نشریه حکمت سینوی
پیاپی 67 (بهار و تابستان 1401)

The common point of the various sections that make up Islamic theoretical philosophy is the apodictique knowledge of the world, although the apodictique principles of each section differ according to the subject of that section. In the classification of immediates, the specific principles of psychology fall into the category of sensa, which Avicenna attributes their perception to the internal senses and the very soul. One question is, based on the functions that Avicenna defines for each of them, whether any of the internal senses can be, next to the soul, the source of knowledge of the soul or not. The only faculty that is a candidate for this is the faculty of estimation. But its function is the perception of particular meanings, not the knowledge of the perception of particular meanings that leads to the knowledge of the soul. Another question is how the soul can know the animal and plant faculties of the soul that are material and impressed in the body. The present article, by examining the functions that Avicenna attributes to the faculties of the soul, shows that none of the external and internal senses of the soul are used for the knowledge of the soul, and that it is the soul itself that knows the apodictique principles of psychology by perceiving itself and its states and actions immediately. In addition, knowledge of the animal and material faculties of the soul is achieved through the direct perception of actions of these faculties, which are at the same time accidents of the soul.

One of the famous divisions in the tradition of Peripatetic philosophy, rooted in Aristotle’s texts, is the division of wisdom into practical and theoretical, and Avicenna, in line with this tradition, introduces this division in his works. But the question of the nature of normative (moral/practical) propositions is controversial. Some commentators consider practical wisdom as belonging to practical intellect and non-cognitive and others, by accepting this belonging, consider it cognitive. There is no agreement in this second category: some claim that propositions of practical wisdom are based on accepted belief and the product of rational construction and the result of the dialectical method, while others consider these propositions to be the product of demonstration; so, they interpret practical propositions realistically. At the same time, practical wisdom is considered a field independent of theoretical wisdom. In this essay, after critical consideration of the first two views, the possibility of two types of realistic interpretations of the nature of practical wisdom from Avicenna’s point of view will be distinguished from each other: according to the first interpretation, practical wisdom is a field independent of theoretical wisdom and has its own principles; then, by criticizing this interpretation, the possibility of the second realist interpretation is defended. Accordingly, propositions of practical reason firstly have a cognitive aspect; secondly, are the result of demonstration and are mind-independent; thirdly, they belong to theoretical reason and are included under theoretical wisdom, in such a way that practical wisdom is dependent on theoretical wisdom in its principles and does not have its own self-evident principles.

The innate human nature (fiṭra</em>) entered Islamic philosophical anthropology in a systematic way after Mulla Sadra, and it was not present in Avicenna’s philosophy. It seems that previous Islamic philosophers did not raise this issue because they considered it a Quranic subject and found it only useful in proving the existence of God. However, if we consider the definition of fiṭra</em> by later Islamic philosophers, we can find topics related to it in a scattered way in Avicenna’s works, too. In this regard, what researchers have paid more attention to has been the relationship between the innate perceptions and the rational faculty in Avicenna, to the extent that some have said that he has identified the innate human nature (fiṭra</em>) with the intellect. However, in the present paper, not the innate perceptions but the innate inclinations have been discussed. The main issue in the current research is whether, in Avicenna’s philosophy, innate human nature has been identified with the rational faculty or there is also a possibility for restoring innate, non-rational inclinations of human nature in his body of works. The findings show that, in his works, Avicenna has mentioned the innate inclinations towards God and beauty; however, there is a controversy over the reference of innate inclinations to moral virtues in his view. What makes Avicenna more among the supporters of the theory of innate human nature is his redefinition of humanity. He emphasizes that rationality is not the human differentia, rather ‘human soul’ is the human differentia, and rationality is just one of the properties of the human soul. His emphasis on the existence of human desire and love for God and beauty, as other components of the human soul, is another evidence of the existence of innate dispositions from his point of view.

‘Approved opinions’ and the method of inferring them are one of the topics that have been briefly discussed in Avicenna’s works. According to him, the intellect alone cannot infer ‘approved opinions’, and other components, such as theoretical opinions, reputation, induction, experience, and expediency, must also play positive roles in inferring them. But the method of inferring ‘approved opinions’ from these different components is a matter of debate: while ‘approved opinions’ fall under the category of conventional premises, and Avicenna talks about substantiating these opinions, there are other places in his work that he speaks of the indemonstrable character of the conventional premises. However, with an analytical look at Avicenna’s discussions in the section on the conventional premises in logic and the functions of practical reason and examining his views on ethics, a new explanation can be provided that clarifies the incompatibility of the aforementioned components with the indemonstrability of conventional premises. This explanation originates from this philosophical point in Avicenna’s work that there is a fundamental difference between substantiation and its premise for inferring the ‘approved opinions’ and demonstration and its premises in classical logic and theoretical philosophy. When he talks about substantiating ‘approved opinions’, Avicenna does not mean to demonstrate them, which is incompatible with his view about the indemonstrability of conventional premises. Contrary to demonstration, substantiation can be based on analogy and induction, that is, ‘approved opinions’ can be inferred analogically and inductively. The analogy can also have different premises, from primary and universal premises to experimental and individual ones. Matters such as manners, passions, and human expediencies can also be included in these premises.

The present paper pays attention to the structure of the components of Avicenna’s philosophical psychology (study of the soul) in some of his works and intends to describe and explain the changes that had happened in them in terms of components and their order. The importance of researching this issue lies in the fact that it can bring us, albeit a small step, closer to an understanding of the logic of the development of the structure in these works. Analysis and description of the structure of the components of Avicenna’s psychology in his works show that, in terms of components, there are differences such as lack, excess, and deficiency in the number of them, and, in terms of the order, it suffers from perturbations such as discontinuity, inversion, and transmission. The comparison of the components and their order in his works, in the sequence of their compilations, show a general course of evolution in them: increasing oscillation between concatenation and fragmentation. The result of explaining the changes in the structure of the components of Avicenna’s psychology indicates that these developments, in addition to some external factors, are due to internal changes that had occurred in the structures of his metaphysics and physics.

Experimental sciences and Islamic philosophy have different explanations for pleasure and pain and the role of the soul and the body in perceiving them. Scientists’ explanation of pleasure and pain is completely physicalistic, and for this reason, they reduce sensual states to purely physical states. Regarding sensual pleasure and pain, Avicenna believes in the equal role of the soul and the body but considers illusory and imaginary pleasure and pain to be among the properties of the physical soul. From his point of view, only intellectual pleasure and pain are properties of the soul as such. On the other hand, according to Mulla Sadra, since pleasure and pain are kinds of perception, and all perceptive powers are abstracted from matter, pleasure and pain are also abstracted from matter. Therefore, what is said in the experimental sciences about the mechanism and physiology of pleasure and pain doesn’t have any relevance in the true explanation of pleasure and pain; they only provide requirements and occasional causes. Examining Avicenna and Mulla Sadra’s explanations of pleasure and pain, we will discuss the positive and negative roles of the soul and body in their formation.

To solve the problem of mental existence, Avicenna emphasized that the definition of substance is that its external existence (fi al-aʿyān) does not need a subject. The mentioned definition applies to both mental and external substances. He concluded by adding ‘its external existence is not in a subject’ to the definition of substance that, on the one hand, the same meaning is reflected in the mental existence of the substance and, on the other hand, the same mental substance is a quality of the soul, that is an accident; so that the problem of ‘single essence under two categories’ will not occur. Mulla Sadra put forward two responses to the problem of mental existence. The first one was based on the theory of the earliest philosophers and the acceptance of incarnate dependence, because of which it would be consistent with Avicenna’s opinion. However, Mulla Sadra said that Avicenna, by adding the ‘fi al-aʿyān’ to the definition of substance, had confined the substantiality to individual substances, which requires the opposition between reality and mentality. Mulla Sadra’s second response is based on the emanative dependence in which the mental existence is considered a product of the soul, in which case, the problem of single essence under two categories will not occur in the first place. This view cannot be reconciled with Avicenna’s solution which is based on incarnate dependence. A Careful look at Avicenna’s statements, however, will show that Mulla Sadra’s criticism of him may be defended by making some qualifications and explanations so that we find out that Avicenna’s analysis had prepared the ground for Mulla Sadra’s first response to the problem by distinguishing tautological predication and common technical predication.

The first concepts, according to Al-Farabi, are the cause of the first degree of actualization for the potential intellect, the origination of free will, the individual human life, and the first step towards higher degrees of perception and action. The origination of the first concepts depends on the origination of the powers of sensation, imagination, and understanding, transcending from their respective acquired knowledge and the actualization of the voluntary component dependent on their acquired knowledge. The interactions of sensory-imaginative stages and the formation of the first knowledge and origination of the free will, on the one hand, and the interactions of the first knowledge and higher degrees of knowledge, on the other hand, reveal the polarization of the free will and the active intellect, and the determinative role of the free will in the epistemic position of every human being. Admitting different kinds of first concepts by Al-Farabi shows his precedence in expanding the first principles of the sciences and his modified foundationalism. The imagination plays a part in different levels of the origination of the first concepts: it is a repository of observation recordings, has roles in the formation of experiences at the level of secondary will, and is a receiver of first concepts and an imitator of agent intellect emanations. Furthermore, the epistemological structure of human beings, because of their incapability to know the true nature of things, is imaginative.

Avicenna’s practical philosophy, unlike his theoretical philosophy, did not gain intellectual power in Islamic philosophical tradition. An investigation into the absence of the human action problem at the center of Avicennan thought could explain both the origin of the theory/practice separation in Avicenna and the subsequent philosophical tradition in the Islamic world, which is based on Avicennan thought. While researchers have considered this problem from non-philosophical perspectives, the present paper concentrates on its philosophical origins in the Avicennan thought and explores his conception of practical philosophy in his discussion about the division of sciences. The finding is that the theoretical and practical philosophies are common in theorization and differ in their practical ends. Thus both the theoretical and practical philosophies are theories, but the theoretical one is a pure theory, and the practical one is a second-order theory. Because of the sovereignty of the theoretical over the practical, practical philosophy also aims to theorize the action. But changeable, individual, and manifold qualities of practice are not understood by the unchangeable, universal, and uniform attributes of theory. As an adherent to the priority and dominance of the theoretical, Avicenna tried to theorize action as much as possible (by the action theory in psychology) and entrusted the rest of it, which was not recognizable by theoretical reason, to another authority, that is religion. Thus in Avicennan encounter with humanitarian action, eventually, the practice would not be an original philosophical problem to necessitate a practical philosophy.

Happiness has been a concern of thinkers for a long time. Aristotle was one of the first thinkers who made happiness the center of his ethical system. According to Aristotle, happiness is the goal of human life and it will be achieved by acquiring moral and rational virtues in this world. Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas, as two leading peripatetic philosophers, respectively, in Islam and Christianity, have presented special interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of happiness. In this research, their interpretation of Aristotle’s theory will be investigated in a comparative way to determine their differences and similarities. The findings of the research show that both philosophers have interpreted Aristotle’s theory of happiness by including elements from their religious traditions. In the practical dimension of happiness, Avicenna adheres to the practical aspects of Islamic law, its divine virtues and vices, and considered their observance as a necessary condition for happiness; Aquinas tries to harmonize Aristotle’s worldly happiness with the religious and other-worldly happiness by bringing in the divine grace and theological virtues. Avicenna places intellectual happiness in the center of his interpretation, but considers the role of Sharia (practical dimension of Islam) as necessary and complementary in Aristotelian happiness; Aquinas considers theological happiness based on the Christian faith to be necessary and have a complementary role, in addition to Aristotelian intellectual happiness.

In Avicenna’s work, pleasure and pain are explained and described in detail. However, not much research has been done on how perception determines pleasure and pain. In this study, two issues have been discussed: first, the place of ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ perception in recognizing pleasure and pain; second, that in Avicenna’s intellectual system, pleasure is not limited to material and sensual pleasures, and non-sensual pleasures have strength and intensity. By explaining and describing the true nature of pleasure and pain, Avicenna seeks to overcome natural and animal pleasure and move towards intellectual and spiritual pleasure. Therefore, in Avicenna’s philosophical system, sensual pleasure means the feeling</em> of the suited, and intellectual pleasure means thinking</em> about the suited. In his interpretation of pleasure, Avicenna, in addition to the word ‘perception’, also used the word ‘attainment’. Since something is attained when its essence is present for the perceiver, pleasure is not attained by taking what is equal to the pleasant thing, but only by attaining the essence of the pleasant thing. In a content analysis of Avicenna’s work, we realize that attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure is one of the most important features of his philosophical system, which he has also described as ‘bliss’.

The relationship between music and the audience plays a significant role in the foundations of music philosophy. In a general view, Avicenna’s musical thought is presented in a scientific, mathematical, and rational structure. But this philosopher has not neglected the importance of issues like the music’s effect on the audience’s soul, understanding of music, and musical experiences. In this research, we have tried to explain the concept of the audience and music from his point of view by analyzing major elements of Avicenna’s music theory, including imagination and mimesis, as well as considering the principles of music science in his thought. Avicenna’s words about the audience in his discussions about mimesis, imagination, music of poetry, pleasure and disgust, culture and music, are not just complementary remarks; Rather, his words in this context are in a rational agreement with his intellectual system and his special methodology in the field, which means that he did not speak about the audience implicitly or only by chance. Basically, in his music theory, the audience has a special place. The present discussion has been organized under four general sections: mimesis and music, musical imagination, music’s effect on the audience, and the audience’s effect on the musical work. In doing this, we have used Avicenna’s first-hand collection of texts, especially his works on musicology, such as ‘A Comprehensive Account of Music’, in the mathematical section of his encyclopedic work, The Book of Healing</em>.