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سال پانزدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 86، بهار و تابستان 1401)

This article examines Suarez’s theory of analogy. Suarez, on the one hand, believes in the unity of the concept of “being” (ens) and considers it to preserve the unity of the subject of metaphysics, because, according to an Aristotelian principle, every science must be about one subject, and because Suarez considers God, intellects, and creatures under the concept of “being qua real being” as subjects of metaphysics, there should be a unity of the concept of being. On the other hand, the analogy in scholastic and especially Thomistic philosophy maintains that the ontological distance between the God of all good and the world, which is the fruit of original sin and inherently evil, because it holds the concept of being about God and creatures, is not the same concept, but merely analogical. Suarez, therefore, abandons Cajetan’s traditional reading in order to maintain both such unity and not to reject the analogy. He chooses the analogy of intrinsic attribution, according to which, first, one concept is analogous to another concept and not two concepts to the third concept, and second, the concept of ens is intrinsically present on both sides of the analogy. In this article, we prove that this causes Suarez’s analogy of intrinsic attribution to be the same as Ibn Sina’s graded unity and Scotus’s univocity and that Suarez, while using the characteristics of univocity in his metaphysics, such as the unity of the concept of being, considers analogy only formally and in the title, and completely avoids it.

Indoctrination is the act of inducing and transmitting ideas to another, which causes the person indoctrinated with the opinions and ideas expressed to be immune from error and revision. Ignoring the evidence and arguments to the contrary will weaken the power of reason and rationality and cause dogmatism. But anti-indoctrination approaches also use inductive methods in promoting and expanding their fundamental views. This situation leads to a phenomenon called “the paradox of indoctrination”. The question is whether indoctrination can be avoided and if not, what kind of indoctrination is not only necessary but also useful? Those who do not consider indoctrination as a completely negative concept and point to its positive and involuntary dimensions have resorted to solutions such as world-picture, strengthening rationality, and initiation to respond to the above paradox. This qualitative research by using conceptual analysis and comparative methods after critiquing the proposed solutions introduces an alternative approach to better understand the necessity of indoctrination and its place in human thought and life. The research claims that by resorting to epistemology and distinguishing between two types of explicit and implicit knowledge, we can speak of implicit indoctrination. The negative and removable part of indoctrination is related to the explicit and expressive aspect of indoctrination in the form of explicit propositions and teachings. Implicit indoctrination, on the other hand, is a vital component in sharing and transmitting lived experiences and individuals’ intuitive perceptions of their community and culture due to their contextual, procedural, narrative, and rule-following.

The present article begins with the concept of post-truth in the Nietzscheian sense and ends with the concept of enchantment in the form of Nietzsche’s jester. By explaining the way in which the modern human encounters post-truth in the Covid19 era as a nontruth-truth, and distinguishing between the concepts of post-truth and fake news, the following questions arise: By encountering the post-truth, what kind of subjects are being constituted? And how will these subjects be constituted? I will exploit the Lacanian psychoanalytical perspective and method to prove my hypothesis, based on the fact that constituted subjects are hysterical subjects. The subjects that occur in a discourse turning and by questioning the master signifier, reveal the lack in knowledge of the Other and recognize that the truth is nontruth and illusion. Thus, the prelinguistic mythical desire (Delta) repulsed by the current discourse will be re-operated by the hysterical subject. According to the myth’s re-operation, overtaking the current discourse and their relationship with mythological studies in the sphere of Jungian analytical psychology, I will answer another question considering that how the enchantment in the information and virtual media era takes place and how we are moving toward a re-enchantment in Post-Covid19 era and which psychological archetype is projecting by this enchantment? At the end, the subjects’ enchantment in the era of virtual media projects the Explorer archetype and in the coming era of Post-Covid19 will be projected by Nietzscheian Jester/Clown.

Brandom’s main claim is that the representational dimension of language, including intentional directedness, emerges and also reflects the social dimension of language. Brandom argues that his analysis of the expressive function of “about” in de re ascriptions confirms his main claim. Deflationary interpretation of Brandom’s analysis denies that “about” ascribes a property to mental states. In the present article, first, by explaining Brandom’s inferentialist analysis of singular terms and notion of object, we show how objects via inferential triangulation can be given to us. Then, we elucidate the connection between Brandom’s analysis of objectivity and his analysis of intentional directedness as the reflection of social dimension. Relying on this elucidation, we explain Brandom’s claim that “about” plays a role similar to Kant’s categories . Brandom’s view on intentional directedness is a radical switch of view which challenges the whole tradition of philosophical theory seeking to explain intentionality as a property of mental states.

major part of Arendt’s views on “Will” is evoked in her last work, The Life of the Mind, which tends to hover around the history of the will, i.e., it is more concerned with the history of the will, that is, the experience and efforts of philosophers to write about these experiences. Arendt’s judgment about almost all of these efforts is that they have failed to reveal the right assumed to be intended for the experiences, as this failure takes its roots from biased thinking. Thus, it may seem a rational hypothesis to suggest that Arendt has accounted for a simpler explanation of the will. Although Arendt does not clearly explain her theory of the will, she provides a number of propositions about it, raising the question of whether these propositions can produce a coherent explanation. So the following questions are introduced: What is this power? How does this power relate to other human forces and to the “self” or the “voluntary self”? What is the relationship between this power with action? What is Arendt’s justification for his concept and spontaneous will? Why does Arendt emphasize spontaneous will via such power and does not let the will be formed by thinking? And finally, does Arendt succeed in producing a consistent explanation of the spontaneous will or not?

This essay aims to explore the focal importance of the sense of touch in the  young  Johann Gottfried Herder’s Philosophy. In line with this purpose, some ontological and epistemological aspects of his early philosophy are examined. However, the true incentive of this inquiry is the role that sense of touch plays in Herder’s Aesthetics, the discipline which has a fundamental and indispensable interrelation with all fields of his thought. This text attempts to outline Herder’s stance regarding embodiment and sense of touch especially in relation to Ontology and Aesthetics of German rationalist tradition and also to Immanuel Kant’s pre-critical philosophy. It will be explained that the sense of touch, as Herder contends, is the most fundamental part of human perception, which grasps the being of the soul and the being of the world in terms of one single force, i.e. the force of representation; And aesthetic experience, as Herder assumes, consists in the very experience of detecting this unity between the soul and the world, namely the experience of perceiving perfection.

Direct Doxastic Voluntarism claims that all or some of the states associated with our beliefs, that is, the formation, maintenance, justification, and suspension of our judgments, are under our direct voluntary control. The followers of this view emphasize the important role of the will according to their own intellectual principles and in a way insist on the agent’s activity from an epistemological point of view. The present study, while analyzing the views of some epistemologists who believe Direct Doxastic Voluntarism seeks to answer the question of whether our beliefs and judgments are formed under the direct control of the will. Evaluating Direct Doxastic Voluntarism shows that although this approach is not very justified, due to the extreme role of the will for the formation of all kinds of beliefs, and confirmation and suspension of judgment. This has led to a global version of this thesis that may not be acceptable for most epistemologists. Yet by limiting its scope, it can be defended about some beliefs because of its compatibility with individuals’ cognitive experiences. By accepting a less global version of this doctrine, the present article examines the views of some direct voluntariors while denying the extreme scope of the will and emphasizes its position and reasonable role in the subject.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the intentionality that Husserl speaks of represents reflective action and the objectifying of t consciousness which examines the constituted experiences from above as an object for the subject. As a result of this intentionality, the pre-reflective and constituted confrontation with the world is impossible and the pre-predictive unity of the subject and the object remains hidden. To solve this problem, then, we must consider an intentionality as a fundamental intentionality by which consciousness, without explicitly conceptualizing and instead of assuming its own objects, turns to them. This intentionality, which Merleau-Ponty calls “operative intentionality,” does not depend on the intention being in front of the subject, but on the initial orientation of the subject towards the world by which the subject is placed in the world and cannot be considered outside or separate from it. The presence of the subject in the world is made possible by the subject’s body. As a result, the body becomes a tool for consciousness that allows it to communicate directly with the objects around consciousness. Such a meaning of intentionality means that it is no longer possible to regard objectivity as finding the nature of objects in transcendental consciousness. Rather, objectivity is the moment in which the world is given to the subject in the perceptual experience. In this article we explain how this meaning of objectivity is realized and its conditions in Merleau-Ponty phenomenology.

By discovering effective reality and then establishing a relationship between effective reality and concepts such as human relations, the nation, and the salvation of the homeland, Machiavelli succeeds in devising a new interpretation of morality, virtue, and its relation to the reality of life. By placing human relations and the public interest in the exploration of moral law, he paved the way for Hegel’s conception of concrete morality and ethnic religion. It is according to Machiavelli’s idea that Hegel came up with the basic idea of ​​the phenomenology of the soul, which is to establish the dialectical relationship between heaven and earth. Accordingly, the contradiction between morality and human nature and desire is eliminated, and by cultivating morality from the roots of desire, human desire and nature introduce morality in general in the name of an understandable ethnic and customary spirit. Also, given the possibility that Machiavelli’s effective reality gives him, Hegel succeeds in establishing a relation between idealism and realism and explains the extraction of idealism from within realism. In this regard, the authors try to establish a relation between the logic of Prince Machiavelli and the evolution of the phenomenological logic of the soul by presenting a new interpretation of the modern Prince Machiavelli and showing the great philosophical possibilities that this work offers to philosophers after him, especially Hegel.

This article discusses the modes in Ibn Sina’s logic and enumerates the types of absolute necessity and necessity and examines the relationship between the logical and philosophical meanings of the modes. Mulla Sadra’s interpretation of absolute necessity and its interpretation of eternal necessity are discussed in what follows, and we highlight the philosophical results that Sadra derived from this necessity, and it becomes clear that necessity in existence is of the type of eternal necessity and necessity in quiddity is of the type of essential necessity. The argument ability of the propositions of eternal necessity is also discussed. In the following, we discuss Mulla Sadra’s initiative on the possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility). Existence as the possibility in the sense of need is the same as need, and all beings in this sense are the same as belonging. According to the principles of transcendental wisdom, because of the gradation of being, possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility) may be subject of gradation. According to Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, Mulla Sadra’s initiative in proposing the possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility) is in fact a completion of the discussion of absolute necessity in Ibn Sina. Based on this, we have also, reviewed and expanded his views.

Critical theory has always been understood by contemporary philosophy and sociology as something definite and “known” that finds its main roots in Hegelian-Marxist negation. But less attention has been paid to the question of whether other lineages and societies can be discovered or “invented” for it? Leibniz can be considered a philosopher who, through the lens of his differential philosophy, exerted a marginal but powerful influence on critical theory. Here it is shown how the three aesthetic concepts: Inequality, Autonomy and Harmony, are rooted in a kind of differential calculus and can be explained using concepts such as Identity, Monad and Com-Possibility. In addition to identifying the Leibnizian roots of negative aesthetics, the question has also been raised as to how these concepts relate to differential concepts. Apart from the concept of Inequality in Adorno’s thought, which is somehow in antagonistic relation to the Principle of Identity, the other two concepts can be considered as philosophical-aesthetic forms of mathematical-physical concepts; In a way, the Autonomic Art was shown to be a kind of monad, and Harmony was shown as a form of Continuity. The idea of ​​how a philosophical theory can be inspired by new mathematics or physics should be considered the most promising achievement of this research.

The theory of hyletic data has a crucial function in Husserl’s phenomenology. Relying on this theory, he works out a double schema from sensuous hyle and intentive morphe which allows to cope adequately with many problems in theory of perception and intentionality. In contrast, some phenomenologists and commentators of Husserl, including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Quintin Smith, Gurwitsch and Sokolowski have questioned this theory and, according to their lights, shown that by removing hyletic data and substituting it with a unitary schema of noetic acts not only theory of intentionality would remain unharmed, but Husserl’s phenomenology could get rid of an unreasonable, untenable element without any explanatory value and intuitive validity. In this essay, I would try to show that without the theory of hyletic data, a substantial part of theoretical system of phenomenology, such as theory of constitution, would become dysfunctional. In responding to these criticisms, my emphasis is mainly on the contribution of hyletic data to the theory of constitution, the formal ontological status of hyletic data as an object under the formal category of dependency, as well as the phenomenological status of these data as foreign entities to ego.