فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و هفتم شماره 4 (پیاپی 108، زمستان 1401)

The problem of total susceptibility of thoughts to objective (social) and subjective (individual) circumstances is a major issue propounded by some schools of thought, such as Sophism, humanism, and existentialism. On these accounts, the human thought or mind is the criterion of the truth, and any thought is susceptible to objective (social) and subjective (individual) circumstances. This article draws on the descriptive-analytical and critical method to analyze and criticize this theory in accordance with Shahid Motahhari’s works and views. It answers the following question: Is any thought fully susceptible to its subjective and objective circumstances? The results show that the theory is true of purely materialistic people whose logic or rationale is that of self-interest, and not true of those whose logic is that of innate nature (fiţra) and are trained in the divine school. Furthermore, this theory denies the existence of a reality, holding that the human thought is a product of, and susceptible to, its subjective and objective circumstances, without assigning any autonomy or freedom to human thinking, while humans have the freewill and awareness to avoid the impacts of their subjective and objective circumstances. This theory is based on materialism, skepticism (relativism), and a generalization of the principle of interaction of things and thoughts. It is subject to several objections, including the relativity of truth, denial of the possibility of error in human thoughts, invalidity of all philosophies and thoughts (both divine and material).

Empathy is a human capacity by which they show emotional altruistic responses. By means of this characteristic, one can see the world from another person’s perspective and understand their feeling. Accordingly, people can understand the sufferings and pleasures of others by imagining their circumstances. Empathy plays a crucial role in morality, and in particular, it affects moral judgments. Some critics deny the usefulness of empathy for moral judgments. The critique is articulated in two different ways: there are arguments against the necessity of empathy for moral judgment, and there are arguments for the negative impact of empathy on moral judgment. In the present article, which draws on the descriptive-analytic method, we first study the arguments offered by critics, and then analyze three kinds of relations: causal, constitutive, and explanatory, to reconsider the negative impacts of empathy on moral judgment. We finally conclude that, first, empathy is justified as a constitutive element in explaining moral judgment, and second, while all types of empathy (cognitive and emotional) cannot be deemed necessary for moral judgment and its impacts cannot be seen as fully positive, we can at least show that cognitive empathy is a positive element of moral judgment.

Since its introduction to the Islamic world, “Greek thinking” was always acknowledged by Muslim intellectuals. Some intellectuals entered the Greek thinking after having accepted the possibility of gaining self-sufficient rational knowledge, trying to offer their own speculative interpretation of the Greek thought. Some others believed that there is an essential distinction between Aristotelian self-sufficient rational knowledge and intuitive knowledge based on revelatory doctrines. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, as a major philosopher in the Islamic world, insisted on the genuineness of revelatory wisdom, and yet offered certain ontological principles and dew upon the philosophical heritage from his predecessors to show the significant of knowledge coming from demonstrative syllogism, and in a unique reading, he presented a graded unity between knowledge from dialectical wisdom and illuminative wisdom. The present article uses the analytical method to study the place of the “Greek identity” for Mullā Ṣadrā, which is might be helpful for an understanding of the nature of philosophy in the Islamic period and the relation between reason and revelation in the Islamic world.

Scientific theology is a project in which science is deployed to enrich and defend theology. Alister McGrath is a pioneer of this project. He tries to show that theology and science are compatible and interactive, and the methods and principles of science can be used in theology. The question in the present article is which methods and principles of science are used by McGrath in his project, how his theology is characterized, and finally, what objections can be raised against his project. This is a major theological project, the study of which is instructive. In this article, we draw on the descriptive-analytical method to explain and then evaluate McGrath’s account. In his works, McGrath uses the a posteriori method, the realistic approach, and theory in theology, and his theology is realistic and a posteriori, which gives an outline of the reality. Despite its strengths, scientific theology has deficiencies, including failure to provide plausible arguments for use of science, reliance of theology on philosophy instead of science, taking scientific methods and principles as established, and an optimistic view of science.

In many respects, David Hume pioneered tremendous developments in philosophy, some of which continue until today. A case in which is his introduction of a version of psychologism into different areas of philosophy. In the present article, which uses the descriptive and analytical method, we begin with a description of the presence of the psychologistic element in major parts of Hume’s philosophy, including his discussions of causation, substance, identity, the soul, the origin of morality, and universal concepts. We then analyze his contribution and the importance of his psychologistic approach in various aspects. We aim to show that very influential trends today, including naturalism and interdisciplinary studies in cognitive science, have roots in his psychologistic approach.

In The Organon, the fallacy of begging the question first appears in the fifth chapter of “the sophisticated refutations,” where Aristotle believes that this fallacy is deceptive only when similar things cannot be distinguished from different things. On this definition, begging the question is a circular arguments, in which the conclusion is identically one of the premises. The same interpretation appears in the works of Muslim logicians as well, where most examples are those in which the conclusion and premises differ only in their appearance. In the classical logic, however, reiteration of premises in the conclusion does not amount to the invalidity of the argument. In the present research, which is done with the analytical-analogical method, we propose a structure of the fallacy of begging the question: it does not involve a simple circle where the conclusion appears in the premises; rather, it involves the claim that the circular relation between the premise and the conclusion is a criterion for the truth of a certain proposition. In fact, the formal structure of this fallacy is as follows: (P→P)├ P. Given the truth or falsity of a proposition for an audience, this proposal can explain why certain circles are epistemically misleading to the audience, and others are not. Moreover, the argument “if P, then P” will not be rendered invalid in this way neither syntactically nor semantically.

Existentialism is a philosophical school based on freedom, choice, and responsibility, which seeks a definition for human authenticity. This philosophical attitude is reflected in the plays written by Samuel Beckett, the Irish-French author of the twentieth century and a noble laureate in literature in 1969, including his Endgame. Beckett did not adopt any left or right political positions, and was always an independent intellectual. He never spoke about his own works, which is why everyone interprets his work in their own perspective. People who fail to properly understand Beckett believe that he was disappointed and his works were ambiguous. The present article draws on the library, descriptive, and analytical method to show that in his Endgame, Beckett describes the human condition to criticize statics, depression, and passivity. Most humans, while free, avoid thinking and trying to advance the society and shun their responsibility. Without a will, they are reluctant to change their own and other people’s lives, and with idleness and ignorance, they acquiesce to exploitation. Just like other existentialists, Beckett believes that the human freedom or emancipation lies in self-construction, awareness, and the power of will and choice.