نشریه پژوهش های مابعدالطبیعی
سال سوم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

The main topic of the present article is whether the theory of intertextuality - in its classical form and narration formulated by Julia Kristeva, the author of the word intertextuality - can be used as a way to understand the meaning of language and religious texts? And that using intertextuality can achieve a single, complete and final meaning? And assuming meaning, what will be the state of objectivity in understanding the language of religion and religious texts? We have also answered the question that by emphasizing the intertextuality of texts, such as the dynamics and continuous processing of texts, during intertextuality, can the meaning of the text be equated with the author of the text? To gain meaning, Kristeva emphasizes the two components of subject and language alongside structure. Based on these two important components of Kristeva, which form the basis of the formation of intertextuality, the discussion is examined in two axes. Given that meaning is the result of cooperation and connection between language and subject, what is the purpose of understanding the meaning of religious propositions and basically the language of religion in both written and spoken forms? Does intertextuality provide a way to understand the meaning of the language of religion? As a result, we find that the use of intertextuality in the Valley of the Language of Religion cannot achieve a single meaning due to the dynamics of the language and the subject matter of Kristeva.

One of Theddeos Metz's main concerns is the meaning in life. He peruses and investigates previous theories about the meaning of life to seek out the commonalities of them. Emphasizing that none of them are perfect and complete, he attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to present a perfect theory that contains all the previous theories and at the same time is free from their shortcomings. Therefore, in order to achieve this purpose, he investigates, analyzes and criticizes the previous theories and then seeks out what are the characteristics of a complete theory?. Metz calls his theory "fundamentality theory" and considers it the most perfect theory to date on the meaning of life. In order to reach his final theory, he presents three statements, each of which becomes complete and more complete, respectively. The authors of this article, after investigating Metz's views, critique some of his ideas.What is the special advantage of Metz's theory is its comprehensive description of meaningful issues as the fundamental conditions of human existence. If we look at Metz's theory with a "critical approach", his opinions can be criticized, but even so, if we have an empathetic approach to Metz's thoughts, his researches and intellectual efforts are considered effective and productive for improving the basic conditions of life, and like him, We consider the search for meaning to give meaning to life.

Moral thoughts in the west, has been essentially idealistic. But by appearance of the nihilism, this approach changed and values has been emptied essentially according to Nietzsche' explanation. The human that always has been lived under the shadow of moral values, suddenly find himself in the unfounded moral values. This human cannot have a meaningful live under the shadow of Platonic Forms, and also under the shadow of Christian moral values. This meaningless for the moral values shows itself in the Nietzsche' critic of metaphysics, religion and moral Christianity. Nietzsche critics both radical rationalism in the Greek metaphysic and considers it as a repressive of human feelings, and also critics religion because in his view, religions promote what he named in "slavery morality". This raised a distrust in modern human about religion and theological morality and so it is human himself that determine the moral values not God. This nihilism may have many different consequences. It should be noticed that the Nietzsche' critic of religion and theology is based on Christian religious principles but some researchers generalized his critics to the other theistic religions. In this article we will show that on the basis of Islamic theistic principles, Nietzsche' critics cannot involved in the religion as a whole.

The current study examines Plantinga's anti-evidentialist position through the perspective of applied philosophy of religion, illustrating how epistemological positions can have detrimental practical effects. The article's main claim is that entering the postmodern era and distancing thinkers like Plantinga from general rationality and lowering its standards, including the duty to ground claims on sufficient evidence, has eventually caused reason to be excluded from religious dialogue or to talk about a kind of regional rationality. The consequence of this transformation is the obstruction of dialogue between followers of various religions on the one hand, and believers and non-believers on the other, and lastly, the deprivation of human beings of common and agreed-upon criteria for criticizing each other's beliefs. When the issue of obstruction of dialogue and critique is combined with the fact that there is a close link between beliefs and actions, the problem becomes even worse; because without general criteria for criticizing beliefs, it will be impossible to criticize the actions resulting from them, and all groups, including extremist groups, will be able to absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions and justify their possible crimes in practice.

This paper is aimed to explain the moral behavior toward the problem of suffering. The main question is what the morally correct behavior is as to the problem of suffering and what its essential concomitants are. Philosophers and theologians have endeavored to justify the existence of suffering in the world sometimes relying on purely intellectual efforts and sometimes by paying attention to propositions and reports of the scriptures and combining reason and narration. In this regard, they established theodicies and defenses that are meant for suffering. From this paper’s point of view, we must distinguish between two subjects: (i) the suffering; and (ii) the suffering person; and the concept of morally correct behavior on suffering is formed in line with this distinction. Do intellectual preoccupations such as theodicy and defense have something to do with the morally correct behavior toward suffering? Based on general two titles the answer is presented: theoretical foundations and management of the suffering situation, which respectively include the analysis and definition of concepts such as suffering, theodicy and defense, epistemological perspectives, and the like; and the essence of morally correct behavior on the problem of suffering. Indeed, subjects that will be discussed in the section on theoretical foundations will clarify the role of ethics in the problem of suffering in an analytical way and, leads us to the conclusion that theodicy, by its very nature, has nothing to do with morally correct behavior towards the problem of suffering and doesn’t care about it.

While faith has been the subject of discussion of theology and philosophy of religion, Recently, cognitive science has also entered into this issue. In this research, which is conducted in an interdisciplinary manner in cognitive sciences and philosophy of religion and based on a metaphorical approach, an attempt has been made to show that in the cognitive sciences, in general, and in the conceptual metaphor approach, in particular, Faith is a productive and sensory phenomenon. The ancients considered faith to be a heartfelt acknowledgment and therefore a presence and therefore were not bound by its epistemological definition. But referring to the arguments of this approach, Faith, as a metaphor, is a term for things like trust, confidence, and confidence that is projected and generalized by neurons in the human brain and so in this trend of cognitive sciences, faith is a metaphor that as a result of refinement, a special kind of biological and physical experience is obtained. This Research, while explaining the view of metaphorical approach in cognitive sciences to the concept of faith, and analysis of the results, to provide the ground for the interaction between the literature of philosophy of religion and the literature of cognitive sciences in the category of faith.

At the end of the era when modern man claims superiority and originality and denies everything he doesn't understand and thinks he doesn't exist and knows himself as the leader in the field of existence and knowledge, a tiny creature called the corona virus intelligently challenges his entire existence. has drawn With the spread of the corona virus in the world, different approaches have been presented regarding the emergence and emergence of such a dangerous virus in the world, and every thinker has analyzed this new predicament of modern mankind from his own perspective.
Why the occurrence and spread of Corona and its new strains as well as its unfortunate consequences in the world in the form of the problem of Corona virus is the issue of this article. In this article, from the perspective of the skeptical theism approach, which is one of the answers given to the problem of evil, we will examine how this approach responds to the problem of corona evil, and on the other hand, how the unknownness and special characteristics of this virus can strengthen the claim of skeptical theism?

The epistemological problem of Kant and Dilthey is the objectivity and validity of knowledge in the natural sciences and the human sciences respectively. In this context, they undertake a critique of reason and determine the scope of the theoretical reason’s ability and the concepts applied in acquiring knowledge. However, the two philosophers disagree in different respects: Kant deals with the critique of theoretical reason and delineation of the faculty of judgment, whereas Dilthey introduces the idea of the critique of historical reason characteristic of human sciences and seeks to establish the criterion by which human sciences could be distinguished from natural sciences. To this end, both introduce the concepts and categories involved in acquiring knowledge and justify their application. In this paper, after comparing the views of the two philosophers, we have concluded that given the comprehensive nature of categories of life compared to categories of understanding, and the hermeneutical relationship between them, neither Kant's categories of understanding are equivalent, counterparts to Dilthey's categories of life, nor natural and human sciences are at one level. Rather, the relation between them is derivational one, that is, one is grounded in the other; and Dilthey attempts to discover and provide a foundation of categories of understanding and natural sciences, which are, respectively, the categories of life and human sciences.

Belief in the external world and the problem of the objective reference of ideas is a fundamental question that every epistemological approach tries to provide an answer to. In Descartes's philosophy, according to the cogito principle (cogito ergo sum), first I and then the world are proved, yet the distinction between I and the world, or subject and object, always raises the question of how the objective reference of our ideas is proved. And what are they? Are objects mind-independent? Or are they the same things we see, feel, smell, taste or touch? In other words, are they just sense data or are they imaginary data? And whether objects are mind-independent, but we have perceptions of them and receive sense data from them? Empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have each given reasons for explaining this objective reference. In this article, we first investigate the views of each of these philosophers from the concept of idea and the object, then examine and analyze their beliefs about the origin of ideas and the external world, and try to critically point out the flaws in each. Finally, on two levels: (1) the existence of external objects and (2) their conformity with the ideas of the mind, we investigate the problem of skepticism and show which of these philosophers' beliefs can be considered to lead to skepticism.  And which one cannot believe.

Gilbert Ryle, in his book, The Concept of Mind (1949) discussed about denial of mind, identity of mind and mental states, through his physicalism and reductionism approaches. On a basis of Descartes’ dualism, he argued that believing in the existence of mind alongside mental states, is a category mistake that has baffled philosophers. He believed we should not relate mental states to a substance called mind, as we relate physical states to the body; Mind is but a name for a series of applied mental states and has no existence beyond words.
            Ryle’s main issue is his inaccurate understanding of mind’s inception and its connection to the body. It would appear that we can present a different explanation of substantiality of mind and its contrast with mental states by referring to Sadra’s viewpoint of mind’s inception and its connection to the body, which Ryle's problems are not directed towards. According to this information, a substance named mind exists which mental states are based upon.

One of the disputes between the theologians was recognition of the first duty upon the Mukallaf (the religious duty-bound). The Mo’atazeleh and Asha’ereh theologians consider recognizing the Almighty God through the reasoning to be the first Wajib (Islamic duty). Some consider the reason behind it to be intellectual, and some others believe it is Sam’ee. However, they had no conflict in terms of the original topic. With this approach, the distance between the faith and the disbelief is based on the knowledge or ignorance of the Almighty God, in a way that the one who knows God is considered a believer and the one who does not know him is an unbeliever.
Ghazali, the fifth century’s theologian, opposed this thought. He took the knowledge or ignorance of the Almighty God through reasoning out of the circle of belief and disbelief. In this regard, he banned immersing in theology except for some limited cases and separated the faith from recognition (of God). With this approach, he obliged the public to imitate and surrender to beliefs, and whoever disobeyed deserved punishment.
The current study has analyzed Ghazali’s thoughts on intellectual reasoning for recognizing the Almighty God by using a descriptive-analytical method and believes that Ghazali has not obliged the Mukallaf to provide reasoning for religious principles and has supported the imitation in terms of beliefs and its derivatives.

Dreaming has historically been the source of human inspiration. The Qur'an mentions the dream of the Prophet of Islam in three cases, as it states the dream of some previous prophets. According to the verses of the Qur'an, the true dream is not limited to the Prophets of God, just as Joseph's two companions in prison saw their future destiny in a dream. So, the Qur'an does not believe that what appears in dreams is the product of human imagination and has no validity, but the Qur'an speaks of the true dreams of prophets and even non-prophet.
Describing the beliefs of Muslims, John of Damascus, a Christian saint, said that they believed that their Prophet had received the Qur'an in a dream. The claim of the revelation of some verses of the Qur'an regarding dreams is also seen in Islamic narrations, as the revelation of the first five verses of Sūrah Al-Alaq is considered a dream by Tabari. Moreover, the book Sahih Muslim has announced the revelation of Sūrah AI-Kawthar in a light dream of the Messenger of God. Thus, claiming the revelation of a part of the Qur'an in a dream does not violate the consensus of narrators and Islamic scholars.

One of the most important issues in Psychology is the unity or plurality of the human souls. The three views of specific unity, specific plurality and analogicity unity are the result of research by Muslim scholars on this issue. According to what exists as an official reading of Ibn Sina's philosophy, in works such as Shifaa, he raises the issue of the specific unity of human being and believes that the soul, which constitutes the essence and truth of all human beings, is a kind of It is one and only, and the difference between human beings is only in the accidents and the secondary perfections. However, in some of his statements, there is evidence that it can be said that Ibn Sina has expressed the different levels of the human souls in the form of two specific of contrast and analogicity unity. This article analyzes and critiques this issue in the framework of the principles of Sinavi wisdom and based on the  his words.

A Comparative Study of the Meaning of Life from the Perspective of Allameh Tabatabai and Martin Heidegger One of the common concerns of Allameh Tabatabai and Martin Heidegger has been the meaning of life and the meaning of life for them is the purpose of life. Each has responded to it according to their own intellectual foundations. Allameh proves the purposefulness of the created world, including man, through the attribute of God's wisdom. He believes that living in the light of belief in God and adherence to morality and human behavior makes sense But from Heidegger's point of view, what makes Dasein meaningful is being in the world.   Contrary to Allameh, Heidegger believes that man himself creates values ​​and that no external criteria can be set for values. He divides Dasein into genuine and non-genuine based on attention to death and liberation from the domination of others. Both philosophers believe in the meaning of life, with the difference that Allameh believes that man discovers the meaning of life    But Heidegger says Dasein falsifies the meaning of life. Both philosophers believe in the meaning of life, with the difference that Allameh believes that man discovers the meaning of life, but Heidegger says that Dasein forges the meaning of life and Allameh's intellectual basis is to prove the meaning of the Qur'an and human nature, while Heidegger Heidegger's intellectual basis is Dasein's conscience and death

Deism appeared at a crucial time in the formation of the new West and developed a particular view of God, the world, and religion. Therefore, understanding deism and its consequences can enrich our understanding of modernity and reveal the way to avoid possible mistakes and deviations. since this movement was not treated equally in Europe and the United States, in order to limit the scope of the discussion, only French deism will be examined, which is the center of revolutionary changes appeared in eighteenth-century Europe.
We try to show the impact of this intellectual movement on the culture and thought of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, as well as explaining the anti-Trinitarian origin of French deism. The role and influence of French deism on the rejection of revealed religion and the establishment of the authority of modern science are among the most important influences of this movement on the French Enlightenment culture. Hence, the founders of this movement can be identified by characteristics such as scientism, promotion of secular ethics, and reduction of lordship to creativity.

This paper discusses the relationship among religious law (Sharia), wisdom (Hekmat) and mysticism. Considering history and elements of time and place in scientific discussions and subjects has fundamental role in their explanation and elaboration of their subsequent results. The present study aims to observe its historical aspect and to explicate its climax between sixth to the first half of eighth Hijri centuries in the Islamic intellectual circumstances especially in rational and geographical realms of Azarbaijan; likewise, the present study intends to present a justified display of Mokhtar Theory (accumulation and incorporation) among the approaches which are library-based methods. The present study’s findings include: 1. The subject is an ancient discourse in most of the Islamic philosophy sects. 2. Considering proportion and relationship of these three concepts, various attitudes have been presented that the most acceptable one is theory of accumulation and incorporation. 3. The top scholars who introduced the process of rational realm of Azarbaijan are Sheikh Shahabaddin Sohravardi and Khajeh Nasiraddin Tosee and their followers in sixth to eighth Hijri centuries. 4. These scholars’ planning in sixth to eighth Hijri centuries provided the prefect idea of accumulation and incorporation in Sadraee Philosophy.