نشریه متافیزیک
سال چهاردهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 34، پاییز و زمستان 1401)

The category of time is one of the fundamental philosophical conceptions in any system of thought it's explanation forms the universal schema of that philosophical system. Bloch's complex and fantastic metaphysics needs a new theory of time and can't accept the normal conception of time. Thus he, based on a syncretic approach, uses and combines different meanings of time to formulate a multiform schema of time. Our question is: what is the meaning and role of category time in Bloch's philosophy for answering this question we must first know multiple meanings of time. This article shows that time in Bloch's philosophy is not a question of the past, the present, and the future being made up of a sequence of events, which implies a realness of an event, but rather that all three exist as a unified and yet open process of indeterminacy within the dialectic of becoming. The universe and history are not a sequence of events but a total process of event generation and events exist merely as the product of processes. So, this processual metaphysics depends on operator Not-Yet and will make a futuristic utopia that is timeless. This syncretic approach with Bloch's intention for making a cosmological and historical utopia cause his theory of time doesn't have logical coherency and methodical constancy.

Mullā Ṣadrā is today the most famous thinker in Muslim world to whom origin of the well–known fourth dimension – i.e. Eternalism– is historically attributed by many writers. But we will show that he has given up the four–dimensionalism. Although he has summarized and almost repeated some points of Mīr Dāmād in Sharḥ al–Hidāyat al–Athīrīyyah, he has not dealt with the current fourth dimension and not used any explicit passage in favor of the four–dimensionalism in his other works to allow us to attribute it to him in them. It is todays usually immediately insisted on Ṣadrā’s substantial movement and the expression of “extension” (Imtidād) in the case of physical natures as evidences of his four–dimensionalism; but even this is absolutely irrelevant to the current fourth dimension. Rather, the evidences show that Ṣadrā – except in Sharḥ al–Hidāyah – has given up the four–dimensionalism of the ancestors in his other works. So, we will continue to try to inquire the very giving up.

In this article, I, firstly, articulate a particularistic metaphysical ground and stress that it is plausible: the moral relevance of act-descriptions is variable according to the particular situation; positive valence and negative valence of act-descriptions can change in different situations. But, secondly, I explain against the particularist that moral principles are compatible with the context-dependence of the moral relevance of act-descriptions in at least two respects. a) Moral principles are indeterminate in acting on them because practical principles fundamentally do not (completely) determine the action. In each particular situation we should judge which act-token to do or which way of avoiding an action to implement. Applying moral principles requires context-sensitivity. b) Moral principles are defeasible. Defeasibility of practical principles, of which moral principles are a kind, means that we can block following them in a particular situation. Moral principles as extended determinations are not abandoned or refuted if we cannot in a particular situation act on them. Blocking moral principles is acceptable at least under two conditions. First, when a moral principle does not include some situations. Second, when acting on a moral principle is in conflict with acting on another moral principle or principles.

According to the “No Miracle argument” (NM), the predictive and explanatory success of science would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain unless mature scientific theories were approximately true, and the theoretical entities postulated by them exist. On the contrary, in his version of “the Pessimistic Meta-Induction argument” (PMI), Laudan, by providing a list of past successful and yet false theories, rejects any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. In response to Laudan, based on the referential approach, realists have tried to show that the central terms of many past successful theories refer after all, and their postulated entities do exist. Moreover, theses terms and their referents have been preserved in the successive theories. In this paper, first, NM and PMI will be explained. Then, the most important realists’ solutions to PMI in the referential approach will be evaluated critically. It will be shown that none of these solutions can rebut PMI conclusively. In the final part of the paper, however, it will be explained briefly that even if realists could not rebut the PMI challenge, the advantage of the referential approach is that still allows them to save a weak version of scientific realism, entitled “existential realism”.

The question of the possibility of the value of truth and falsehood about moral propositions, based on the type of answer to it, builds the discussion of cognitivism and non-cognitivism in the philosophy of ethics. As a proponent of non-cognitivism, Richard Mervyn Hare, by proposing the theory of prescriptivism, on the one hand denies the value of the truth and falsity of moral propositions, and on the other hand, enumerates four conditions for the morality of propositions, which are: prescriptivism, rationality, generalizability and principles. In contrast, cognitivists who have criticized this view for decades try to challenge Hare's prescriptivism by using the problem of thick moral concepts that make them feel influenced by the world. While skeptical of the issue of thick moral concepts as a critique of prescriptivism, the authors considers it a tendency towards a kind of relativism that is itself questionable. In addition, the authors believe that Hare's theory has important Difficulties, such as the possibility of unnecessarily turning predicative propositions into a comprehensive and prescriptive one, And the comprehensiveness and non-obstruction of his proposed conditions for the morality of propositions are among them.

One of the most significant issues and challenges of human existence since the emergence and advancement of technology is "being human." The meaning of "being human" (in this research), as opposed to machines, is existence with passion. According to the Danish philosopher "Søren Kierkegaard," passion is the most critical driver of human life. There is a belief that with the advancement of technology, human beings are getting closer to machines. Humans are entering the era of artificial intelligence and "transhumanism," which "Max Tegmark" calls "Life 3", not only the survival but also the existence of humans is endangered.. About two centuries ago, Kierkegaard, in his diaries and the book "Two Ages: A Literary review" pointed out that man is moving away from the passion in the modern age. The current research seeks to find the relationship between passion as the driving force of human life and the position of humans with machines and living in the era of transhumanism and artificial intelligence by examining Kierkegaard's opinions about the present age and human passion. As a result, by referring to Kierkegaard's theories, it is possible to understand that the best way to escape passivity for humans in the age of technology is to choose the authentic self and prove the spiritual existence of humans in the moral and religious stages, provided that such an idea is converted into action.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the place of metaphysics of light in the thought of Saint Bonaventure. Bonaventure is one of the mystical philosophers of the thirteenth century who had many influences on later thinkers. How man achieves fixed and common truths is a fundamental issue that Saint Bonaventure has faced in epistemological discussions. He uses the theory of light to explain this issue. In this article, while proposing different views and approaches to Bonaventure's theory of light, an attempt has been made to examine issues related to the metaphysics of light. The results show that Saint Bonaventure uses light as an analogy to communicate with God and enjoy Him in life. A God-centered view that seeks to reconcile the philosophical search for truth with the ultimate truth of Christian revelation. Despite his influence on Aristotle's thought in the form of the physics of light, in the general synthesis of his thought, the use of Neoplatonic and Augustine's ideas and the metaphysics of light is evident. "Lux" and "lumen" are terms used by Bonaventure to describe the metaphysics of light. In his metaphysical thought, light is the most original form on which all other forms depend, and whatever it is, it is formed through the basic form of light.

The need for philosophy in science and utilizing philosophy in research works have been emphasized consistently by many experts. In recent decades, with the increasing growth of new technologies, the explanation of the relationship between these technologies and philosophy and the situation of philosophy in identifying these technologies have become vital. Transhumanism is a technological and futuristic movement its experts acknowledge their ideas to be the philosophical inheritors and revivers of the ideals of the Enlightenment. The present study aims to understand and analyze the philosophical origins and hotbeds of transhumanism in the context of humanism and the Enlightenment, as two significant intellectual-philosophical west currents, and perfectionism as a philosophical idea. Considering this origin, one can also find the philosophical foundations of transhumanism under humanistic ontology, pragmatist epistemology, and technological values; which are the basis of their attitude toward man and the enhancement of his nature.

The most important discussion of the philosophy of ethics is the ontology of ethics, and the most important discussion of the ontology of ethics is moral realism and anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any imperative, recommendation, feeling, taste, agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality; however, anti-realism does not consider any reality for the morality other than an imperative, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement. This research has analyzed Sheikh Ishraq's writings on ethics in a rational way. Validity of existence in his view has become an illusion of his non-realism in moral philosophy, but in addition to the rejection of the reason he provides for validating philosophical concepts, it is possible to present an interpretation of his view that considers moral concepts to be real; In this case, his point of view is included in the category of moral realism, stating that the meaning of moral concepts are concepts of the Sankh Noor that are considered real. This research has explained the realistic approach of Sheikh Eshraq through the realistic concepts of ethics, aesthetics, and eschatology, introducing the way of knowing and explaining how to create moral virtues.

This article shifts from doubt about the meaning of a commonly neglected phrase in Aristotle’s Metaphysics about the relation between metaphysics and myth into a fundamental question about the relation between metaphysics and emotions. The contemporary philosophical trend of reviving emotions, with all of its advantages in different felids of philosophy, has been almost silent in the field of metaphysics. The historical cliché of reason/emotion (also, reason/body) separation, among other things, has overshadowed the possibility of revising/ re-reading metaphysical texts through the lenses of constitutional emotions. This article develops a different narrative about the nature of metaphysics in Aristotel’s thought through re-reading some of his works. According to this narrative, certain emotions, including wonder (thauma), praise, pleasure, and desire, alongside the “nous”, play a constitutional role in the construction of the Aristotelian structure of metaphysics. I will discuss that the concept of “nous/ reason” cannot suffice for giving a comprehensive explanation for the tools and methods of metaphysics. According to the constitutional role of emotions, reductive interpretations of Metaphysics should be radically challenged in that they have ignored the emotional foundations of metaphysics during the history of philosophy. Moreover, I will suggest that the new narrative of metaphysics can provide some material to revise the traditional understanding of the soul’s parts, the soul’s unity, and relation between soul and body in Aristotle’s thought.