The creation of new republics in Central Asia after the Soviet government fall changed the geopolitics of northeast Iran. Thus, the borders of the region, formerly known as threatening borders, evolved as an opportunity to recreate Iran's role in an area outside of Iran's direct influence. The end of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq and the independence of the Asian countries led Tehran to consider the republics of the region as a new and further opportunity. Throughout this period, with the rise of four constructive governments, reforms, principles, and the hope of relations with the Central Asian region in various political-security, economic and cultural areas. However, the achievements were not expected. Therefore, in this study, in a qualitative and descriptive-analytical approach, we seek to examine the desirable foreign policy pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Central Asian region, and we seek to answer the question that what the most appropriate approach to foreign policy to is secure the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Central Asia? In response to this question, the hypothesis has been examined that the cultural approach is more capable of developing Iranian-Asian relations through the use of semantic components in the form of a joint Islamic-Iranian heritage than other approaches.

Since 2011, the land of Syria has become a place for the war of discourses, each of which considers itself right and the other wrong, and seeks to reject the other. In the middle of this field, the Islamic Republic's approach to the foreign policy discourse in the Syrian civil war is defined by relying on the discourse of revolutionary Islamism in defense of the Baathist government of Syria. For regional powers (such as Iran and Turkey) and extra-regional powers (such as America and Europe), in addition to the significance of geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in which Syria is at the center of, the occurrence of the Syrian civil war (2011-2020), the formation of the center of the crisis between Sunni and Shia fundamentalist Islamic discourses, such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (representing the Sunnis) versus Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran (representing Shia Islam) and sending Muslim jihadist forces from all over the world to that place, attracted attention twofold to Syria. But in this field, the Islamic Republic was directly pressured by the liberal discourses of the Western countries due to its role in the Syrian civil war, and the moderate Sunni fundamentalist forces were directly supported by the Western countries. Based on a descriptive-analytical view based on discourse theory and the conflict between the discourse of the Islamic Republic and the discourses of Islamic fundamentalists and Western countries, this article seeks to answer the question of how we can evaluate the discourse governing Iran's foreign policy in the crisis of the Syrian civil war? To answer, the hypothesis is proposed that the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on the sign of the negation of sovereignty contained in the constitution, has started to fight with discourses to achieve hegemony in the region, which are in conflict with the hegemony of the discourse of revolutionary Islamism.

Throughout contemporary history and based on different readings of Islam, various Islamic currents and movements have emerged, each of which has had direct or indirect effects on the evolution of Islamic societies in a way and to a certain extent. Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat Tablighi, two branches of Deobandi beliefs, were founded in the years after 1920. Later, they leave significant effects on the Muslims of South Asia and even the world. This article tries to explain the similarities and differences between these two currents with a comparative approach, focusing on their attitudes and functions in the socio-political field. The results indicate that the conflicting values of Jamaat Tablighi and Jamaat-e-Islami have distinguished the political-functional and operational results of the two streams. The method of data collection was through library study using primary data that explains the aligned and non-aligned values of the two streams with a descriptive-analytical method. It also covers the weak knowledge background of these Islamic currents in academia of Iran.

As two neighboring countries, Iran and Afghanistan are affected by each other's political-security, economic and cultural-social developments. The large-scale migration of Afghans to Iran began in the early 1980s due to the Soviet invasion. The first generations of Afghan immigrants were generally concerned about security, survival, work, and daily life, but the new immigrants have more social, scientific, cultural, political, and social concerns. In this regard, an increase in their willingness to educate can be observed. Anyway, these people experience challenges in their own lives and have opportunities as well. The current research seeks to study the challenges and opportunities of Afghan educated people living in Iran. The theoretical lens used has been constructivism. To achieve this goal, the grounded theory method has been used. Using the purposive sampling method, interviews were conducted with 27 Afghan-educated people living in Iran and 22 experts on issues related to Afghan immigrants. The findings show that Afghan educated people face socio-cultural challenges (educational limitations, the experience of humiliation and insult, living with a fear of being powerless, and a negative image), economic (occupational limitations, economic weakness, investment limitations), and political-security (structural discrimination, instability of policies, inefficient laws and polarization of immigrants). On the other hand, In contrast, they have opportunities Including social- cultural (Educational benefit, cultural commonality, self-governing schools, and creation of coordination networks), economic (Iran's welfare level and benefits from defined jobs), and political-security (Iran's security and the opportunity to become a refugee). These challenges and opportunities should be explained in the context of political developments and the Iranian immigration policy system, which is a multi-layered phenomenon.

The discourse of Nasserian nationalism in the fifties and sixties, the manifestation of the utopia and the place of realization of the suppressed Arabic human desires during the years of the rule of transnational and proxy systems were thought and in the face of other competing discourses such as liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism, it became the dominant discourse of the region; But over time, the duality in the slogan and action of this discourse became known to everyone. Moreover, as an imposed and hegemonic discourse, the emerging dictatorship of Arabic nationalism was forced. This article, using library data and critical discourse analysis method, first identifies the semantic system and components of Nasserian nationalism discourse based on the definitions of the two concepts of discourse and hegemony, and then aimed at integrating attitudes and behaviors of this discourse Nasserian nationalism is measured in textual and intertextual analysis. Data indicate that Nasserian nationalism focused most of its attention on the magnification and myth of Abdel Nasser and the hegemony of his intended political movement within the country, the region, and even the world. In other words, the point of Nasserian nationalism discourse, the integrated Arabic identity in Charisma, and the power of Abdel Nasser were summarized. Furthermore, taking advantage of the period of the absence of the Arab society from colonialism and corruption of the monarchy and relying on signs such as the Arab unity, the Arab nation, and other ideological and epic signals was an opportunity to legitimize its political status and authority over other regional discourses. Abdel Nasser used any tool for enemy and non-hostility and increased political and ideological conflicts in order to attract different strata of people to his discourse. Explaining the factors of formation, authority, and ultimately suppressing the discourse of Nasserian nationalism in the geopolitical environment of that time is the most important issue.

Gaining power by the Justice and Development Party with a democratic and pragmatic face was a new voice in Turkey's political environment which managed to reflect and represent the real issues of the society and be popular with the public. However, since 2013, the ruling Justice and Development Party has transformed from a popular quasi-democratic political party to an exclusionary populist party; In a way that most theorists of populism, many analysts of Turkish issues, as well as writers of prominent news media such as Guardian, Bloomberg, New York Times and Foreign Policy, called Erdogan and his party "populist". Accordingly, the current research, by using the theoretical framework of populism, especially the ideas of people like Kurt Wieland, Robert Barr, Kenneth Roberts, and Pappas, in the form of "populism as a political strategy", tries to answer this main question that what the causes of Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party's tendency towards populism were in the last decade; And how did Erdoğan utilize populism to achieve his desired goals? The findings show that, in the last decade, relying on populist tools and positions such as the foreign status of political actors, anti-establishment attraction, personal ties, unorganized mobilization, etc., Erdogan has artistically used populism as a "political project to build and maintain power" for himself and his party. The research approach is political sociology, qualitative research method, causal explanation type and data collection method, library, and also using virtual resources.

The protest movement began in Tunisia in late 2010. It became the pattern of Arab societies' practice and quickly overthrew other Arab countries. These social-political developments, with the disintegration character, led to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt; But in Syria, there is a unique characteristic that did not fit the concepts expressed by Islamic awakening scholars in the Muslim world. Therefore, the necessity to review the developments of these two countries and study their similarities and differences as a research issue was reinforced again. Aimed at a comparative study of the Egyptian -Syrian protest movement, in the structural and institutional changes, the role of scholars and elites and people, violent or peaceful, the interference of the foreigners, and the results, this study has taken into account the question that if the Egyptian protests in comparison to the events of Syria are similar or different on the components of Islamic awakening. The hypothesis of the article states that achieving different results in Syria and Egypt is due to the difference in the components of Islamic awakening. The subject was done using a comparative-comparable study method using valid library and internet resources. The findings based on the conceptual framework of the research indicate that Egyptian developments, due to dictatorship reasons, Mubarak's strong dependence on the West and its relationship with the Zionist regime, have been similar to the indicators of Islamic awakening; Despite the preceding protests and based on the Syrian government independence from the Western-Arab axis and acting on the front of the Zionist regime, Syria has been managed from abroad. As a result, Egyptian developments have been close to the concept of Islamic awakening and its common components; But in Syria, there are a lot of differences with these indicators