فصلنامه پژوهش تطبیقی حقوق اسلام و غرب
سال نهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 32، تابستان 1401)

The precaution principle is one of the significant legal principles which has been debated by lawyers in recent decades and has been used in the law of many countries such as France, Belgium, etc. This principle seeks to assure that the necessity of preventing danger is not limited to inevitable dangers associated with definite damages, but when the society is expose to serious dangers the casual relationship between which and the damage has not been definitely proven scientifically and technically, the necessary measures are taken to prevent the damages as well. Given the function of the precaution principle, it is possible that the efficacy of this principle is confused with some other legal institutions and rules in the first instance. Employing a descriptive-analytic method and after introducing the mentioned principle and addressing its constituent elements namely: 1) confronting the suspected risk; and 2) fear of causing a heavy or irreparable damage, the authors in this paper have reached this conclusion that this principle is distinguished from the compensation principle and provisional measure in law of Iran as well as the necessity to preclude the probable damage and Assimilative Capacity Model. However, its function can be justified by the rule of precaution in life, honor and serious properties in Islamic law. Furthermore, we can invoke the ta’zir or the necessity of maintain the System for legislating crimes and the foundation of fault for proving the damage.

One of the indisputable principles in Islamic international relations is Nafy-e-Sabil Rule (no domination over Muslims by Non-Muslims) according to which the basic rule is that any agreement in which Muslims or the Islamic State is somehow dominated by non-Muslims is not valid and its performance is not required. One of the issues in which non-Muslim domination over Muslims is controversial is non-Muslim arbitration in Muslim-non-Muslim or even Muslim-Muslim claims in Islamic states which is usually stipulated as a subordinate obligation in the contract that is called “arbitration clause”. According to the primary rule, the denial or Nafy-e-Sabil Rule rejects such obligations that require a Sabil, however, necessity, hardship (haraj), and expediency are among the topics that, if fulfilled, can be considered for a departure from the elementary rule. The present study is an attempt to explain the nature and validity of the arbitration clause in the contracts of Islamic states in the international arena which has been conducted by descriptive and analytical method. It has finally led to this conclusion that the arbitration clause and referral of the arbitrator to the infidel, although at the first is overcome by the rule of Nafy-e-Sabil and, as a consequence, is ineffective, but the secondary rule in the field of haraj and expediency governs it. This analysis justifies the accession of Islamic states to international conventions. Furthermore, some jurisprudential-legal solutions have been provided to get out of the rule of Nafy-e-Sabil Rule.

One of the most important harms of armed conflict, especially in the Southwest Asia region, is the recruitment of children into groups and the armed forces and their use in conflicts which is clearly shown by the actions of groups such as ISIS, the Taliban and the Saudi-led coalition of aggression in Yemen. Such a treatment of children constitutes a violation of the rights recognized for them in human rights and humanitarian law instruments, and the International Criminal Law has reaffirmed the necessity to punish the perpetrators. International instruments have required governments to criminalize the recruitment and use of children for armed conflict in order to guarantee their rights. Therefore, in the present study, the position of three legal systems in the region of Southwest Asia i.e. Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq in dealing with this issue has been studied through a descriptive-analytical method. The findings of the research indicate that these countries, inspired by international regulations and especially the statute of the International Criminal Court, have criminalized this field. Recruitment of children and the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts are describe as a crime in Syrian law and laws of Afghanistan and Iraq respectively which has been identified as a war crime in Afghanistan and Iraq. Criminal regulations of Afghanistan and Syria have imposed penalties such as imprisonment and fines for this crime, but in Iraq so far no specific punishment has been determined in this regard, and contrary to the principle of legality of crime and punishment, the decision in this case is left to the judiciary.

One of the types of murder which is often faced with ambiguity and on the diagnosis of which there are disagreements is the quasi-intentional murder. This is due to the fact that it is a combination of premediated and erroneous murder. Because the perpetrator has the intent to act, it is similar to premediated murder and since he/she has no in intent to kill, it is similar to erroneous murder; that is why it is called quasi-murder. The question is what is the meaning of quasi-intentional murder in the above legal systems? We answer it comparatively. In jurisprudential texts it is mentioned that “arrest the quasi-murderer if he has intent in his act or is wrongful in his intent”. In Iranian criminal law the quasi-intentional murder is a killing in which the perpetrator has the intent to perform a non-fatal behavior but has no intent to kill. The text of the Art. 121-3 of the French Criminal Code reads as follows: “There is no felony or misdemeanor in the absence of an intent to commit it. However, the deliberate endangering of others is a misdemeanor where the law so provides”. What is shared in these three systems is the typically non-fatal intention and lack of will to kill. There is no disagreement between Imamiyah jurisprudential texts and 2012 Islamic Criminal Code of Iran, but manslaughter is divided into quasi-intentional and erroneous murder in Imamiyah jurisprudence and Iranian criminal law; a division which is not mentioned in French criminal law and only the term manslaughter is used. The approach of this paper is the comparative study of principles and rules of the above three criminal law systems.

The present study aims at assessing the status of the private sphere in the legal system of Iran as a Jurisprudence-based one in a comparison with Germany’s. The modern state has such limited the scope of private sphere that the privacy of family as its most important element is dubious. The private sphere exists and forms the human society besides the public sphere and the state only when it is subject to the supplementary rules of private law and the state does not regulate its relations with the mandatory rules except for observing the international human rights. The research method is a comparative study of Iranian and German family law with a deductive approach. The findings imply that in the German legal system, the state guarantees human rights requirements, especially freedom and equality in the family, but its intervention is not limited to this and beyond it, it limits the private sphere and, as a result, the personal rights. In Iran, the state also regulates family relations comprehensively, although this regulation is not necessarily intended to observe human rights. The result of the research demonstrates that in modern relations between the state and the nation, the family is not legally considered to be a part of private sphere, and this means that the scope of the private sphere is limited to the privacy.

The ownership is known as most complete right in rem. Imamiyah jurists have presented different approaches and views regarding the truth of ownership according to which most of them are a hypothetical phenomenon. In our opinion, this is due to the mistake of the subject (property) with its rules (rights and duties related to property). In this article, by means of a descriptive-analytical method, we have proved that ownership should not be considered as a hypothetical phenomenon, but as an abstract fact and is theoretically falls within the “category of relative”. A category that has an important place in both classic and modern philosophies. Although this view can be inferred from some phrases OF Mohaghegh Ansari, he has briefly mentioned it and has not revealed its analytical reality. Having economic value and capability to become owned are two issues about transferable rights that have long been questioned by Islamic jurists. However, since the material existence of an object is not necessary to abstract philosophical category of relation, according to our theory in this research and through placing the ownership in category of relation, it is easy to defend the capability of transferable rights such as corporate stocks and, in general, the capability of intangible objects as the subject of ownership.

The right of access to a healthy environment is one of the most important rights in the current discourses on human rights and citizenship. Pursuant to this right, everyone has the right to live in a healthy, clean and unpolluted environment. The emergence and importance of this right in the area of public law was the result of the evolution of human being’s collective life style, the change of human-state relations with nature, and forgetting the ecological semi-systems around the self in the rapid process of development after the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the fundamental question which arises is that on the basis of which foundations such a right is formed for humanity and how it is justified in terms of philosophical-theological views reflected in Islamic sources as well as in modern texts? In this paper, it has been tried to address some aspects of this issue. Accordingly, first,  in addition to conceptual analysis, we deal with the philosophical-theological foundations of the right to the environment (1). Then, the general philosophical-theological rules of this right from the perspective of Islamic law would be discussed (2). The basic presumption based on which this paper is grounded is that the right to environment cannot achieve its goal which is ensuring the healthy environment without thaking into account its philosophical dimensions as well as it metaphysical status.

The role of will in the creation of obligations and the determination of their boundaries and effects is evident for all. Traditionally, it has been debated whether the concordance of wills does lead to the creation of obligations? In other words, are two persons need primarily to create an obligation or a single will can create an obligation against him/herself? This question arises for this fact that obligation was understood as the legal relationship between two persons. The advocates of the classical theory have always criticized the theory of unilateral will as the source of obligation; the criticisms which are often answered by the advocates of the mentioned view. In its recent amendments and in particular Article 1-1100 of the French Civil Code, the French Legislature has recognized legal acts arising from unilateral will. There are disagreements in the Law of Iran; some have completely rejected this view and others have accepted it. As regards the nature of this obligation, some consider it as a directive unilateral act and others, invoking the theory of exhaustivity of contracts and unilateral acts, maintain that this view can be accepted as a general theory. This study is conducted through a descriptive-analytic method and aims at examining the creative power of unilateral act as the source of obligation in law of Iran and the French law.

Because suit’s dismissal writ issues in between parties’ arguments closure and appeal judgment’s issuance and before that the court has done its primary proceedings and quashed the primary verdict, this question arises that whether with appeal suit’s dismissal writ issuance the quashed primary verdict revives or remains persistent as quashed? To answer, it seems that after primary verdict’s quash, whether the appellant has been the primary suit’s plaintiff or defendant, relying on the proceedings singleness principle, that would be only plaintiff who can discontinue the suit and with suit’s dismissal writ issuance at the appeal stage the suit becomes res judicata completely. This happens in courts where the file has referred to them after quash as well. But if the appellant was the defendant, he/she could discontinue the appeal suit only before the primary judgment’s quash. What said, in addition to quash of verdict in appeal stage includes writ’s quash in that stage and judgment’s quash in supreme court appeal and objection to ex-parte verdict, however, due to some practical reasons it happens differently in retrial and third person’s objection suits. Although appeal court’s decision for its initial trial can as well be deemed judgment, the suit discontinuance before that decision does not lead to suit dismissal writ. Therefore, issuance of that writ cannot be expected in the supreme court. This happens not only about suit dismissal writ but also as to suit rejection one. In this way, different functions would be explored for discontinuance of a suit.

In the 21st century, a wide range of human rights systems and their institutions and regulatory bodies does not exclude any of their members from their supervisory jurisdiction in implementing their mechanisms in defense of human rights in order to prove their determination to protect human rights, usually by emphasizing an introverted approach. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as a regional institution, has shown a tendency toward designing minimal mechanisms for protection of human rights in Islamic states in recent years. The present article, through a descriptive-analytical method, while studying the general attitude of the Organization in the field of human rights, examines its inadequacies and weaknesses on monitoring the human rights situation in member states and the obstacles and challenges facing the recent tendency of the Organization to become a fixed practice. It appears that despite the primary positive assessment, the recent practice of the Organization in reacting to human rights violations and its limitation of the scope of this practice to a few number of states and its discriminative approach of not-reacting to the violation of human rights by other states reveal both the political bias of the Organization and inefficacy of the elements constituting the customary rule for fixation of this practice.

The Middle East region, especially the Islamic territories, has always witnessed some kinds of military and diplomatic interventions by European and Western states. Since World War II, these interferences are shaped and continued in various forms such as intervention by invitations, agreements, or military assistance. Foreign intervention in the region has not been and is not possible without the permission or support of local entities. What may justify or legitimize permission or accompanying foreigners in Islamic international jurisprudence is the concept of "asking help from non-Muslims", "recourse to non-Muslim" (or Istianat). This article, while examining this notion in the Islamic teachings, compares it with concept of "intervention by invitation" in modern international law and explores the scope and extent of application of "Istianat" in the times of short or long presence of foreign military in Islamic territories. This issue has been raised since the US and its regional allies’ military intervention in Iraq, and now, two decades later, it may be discussed on the current situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power. The withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan might be considered as a turning point in ending the Western coalition's military intervention in the Islamic territories and future developments in the region.

The chapeau of Article 107 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code states that the withdrawal and dismissal of actions “…shall be in the following order…”. Then, in three paragraphs, paragraph (A) mentions the withdrawal and dismissal of actions, paragraph (B) refers to the withdrawal and dismissal of actions before the end of the negotiations, and paragraph (c) provides the withdrawal of the claims after the end of the negotiations. In all three paragraphs, withdrawal of a petitions and claims are voluntary, and only in paragraph (C) (withdrawal of the claims after the end of the negotiations) the consent of the defendant is the precondition for dismissal. Even in this case, if the defendant does not consent, the plaintiff can resort to withdrawal and dismissal of actions. But the court should issue the writ of suit’s dismissal and the plaintiff no longer has the right to sue on the same matter. Therefore, according to this Article, the will of the plaintiff is effective in the withdrawal of a petition and claim and the will of the defendant or defendants has no effect. In addition, there is no mention of the court's obligation to rule on payment of the costs of the proceedings in the case of dismissal of actions. It is despite the fact that, undoubtedly, file a case and then the petition impose some costs on the defendant or defendants and the court has a duty to address it. Furthermore, four terms of petition, claim, termination of negotiations and dismissal of action are mentioned in this Article, but their meaning are not stated. This paper tries to discuss and critique this Article and compare it whit similar cases in French law.