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سال هفدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 90، بهار و تابستان 1403)

The issue of how motion is realized and exists externally, following Ibn Sina’s description of two types of motion, became one of the significant topics in Islamic philosophy. A group of philosophers, following Ibn Sina, advocated for the external existence of gradual motion (harakat-e tawassutiyyah). Mir Damad’s research led many philosophers to accept the external existence of absolute motion (harakat-e qatiyyah). Mulla Sadra, drawing from the principles of hikmat al-muta'aliyah (Transcendent Philosophy), emphasized the existence of absolute motion but did not provide a specific argument for its external existence. Allameh Tabataba'i is one of the philosophers who believed in the existence of both types of motion. What is important is that Allameh Tabataba'i, by using the principles of hikmat al-muta'aliyah, such as the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) and the gradation of reality in the very essence of existence, first proved the objective realization of something that represents a gradual transition from potentiality to actuality. In the next stage, through a precise explanation of the concept of motion, he demonstrated that motion, based on its dual aspects of fixity and fluidity, exists in reality with both types being included and consistent with the definition of motion.

Mystical ethics constitutes one of the three tiers of Avicenna’s Neoplatonic ethical structure. Like his other works on mysticism, Avicenna presents mystical ethics within the intellectual framework inherent in mystical thought itself. In other words, Avicenna's discussion of mystical ethics cannot be fully understood without considering the intellectual tradition of Sufism. However, due to the particular place of scientific ethics in his work, the volume of Avicenna’s writings on mystical ethics is quite limited. Therefore, in this article, other texts written within this intellectual framework are also employed to elaborate on some of the mystical aspects of his ethics. Through additional explanations of these texts, Avicenna’s brief statements are further expanded. Furthermore, the ethics presented in mystical texts encompasses a broad range of concepts, and Avicenna’s mystical ethics also briefly touches on many of these concepts. This article aims to focus solely on the concepts shared between Neoplatonic ethics and mystical ethics. The research will demonstrate that the source of these shared concepts is Sufi thought, although Avicenna found no conflict between them and the Neoplatonic structure of his ethical thought.

Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics is one of the significant works from Immanuel Kant’s so-called "pre-Critical" period, published in 1766, fifteen years before the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, Kant examines and critiques the claims of Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish scholar and mystic, regarding access to a transcendent, supersensible world. The question of this paper is whether Kant’s critique of Swedenborg’s claims was influenced by Hume. If so, which fundamental concepts in the essay Dreams reflect this influence In the present paper, we read Dreams in light of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, a work that Kant is believed to have studied before writing Dreams. Through an analysis of both works, we ultimately conclude that some of Kant’s most important positions in Dreams, including his critique of metaphysics, his empirical interpretation of causality, and his understanding of metaphysics as "the science of the limits of human reason," were directly influenced by Hume.

This paper, through an interdisciplinary and comparative study, seeks to uncover the connection between Foucault’s approach to the concept of power and Kafka’s perspective in his novel The Trial. The point of convergence between Foucault and Kafka can be found in the concept of biopolitics, where life itself becomes the subject of politics. The emergence of biopolitics marks the distinction between the modern world and the traditional one. In the pre-modern world, power manifested itself in the figure of the executioner and in the moment of death. However, modern power engages in the management of the living and free subject. The case study of this research is Kafka’s The Trial. The character K. (the protagonist) is entangled in the same panoptic power that Foucault describes in his works—a power that pursues not just a specific criminal act, but the entirety of the criminal's life. This is why K. is never accused of a specific crime; instead, he is compelled to narrate and bring to light his entire life, from childhood to the present. According to Foucault, the more modern power hides itself, the more it brings the lives of the masses into the light. Similarly, in Kafka’s novel, K. never gains access to the court, which remains hidden from his view until the end. The court, like Foucault’s diffuse power, is omnipresent and has no fixed location. This paper demonstrates that this omnipresent power is not a theological force but the very biopolitics that Foucault speaks of.

In his text Subject and Power (1982), written two years before his death, Foucault stated that the central theme of his research was not "power" but the "subject." His lecture series Subjectivity and Truth (1980-1981) and The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-1982) also confirmed this emphasis, particularly as he considered the overarching problematic of these lectures to be "subjectivity and truth," demonstrating that the subject must become problematized in relation to truth. Finally, in the preface to The History of Sexuality (1984), eight years after the first volume was published, he provided a general outline of his intellectual trajectory and explained why he shifted toward "genealogy." Based on this introduction, the present article, after explaining how the subject relates to the network of power and truth, concludes that the method and approach to studying the subject are "genealogy and problematization." The domain of inquiry into the recognition and construction of the self as a subject is the history of the desiring human and, consequently, sexuality. In fact, the "techniques of the self" associated with the system of sexuality maintain the individual's constant relationship with themselves, which results in the continuous production of subjectivity. Therefore, by studying the history of these techniques, one can arrive at the history of subjectivity. However, this history only leads to the genealogy of the subject when we analyze the intersection of techniques of the self and domination, which is essentially the meaning of "governmentality"—the governance of behavior and the management of possibilities through various truth games. Thus, it is concluded that sexuality is not only an appropriate domain for genealogical study of the history of subjectivity and techniques of the self but also a rich field for understanding governmentality and the more complex ways in which power functions.

The term "negation of negation" is a description Meister Eckhart employs for the "hidden essence of divinity." Through a precise analysis of Eckhart's works, in which he addresses the concept of "negation of negation," it becomes clear that although Eckhart sometimes uses the term "the One"—borrowed from Neoplatonism—as synonymous with "negation of negation," his understanding of "the One" significantly differs from that in Neoplatonism. For Eckhart, "the One" is not only beyond "being" and beings, but also manifests as "negation of negation" throughout the world. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the concept of "negation of negation" can serve as the key to resolving many apparent contradictions in Eckhart's works or conflicting interpretations of his writings. One such contradiction is the issue of the relation of "being" to God. "Negation of negation" teaches us that, for Eckhart, "being" holds two distinct meanings: in one sense, attributing "being" to God is permissible—though not ideal—while in another sense, applying the term "being" to God is nothing but error and a deviation from the truth.

This paper aims to examine the role of rational impressions in general, and a specific type of them, namely cognitive impressions, within the epistemology of early Stoicism as essential for attaining knowledge. To achieve this, the process of forming impressions in the ruling part (hegemonikon) of the soul, from a natural perspective, is first clarified. The discussion then turns to how human impressions, as those of a rational being, inherently possess inseparable, non-material content, distinguishing them fundamentally from the impressions of non-rational beings, including children. Thus, the claim made by some commentators that these impressions are similar in their initial stage of formation in the soul is not accurate. To further this argument, the place of concepts in Stoic thought and the difference between their approach and that of other ancient thinkers, including Epicurus, is examined. Finally, with reliance on the Stoic causal approach and the role of expertise, an analysis is conducted on the inadequacy of focusing solely on apparent characteristics to distinguish cognitive impressions from non-cognitive ones.

Lyotard identifies the crisis of legitimacy in grand narratives as a characteristic of the "postmodern condition." Metanarratives are systems of thought that present themselves as the ultimate criteria for truth, legitimacy, justification, explanation, and judgment. Among these metanarratives are the "speculative narrative" and the "emancipatory narrative," both of which are based on the "representational theory of knowledge," upon which modern knowledge and rationality are founded. This paper aims to demonstrate how Lyotard’s critique of the "representational theory of knowledge" sets the stage for his critique of all metanarratives and modern science and rationality. By emphasizing the relationship between science and power on the one hand, and the plurality of language games on the other, Lyotard reveals the paralogical (fallacious) basis of legitimacy and justification in the domain of "knowledge and reason." The paper also addresses how Lyotard’s critique of disbelief in metanarratives paradoxically encompasses his own claim, which could be seen as a new metanarrative emerging from the postmodern condition. Furthermore, Lyotard discusses the diversity of language games and simultaneously rejects the grand narratives that illegitimately attempt to assert their superiority, without distinguishing between them. This prescriptive critique of Lyotard’s, alongside his claim of diversity in the realm of language games, is another criticism of his thought in this paper, particularly in his critique of science and rationality in the postmodern condition

The issue of self-knowledge, while ancient, has always been both challenging and paradoxical. In this paper, considering that the "self" is the central axis of Kant’s thought in all three Critiques, we will attempt to analyze the mystery surrounding self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. To this end, we will briefly examine the following points: (1) What is the difference between self-consciousness and knowledge of the "self" (2) Awareness of something without having knowledge of it is one of the dilemmas of Kantian philosophy, and this becomes more pronounced when it comes to the "self." However, this mystery cannot be seen as a flaw in Kant’s philosophy, as in the discourse on self-knowledge, the self is always a logical step behind itself. (3) Finally, despite Kant’s claim that the thing-in-itself has no relation to time, we will explore the connection between the "self" as a thing-in-itself and time, which contributes to the mystery of the "self."

Lacan's article Kant with Sade and his seminar on psychoanalytic ethics represent a novel and innovative contribution to ethical debates. As acknowledged by most interpreters and commentators of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Kant with Sade is considered one of Lacan's most complex and challenging writings in his book Écrits. Despite the often incomprehensible complexity of Lacan's text, the author of this research argues that in this groundbreaking article, Lacan introduces the idea that the philosophy of Marquis de Sade, particularly in his book Philosophy in the Bedroom, not only extends Kant's ethical ideas in Critique of Practical Reason, but in fact complements them. In this article, Lacan claims that Kant represents the law, while Sade represents desire. Kant seeks to establish a pure moral law that restrains the pathological or disordered desires of the subject, whereas Sade pursues pure desire, one that transgresses all laws and is free. However, Lacan’s main thesis is that the law is dependent on desire for its existence, and desire, in turn, relies on the law for its existence. In other words, law and desire share a symbiotic and reciprocal relationship—a relationship that constitutes and grounds the psychic life of the human subject. The subject emerges from the dialectical relationship between law and desire.

This study addresses the separation and lack of alignment between truth and the various levels of human knowledge. The levels of knowledge referred to here are the types of cognition Ayn al-Quzat discusses, namely: sensory, imaginative, rational, and mystical knowledge. The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which each type of human cognition corresponds to reality and the ultimate truth of the world. For this purpose, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. Ayn al-Qadat primarily views rational and mystical knowledge as the core forms of human cognition, whereas sensory and imaginative knowledge serve mainly as preliminary steps towards rational cognition. With respect to correspondence to reality, rational knowledge is capable only of grasping sensory objects as they appear, while its understanding of the metaphysical realm and human states remains allegorical and cannot be considered to truly correspond to reality. With respect to mystical knowledge, while it enables the perception of truths beyond the sensory world, this correspondence is from a human perspective and does not fully coincide with the ultimate truth of the world. This misalignment can be seen in Ayn al-Quzat’s discussion of the relation between divine attributes and God’s essence, the evaluation of the attributes, the status of Iblis, and the perception of God’s love for His servant. Exiting this human perspective and reaching the stage of annihilation (fana) leads to the perception of the truth of the world, although in this state, attributing cognition to the human being becomes very difficult.

The fundamentality of existence and the ideality of quiddity gives rise to the assumption that quiddity is abstracted from limit and non-existence and indicates it. Examining this view and criticizing it should be approached from two perspectives: 1- the non-existence of quiddity; According to the fundamentality of existence and ideality of quiddity, it is concluded that quiddity does not exist. 2- source of abstraction of quiddity; If the reality of things lies in their existence, how is quiddity abstracted from it and how signifies it Examining these two perspectives will eliminate the suspicion of the nonexistence of quiddity and will reveal how quiddity is abstracted from reality and how it signifies reality. The essay begins with a precise interpretation of the ideality of quiddity and explains and expands upon the meaning of quiddity’s nonexistence based on this interpretation. It then investigates two famous views regarding the source of the abstraction of quiddity, evaluating the arguments for each. Finally, it addresses the question of how quiddity signifies reality —whether unconditionally (lā-bi-shart) or with the condition of negating conditions (bi-shart lā). A careful examination will reveal that, firstly, quiddity signifies presence and the measure of the reality of things, and second, this signification is conditional.