نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 17 (بهار و تابستان 1403)

Most of the Muslim philosophers, under the influence of the Aristotelian tradition, have considered the subject of metaphysics as "existent in terms of existence". In the meantime, only Fārābī, in a rare definition, places the necessary being (wājib al-wujūd) as the subject of wisdom (ḥikma), which Ibn Sīnā seriously criticizes. Suhrawardī also sometimes used "existence" in the infinitive sense in his peripatetic works, which was later reflected in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, but the subject of Suhrawardī's philosophy of illumination and the divider of light and darkness is "object". Although other thinkers have unanimously mentioned the subject of metaphysics, Rajab ‘Alī Tabrīzī, the founder of the third school of thought in the Isfahan school, has discussed it with a new approach and has based it on a specific conceptual system. Considering the two conditions of "being more general" and "the ability to be taken as different subjects of science", he concludes that "the object in terms of existence" is the subject of ḥikma. In Tabrīzī's neo-peripatetic school, the meaning of "existence" is the existence of an object in the external (world), and the meaning of "existent" is the object that exists. Accordingly, actual existents are divided into two general categories: wājib and mumkin. What Ḥakīm means by wājib is constant and ever-existing creatures that are imperishable (everlasting) and in his term, is called "particular possibility". What is meant by mumkin is objects that are variable and "capable of existence and non-existence" which have been termed as mumkin-i ‘ām (general possible). Therefore, "God" is not even an instance of wājib al-wujūd, and therefore it will not be one of the instances of the subject of metaphysics. Such a conclusion is harmonious with Ḥakīm Tabrīzī's tanzīhī (transcendental) approach in theology.

The concept of reason has been one of the most frequently used concepts and terms in different periods of philosophy. In this study, the authors try to answer the question that in the early period of philosophy in ancient Greece, what definitions the philosophers have had of the concept of reason. Therefore, this article is intended to examine and analyze the historical concept of reason among the early Greek philosophers with emphasis on Plato and Aristotle. The authors of this article claim that the concept of reason in its initial roots has multiple meanings in three different fields of epistemology, ontology, and ethics studies; therefore, the accuracy of the philosophical opinion requires that we pay attention to the plurality of different meanings in the application of this concept and its definition in texts. Our method in this research is historical-analytical, in which, by examining the reliable sources of the history of philosophy and the original texts, we find out the early applications of reason.

Reappraising the concept of God in Al-Kindi’s reflections with the Qur'anic approach displays another of his aspects. In explaining the concept of God, Al-Kindi emphasizes the "Creatorship" and has reflected this in various treatises from his collection of philosophical treatises. The question is how Al-Kindi used the Qur'an to explain the concept of God? Can Al-Kindi's explanation of the concept of God also be considered Qur'anic? To express the concept of God and introduce him as the creator, Al-Kindi, either openly uses the verses of the Qur'an or implicitly uses the Qur'anic themes and the concepts of Ḥaqq, ‘Alīm, ‘Ādil and Qādir to describe God. In some treatises, he cites verses from the Holy Qur'an (Yā Sīn, 78-82; Al-Raḥmān, 6) and in using the Qur'an directly, he considers God as Creator (Khāliq) and in using the Qur'anic themes and views God as Truth (Ḥaqq) which has Qur'anic attributes. In this article, by examining these verses and Al-Kindi's explanation of them, we reappraise the concept of God from a Qur'anic point of view and answer the above-mentioned questions.

The relationship between faith and human free-will has always been discussed in Western and Eastern societies. In this research, the authors have discussed the relationship between faith and free-will and have compared the views of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Paul Tillich. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, while maintaining the free-will in acquisition of faith, rates it in rank of heart and as second to the early knowledge of religion, and considers faith to be preliminary to action and obedience. Whereas, Paul Tillich defines faith as the ultimate end or final attachment and considers it to be the outcome of the action of all areas of human existence, such as reason, will, and feeling. He considers the first stage of faith, which is finding the object (muta‘allaq) of faith, to be voluntary and the stage of submission and attachment to be involuntary, and considers obedience as a product of faith. Therefore, in order to explain the difference between the relationship of faith to human free-will in the Islamic and Protestant Christian perspectives, as well as to find out the impact and relationship of human free-will in reaching faith in these two perspectives, we have compared the views of these two thinkers in a comparative and analytical method.Paul Tillich, the Protestant philosopher and theologian, also discusses reason, faith, and agency with him in his books, The Dynamics of Faith and Systematic Theology. From Tillich's point of view, faith is neither knowledge of truth, nor knowledge of proposition, nor authority of belief.

The issue of "unification of the soul with the active intellect" which has since long ago been the focus of attention of philosophers, especially the Aristotelians, has a direct effect on the series of epistemological functions of the active intellect. Through this research, it is clarified that Ibn Sīnā, by rejecting the absolute impossibility of the unification and the unification of the intelligent and the intelligible, does not accept the unification of the soul with the active intellect; but Ṣadr al-Muti‘alihīn, despite accepting the metamorphosis of the substantive and conceptual unification of the soul with the active intellect, accepts the existential unification of the soul with li ghayra (for-something-else) aspect of intellect as the unification of the non-actualized with the actualized and substantiates it. It seems that the focus of Ibn Sīnā's discussions is their essential unification, therefore it is not incompatible with Sadrian findings; whereas, on the other hand, some of the objections of the Neo-Sadrians are incorrect on Ṣadr al-Muti‘alihīn's view, which we have discussed in this article.

Based on gradation in existence and the similitude of existence and knowledge, which are among the most important ontological foundations of Sadrian philosophy, "gradation in knowledge", which is one of the most important results and branches of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy and has significant epistemological consequences, will be a reasonable and defensible issue. Gradationality of human presential knowledge is a certain and accepted entity; as these kinds of knowledge are derived from the level and rank of human existence, and the higher the superiority of this level and rank would be, naturally, the higher would also be the superiority of his presential knowledge, which is of existential similitude. But according to the common view, human acquired knowledge are ungradational and indescribable in terms of intensity and weakness; that is because this knowledge does not arise from the level and rank of human existence; rather, they arise from imaginations or concepts that are compatible with the capacity of the external reality, and there is no room for gradation in imaginations. However, the present research claims that according to the principles and some findings of Sadrian philosophy, it may be possible to raise the idea of ​​gradationality of human acquired knowledge and propose some justifications for it. To this end and with the aim of explaining the gradation in acquired knowledge from an ontological and epistemological point of view, the authors have addressed the quality of permeation of gradation in the various types of perceptions and attestations.

The correspondence between the macro-anthropo and micro-anthropo is a basic matter in the transcendental philosophy, which helps greatly to explain the various topics of Sadrian philosophy. One of the topics of Sadrian philosophy that needs to be expounded is the unity of the universe with its different dimensions, a mystical problem that has to be rationally explained. The present study explains the unity of the universe in two areas, internal and external, with the descriptive-analytical method and based on Sadrian ‘ilm al-nafs (psychology), and according to Mullā Ṣadrā's innovations in ‘ilm al-nafs, it deals with the application of psychology to the universe as a macro-anthropo; a comparison that is also evident in Ṣadrā's own words. The result of this research is the explanation of the unity of the universe in the external field by expressing the three aspects of collective unity, true-but-shadowy (ḥaqqa-yi ẓillī) unity, and the particular unity of the universe, and in the internal field, it explains the simplicity of the universe in the sense of the simplicity of the first intellect, and considers attention to the levels of the universe as leading to the composition of the universe from matter and form, without the existential multiplicity being obtained in it.

Event, which in a general sense is anything that happens, takes place or occurs, is considered one of the world's categories in contemporary metaphysics. Although most of the metaphysicians have accepted the existence of event as a category, they disagree about its quiddity, and therefore, different approaches have been formed in its definition. Discussion about event and its quiddity is not limited to contemporary metaphysics and can be traced in the works of other philosophers as well. For this purpose, paying attention to the relationship and link between the concept of event (in the general sense) and the concept of change and movement and considering that every event is equivalent to a movement will be helpful. Although some have objected to this equivalent-making, in this article, which is a research based on the thought of the contemporary philosopher Allāma Muhammad Taqī Ja‘farī, it is shown to be acceptable. According to this relationship between event and movement, the quiddity of event has been followed in the works of Allāma Ja‘farī; and based on his metaphysical principles and his different view on substance and accident, event finds a new definition in the category of action or passivity.

In the fundamentalist system of some Muslim philosophers, the presential knowledge is the foundation of other branches of knowledge. Among the important features of this basic knowledge is its infallibility, against which of course many objections are raised. In this article, one of these objections, called "phantom limbs phenomenon", is dealt with. According to this objection, sometimes the percipient (mudrik) feels pain in some of his organs, while he lacks that organ, so the percipient has an unrealistic feeling, and since sensations are an example of presential knowledge, we can conclude that presential knowledge is fallible. To answer this objection, it is necessary to give two introductions first, the existence of sensory perception is contrary to the existence of its material dependent; secondly, this feeling includes numerous sensations that have been obtained by the recipient through many sensory powers. Considering these two points, the error occurs in the phantom limbs phenomenon in two ways: first, where the existence of sensory perception is validated in is anecdotal terms, and this validity is also the validity of reason, not sense. Second, where reason issues a verdict about the relationship between these feelings, if the external perceptible is seen only in terms of being presential and without the intervention and credits of the intellect, it is infallible.

In his numerous works, Shariati mentions the concept of stupefaction profusely. In this article, the author deals with the issue of how this concept is different from or similar to the concepts such as "colonization", "exploitation", "imperialism", "alienation", "assimilation", or "demagoguery". In other words, is "stupefaction" equivalent to "demagoguery" or "alienation" or is it a concept invented by Shariati to explain a social situation? In Shariati's view, the concept of "demagoguery" is closely related to the organization of the social situation in the context of human society. This situation is not just a psychological modality, but it is related to the subjective-objective structures of society and social institutions within the framework of human actions. In other words, when Shariati mentions "stupefaction", he uses a sociological language for making an inquiry into the visible and invisible structures of society, rather than merely expressing a mental state in a person who suffers from behavioral disorders. The method of study in this article is the method of text analysis.