مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال پنجاه و هفتم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1403)

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

The quality of the human body in the concept of resurrection has been a contentious issue among philosophers and theologians. The fundamental question revolves around how resurrection manifests in human existence. Various viewpoints can be categorized into three main types: Ideal Body: Some propose an idealized form for the resurrected body, transcending earthly limitations. Elemental Body: Another perspective suggests an elemental body distinct from the worldly one. Worldly Body Itself: Advocates of this view assert that the resurrected body remains identical to its earthly counterpart. They often draw upon Quranic verses, while some also present rational arguments. The present work, through examining and critiquing the existing reasons, posits the hypothesis that these reasons lack the ability to prove the claim of identity theorists regarding the afterlife. Instead, they merely represent a superficial appearance of continuity between the postmortem body and the worldly body. The current study employs a descriptive-analytical approach. After collecting the relevant reasons, they are subjected to critique and evaluation, validating their relevance to the intended claim.

Evidentialism posits that the epistemic value of propositions lies in their evidence. However, alternative approaches, independent of evidential support, have emerged to maintain validity when competing viewpoints falter. This phenomenon, often termed "epistemic presumption," serves as both a procedural starting point and occasionally holds substantive truth-value. In discussions surrounding the existence of God, differing presumptions—whether theism, atheism, or non-belief—are contentious. Theists and atheists assert positive claims necessitating evidence, while agnostics posit that both positions lack support, contingent upon evidence provision. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon all three perspectives.

Understanding the reality of entities can be approached through two methods a) positively, to discern the essence of the object, and b) negatively, to delineate what the object is not. This study investigates Avicenna's perspective on the essence of the soul. While previous research has extensively explored the positive attributes, this study delves into the less organized negative attributes, shedding light on the soul's distinctions from nature, the Spirit of vapor, temperament, body, corporeality, intellect, and vitality. The significance of the soul's divergence from corporeality lies in its implicit deviation from temperament, the Spirit of vapor, the physical body, and other material elements. Notably, disassociating the soul from intellect is essential to prevent misunderstandings, avoiding the misconception of the human soul as a purely abstract concept. Furthermore, examining the soul's connection with vitality elucidates shared attributes and encompasses a diverse spectrum of entities characterized as living.

In the thoughts of theologians and philosophers of religion, symbolism and cryptic language are used as a means to convey the immaterial world and express metaphysical truths. This functionality is also employed in certain philosophical texts to describe the relationship between humans and God. The aim of this article is to explore the general concept of symbolism from the perspectives of Suhrawardi and Jaspers. After explaining and analyzing the nature and reasoning behind symbolism, as well as its characteristics and specific use in elucidating the concept of its role in the relationship between humans and God, the article compares the views of these two philosophers, identifying similarities and differences. For instance, Suhrawardi uses cryptic language to conceal meanings, while Jaspers aims to clarify the truth as much as possible through symbolism. According to both philosophers, the main feature of symbolism is its representational nature, and what is intended is an inner meaning, which ultimately cannot be fully deciphered. Suhrawardi believes that the encounter with symbolism occurs in the world of imaginal forms, while for Jaspers, it takes place in this very world. From Suhrawardi's perspective, symbolic language is not the only way to connect with God; God is not the sole creator and source of symbols. However, according to Jaspers, the transcendent manifests solely through symbolism, and the purpose and origin of symbols are solely attributed to God.

Fitrah (human nature) is a vital principle in the Islamic worldview. Its numerous impacts in various philosophical discussions, including the philosophy of religion, ethics, history, epistemology and the problem of knowledge, educational philosophy, legal philosophy, and political philosophy, indicate its significance and importance. Mortaza Motahari referred to fitrah as the "mother principle" in Islamic culture and teachings, and in his various works, he examined the effects and implications of fitrah in humans, considering it a continuation of the general essential movement of existence. However, beyond citing verses and hadiths, he rarely focused on the rational proof of the principle of fitrah, more so providing a general methodology (which, according to the author, can be based on the model of inference to the best explanation). This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and by gathering and analyzing information, first examines the essence of fitrah and human innate qualities, then aims to establish the existence of fitrah in humans. Different justifications for the existence of human tendencies in humans are analyzed to identify the correct explanation. Subsequently, some of the effects and outcomes of fitrah are explored, including the argument of fitrah in theism, the impact of fitrah on epistemology and the problem of knowledge, ethics, the philosophy of history, educational philosophy, and sociology.

There are various theories regarding the logical structure of abduction. Peirce, the logician who introduced this type of reasoning, placed it alongside deductive and inductive reasoning. However, the logical form and inferential process involved in abduction remain unclear, leading to questions about whether abduction is truly an argumentative process. In this article, we aim to support this perspective by demonstrating that Peirce's writings implicitly suggest that abduction is instinctive, and if abduction is indeed instinctive, it cannot be considered an argument. Additionally, drawing on the views of earlier thinkers such as Avicenna, we argue that abduction may be related to the faculty of estimation, which is common to both humans and other animals. This perspective helps explain why animals can transcend mere sensory data and engage in something akin to forming natural or causal hypotheses. Furthermore, findings from contemporary experimental psychology indicate that the human mind employs multiple systems for decision-making and judgment, not all of which are argumentative. For instance, Daniel Kahneman identifies two decision-making systems in humans: the first is non-argumentative and evolutionary, while the second is logical. Based on examples of abduction, it can be considered a process belonging to System 1 of the mind, which operates quickly and non-argumentatively.

What role did Avicenna play in the evolution of philosophical thought regarding the recognition of presential knowledge? The clearest example of presential knowledge is human awareness of their own essence (self-awareness), and Avicenna used this self-awareness as the basis for his argument to prove the soul in the "suspended man" argument. However, what type of knowledge is this self-awareness: presential or acquired? Avicenna's statements about this self-awareness sometimes suggest it is presential knowledge and sometimes align with it being acquired knowledge. This article, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, examines and analyzes his statements, especially in the book "Mubahathat," where he defends the suspended man argument and addresses questions related to self-awareness. The aim is to clarify the connection between his concept of self-awareness and presential knowledge and to determine the position of his teachings on self-awareness in the development of the division of knowledge into presential and acquired in Islamic philosophy. The result of this research is that Avicenna's concept of self-awareness should be considered presential knowledge, even though he did not use this term and sometimes explained it using terms and concepts related to acquired knowledge. Therefore, he can be regarded as the pioneer in drawing philosophers' attention to this type of knowledge in the history of Islamic philosophy.

Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding.

The principle of the primacy of existence leads to a shift and reclassification of primary and secondary philosophical Intelligibles. According to the principle of the primacy of existence, existence must have individuals or concrete counterparts and cannot be considered a secondary Intelligible without a concrete external counterpart. Additionally, based on this principle, the attributes of existence are aspects of the essence of existence and will have concreteness and externality similar to existence itself, whereas essences only have conceptual identities and lack externality. This issue is examined through a descriptive-analytical approach, revealing that neither can the claim of reclassifying all intelligibles be fully accepted, nor can one assert the lack of externality of existence and its true attributes. Based on the effects of the principle of the primacy of existence on the nature of intelligibles and considering the ontological and epistemological explanations of intelligibles, as well as the differentiation between true attributes of existence and other intelligibles, the findings of this paper lead to the conclusion that the principle of the primacy of existence results in existence and its true attributes being primary intelligibles in both epistemological and ontological explanations. Essences are considered secondary philosophical intelligibles from an ontological perspective but primary from an epistemological perspective. Intrinsic attributes of existence, relative, additional, and negational intelligibles will be secondary philosophical intelligibles according to both epistemological and ontological explanations. The reclassification of intelligibles also leads to a new classification based on the principle of the primacy of existence.

The question of whether the universe is eternal and without beginning or created by God from nothing and thus temporally originated has long preoccupied philosophers and theologians. This debate has given rise to extensive discussions in philosophical and theological writings under the topic of "origination and eternity." Most philosophers have regarded the universe as eternal, while most theologians have considered it temporally originated. The conflicts and rebuttals between supporters of these two camps were to be expected. Imam Muhammad Ghazali's book The Incoherence of the Philosophers is one of the well-known rebuttals written against Ibn Sina and his belief in the eternity of the world. This paper, after summarizing the historical debate on this issue, reexamines the conflict and aims to provide a new interpretation. Essentially, the debate over origination and eternity can be understood as appearing to address the nature of the universe, but in reality, each side had theological preconceptions, and the underlying issue was shaped by different theological perspectives.

The rationality of religious beliefs has been a central topic in philosophical inquiry throughout history. Recently, two prominent epistemologists, John Greco and Linda Zagzebski, have defended this rationality within the framework of the epistemology of testimony. Greco, through his general anti-reductionist approach, asserts that religious knowledge is transmitted to recipients via reliable channels of transmission. Zagzebski, on the other hand, argues for the rationality of religious belief by justifying religious authority through a conscientious, self-reflective trust in others—a trust that stems from trust in oneself, which she presents as a deliberative reason. In this paper, we critically analyze the views of Greco and Zagzebski, alongside Jennifer Lackey, to demonstrate the inadequacies in their arguments. Specifically, we aim to critique these two thinkers by examining the logical implications of their positions, ultimately showing that their arguments for the rationality of religious belief are not valid. We identify three key issues with Greco’s perspective: (1) it fails to eliminate the influence of epistemic luck; (2) it does not adequately apply to fundamental religious beliefs, which are essential for participation in religious communities; and (3) it encounters the "garbage problem," which remains unresolved. Similarly, we highlight three problems in Zagzebski’s view: (1) her approach could classify the beliefs of communities such as terrorists and racists as rational; (2) it necessitates accepting the testimony of authority figures even when they are clearly erroneous; and (3) deliberative reasons are insufficient in addressing significant issues. Therefore, attempting to prove the rationality of religious belief through the epistemology of testimony, at least as proposed by Greco and Zagzebski, leads to a dead end.