پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال بیست و دوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 44، پاییز و زمستان 1403)

Comparative theology, as a new approach in theology, seeks to have a constructive encounter with other religions and theologies and to gain a deep understanding through comparison and adaptation with other religions. The process of this understanding in comparative theology requires a proper context and strategy to achieve the goals of this theology. In this paper, based on Gadamer's hermeneutic principles, the hermeneutic strategies of comparative theology are examined and analyzed. The result of this analysis indicates considerable affinities between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and comparative theology such as the infinity of understanding, the fusion of horizons, the game of understanding, the understanding of self through the understanding of the "other", the acceptance of prejudice as an integral part of the flow of understanding, and finally the enrichment of one’s theology through the understanding “other’s” theology. According to this result, the phenomenon of understanding in comparative theology can be explained based on Gadamerian hermeneutics. In general, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can result in the development of comparative theology and its achievements. Comparative theology, in addition to adopting the original and traditional meanings of religious teachings and rituals, is based on a dynamic understanding of religious traditions and also a hermeneutic flexibility of religious doctrines.

Joshua Golding, by appealing to faith in God as a finite but transcendent value, develops a new formulation of the pragmatic arguments. Golding argues that the potential value of attaining a good relationship with God is transcendent and a religious way of life is more likely than a nonreligious way of life to result in attaining a good relationship with God. In addition, Golding’s version aims to replace Pascal’s problem with a finite but transcendent value and justify that it is pragmatically rational for a person to pursue a religious way of life. Since Golding claims that the pragmatic value of choosing faith in God is higher than nonreligious choices, this paper attempts to defend his claim. Due to the position of the Axiology of Theism in this issue, the present paper examines both Pro-theism and Anti-theism arguments. This review shows that the Anti-theism claim in impersonal scope is not plausible and in personal one, which is based on the meaning of life argument is not defensible. Moreover, Proponents of the Divine Hiddenness by rebutting the Axiology of Theism also pose a challenge to Anti-theism arguments. Therefore, regarding Pro-theism arguments, God, as a perfectly moral good being, necessarily adds value to any state of affairs in which God exists. Hence, Golding’s pragmatic argument in claiming that attaining a good relationship with God is of value can be defended.

John Cottingham, a contemporary English philosopher, believes that it is necessary to pay attention to the emotional aspect of faith in two ways: (1) the impact of the emotional aspect in human conversion and explanation of the problem of evil, and (2) attention to the language of religion and its function in philosophical issues. From his point of view, conversion is not a forced process but achieved through internal acceptance. This acceptance is not realized just by listening to rational arguments, but it is a response from all the intellectual, emotional, moral, and spiritual aspects of a person. In Cottingham’s view, the problem of evil needs an emotional explanation that considers the world based on Divine providence and God’s love. He also believes that although religious beliefs have propositional and cognitive content, such content is expressed in layers of figurative and literary metaphors in the form of symbolic language. The discovery and extraction of content from these layers need a unique method, so, the literal analysis of these phrases results in misunderstanding. Paying attention to the emotional aspect of human conversion is a valuable point, but weakening the rational aspect in this field is not in favor of religion, and this is one of the important weaknesses of Cottingham's thought. Regarding the emotional explanation of the problem of evil, generalizing it to all human beings -especially the prophets- is not true. Also, not all religious content can be understood by symbolic language, rather, religion consists of different propositions, many of which have a literal meaning.

Human beings morally wrong each other. Forgiving is one moral reaction to those wrongs. The Noble Quran prescribes that some wrongs be forgiven and some don't. These prescriptions can be explained by evolutionary theory especially by natural selection. Natural selection can act at different levels especially at individual level and group level. Forgiveness preserves biologically valuable relations with relatives, friends and so on. Therefore, individual selection favors such forgivers to those who seek revenge. Forgiveness in The Noble Quran is over and above reciprocation. Research in game theory shows that it is, but in the long run promotes reciprocation. Group selection distinguishes between forgiving in-groups and out-groups, and between those in-groups that act according to group morality and those that don't, and between those out-groups that could become in-groups and those that could not. The Noble Quran's prescriptions about forgiving enemies and doing good deeds in response to their evil deeds, or not forgiving are best understood by these distinctions. The Noble Quran's prescriptions about forgiveness have been selected by cultural group selection.

The problem of evil is a significant issue that theologians worldwide have addressed with considerable seriousness, offering responses informed by their theological perspectives and concerns. Among them, the patterns of Process, open, protest, weakness of God, cross, death of God, existential, and feminist theologies are notable examples. The great mystical theologian, Ibn Arabi, also gave answers to the problem of evil, which in this article we intend to reconstruct them according to contemporary theological models. Some of the components in the reconstructed responses according to each theology include: The diffusion of absolute power and its non-exclusivity to God, as well as the existence of indeterminate possibilities for the future of humans in process theology; human agency in the world and the reciprocal influence between humans and phenomena, and the monistic exchange between God And man in open theology in open theology; the ontological unity of God with the world and with the causes of good and evil, which legitimizes the right to protest against God in protest theology; divine moderation regarding the good and evil of the world, indicating that the world is considered "the most novel possible world" in the theology of God’s weakness; the transformation of Christ's suffering through His martyrdom and God's caretaking of the people in the theology of the cross; the implications of expressions such as “Fabulous Gryphon (ʿAnqāʾ Maghrib)” and “Absolute Unseen” for God's absence, and the emphasis on the principle of inward and spiritual joy in the theology of the death of God; the capability for meaning-making and the reconstruction of the relationship with God in existential theology; and the emphasis on both divine and earthly aspects in human beings, with a more complete active-passive vision of God in women in feminist theology.

Understanding-centered philosophy of religion, in addition to examining the rationality of religious beliefs, also pays attention to the way of achieving religious understanding and to the factors that are effective on it. This understanding is therefore more ambitious than knowledge-centered epistemology and also emphasizes the experimental, practical, emotional, social, and cultural aspects of religion. In this philosophical approach to religion, insights gained from these various dimensions are used to deepen the understanding of religion and foster a more profound faith. Understanding-centered epistemology not only broadens the responsibilities of the philosopher of religion but also shifts the focus in the philosophy of religion from disagreement to dialogue, from individual-oriented rationality to the wisdom cultivated by communities, from differences as an epistemic challenge to diversity as an epistemic opportunity. It also plays a role in fostering synergy among different religious traditions.

The cosmological argument consists of a group of arguments designed to demonstrate the existence of a necessary fact, based on at least one a posteriori premise. At the end of the 20th century, Robert Koons proposed an advanced version of this argument, claiming that it successfully addresses the objections raised by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, and Russell. To support this claim, he incorporates 20th-century developments in logic and philosophy, including modal logic, non-monotonic logic, and mereology. These innovations give Koons's version of the cosmological argument a distinct, innovative character. He begins by introducing the concept of "cosmos," defining it as the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts, and proceeds to demonstrate that the cosmos itself is a wholly contingent fact. Using the causal principle that every wholly contingent fact must have a cause (unless proven otherwise), he argues for the existence of a cause for the cosmos. He further asserts that, since cause and effect must be distinct in terms of existence, the cause of the cosmos cannot be contingent but must instead be a necessary fact. In this paper, we first outline the assumptions underlying Koons's argument, then evaluate its effectiveness in addressing the objections raised by previous philosophers.

Some Western philosophers hold that certain truths exist within the human soul, as if the individual has brought them from another world or possessed them prior to earthly birth, or they have been embedded in human nature in some other way. These truths, from an ontological perspective, are not derived from experience. The knowledge of such truths is referred to as "innate knowledge." However, most Islamic philosophers, while accepting the principle of “Fiṭra” (primordial nature) in humans, reject the idea of knowledge being innate. The Qur'an, in the explicit wording of some verses, also indicates the absence of actualized innate knowledge; yet, the apparent meaning of other verses suggests a form of actualized innate knowledge. The claim of this paper is this paradox can be resolved in two ways: 1. By adopting the apparent meaning of the first set of verses and interpreting the second set in favor of the first (the exegetical method); 2. By distinguishing between “acquired knowledge” (al-ʿIlm al-ḥuṣūlī) and “presential knowledge (al-ʿIlm al-ḥuḍūrī), such that the first set of verses explains acquired knowledge, and the second set explains presential knowledge (the philosophical method). The conclusion is that, from the exegetical perspective, innate knowledge is not actualized at the beginning of creation. However, from the philosophical perspective, while innate knowledge is not actualized in the realm of acquired knowledge (which includes most human knowledge), it is actualized in the realm of presential knowledge.

Natural theology, as opposed to revealed theology, refers to rational reflection on the existence and nature of God, and has long been tied to arguments for God's existence. Alister McGrath, a Christian theologian, critiques natural theology and, through offering a new interpretation, applies it within the interactive relationship between science and theology. The central question of this paper is: what are the characteristics of McGrath’s understanding of natural theology, and what criticisms can be made of it? McGrath views natural theology as a product of non-Christian factors, such as biblical criticism, the rise of the mechanistic worldview, etc. He argues that the Bible does not support natural theology, and its use undermines divine revelation and other core Christian beliefs. He then reconstructs natural theology within the framework of Christian beliefs, especially the “doctrine of creation”. Since this theology incorporates religious presuppositions, McGrath contends that using it to prove the existence of God is circular, and it can only address the boundary questions of science. In his critique of Enlightenment natural theology, McGrath mistakenly conflates it with deism and incorrectly attributes many theological challenges of the Enlightenment to the use of natural theology. Due to his imprecise conception of natural theology, McGrath denies any historical precedent for the use of this theology in Christianity. Furthermore, the path he takes in defining nature leads to relativism, and his efforts to reconstruct natural theology seem futile, as all the functions he expects from this theology are already embedded in his definition of nature.

Following C.D. Broad, Swinburne argues that the principle of credulity can be applied to religious experience. He contends that, based on this principle, religious experiences are real and can provide evidence for God's existence. In this paper, contrary to his claim, I argue that the principle of credulity cannot be applied to religious experience. To this end, firstly, I try to explain his view on the principle of credulity. My next step is to examine the critique proposed by William Rowe, which argues that since there is no clear distinction between real and illusory religious experiences, the principle of credulity cannot be applied in this context. In the following, I will assess the responses that claim religious experiences, like sensory experiences, can be evaluated, suggesting that the principle of credulity can indeed be applied to religious experiences. Finally, I will demonstrate that applying this principle to religious experience faces a more serious problem. Referring to the principle of simplicity, I argue that because the object of religious experience (God as infinite) is so complex, the principle of credulity cannot be applied to it. Consequently, we need to find another way to justify the epistemological value of religious experience.

In the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, the philosophical tradition of the West is the history of elimination of absolute alterity. In this context, being is subordinated to thought through thematization, or the same and the other are totalized in a neutral impersonal being, which in any case is disposed to tyranny and self-immanence. In this research, we are trying to show that Levinas's critical view is formulated on linguistic analysis, and his suggestion to break up the ontological totality is based on a Jewish approach to language. Using Jewish nominalistic ideas, Levinas points out language is not one-dimensional logos including mere indicative statements. Name is the representative of the vocative dimension of language and it resists totalization. It is only in the speech that the other remains outside the conditions of human knowledge. Since in the Jewish tradition the Torah is considered as the names of God, Levinas shows that the Jewish revelation is understood in the vocative and imperative realm of language. Revelation is not a knowledge about God, but God's speaking with man and a relationship between two individuals. In this sense, God's names are moral commands (musts) from beyond existence that break up the ontological identity and make space for alterity.

Miracles are one of the important issues in the relationship between science and religion. The question is whether miracles can be scientifically explained or not. In this article, based on the principles of transcendental theosophy, the possibility of a scientific explanation of miracles is investigated. Supernatural events, both good and evil, like all natural phenomena, need both real and preparatory causes. Nevertheless, supernatural events have two ontological characteristics that set them apart from normal ones; one is the agency of the souls and the other is the non-conventional role of preparatory causes. Due to the agency of the souls, as supernatural beings, offering a scientific explanation that is bound to methodological naturalism is not possible. Moreover, in the miracles and good supernatural events, because of their invincibility, the non-conventional role of preparatory causes cannot be recognized and scientifically explained. In other words, Divine wisdom requires that miracles cannot be known even if the agency of the souls, preparatory causes, and natural factors are ignored. As a result, miracles should be considered outside the scope of science.