مجله فلسفه علم
سال دوازدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 23، بهار و تابستان 1401)

Many attempts have been made in the history and philosophy of science to suppose machines as human beings. Sometimes they are attributed mind, sometimes emotion, and sometimes intelligence. All this is to make the border between humans and machines as narrow as possible, so that one day they may unite. But this effort can be made in another direction. It is possible to bring humans closer to the machines as much as possible with a systematic view, which is what the cybernetic perspective has done. This approach has played a significant role in the emergence of artificial intelligence studies and along with the two approaches of computationalism and representationalism has been able to introduce artificial intelligence as the most important and functional field of science to the world.

This paper addresses the scientific realism debate by giving thought to the epistemic status of scientific instruments. The paper claims that a perspectivist yet realist view is capable of explaining the role of instruments in science. Thus, instrumental perspectivism is defined and supported against the following three criticisms. 1- Perspectivism leads to relativism. 2- Perspectivists’ view that instruments represent reality partially is trivial. 3- The perspectivist claim that instruments are not transparent is either trivial or unacceptable. In response, I defend a realist version of perspectivism on the basis of the concept of “robustness”. I also argue that perspectivism has interesting implications for the plurality of scientific representations and for teaching science to the public. Furthermore, I explain that the (post)phenomenological account of “mediation” sheds light on the assertion that instruments are not transparent.

Most of the scientific answers given to the problem of consciousness have either slipped towards reductionism or tried to explain it through functionalism. The common deficiency of most of them is ignoring the phenomenological and qualitative aspects of consciousness. The view of neural Darwinism has the advantage that, despite being scientific, it leaves aside both reductionist and functionalist perspectives. This view seeks to explain consciousness through the mechanism of natural selection in forming neural groups. Although this theory overcomes most of the contemporary challenges that consciousness has faced, such as Blind-sight, it leaves the hard problem or the explanation of Qualia untouched. In this regard, this view suffers from a kind of inadequacy of empirical data to determine the theory. In this article, a proposal is made to complete and develop this theory in order to overcome the mentioned deficiency. This is done by introducing a Multiple Supervenience that is rooted in Dispositionalism. This relationship relates basic properties to higher-order properties but differs from the classical supervenience in that it can explain the specific causal relationship between levels. The paper shows that this Multiple Supervenience is applicable to the theory of neuronal Darwinism. In order to explain consciousness, Neural Darwinism uses the potential of individual neurons or groups of neurons and the stimuli obtained through external sensors, as well as emergent properties.

This article pursues two main goals. First, a concise description of the concept of quantity from both philosophical and scientific perspectives with the aim of establishing a scientific relationship and semantic connection between them. And second, to propose a modification of the philosophical concept in such a way that it is both compatible with its scientific concept and finds the ability to describe quantitative facts from a rational and philosophical perspective. Explanation of this meaning is the article innovationThis article emphasizes that the concept of "quantity", like many common philosophical and scientific concepts, must be analyzed with a new perspective. This meaning is rooted in the fact that many of the concepts contained in Islamic natural philosophy have not been influenced by the profound changes in the natural sciences. In this article it is shown that the initial definition of philosophers of quantity is accurate and it can be used for the general definition of quantity in new empirical knowledge, but its description and division must be corrected and completed.

Every science is based on metaphysical and philosophical assumptions, and medicine is no exception. In mixed medicine, Galen considers philosophy and logic to be part of medicine and bases his medical theory on it. Therefore, Galen considered anatomy and physiology not only for the study of organs and processes inside the body, but also as an important source for answering philosophical questions.Therefore, the problem of the present research is to investigate the impact of Galen's philosophical teachings on his knowledge of anatomy and physiology. For this purpose, the article consists of four parts: in the first part, the history of physiology before Galen is examined, and in the second part, it deals with the philosophical teachings and important concepts of the knowledge of physiology and Galen's philosophical outlook, and in the next parts, the impact of Galen's philosophical teachings on the knowledge of the physiology of the brain and nerves. Cardiology, respiration, digestion, reproduction and embryology are examined. This research has been carried out by library method and relying on the works attributed to Galen. Examining the works related to Galen's physiology shows that he was influenced by Plato's theory of the three organs and believed that the three main organs of the body are the brain, heart and liver, therefore Galen's system of physiology includes a set of activities focused on the liver, heart/lungs and brain. A process that must be constantly renewed to continue living. Also, Galen's goal of analyzing and understanding the anatomy and physiology of the body was to understand the nature of pneuma.

Study the titles of body organs as well as counting them in the anatomical texts of humoural medicine indicates an important issue: in these texts and in comparison with modern anatomical texts, there is no mention of a significant number of body organs. This is while these two different conclusions are the result of the observations of the same action: the dissection of the corpse. In addition, some of these organs are visible to the naked eye, including lymphatic vessels. Therefore, the humoural physician has seen some organs in the process of dissection, but has not. According to the authors of this article, the reason for the invisibility of these organs lies in the connection between observation and theory. In short, the observation of the humoural physician's dissection practice, unlike the observation of the modern anatomist dissection practice, has been based on the humoural theory. Hence, the humoural physician, in the process of dissection, has seen organs which have a humoural function. The rest of the body organs were either not seen or reduced to a fleshy appendages.

By appealing to the no-miracle argument (NM), scientific realists claim that the approximate truth of scientific theories and the existence of their postulated entities are the cause of the predictive and explanatory success of science. Antirealists, however, by appealing to the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMI), claim that a lot of past predictively successful and yet false theories show that there is not any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. One of the most influential responses of realists to PMI is Structural Realism, proposed by John Worral. The aim of this thesis is to show that during theory-shift there has been a continuity at the structural or formal level, and the central terms of successive theories refer to the same entities (structures). In the first part of this paper NM and PMI will be explained. Then, a critical evaluation of structural realism is given in both epistemological and ontological versions. It will be shown that this thesis is unable to rebut PMI conclusively. The conclusion of this paper, however, is that PMI cannot work against structural realists’ thesis if they limit the domain of their claim to existential sentences of scientific theories, to what I call “Existential Realism.”

Since Aristotle denied the possibility of a space independent of bodies (absolute space), it is clear that in his view, the motion relative to absolute space (absolute motion) is impossible. But, has Aristotle been able to provide a consistent explanation of motion without using the concepts of absolute space and motion—what has not been achieved in Einstein’s general relativity? Is his explanation of motion consistent with Mach’s principle (relativity of motion)? To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of motion and Mach’s principle. This paper demonstrates that Aristotle’s explanation of ‘motion’ does not satisfy Mach’s principle. Moreover, it becomes clear that despite Aristotle’s attempt to remove the concepts of absolute space and motion from physics, his theory is not entirely devoid of these absolute concepts. In other words, it is demonstrated that Aristotle’s theory of motion suffers from an internal inconsistency in the case of rotatory motion. In this study the library data gathered is analyzed based on the descriptive-analytical methodology.

Why are some technology policies successful and some not? Although this question is directly addressed in science, technology and innovation policy, it can be deeply explored in the philosophy of technology as well. The aim of this article is to discuss this question regarding the problem of the value embodiment in technology. Of the relation between value and technology, it is no longer a question of whether technology embodies value or not, but of how it does. van de Poel has recently proposed an account of the embodiment to explain how AI systems as sociotechnical systems can embody moral values. Using his account, we try to answer particularly a question related to the first one but regarding domestic considerations: why are not the policies of developing domestic instant messengers and banning non-domestic ones successful in Iran?

The later Wittgenstein presents all types of knowledge claims in the context of language games. He also maintains that no language game is possible without certainty. Certainty lies outside of language games, but the very existence of any kind of language game depends on it. In his view, even "the game of doubting presupposes certainty". According to Wittgenstein, certainty, as well as absolute doubt and absolute knowledge are meaningless. But relative doubt, or as he calls it, "reasonable doubt", is meaningful and can produce its own language game. The language game of doubting, like other language games, is based on what Wittgenstein dubs a set of "world-picture" or a system of "hinge propositions". In Wittgenstein's opinion, ‘hinge propositions’ are based on people’s lived experiences and their collective agreements over them. ‘Hinge propositions,’ in this sense, are objective, and although he refers to them as ‘propositions’, they are not propositions in the usual sense of this term: they do not partake in reasoning and arguments but the discourses of causes (and their effects). In this article, we first discuss the characteristics of relative doubt and the rules of the language game of doubt, as well as the characteristics of certainty and the system of ‘hinge propositions’. We then move on to a critical assessment of Wittgenstein’s views on the above topics by highlighting some internal inconsistencies in his arguments and exposing some shortcomings in his views through the prism of Critical Rationalism.

David Bloor, one of the leading leaders of the Edinburgh School, refuted the theory of Strong Program by proposing four principles. These four principles include the principle of causality, the principle of symmetry, the principle of impartiality and the principle of reflexivity. According to the principle of causality, sociology must go through a causal process because only then will it lead to the creation of a belief or a situation of knowledge, and there will also be a variety of causes apart from social affairs in the creation of beliefs. According to the principle of symmetry and impartiality, sociology is neutral towards dualities and must explain the same types of causes. And the remarkable point in the reflexivity principle is that the patterns of explanation of the sociology of knowledge must be applicable to the sociology itself. The two most important principles in a strong program are the principle of symmetry and then the principle of causality, which is widely discussed among the proponents and critics of a strong program.

Relationalism is at the opposite point of substantialism, and instead of studying objects separated from each other, it starts to study the objective relations that determine them. The Marburg school is one of the most important exponents of this idea. The explanation provided by the Marburg school of relationalism was to solve the crisis of science in the 20th century. In other words, this school sought to provide an answer to the paradox of the progress of science at the same time as revolutionary changes occurred in it without losing scientific objectivity. The idea of the Marburg school was that if these changes could be explained based on an objective method or law, the credibility of science would be preserved. This objective method is the transcendental method that was reformulated inspired by Kant's transcendental logic. In this approach, the relationship between concept and reality has been revised, the reality is completely conceptual and at the same time dynamic, and it is explained how the object of scientific theories is continuously reproduced as a cultural component.