نشریه اندیشه فلسفی
پیاپی 7 (تابستان 1401)

The monotheistic tradition, especially in Abrahamic religions, emphasizes the belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, purely benevolent, just and wise God. Such a view is threatened by various forms of evil-beliefs, and if logical and convincing answers cannot be given to it, it is a serious threat to the tradition of monotheism. In this article, it is shown that due to the presence of the infinite God's activity on one side of the equation of the problem of evil, the most logical solution is to use the total of possible answers in a combined and unified way, because the combination of the existing ways brings closer to the answer and is more convincing in this context. Therefore, while paying attention to the differences between the metaphysical, natural and moral evils from each other, combining answers such as the relativity of evil, evil as a necessity of human free will, seeing evil as a punishment for human sins, evil as the cause of human spiritual excellence, and seeing the world of the hereafter and the importance of the eternal perspective are needed as the final manifestation of the evil philosophy.

Kripke’s modal argument against the descriptive theory of names (descriptivism) is based on the idea that descriptivism cannot explain the intuitions arising from the rigidity of proper names. One answer to the modal argument is widescopism. In this paper, I first introduce the modal argument and widescopism. I, then, explain how Kripke and Soames argue against widescopism. In the next stage, I reconstruct Sosa’s answer to Kripke’s and Soames’s. After that, I turn to Caplan's argument against Sosa's solution. According to Caplan, Sosa's solution leads to the loss of the main and primary intuitions of descriptivism. I try to show that Sosa can defend his solution against Caplan.

The rule "There is No Effect on the Existence Except Allah" is emphasized by the Ash'arites and Mulla Sadra. But each has offered a different interpretation of this rule; According to this rule, the Ash'arites have denied any causation, influence, or effect among the possibilities, and attribute all actions exclusively and directly to God Almighty. But Mulla Sadra, based on his philosophical principles in transcendent wisdom, while proving the near activity of God for all actions, also accepts a role for other possibilities in actions and proves a kind of influence and effect among the obligatory sub-transcendence. In this article, with a descriptive-analytical-critical method, both views in this regard were examined. Accordingly, neither view is flawed. Of course, Mulla Sadra's view, with the explanation given by Mullah Ali Modarres, is largely free from problems.

Aristotle's discussions about Tuche (Τύχη) or fortune have obvious contradictions in two domains of ontology and axiology. In the domain of ontology, he has testified to the existence of fortune as a cause by accident- a cause by accident for an event which has occurred out of a choice based on thought and for a given intention. Aristotle believes that fortune-based affairs are subjects of intention and intellection which emerge from those agents who can take volitional actions. At the same time, he introduced fortune as an anti-rule and instable affair with indeterminate and purposeless causes. He accepted the existence of fortune even in the domain of the actions related to Techne and human happiness. However, he does not attach any value to it in axiology and declares it to be a cause by accident that comes after nature and intellect, even believing that there is no knowledge for it. Moreover, it is valueless in the domain of the action related to human happiness.

Is Meinongian dicopulation justified? This is the main problem in this paper and our hypothesis is that Meinongian dicopulaism is counterintuitive. This is despite the rich list of syntactic and semantic features that Meinongian advocates of the double copula strategy attribute to the Meinongian (internal/encoding) mode of predication in contrast with the ordinary mode of predication. That is what we demonstrate in this paper. We argue that neither of the requirement that Meinongian formulas (i.e. those containing the Meinongian mode of predication) must be monadic; nor that they resist lambda abstraction; nor that logical closure governs them; nor that they can be incomplete (or inconsistent) and nor that they are no way contingent, may succeed in discriminating Meinongian from ordinary predications. Nonetheless, dicopulaistic semantics support our intuitive understanding of abstract objects as sets of properties only whence they embrace the counterintuitive conception of multiple denotations; of either copulas or (abstract) objects. Meinongian dicopulaism does not work.

According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.