نشریه متافیزیک
سال شانزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 38، پاییز و زمستان 1403)

Bruce Ellis Benson, in his phenomenological theory, "The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue", points out that in the creation and performance of a musical work, there is always a platform for improvisation that brings the composer, performer, and listener into a kind of discourse which is always open to any subsequent conversions or adjustments. Through hermeneutic phenomenology, he presents his theory in the context of Western classical music and jazz with an overview of musical traditions and applications. The purpose of this study was to explain the concepts proposed by Benson's concept of improvisation, including the ontology of the musical work, the originality, and the identity of the musical work. The improvisational theory of musical discourse is a poststructuralist theory and introduces the basis of music as improvisation, which always has an interpretive nature. Musical tradition and practice as a world are important for a dialogue in music. Instead of playing the composer as the sole creator of music, Benson considers the piece to have a fluid identity that always continues to exist with the performances and interpretations of an experienced performer familiar with the tradition and practice of that music. In this research, which is in the category of qualitative research, the research method has been applied in terms of purpose and descriptive-analytical in terms of method. All material is obtained through the library method.

The relation is divided into external and mental relations in Ibn Sina's philosophy. External relation is a relation that exists in concrete. This external realization entails that the occurrence of the relation on the subject and its coexistence with the other part would be external attributes, but this entails infinite regress and so is absurd, and therefore, the external realization would be absurd. In this article, analyzing Ibn Sina's answers shows that, on the one hand, he believes that "occurrence" for the external relation is a relation that exists in concrete and occurs by itself, not by another occurrence, so it does not entail infinite regress, and on the other hand, he believes that coexistence is an intrinsic attribute for the existence of relation. Therefore, for Ibn Sina, the existence of the relation is not independent of other beings. This type of existence, which connects all objects, indicates the interest that lies in the nature of relation and is made in the mind and the concrete. Therefore, it gives a kind of objectivity to the relationship between beings in the mind and the concrete.

Roman Ingarden a Realist phenomenologist grounded his phenomenological thought on aesthetics. However, Ingarden's concern was not to explain a merely aesthetic philosophical system but to oppose Husserl's Idealism. How does Husserl's transcendental Idealism explain the existence of the external world? Ingarden does not find Husserl's answer convincing and meanwhile, Ingarden expands his reflections from a general ontological project to ontologies focused on different art forms. He shows that ignoring the existential structure of objects, the difference in the way of giving, and the contribution of their mode of existence in the Idealistic approach, cause many problems that are incompatible with the whole of Husserl's philosophical system, and these problems are not overlooked. For Ingarden, the real world is an existential object at the highest level. Therefore, Ingarden proposes a distinct solution to the controversy by distinguishing consciousness from the real world as two separate existential fields and focusing on the intentional aesthetic object that refuses idealism or realism contradiction. Ingarden analysis shows that, as Husserl says, if the existence of the world of experience is completely intentional, it still cannot be said that everything that exists is a result of consciousness. In other words, the aesthetic description of the purely intentional object and reflection on the metaphysical qualities of the work of art through research into the schematic structure of the work and the aesthetic experience resulting from the concreteization of the work of art is the path that keeps Ingarden in the realistic direction of balancing the Idealism/Realism controversy.

One of the most important aspects of our mental life, in terms of the quality and meaning of our existence, is emotions; Because emotions can guide our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in a certain direction. To explain this category, the differentiation of passions, rational tendencies, instincts, and the role of each in human actions should be investigated. Leibniz in his philosophy of mind highlights these different inclinations of the mind well and by focusing on dynamic forces, transforms the understanding of the human mind specially. He tries to explain how these types of emotions affect the body and mind based on the approach of psychophysical parallelism and the experience of states such as pleasure and pain based on his metaphysical background. Although Leibniz never wrote a separate treatise on passions like Descartes, he deeply cared about the appetent dimension of the human mind, and his ideas in this regard can be found in the work new essays on human understanding. In this article, an attempt is made to explain his approach to emotions and, more specifically, human passions by focusing on new essays on human understanding.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is shown in ethics. In the moral philosophy of Levinas, the central subject is left out of priority and his "other" and his "face" are given priority in such a way that the other's face indicates moral messages and the subject feels duty upon receiving these moral messages. consider himself accountable and responsible to the other. But the question is, what is the meaning of "face" in facing the other in Levinas's moral philosophy? And on what basis can its moral aspect be justified? Can it be based on ontology and epistemology, or psychology and linguistics? Levinas, when Western philosophers tried to give priority to the subject and reduce all issues to ontology and epistemology, provided a redefinition of another concept and another face. The author believes that the moral foundation of another figure can be examined based on four bases: 1- ontology 2- epistemology 3- psychology 4- linguistic so that finally the moral foundation of Levinas's thought can be discovered in his linguistic basis.

This paper delves into the ontological nature of perceptual experiences, seeking to categorize them within a metaphysical framework. Contrary to the orthodox debates about the content and phenomenal character of experiences this discussion examines their underlying nature as belonging to ontological categories. The common perspective considers perceptual experiences as mental events whose content represents the world. Despite this, the question remains whether these experiences can be ontologically classified as events. At first, this paper accounts for Alex Byrne's view, which disputes reasons based on ordinary language and introspection for classifying perceptual experiences as events. Byrne then compares perceptual experiences to propositional attitudes and beliefs, suggesting an alternative view. Thus, experiences are not events at all but rather states that, like beliefs, relate the subject to content. It appears that Byrne, by proposing this, firstly acknowledges the ontological distinction between states and events and secondly, gives precedence to the notion of perceptual experiences as states. By examining the temporal structures of phenomena (temporal shape), I address whether the distinction between different categories, including events and states, is ontological or merely different ways of expressing our descriptions of phenomena in language. Through discussions on the issue of the persistence of physical objects, I ultimately conclude that determination at the moment can serve as a good criterion for distinguishing the two categories of state/event. Finally, I will argue that experiential properties are dynamic, and their instantiation by the subject places perceptual experiences in the category of occurrents, specifically events.

Heterophenomenology is a term that Daniel Dennett coined against Husserl's phenomenology, and its purpose is to study the problem of consciousness from a third-person perspective, as it is common in natural sciences. Dennett criticizes Husserl's phenomenology due to its reliance on introspection and first-person perspective, as well as the impossibility of creating consensus. The result of this is skepticism, solipsism, and relativism. According to Dennett, the only appropriate and agreeable method for studying consciousness is to focus from a third-person point of view on the processes that go on in the brain and are not available through introspection and from a first-person point of view. Accordingly, Dennett proposes the model of multiple drafts in opposition to the Cartesian Theater to investigate consciousness, according to which all types of perception, thinking, and mental activity in the brain are accompanied by multi-directional processes of interpretation, description, and development within sensory data. In this article, the claim is defended that the criterion of essentialism to distinguish introspection from the phenomenological method, considering Dennett's opposition to any essentialist approach to studying consciousness, is not effective. In addition, the priority of the third-person approach leaves no room for a phenomenological science based on the third-person perspective.

The central focus of this article with an interdisciplinary approach revolves around the common concern shared by Hannah Arendt and Milan Kundera: the perils of history for the individual. A general question to ask in this research is why Arendt and Kundera in their books distrust History’s forces. This implies that the individual, under the influence of impersonal appeals and invisible hands, erases oneself from memory and surrenders to suprahuman forces. Totalitarianism has consistently drawn the individual into submission through the support of these suprahuman historical forces. Hence, according to Arendt, Eichmann, for instance, was corrupted by history, as he was stripped of any personal decision-making and choice, solely entrusting himself to the quasi-divine voice of history. Beyond these historical strategies, any transformative action becomes impossible. Returning to action (in Arendt's terms) and guarding the legacy of the novel (in Kundera's terms) constitute resistance against such historical overreach. In Arendt's view, every action initiates its narrative, while, according to Kundera, the novel's memory records experiences forgotten by official history. As a result, Arendt and Kundera prefer personal history over public history, action over reaction, and decision over command. Therefore, Arendt emphasizes the significance of action, and Kundera underscores the independence of the novel against history. Both advocate loyalty to a poetic individuality that is increasingly fading into oblivion in the modern era.

The “sign-looking” approach to nature is one of the approaches to facing nature, which Mullasadra has illustrated and presented many examples of in his works. The current research deals with the role of the interaction of this approach to nature in the conduct and excellence of human beings from the perspective of Mullasadra. By analyzing the works of Mullasadra, we can talk about three types of interaction and approach with nature: neutral look, short-sighted look, and “sign-looking” approach. From his point of view, the examples and phenomena of the world of nature, the signs of God, God's works and actions are the manifestation of Allah's Good Names, and also the ultimate goodness and beauty are possible and their existence is the existence of a sign. This approach is associated with components such as being beautiful and good, continuous performance, and deep insight, and plays a role in human excellence in various ways. Through the passing of a good, continuous and gradual view of “Sign-looking” to nature, a person attains the knowledge of God's Good Names and different layers of reality, inner faith, and great love, and realizes the most intense state of being active in his love.

The concept of "happiness" has consistently garnered the attention of various philosophical and ethical systems. In his work, A History of Happiness, Nicholas White critically examines the historical trajectory of this concept while presenting the differing criteria employed by philosophers to define happiness. Ultimately, he concludes that happiness does not serve as an effective guide for applying diverse desires and goals. Notably, White does not explore the notion of happiness in the works of Islamic philosophers, such as Mulla Sadra. Given that Mulla Sadra's perspective on happiness and a flourishing life is grounded in his unique philosophical principles, the authors of this article aim to evaluate White's critique of conventional standards of happiness through the lens of Mulla Sadra's existential framework. This evaluation seeks to address whether the essence of happiness is clearly articulated within Sadra's philosophy or if the criticisms directed at other happiness theories, as interpreted by White, are equally applicable to Sadra's theory. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, this article elucidates Mulla Sadra's understanding of happiness and its efficacy about the criteria established by other philosophers. The research findings indicate that considering the various existential levels and capacities of human beings, a degree of happiness is attainable for all.