete; because death is not inherently evil. In the posteriori argument, rational analysis of the concept of evil is expressed. In the a priori argument, given the certainty of God's existence and attributes, the possibility of the existence of evil disappears. The uselessness of the theory is rejected by ability of this theory to solve the logical problem of evil, and being pain-oriented of the nature of evil is not acceptable; because pain is not inherently evil.