نشریه آموزه های فلسفه اسلامی
سال هفدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 30، بهار و تابستان 1401)

An article claims by increasing the process of doubting and creating doubt on the ontological principles of Islamic philosophy to have provided innovative flaws on the theory of emanationism, centered on the doctrine of analogical gradation (modulation) in all philosophical schools to show that basing the theory of education on Islamic philosophy is invalid and useless. This article after expressing the scattered words and producing various doubts and choosing the title “Consequences in Education” intends to reach a novel theorizing about the “purpose and stages of education” with the unaccepted obligations of Islamic philosophy! What has been mostly used to criticize the article is a section of the topic of modulation of existence and arguing about some scattered ontological matters, and it has not even mentioned the psychological (self-knowledge) and anthropological positions and the stages of human growth (development) in Islamic philosophy in order to be able to achieve the stages of education in line with the stages of growth in the Islamic philosopher’s perspective and open a seemingly logical way to the audience for doubts. Nevertheless, the article claims to have achieved innovation and rejected two sequencing (Arabic: توالی, succession, consequentialism) and parallelist (Arabic: توازی) theories and has made its way to create a third opinion, which is the combination of both. The analysis of the claims of the article and its accusations against Islamic philosophy, particularly in the field of education will reveal the criterion for distinguishing true criticism from doubting.

The new emerging spiritualities have a special and new look at man and his place in existence, which in many cases leads to humanism. One of them is a mysticism missioned by Deepak Chopra who believes that man has absolute ability through his mind that he can become the same level as the Almighty God and capture both the material world and the universe and cause both the sickness or healing of his body. On the other hand, Mullā Ṣadrā (Persian: ملا صدرا, Arabic: صدر المتالهین) while emphasizing on the potential abilities of the human soul and mind believes that they can cause creativity in themselves and others, if they evolve and approach (endearment) God the Almighty, and they can interfere in the possibility existence as vicegerents of Allah with Divine permission (by the Divine leave of Allah). This research is critical that intends to critically examine Chopra’s view on the subjectivist man based on Ṣadrā’s views. The findings of this study indicate that the human mind from Ṣadrā’s point of view cannot be counted as the third realm of human existence alongside the soul and body, but it is soul modes and following religious orders strengthens and enhances the abilities of the soul and sa'ādah (Arabic: سعاده, the happiness) in the hereafter and in the present world.

This research has put the negation of the rule of necessity and the principle of causality in Kant’s practical philosophy and post-Kantian theology to the test of Islamic philosophy by a citation method. According to this research, concepts such as transcendental creation, transcendental negation, dialectic, Dasein (existence) and the idea are the watchwords that are the common boundary between the two theological sects of Mu'tazilism (Arabic: المعتزله al-muʿtazilah or اعتزال iʿtizāl) and Ashʿarism (Arabic: الاشعریه: al-ʾAshʿarīyah, or Ashʿarī) in Islamic theology and two currents of liberal theology and dialectical theology are in Christian theology, and these currents have been inevitably led to the negation of the rule of necessity and the principle of causality, which had no result other than the entering of the imagination of composition in the essence of God, accepting the notion of “the existence of Ajwaf” (Arabic: وجود اجوف , hollow existence) and preventing Sharia (Arabic: شریعه, Romanized: sharīʿa) law in favor of free will. This was the immediate consequence of the separation of philosophy from the defensive apologetics or the subordination of philosophy to the defensive apologetics in theology according to this research. Returning to the early philosophical order under a monotheistic worldview and subordinating the defensive apologetics to metaphysical philosophy is the suggested solution of this research to solve the issue.

The existence of illusions in perceptual perceptions have many philosophical challenges; so, it is important to study the views and solutions of Muslim philosophers in this issue. The information in this article has been collected using a library method and analyzed by using a rational method in such a way that firstly, the quiddity of sensual knowledge and the process of its emergence in the field of body and soul are discussed, then the challenges arising from the issue of perceptual illusion have been explained, and then the way Muslim sages face the issue of perceptual illusion and its challenges are discussed. It has been concluded by analyzing the views of Muslim sages that the issues of the sages’ confrontation regarding perceptual illusion are: 1- Non-attribution of perceptual perception to mistake (Arabic: خطا, khaṭā) and correctness (Arabic: صواب, ṣawāb, right) 2- The effect of the faculty of estimation and estimated on perceptual illusion 3- Discovery and correction of perceptual illusion through intellectual faculty. It is clear according to the author by analyzing and separating the epistemological and ontological aspects of perceptual perceptions that perceptual perceptions can be true and false in the true sense and their epistemological validity is based on thought and reasoning; hence perceptual perceptions and sensible propositions are removed from the axioms and certainties.

Muslim philosophers have been influenced by the views of ancient Greek philosophers in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality, so that the essence of the views presented in the Islamic era can be seen in the opinions of Plato and Aristotle. Avicenna, like Aristotle, has denied the theory of Forms (theory of Ideas) and rejected Plato’s view about the general and partial issue. Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī has accepted the Platonic theory of Forms, but he has denied the Platonic generality in the issue of generality (generic) and partiality and has had a common opinion in explaining of “generic” (Arabic: کلی) with Aristotle and Avicenna, which means that he, like Avicenna, considers generality to be the same of mental concept as independently subsistent. Of course, Shaikh al-ʿIshraq (Master of Illumination) has opposed Avicenna in some minor aspects of this issue and has presented innovations. This article has explained Suhrawardī’s point of view on the issue of generality (generic) and partiality by an analytical-descriptive method and studied the reason of his tendency to Peripatetic explanation of the “generic”. Suhrawardī’s critiques of Sinavi’s approach have also been explained in this analytical study, and their impact on Mullā Ṣadrā’s critique on Peripatetic’s theory has been shown. Also, Mullā Ṣadrā’s encounter with Suhrawardī’s view on the issue of generality (generic) has been analyzed.

Theologians in proving the will of God (the divine will) use an argument based on certain preliminaries (premises) and principles (foundations) that have serious problems. These problems are noticed by scholars who have different principles but have accepted and cited this argument. Summary of the argument: There are only some objects among the possible existences (contingent beings) and these objects are created at a certain time. Allocating existence to them and allocating them to their specific time requires an individualizer (Arabic: مخصص, specificative, specificator, particularizer). This individualizer (specificative), which cannot be knowledge or power, proves another attribute for God, called will. This argument, which is formed in Ashʿarism (Arabic: الاشعریه: al-ʾAshʿarīyah, or Ashʿarī) and despite the fundamental and content problems by some Mu'tazilism (Arabic: المعتزله al-muʿtazilah) theologians, Imāmiyyah and some scholars have repeated it, have some problems such as preference of one thing over the other without a justified cause undue preference (Arabic: ترجیح بلا مرجح, distinction without a difference), the temporal contingency of the origination of the world, the allocation of will to material and temporal affairs, the possibility of divine will, etc. In addition, there are some problems in the completeness and correctness of this argument, including internal conflict, the lack of exclusiveness of the individualizer (specificative) in the will, the possibility of generalizing the characteristics of the will to knowledge and power, and as a result, the possibility of replacing these two attributes as the individualizer (specificative). We intend in this article to prevent the mistakes caused by this argument through examining these problems and criticizing its argument.

Eschatology and anthropology have a decisive role in human happiness (Arabic: سعاده, Romanized: sa'ādah) and it can be the foundation of human happiness and his distance from misery, if it would be based on revelation and rational reasoning. The embodiment of deeds is one of the most important issues in these two fields. The embodiment of deeds means the formation of beliefs, morals (ethics), attributes, dispositions, will, deeds and effects of a person and the process of becoming of a person of the same; in fact, man creates his own truth with these matters and becomes revivification with them. This issue in this article is discussed based on the opinions and thoughts of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. He, who is a capable commentator and a philosopher full of knowledge, explains this issue in the field of embodiment of deeds by using the Qur'anic revelation and the strong principles of transcendental wisdom (Ḥikmat al-muta'aliya). The truth of the embodiment of deeds by addressing a series of principles adapted from his opinions is explained in this article and which by expressing these principles and extracting their branches, the truth of the issue of the embodiment of deeds is revealed and hence a profound interpretation of the facts of the resurrection of human beings is revealed and many doubts about the important field of resurrection and the quality of reward for deeds are criticized and the soulful resonance of the connection of revelation and intellect (reason) in the pure thought space of Shīʿa Islam is spread, which it will be inspired by the persuasion of people and the submission of honest scholars, if it reaches the ears of every listener anywhere in the world. It has been used in the final part to prove moral realism and moral generalist method, since the embodiment of ethics is one of the obvious examples of the embodiment of deeds.

One of the old issues among philosophers is the existence or non-existence of Void (Arabic: خلا). Muslim philosophers, who mainly following Aristotle, considered the theory of void to be incorrect and also introduced proofs to annul the void. Fakhr Rāzī is one of the few Muslim theologians who has tried a lot to prove it. He presents many arguments to prove his theory, which are tangent through the needlessness of the void from the body (physical being), being a void of origin and the end of the movement of the moving body and the creation of a void when separated from the surfaces. It was proved in this study that Fakhr Rāzī’s arguments and his theory in this regard have some problems and criticisms, the most important of which is the confusion and fallacy between void rules and the empty space of any body.

All beings in the world according to Ṣadr al Muta'allihīn, benefit from awareness (consciousness) in accordance with their existential order. Therefore, material bodies such as elements, inanimate bodies and vegetable, which are generally considered to be devoid of consciousness even have knowledge and awareness in general usage (custom). Ṣadrā has tried by two different approaches to justify the diffusion of the knowledge to material objects philosophically. He has attributed knowledge to objects with the same material identity by proving the absolute objectivity of existence with knowledge in the first way, and he considered knowledge to be proved for them through the union of objects by intellectual principles (masters of species) in the second way. The main issue in this article is whether the same results can be obtained from these two approaches or not. And which of these two ways is stronger and superior than the other? Both approaches have been studied by analytical and comparative method in this article and it has been firstly proved that the results of these two approaches are not the same, and the awareness that is proved for material objects according to the first approach is different from the knowledge that is proved according to the second approach, secondly, the second approach is stronger and superior for some reason.

The issue of the endurance of dispositions in the context of physical resurrection is analyzed. Mullā Ṣadrā has explained the endurance of dispositions and its existential requirements in the theory of physical resurrection in such a way that many of the scholars after him have expressed their approval for this view, but Muhaqqiq Zonouzī has a different view. He believes that the soul leaves inner effects after death in the worldly body that will be the difference of the bodies after death, which will be the endurance of dispositions in the body and the body moves toward the soul by substantial movement in the physical resurrection, but Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory is based on the capability of the creation of the existential soul. The philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā and Zonouzī by the method of content analysis and description is studied in this research and the conflict will be determined based on the principles of both thinkers. The comparison of the oppinions shows that according to Zonouzī’s interpretation of the parts of the body, an element based on the substantial movement was added to the soul in which dispositions in this process, but according to Mullā Ṣadrā, the human soul, relying on the existential creation and promoting it, will lead to the realization of physical resurrection.

Many real and arbitrary criteria have been mentioned in order to differentiate the knowledge from each other, such as the difference between subject, predicate, method, goal, cognation of propositions, position (stipulation) and consideration (validity), etc. Theoretical mysticism, which is an attained knowledge (Arabic: العلم الحصولی) and responsible for rational explanation of mystical intuition has relied on some of these criteria to differentiate itself from philosophy. The question, by considering that many theological, cosmological and anthropological issues of theoretical mysticism are common to philosophy in manner and subject matter, is whether theoretical mysticism (speculative Sufism) can actually be considered as a distinct knowledge from philosophy, especially Islamic philosophy. It seems that the separation of theoretical mysticism from philosophy despite the efforts of theoretical mysticism in this field is doubtful and the evidence of theoretical mysticism is not sufficient in the justification of the distinction or the proof of honor (virtual manner) and the excellence of this knowledge to philosophy in proving claims is not sufficient. Although these criteria prove the distinction between intuition, reasoning, practice or intuitive mysticism from practical mysticism and philosophy. However, it does not seem sufficient to prove theoretical mysticism as a separate knowledge. One of the main criteria presented for distinguishing theoretical mysticism from philosophy, which is the difference in the subject has been analyzed and studied in this article, and has been disputed from two aspects, i.e., the realization of the subject and the ability to create distinction.

Mullā Ṣadrā in the issue of principality of existence with the negation of the conceptual part of existence considers the nonconditioned as a source of division to have extensional unity and individual plurality. The truth of existence has collective and expansionary unity and it is the basis of the principality of existence and the subject of philosophy for this reason. He has two different attitudes towards the existence of the positive condition in the discussion of the validity of the nature of his own. The separation of the principality of existence in two meanings is the result of this discussion In the first sense, the root of external realties and what fills the external world is the existence of the nonconditioned as a source of division, and the nature or the ranges of the truth of the unconditioned of existence are consequently realized. Ṣadrā in the second and final view considers the validity of nature as a mere mentality by rejecting any external distinction of existence and nature and considers the existence of nature as a function of the existence of the soul and its human minds and its mental aspects.