فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال بیست و چهارم شماره 2 (پیاپی 92، تابستان 1401)

Perhaps it can be claimed that fewer philosophical and theological issues such as the issue of divine knowledge can be found about which this extent of different and sometimes contradictory opinions exist and it is due to these very differences of views that Shaykh Tusi states the following regarding the discussion of divine knowledge in his commentary on al-Isharat [Remarks and Admonitions]: Some people have completely denied divine knowledge and in this regard, Avicenna’s view as the chief of the Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic world has kindled extensive disputes. So much so that Shaykh Tusi, a commentator of the book of al-Isharat, who at the beginning considers himself to be committed to the commentary of al-Isharat, does not stay loyal to this condition in the discussion of divine knowledge and follows Shaykh Ishraq in this issue.This issue has gained so much popularity that Avicenna considers divine knowledge of existents before their creation to be in the form of imprinted forms.Many books and articles have been written about divine knowledge in general and Avicenna’s view specifically and that which distinguishes the present study is that apart from a critical view of the author regarding the accuracy and reliability of the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna, the author, through analytical study and reflection on the expressions of Avicenna and the explanation of his foundations, believes that Avicenna must be considered the innovator of the theory of “Perfect Integrated-Comprehensive Knowledge” and in the first step of this study, after acknowledging the excessive difficulty of the issue of divine knowledge, the problem statement and point of conflict and Avicenna’s view regarding God’s knowledge of existents before their creation is explained and it is claimed that Avicenna must be considered the innovator of Perfect Integrated-Comprehensive Knowledge by citing his assertions and benefitting from all his other philosophical foundations. After indicating the nature of knowledge and by mentioning two essential features of imprinted forms in the Peripatetic system, the attribution of the theory of imprinted forms is analyzed and through presenting Mirdamad’s view regarding the circumstances of the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna, a solution has opened up before researchers. And in confirmation of the rightness of Mirdamad’s claim, Avicenna’s statements clearly show that there are serious challenges in the dogmatism and indisputability of those who claim the attribution of imprinted forms to Avicenna. In continuation, by explaining the compatibility of perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge with Avicenna’s foundations, the difficult path to arriving at the reality of divine knowledge is smoothed to some extent and the ambiguities from the views of the most well-known philosopher of the Islamic world can be removed. Addressing Mulla Sadra’s doubts regarding Avicenna’s statements in al-Shifaʾ [the Book of Healing] along with his answers to them shows that according to Avicenna the divine realm is free of any type of acquired knowledge even actualized acquired knowledge and while refuting all types of multiplicity the idea that the divine essence is adorned and envisioned with the forms of existents is certainly not right and the three terms, essence, God’s knowledge of His essence, and God’s knowledge regarding others, are all expressing a single reality which is the essence of God. and in precise scientific and technical terms, the basis of the words of the claimants to the attribution of actualized acquired knowledge arises from this false idea that they consider the rationality of the forms to come after their existence whereas Avicenna’s statements, rational laws, and foundations assert that the existent that is simplex from all aspects possesses all the perfections at the essence level and all the acquired existents (immaterial existents) and contingent existents (material existents) are present for Him in the divine realm due to the rational existence they possess.Avicenna’s emphasis and assertion on the selfsameness of essence and attributes in the denotative and conceptual sense consider God’s essence to be free of all types of multiplicity even the multiplicity of aspects and in contrast to Mulla Sadra’s view, which considers that the multiple assumptions presented in al-Shifaʾ regarding the reality and depths of the essence show Avicenna’s confusion and helplessness regarding the topic of divine knowledge, it must be considered a sign of strength and philosophizing and, ultimately, it is worthy of attention and Mulla Sadra himself considers Avicenna’s assertions and admonitions regarding divine knowledge to attest to perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge which is, in reality, another expression for comprehensive knowledge along with detailed revelation.

One of the traditional theistic beliefs is the belief in God’s absolute attributes. One of these absolute attributes is “Omniscience”. But there are some challenges concerning this attribute and one of them addresses indexical propositions. Among all kinds of indexicals de presenti -propositions that inform about present time, the de se propositions are considered by philosophers. Philosophers who criticize Omniscience use these propositions in different ways. In this article, these challenges and responses to them will be scrutinized.De presenti propositions are troublesome for traditional theism because it seems that the knowledge of different present moments causes a change in God and this contradicts God’s immutability. For example, if God knows that “it is 9 a.m. now”, then He should know “it is 10 a.m. now” an hour later. So, His knowledge changes from time to time which means God Himself changes.There are some responses to this problem:1- To change de presenti propositions to non-indexical ones. For example, the audiences of The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy of Iran could say: “Today, the Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy was declared” or say: “The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy is declared on August 5, 1906”. Therefore, the knowledge of such propositions is fixed through time.2- To claim that God is timeless. That is, God is outside the boundaries of time and His knowledge of different moments, unlike human beings, is immutable.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. Theologians traditionally have presupposed that any kind of change in an absolutely perfect being brings it down from its absolute perfection. But this is not so clear. It can be shown that some changes in God, including changes in His knowledge of different moments, do not affect His perfection.Also, knowledge of de se propositions like “I’m in the hospital”, is challenging for God being Omniscient because only the person who utters such propositions, not God, can know them.There are some responses to this problem:1- To distinguish between the content of a proposition and the proposition itself. Although “I’m in the hospital” can only be explained by the patient himself, it indicates a situation in the world, that is, that person X is in the hospital, which can also be explained by other people. Although God's knowledge does not belong to the de se propositions themselves, it belongs to the content of such propositions,2- Theists can claim that knowledge does not belong to propositions themselves, but belongs to their truth. In such a case, the Omniscient can know “I’m in the hospital” is true.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. According to this solution, theists can consider what atheists put forward against Omniscience not as a denial of the existence of God, but as an illumination of the concept of God, and by accepting it, restrict the extension of the absolute knowledge of God.In this article, we first try to show that some of the objections against solutions for the problem of indexicals could be avoided. So, responses like God’s timelessness or distinction between a proposition and its content can overcome the problem. At the same time, the final solution in each part, which is to modify the interpretation of the concept of God, is a way for those who think other responses do not work.

In this paper, it is shown that as people often convert their beliefs into knowledge through many external means, knowledge cannot be considered exclusive in a justified belief where its justification has been achieved internally. If we do not consider these people’s beliefs as knowledge, we will face some problems; not only will we be caught up in pervasive skepticism but we would also be rejecting the reality of most human items of knowledge. Therefore, to acquire our knowledge, we do not need to use internalism as externalism provides us with new facilities. Philosophy of religion may achieve new solutions through this expansion in epistemology. In this paper, four currents in the philosophy of religion that have used epistemological externalism are mentioned. It is also shown that religious epistemology, based on the trusted hearings which follow Greco’s path, provides a reliable way to justify religious beliefs.However, if we have a justification for religious beliefs through reassured hearings, all religions can claim that their followers believe in their own religious beliefs in this way; so they must be justified, and therefore, all religions must acquire true knowledge, and this is nothing but pluralism.But it seems that to explain the diversity of religions, we do not need to resort to religious pluralism. It can be said that beliefs based on trusted hearings do not rely on their confidence only in the religious preachings, but their confidence in the religious preachings that have been transferred correctly and also that the religious preachings which are based on trusted hearings depend on another preaching and each has been assured through its previous preaching. If some kind of mistrust occurs in this chain then the ultimate believer in the reliability of the narrated in this chain or their collection (in Greco’s particular view) cannot turn his belief into knowledge with the necessary justification.But the problem is what the end of the chain is based on. In some religions, a person can believe in the ability to understand many spiritualities and he has attempted to convey his findings to others. It is clear thatat the end of this chain, if it is the personal findings or readings of a person from spirituality, then the difference in spiritual reception among the early leaders can justify the diversity of religions. Therefore, this type of religious epistemology is dependent on the source of narrations.But some religions speak of believing in an existential truth and one of the consequences of believing in his existence will also be to achieve spirituality. They also believe that their early leaders have based their teachings on their confident hearings of that existential truth.In the meantime, Abrahamic religions believe in God as that existential truth. If a religion (such as Islam) can show the correctness of the chain of reassurance that leads to the prophet’s speech from God and also the prophet considers it not as his concept of spirituality but rather he has stated it because it is the same as the word sent by God, he can show the source of his teachings to be God.What we should ultimately be sure about in this type of epistemology is that he has been able to establish a relationship with God and has conveyed God’s words. In this paper, four paths are mentioned to achieve this assurance.

Influenced by Hume, Searle denies the non-physical essence of the soul, but in two stages he has distanced himself from Hume and put forward his theory of the “Formal Self”. This paper describes Searle's theory, then shows its shortages by rational analysis.Hume saw each perception as distinct from other perceptions. According to Searle, in this case, it is impossible to distinguish between one consciousness having ten experiences and ten different consciousnesses each with one experience. On the other hand, the existence of the body is essential for having a series of conscious experiences. The sequence of conscious states must have a physical realization. Now there is a neo-Humean account of the self, according to which the self is an embodied brain in causal contact with the world, carrying unified and expanding conscious fields.Secondly, Searle argues for the necessity of a non-Humean self by proposing three gaps between psychological antecedents and voluntary action:The gap between reflection and prior intention: There is a gap between the reasons for a decision and the actual decision itself. The agent in his experience does not find beliefs, desires, and other reasons as sufficient reasons for a decision;The gap between prior intention and the intention-in-action: There is also a gap between the decision to perform an action and the actual effort to perform it. We sometimes do not do what we set out to do, for a variety of reasons or even for no reason;The gap between intentions-in-actions in temporally extended actions: In temporally extended actions, there is another gap between starting action and continuing it. In an activity like writing a book, the initiation of the original intention-in-action is not by itself sufficient to guarantee the continuation of that intention-in-action through the completion of the activity.Thus, primary psychological causes are not sufficient causes for voluntary action. But if the gap between the psychological causes and the action is not filled, voluntary action will not be realized. According to Searle, to fill this gap requires an irreducible non-Humean notion of the self. This Searlean notion is neither an experience nor an object of experience. Just as in visual perception, the perspective is an absolutely formal condition for the comprehension of experiences and has no other substantive or real properties, the Searlean self is also an absolutely formal but more complex concept.The formal self is the result of Searle’s scientific worldview and materialism. Because of his ontological materialism, he denied the soul as being an immaterial, body-independent substance, and when he does not find Hume’s view as satisfactory to the interpretation of conscious action, he doesn’t turn to dualism, but rather suggests a formal self. This formal self does not clearly differ from denial of the self. In the analogy of the soul to perspective, the perspective is the condition of understanding the visual perceptions, but perspective itself is not something that can be perceived and has no real characteristics. The Serlean self is a formal notion whose postulate is the condition for the realization of voluntary action. Although according to Searle, the formal self is an identity with consciousness, perception, rationality, the ability to act, and the ability to regulate perceptions and reasons to perform voluntary actions based on the assumption of freedom, he does not mean that this identity is an objective reality; because in this case, he should accept the duality of soul and body, while he strongly avoids this. The Searlean formal self is not an external objective fact. As a result, it cannot bear the heavy burden of filling the three gaps.

Dialectics in philosophy was first used by the philosophers of ancient Greece and was changed by philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, and there is a strong use of analogy in the works of Plato. In Plotinus, dialectics is discussed in the third treatise of the first Enneads, and analogy is also discussed in different cases, especially the fifth Enneads. In studying the language of theology in Plotinus, one can trace dialectic and analogy, as well as negative methods and silence. Much has been said about Plotinus’ negative theology, but the discussion of dialectic and analogy in Plotinus’ theology has been neglected. The question is, what is the place of dialectics and analogy in Plotinus’ theological discussions? Can a connection be made between dialectic and analogy and Plotinus’ theology? In this article, we try to answer the question of the role and position of dialectic and analogy in Plotinus’ theology by elaborating on “dialectic” and “analogy.” No research has been done on the dialectic and analogy of Plotinus, especially on the theology and language of religion.Dialectic has been used in various meanings, and the purpose of this article is to address the dialectic in Plotinus’ theology and the language of religion. Plotinus deals with dialectic, examining it both as a method and as a science, which pays attention to “truth” and “supreme reality” in both dialectical meanings. In addition to dialectic, he uses the analogy of “king”, “fire”, and “sun” in describing the One. To him, dialectic is the highest part of philosophy and not a tool.In Plotinus’ theology, dialectics and analogy are used to explain the One in such a way that it discovers both transcendental and ultimate reality and shows the way for the soul to reach that ultimate reality by distinguishing between reason and sensory perception and appealing to and paying attention to reason. This One isread with different names such as the first cause or “first good”, “final reality”, “transcendence”, and “beyond-thought.” In this way, a re-reading of the negative and positive methods is combined. Negative, either removes positive things that are specific to the stages below the One from the One in a detailed sense and places the One in the highest order; or, negative in itself has a positive meaning for “One” means both negative and positive. Negatively, the One is nothing but itself. The One in a positive way as existence is in a hierarchically distinct from sensible and tangible beings. Thus, in the dialectical method and analogy, both a negative description can be given in a detailed sense for the existence and meta-thought of the One, and a positive description of the One in “cause”, “analogy”, “goodness”, and “perfection” can be obtained. With dialectical and similar reading, the negative (positive) and positive descriptions of the One are not opposed to and are in line with each other.

The main purpose of this article is to answer the question of what methods and resources the philosopher has at his disposal in answering the goals of First Philosophy and in order to achieve philosophical theories, and how much and how to use them properly. In order to answer this question, the present article believes that determining the methods and resources used in First Philosophy is dependent on the purpose and subject of this science, and if the question is to be answered, what sources and methods are allowed for the philosopher to use in answering a philosophical question, the position of the goal, and the subject of philosophy must be carefully examined. It is worth mentioning that as a result of this study, other issues raised in this framework, such as the relationship between intuition, revelation, and experience with First philosophy and the scope of their influence on First Philosophy are also clarified. Therefore, the premise of the article in answer to this question is that there is a direct relationship between the purpose, subject, and method of philosophy, and determining the method and sources of knowledge used in First Philosophy is dependent on the purpose and subject of First philosophy. By considering the subject and issues raised in First Philosophy, the discussion of the commonalities between the subjects of science or various facts is discovered to be the main goal of First Philosophy. And by considering two basic stages in the methodology of sciences: 1) Problem design and hypothesis making, and 2) Assessment and exploration of theory, we come to the conclusion that they play a role alongside rational analysis in the area of philosophical problem design, specific and general intuitions (sensory-internal) transfer and experience. Due to the fact that the discussion of commonalities is related to the multiplicity of subjects and facts, and that multiplicities and facts can be identified through different sources, First Philosophy owes its existence to different sources of knowledge. But in the position of judgment and measurement, in matters related to absolute existence, the only usable source is rational analysis, and in matters related to the principles and divisions of existence that deal with the subjects of science, given that these divisions may reach cases whose study requires the use of intuition or revelation or experience, along with rational analysis; intuition, sense, and experience are also used. Considering the purpose of universality and universal provability requires the impossibility of using narrative methods (albeit definitive) in the study of philosophical issues, the stipulation of certainty in philosophical results and theories will also pave the way for the use of uncertain methods such as incomplete induction in the design of philosophical claims. Therefore, in the field of measuring and exploring theories, it should be considered in detail if we emphasize the universality of the provability of philosophical problems to accidents of existence, only rational analysis (rational intuition) is applied and to the principles of existence and divisions of existence – related to the subjects of science – rational analysis is applied along with intuition, experience, and induction. And if epistemic reference is not considered in detail, in all three cases, in addition to rational analysis and experience, definitive citation can also be used.