نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال پنجاه و چهارم شماره 2 (پیاپی 109، پاییز و زمستان 1401)

The issue of the creation of the universe has been a challenge for philosophers, theologians and physicists of all ages. The purpose of this research is to study and compare Hawking’s view on the creation of the universe with that of Mullā Ṣadrā based on the teachings of transcendent philosophy in a descriptive-analytical manner. In this paper, the epistemological and ontological foundations of the two perspectives are compared to clarify the commonalities, disagreements and the advantages. It will be revealed that the concepts of “nothing” and “vacuum” in Hawking’s theory of the creation are different from the concept of vacuum in the transcendent philosophy and hence, do not mean pure non-existence. Referring to the religious teachings and based on his philosophical principles, such as the ontological primacy of existence and substantial motion, as well as the idea of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of non-existence), Mullā Ṣadrā proves the temporal origination of the universe (in a specific sense). According to him, Divine emanation is eternal, constant and inseparable from God and thus, the claim that the creation has begun in a real or imaginary time is rejected.

According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, abstract concepts are understandable through the objective concepts within the framework of conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphors are found in everyday language and in scientific texts. The direction of nearness-remoteness in its literal meaning refers to the relationship between objects in the sensible world. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, has used this direction to describe metaphysical affairs. The application of nearness-remoteness to explain philosophical concepts and principles can be formalized within the framework of the theory of conceptual metaphor. Some conceptual metaphors related to nearness-remoteness in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works are as follows: the dispositional possibility as nearness to or remoteness from the actuality, the possibility as nearness to actuality and impossibility as remoteness from actuality, the creatures as things that are near to or remote from God, God as the nearest thing to any existent, perfecting and worshiping as becoming near toward the Divine Essence, the immediate cause as the near cause, the complete cause as the near cause and the incomplete cause as the remote cause, love and affection as nearness, and becoming similar as approaching.

The issue of Divine Names and Attributes and the human temperament is one of the most fundamental topics of Islamic philosophy and mysticism. Ṣadrā has discussed the Attributes of the Lord in the descending and ascending arcs of the circle of being and has mentioned the temperament as “manner” or “secondary nature”. This research, using a descriptive-analytical method, aims to investigate the view of the transcendent philosophy about the effect of the Divine Names on the human temperament. The findings of the research show that according to Mullā Ṣadrā, humans have the same nature but different temperaments, which are also referred to as primary and secondary nature. The primary nature is the manifestation of the Name of Mercy according to which all human beings are created. The human heart is between the two Names of “the Guider” and “the Misguider”, which according to its nature and talent, and with its voluntary actions, it can become a manifestation of either of them. On the one hand, God’s Names play a key role in the formation of the human temperament and have a significant impact on his happiness or misfortune, and on the other hand, this causal impact in the descending arc does not prevent man’s free will to existentially actualize and manifest the Names. Also, decree and destiny find a mystical explanation in this issue.

This article seeks to find the foundation of Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali’s theological, mystical and ethical thought. The purpose of what Ghazali teaches as morality is Sufi education. Ghazali’s mystical ethics is reflected in the form of self-discipline in Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn. This book is one of the most important theological, mystical and ethical works that has always been the focus of the scholars of the Islamic world and beyond. By relying on the ethical and mystical rereading of religious sources and texts, Ghazali caused major changes and reconsiderations in epistemology, ontology, methodology, anthropology and sociology. His mystical path and conduct enjoys ten main stages or positions, each of which pertains to obtaining one of the attributes leading to salvation or the “rescuers”. Ghazali’s mystical and ethical thought originates from his Islamic theological perspective. Although Ghazali rejected philosophy and Kalam in several works, such as Iljām al-ʿAwām ʿan ʿIlm il-Kalām, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, and Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, he himself used these two sciences in some instances. Ghazali advises masses not to get close to Kalam and philosophy. He does not ignore any of mysticism, ethics and politics but has a comprehensive perspective towards them. Ghazali is one of the famous scholars in the Islamic world in jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, mysticism, ethics and other Islamic sciences.

Motion is one of the important philosophical issues whose proponents from the Ancient Greek to the present have proposed different interpretations. One of the common interpretations in Islamic philosophy is the “gradual passing from potentiality to actuality.” Now the question is, in the view of the contemporary commentators, what is potentiality and actuality according to the principles of the Transcendent philosophy? And according to the new sense of potentiality and actuality in the Transcendent philosophy, how could motion be interpreted? This paper, through the descriptive-analytical method, shows that according to Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles, and from the perspective of his contemporary commentators, potentiality and actuality are abstract concepts and philosophical secondary intelligibles that are mentally abstracted through comparing the weak stage of a moving existence with its next intense stage. According to the above reading, the interpretation of motion to the “gradual passing from potentiality to actuality” will be a subjective epistemological interpretation and its definition as “existential intensification” will be an objective ontological definition. The article seeks to explain these fundamental points.

This study analyzes the mystical attribute of sincerity in terms of the states of spiritual journey in some of the most important mystical works up to the ninth century A.H. This study, in a descriptive-analytical method, shows that sincerity, in the words of some mystics, has undergone content transformation in each of the three levels of spiritual journey. As in the first state of the journey (differentiation), it has a positive nature, requiring effort. At this level, the seeker strives to take on moral virtues and avoid moral vices, and is known as purifying (mukhliṣ). In the second state (annihilation), the Divine attraction annihilates the seeker from their metaphorical existence and all their attributes. Therefore, sincerity in the mystic finds a negative sense, meaning that they are no longer assumed as purifying, but as purified (mukhlaṣ). In the third state (persistence), the mystic becomes the manifestation of the Divine attributes and names. Hence, sincerity after being negated in the second level, again finds a positive but evolved meaning. Also, the trait of purifying here is allowed to be attributed to both God and the mystic. The results of this study shows that although most mystics’ statements about sincerity are consistent with the characteristics of the differentiation state, some others’ words extend sincerity to the states of annihilation and persistence, too.

Al-Asfār and the Nicene Creed are among the most important works of Islamic philosophy and the world of Christianity. In these two sources, especially al-Asfār, the concepts of emanation and birth are frequently repeated. By examining these two concepts, the following results are obtained. First, the analysis of the two concepts leads us to common implications such as the emergence of something from something, eternity, cognation between Father and Son, or emanator and emanation, and the necessity of the existence of the intermediaries in the descending arc. Second, these implications are accepted in both sources. Third, in these sources, emanation and birth are used interchangeably. Fourth, the philosophy of Plotinus, in which emanation, burst, and eruption are central concepts, has had an impact on these two sources. Both perspectives, however, have mentioned justifications to avoid the materialistic sense of God, which finally show the closeness of the two concepts in the two sources.

Although, following the Ahl al-Bayt (P.B.U.T.), the Imamiyya have believed in the real agency of the human and the negation of predestination, the Imamiyya theologians have presented different readings and explanations of the human agency in different historical periods. In the school of Ḥillah, where the theological method and basic concepts of theologians approached philosophy, the theologians’ explanation of agency had undergone a change. This study attempts to show that although the theologians of Ḥillah emphasized the role of man in the emergence of actions by proving the power to act and to avoid before performing the action, and the will that determines the power, they distanced themselves from their predecessors by accepting the model of philosophical causality. In the explanation of Ḥillah theologians, on the one hand, the power and will of man in a longitudinal system are the effects of the will and power of the Almighty, and on the other hand, they are considered as the complete cause of the act which necessarily implies the essential issuance of the action.

In modern philosophy, Kant had the greatest influence on Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher uses the term intuition many times in On Religion and his other works, but is he referring to the concept of intuition the same as Kant had in mind in his transcendental philosophy? In this article, after presenting a brief historical overview of the concept of intuition up to the modern era, it is examined in Schleiermacher’s thought according to On Religion. Schleiermacher’s concept of intuition and the question of whether intuition is conceptual or non-conceptual in On Religion is part of the research question. The concept of intuition is comparatively studied according to Schleiermacher and Kant. Richard Crouter, the translator of On Religion and one of the experts in Schleiermacher’s thought, considers Schleiermacher’s concept of intuition to be the most similar and compatible to that of Kant. However, the current research shows that despite Schleiermacher’s influence from Kant, his concept of intuition is rooted in Platonic thought, for Schleiermacher’s concept of intuition, though enjoying similarities to Kant’s sensory intuition, does not consider intuition in relation to sense. He did not even explain intuition in the same way as Kant’s rational intuition; rather, he uses it correlationally with the feeling to explain the essence of religion. According to him, intuition is connected with the essence of religion and feeling and, in a way, leads a person to uncovering.

The truth of the human soul is one of the fundamental issues of psychology and the basis of various ontological, anthropological, and epistemological theories. In expressing the truth of the soul, Plato believes in natural intellectual dualism, which is based on his view on the theory of remembrance and the allegory of the cave. By presenting two definitions of the soul, Aristotle tries to present the true limit of the soul, which seems to be a problematic definition. Fārābī agrees with Plato in dualism and the inability of man to reach the true limit of things, and unlike Aristotle, he denies that the man attached to the matter can understand and offer the true limit of essences; Instead, he considers definition possible only through the things’ properties and implications, which leads him to offer different definitions for the soul. Fārābī’s definitions show his special attention to the issue of happiness, its principles such as natural and voluntary characteristics in attaining the state of the actual intellect, and its implications such as the effects of the practical intellect of the rational faculty. The selection of the word “perfecting” shows the comprehensiveness of the philosophical discussions regarding happiness in the definition of soul. Fārābī dealt critically with the discussions in al-Jam‘, and considered the functional definitions in al-Jadal and Kitāb al-’Akhlāq as the duties of the rational soul.

One of the main concepts in the words of philosophers used in metaphysics in its particular and general sense and in natural philosophy is infinitude with its different types. In the meantime, the sense appropriate for the Necessary is the infinite in terms of intensity which must be interpreted correctly. What is meant by infinite in terms of intensity is existential vastness and intensity. This interpretation is based on the specific principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, such as the ontological primacy of existence, particular gradation in its particular sense, causality in the sense of manifestation, and the simple reality. There are many proofs for God’s infinitude, whose most important consequence is proving the individual unity of existence. Analyzing the individual unity of existence leads us to conclude that there is a mutual implication between these two concepts, meaning that one can infer each from the other, and all the positive proofs for each will work for the other.