نشریه هستی و شناخت (نامه مفید)
سال هشتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 16، پاییز و زمستان 1400)

The knowledge of theology and knowledge of philosophy focus on issues that are not in the realm of experience: the origin of existence and supernatural worlds are among these issues. Dealing with such issues reveals the rationality of them and their proximity in the realm of pure reason. Proving the principles of religion and proving the principles of reality, which are identical, are placed on theology and philosophy, respectively.The stability or instability of any theological and philosophical system depends on the stability and instability of the proof of these principles in that system. Only the formal and content conditions of the argument can firmly connect minds to reality. Proof, as a fact-based reasoning method, puts philosophy and theology together. Although the polemical method is not incompatible with the method of proof, in some situations, its user may be satisfied with silencing the opposite person. In a part of its history in the Islamic period, the knowledge of theology took a polemic path, and disturbed the its good adjacent with philosophy by his own method. We try to explain the conflict between theologians and philosophers of this period and end the origin of this conflict from the field of these two knowledge and their adjacent and interaction, by the sign of the philosophical and theological work of some intellectual scholars.

God’s relation to the world and its creatures has been a creative relationship, and He is agent and creator of possibility system. To explain how this activity is, popular theologians and philosophers have general disagreement over it. In the meantime, the other difference of opinion is seen too, that from one side we have philosophers’ views, and from the other side we face with some verses and traditions that show incompatibility; because contrary to the philosophers’ views that know God’s knowledge the only source of occurring action, in the Holy Quran sporadically, and in some traditions clearly have been regarded to this meaning that creating the creatures depends on passing steps and levels. The problem is that how can this multiplicity (if external) be compatible with rational principles manifesting special rank of God’s existence? In this writing we try to show that philosophical findings along with some religious teachings, eliminate this incompatibility.

According to Aristotle, the intellectual form isthe same as the sense form that has been generalized in the process of abstraction. Masha'i philosophers, including Ibn Sina, agreed with Aristotle's approach. Mulla Sadra proposed a new perspective on the nature of perception and considered perception not as a sensual quality but as a way of being. Mulla Sadra's view of perception caused him to present an innovative theory in imaginary intellectual cognition (substantive concepts) as well. In this article, we have analyzed and explained Mulla Sadra's theory about what it is, how general concepts are formed in human cognition and how they are true for many. Imaginary intellectual cognition and understanding of essential concepts is the result of the human being's existential upgrade in the process of essential movement and existential union with the higher order of rational existence. Mulla Sadra has presented two explanations for the possibility of the truth of substantive concepts to many: 1) Weakness of cognitive power in the face of abstract rational forms gives a vague and blurred perception of them, and this ambiguity provides the basis for doubt and the possibility of truth to many. brought 2) This capability is a consequence of the existence of rational forms in relation to any suitable sensible meaning.

Darwin’s evolutionary theory has taken on a number of readings since its introduction. The common view in the twentieth century was based on blind chance and natural selection. While in some recent views, living organisms are considered as active, not passive ones that remain to be selected. In this article, we will describe Popper as a philosopher, which interested in the theory of evolution. He attributes special importance to the agency of organisms and their activities. We will show how Popper criticized old views and offered new ones. Popper saw agency as an ongoing process that involved arising problems, finding innovative solutions to problems, and eliminating some of them, which will lead to speciation and increase of biodiversity. Popper's active Darwinism is in obvious contrast to the common views of biologists on the inactivity of organisms toward natural selection and in agreement with so-called non-adaptationism. It is shown that the history of such a view can be traced back to Darwin when he spoke on artificial selection and sexual selection. This article attempts to offer a deeper reading of Popper's epistemology that is consistent with his reading of Darwinism.

Constructivist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that all moral values and norms depend on agents and the good will create moral values. The realist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that the will and its autonomy are not incompatible with moral realism, because at least some values exist independently of agents. In this view, a detailed analysis of the good will is usually not given or it finds an unimportant role. Contrary to these two interpretations, in this paper, with an interpretive method, by explaining the fundamental meaning of good will, we discuss the compatibility of Kant's good will with moral realism, in such a way that the key role of good will is maintained. The basis of the good will is autonomy. On the one hand, autonomy is the formal condition of moral facts, and on the other hand, the end in itself is the material ground for the good will. Therefore, the good will can be considered compatible with non-natural realism, because the good will has a formal function and its material ground is an intrinsic and real value.

Anthropological issues have long been of special interest to various philosophers and thinkers. Amongst these, the relationship between soul and body has a special position. Using the principles of transcendent philosophy, Sadr al-Muta'allehin presents his view on the relationship between the soul and the body. Meanwhile, Sheikh Ahmad Ehsaei is one of the most important critics of Sadra's philosophy. The issue of the relationship between the soul and the body is the culmination of Ehsaei’s opposition to Mulla Sadra's view. To an extent that an example of every error that he believed was involved in “the issue of relationship between the soul and the body” of Sadra can be found in Ehsaei’s works. In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the Ehsaei criticisms of Sadra's soul and body relationship. There are two fundamental drawbacks, the rejection of the fundamentality of existence and substantial motion. There are three drawbacks that deal with the issues of soulology: the rejection of the abstraction of imaginal power, the opposition of physical contingency to verses and hadiths, and the contradiction of physical contingency with abstraction of the soul. The root of all the drawbacks that Ehsai brings to Sadr al-Mutalahin is trusting the appearance of verses and narrations and misunderstanding of the fundamentality of existence and substantial motion.

In this article, through research on what is the meaning of divine justice, we examined the issue of human rights against God. The main question is what meaning of justice can be attributed to God? Given that divine justice is presented in three areas of creation, legislation and punishment, the meaning of justice that covers these three areas is "giving everyone the right to it." There is no problem in imagining the right of non-God to God when this right of God himself is positive. Moral justice is the meaning of justice that has no place in attributing it to God in the works of thinkers, especially our philosophers. Among the meanings of justice according to Shahid Motahhari, the meaning that is doubtful is the one that he considers to be the only appropriate meaning of justice to attribute to God: formative or philosophical justice. Moreover, the design of the discussion of justice in the position of creation, which has not yet been created, is questionable; This meaning of justice does not cover criminal and legislative justice, nor is it a suitable explanation for the verses and hadiths that attribute justice to God in all actions and purify him from any oppression

This article on Mulla Sadra's philosophy seeks to answer the question: Where is the place of God in human life according to the theory of existential expansion? According to Mulla Sadra, the foundation of creation is the manifestation and existential vastness of a single and absolute existence. Caused (Ma'alool) is abstracted from existential expanded ranks and has no independence. According to Sadra, the life of any creature is how it exists; Because life is the existence of an object in such a way that actions are issued from it. In other words, the stronger his perception, the stronger his life, and the higher his level of existence. Existence is one and non-existence is non-existence, and all beings exist in the existential circle of expanded existence; Therefore, by analyzing Mulla Sadra's view, it can be concluded that God is present in every moment of human life, and because human perceptions are different, the manifestation of God in their existence is also different. In this view, God's activity is not longitudinal but vast action. The present article, with a descriptive-analytical view, seeks to examine the position of God with the view of the expansion existential in human life.

Despite the fact that Ibn Arabi and Eckhart agree and are similar to each other in many principles, they differ in their emphasis on God's "analogy" and "purification". This difference of opinion, which at first seems insignificant compared to many of their common opinions, leads to a deep difference and even conflict between the thoughts of our two thinkers in the issue of "the place of physical world". Therefore, "the physical world" and its place can be considered as a problem that highlights the differences between Ibn Arabi's and Eckhart's views - in spite of all the similarities and consensus. Even common doctrines such as "the unity of existence" and "the creation of man in the image of God" cannot reduce the deep disagreement between Ibn Arabi and Eckhart on the issue of the place of the world. As it will be proven, Ibn Arabi uses these two teachings in order to sanctify the world and multitudes. But Eckhart interprets these two doctrines in a way that leads to disdain the universe and multitudes.

Wittgenstein with a linguistic view of religious beliefs, and Kierkegaard, who opposes religious propositions, are considered believers, Plantinga has an extroverted and trusting approach. In the mechanism of reaching his general epistemology, he first talks about the functioning of correct epistemological powers and guaranteed knowledge, he enters religious epistemology with these foundations. Plantinga has a virtue-oriented approach in religious epistemology. The virtue of beliefs resulting from divine sense is due to the basis and certainty of this power, reasoning based on its true basis leads us to faith. From the basis of the beliefs resulting from the divine sense, he concludes the natural knowledge of God, this knowledge is natural, reliable and guaranteed. Plantinga has removed any rational reflection from the process of producing and guaranteeing beliefs resulting from divine sense. Plantinga has also acted as a believer in his religious experience. Religious beliefs resulting from religious experience are basic and infallible beliefs, so belief in God is also accepted as a basis. Plantinga, although he does not admit to being a believer and does not accept such a claim, but his being a believer is an essential part of accepting It is his. And without believing in faith, it can be said that his religious epistemological apparatus and structure are not properly planned.

According to the founders of this philosophical school, the phenomenology of ethics was a way to criticize the structure of moral values in Kant's philosophy. Also, provide a new definition of moral values that is based on the truth of human existence. Francis Brentano and Max Scheler, as the founders of the phenomenology of ethics, tried to redefine the structures of moral values by relying on the phenomenological method against the concepts formed in pure practical reason. In their phenomenology of ethics, these two thinkers want to return feelings and emotions as the fundamental principle of human action to the structure of moral values and make it the center of their philosophy. But Brentano's and Scheler's views on the nature of moral values have fundamental differences. In fact, both thinkers use the phenomenological method to understand the nature of moral values, but Brentano has a desire for a psychological understanding of human nature with the help of epistemological foundations, and in contrast to Scheler, he is searching for the fact that with an ontological view of moral values, reveal with the divine command.

Beauty as a fundamental concept has been considered by Plato in terms of its origin, nature, manifestation and perception. This paper, using a descriptive-analytical method, based on Plato's most important treatises on Beauty, such as Phaedrus and the Party; also, by examining the existential- intellectual dialectics presented in the Republican treatise, seeks the possibility of considering the coexistence of Existence and Beauty; and to examine the similarity of existential dialectics and the perception of beauty in Plato's philosophy. As conclusions, in Plato's philosophy, the perception of perceptible beauty is the starting point of existential- intellectual dialectics; causes existential- epistemological transformation, and is the base of the ascension of the soul to a higher existential level than its own, which ultimately leads to "Visit" and realization of the Good. In Plato's philosophy, the perception of beauty as an existential action is equivalent to the psychic promotion based on intellectual and epistemological evolution.