فصلنامه فقه
پیاپی 110 (تابستان 1401)

Proposal is one of the oldest customs of marriage, for which numerous jurisprudence rulings have been established in Islam. One of the cases discussed by the jurists is proposing to a woman who has already been proposed to by another and the first suitor still maintains his proposal. In the current study, through the library method and the analysis of jurisprudential arguments, the ruling of the Makhtoubah proposal has been explained from the perspective of Imamiyah jurisprudence. The findings suggest that one of the main reasons for this debate is the prophetic narration narrated by the Sunnis, which forbids the proposing to a woman who has been proposed by another Muslim man (Makhtoubah proposal). This narration has made proposal of Makhtouba absolutely prohibited, but all jurists consider it permissible to propose to Makhtouba who did not respond to his previous suitor and did not express his satisfaction with sarcasm. There is a difference of opinion only about proposing to a Makhtouba who has given a positive answer to the previous suitor, and a group of jurists have considered it haram. In addition to the Holy Prophet's narration, they have also insisted on other arguments such as the rule of harming a believer as haram, who say that by rejecting the argument or evidence of this narration, the violation of the scope of harming a believer as haram, as well as insisting on the principle of Isalat al-Hal, there is no problem in proposing a Makhtouba.

One of the jurisprudential rules that has less been dealt with is the rule of "Al-Idn al- Shar'ei La Yunafi Al-Diman" which is effective in different chapters of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered as one of the Istiadi rules (rules that have been derived from religious rulings and principles). According to this rule, religious permission by itself not only does not prove the lack of guarantee, but also does not agree with the principle of proof of guarantee. However, it can provide the context for the introduction of arguments proving the guarantee and supporting it in proving this status ruling. This paper seeks to prove this rule; unlike those who practically or officially accepted the opposite rule, which is that the permission against guarantee. Verbal arguments, both Qur'anic and narrative, and non-verbal arguments, both rational and lifestyle, prove the rule. In addition to that, jurisprudential criteria have been enumerated according to which it is possible to distinguish the permissions against the guarantee from the permissions in favor of the guarantee in property, life, and actions. In carrying out the rule, there is a difference in the doubt of permitted guarantee. This rule is used to solve some novel problems.

The issue of "validation of the fear of difficulty as a way of difficulty as being Shar'ei (religiously legal)" is one of the issues that have resulted in important jurisprudential works. However, there is no detailed discussion about it in jurisprudential sources. One of the cases where this question is fundamentally raised today is the permissibility of abortion under the premise of fear of difficulty. The question that this paper tries to answer is whether the fear of difficulty is the fulfillment of the duty, and therefore abortion is permissible, or the flow of the rule necessarily requires the actual realization of difficulty and abortion is not permissible. The research method is analytical-critical and from library sources. The existing study shows that there are two views on the issue, and the supporters of each have various reliable reasons to prove their point of view. However, after examining and adjusting, for them, the reasons are that in the assumption of fear of difficulty, despite narrative and confirmative arguments for validity of the rule of difficulty in the assumption of fear, there are no reasons for its invalidity. Due to the existence of the principle of caution in the blood after the birth of the soul, there is no possibility of abortion in the assumption of fear of difficulty caused by the abnormality of the fetus, and caution should be taken but before the soul is released, despite the fear of the realization of difficulty, the rule of current difficulty and medical abortion is permissible.

Imamiyah jurists have different viewpoints about the continuation of matrimonial bond after the death of one of the spouses. The main source of the difference is that, on the one hand, the continuation of some of the results on the matrimonial bond until after death, such as permissiveness, evokes the continuation of this bond, and on the other hand, the discontinuity of some other results, such as the prohibition of marriage to sister-in-law will be more likely to be interrupted. This study, through using library sources and with a descriptive-analytical approach, has shown that in order to examine the issue carefully, a distinction must be made between the assumption of the death of the husband and the assumption of the death of the wife. By stating that in the first assumption, the matrimonial bond continues until the end of the period, and in the second assumption, it is declared to be terminated at the time of death. At the same time, in the latter assumption, the existence of any relationship and bond between the couple cannot be denied because by relying on Sharia texts, it is possible to establish extra-legal relationship between spouses, which has specific and limited effects in the scope of mandatory rulings. This kind of relationship can be called as "respect bond".

The decrease in the value of money and its consequences is one of the issues affecting the society, and the Imamiyah jurists have different viewpoints about the calculation of this issue in khums. This study, in a descriptive-analytical method and by examining the works of Imamiyah jurists, has counted the arguments of the obligation of Khums in the high price of market due to the decrease in the value of the national currency (in Iran), which include: The similitude of money and the lack of compensation for its devaluation, the usury of compensating for the devaluation of the currency, the inflation being beyond the will of the parties, the unfairness of the calculation of the fall in the value of the currency, the ignorance of the amount of devaluation, the impracticality and the contradiction in the arguments of the calculation of the devaluation of money in khums. In criticizing these arguments, the authors have considered it necessary to maintain the value and price of money, and considered it as usury to compensate for the decrease in the value of money, as contradicting the purposes of the Shari'ah regarding usury. They have not considered the will or unwillingness to be effective for the necessity of compensating the devaluation of the currency, and they believe that the custom also considers the compensation of the devaluation of the currency to be fair and just, and ignorance about the amount of devaluation of the currency can also be solved, because when there is an argument, it is not time to adhere to practical principles and the aforementioned narrative arguments can be justified. Therefore, the arguments stated on the obligation of Khums is not sufficient.

One of the relatively common crimes that take place against the physical integrity of individuals are injuries that pierce the victim's body and cause suffering and fatigue and in some cases lead to the disability of that organ. The diya for this type of injury, which is called penetrating, is one-tenth of the human diya. Different angles of this crime have not been agreed upon by scholars and need to be studied and examined. Among the controversial cases, we can mention the exact definition of the piercing and the amount of the diya for piercing of the organs and the women's diya in these types of injuries. Based on the descriptive-analytical method, after proposing different jurisprudential viewpoints, the present study evaluates the aforementioned arguments and then shows with numerous arguments that penetrating injury, both in terms and in women's diya, is different from the opinion of the famous jurists and accordingly the legislator of the country. Therefore, a penetrating injury is an injury that splits the end parts of the body and does not come out from the other side, and the amount of its diya does not differ in men and women.

One of the important pillars of the theory of proximity of Islamic denominations is the belief in the religious brotherhood of Muslims. Some muhaddith and jurists of the Imamiyyah deny Islam and the opposite faith, because of the denial of guardianship, as one of the main principles of religion or one of the necessities of religion, they consider religious brotherhood as stable only for the followers of Najiya Sect. The present study, by using library studies and content analysis method, seeks to examine and verify the accuracy of the arguments presented by the owners of this view, because the jurisprudential explanation of religious brotherhood will be effective in the way of interaction and social lifestyle of Muslims. The findings of this study suggest that the majority of the arguments presented by the proponents of the denial of religious brotherhood with the opposition are either distorted in terms of the text and the document, and their application has been rejected by the Imamiyah jurists, or because of the special implication of the claim in question. As the majority of Imamiyyah jurists consider the religious brotherhood with the opposition to be established by proving Islam and different levels of faith.