نشریه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 38 (بهار و تابستان 1403)

Although the time dilation is one of the important problems of physics and its philosophy in the contemporary world, throughout history too some philosophers have – though negatively and in a critical manner – discussed about it: they have usually proposed the plurality of and the slowness/fastness of time as a probable view and then have criticized it by several proofs. On the contrary, especially some Neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have explicitly asserted that there are as many times as motions. These times can even be – in a way different from the relativity physics – slow or fast: if a motion is fast, then its time too is fast; and if it is slow, its time too is slow. I have gathered, in this paper, the philosophical reasons of the two opposite views and have rationally analyzed and criticized them. I have showed that the various reasons of the notable opponents of the plurality of and the dilation of time – including Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Dīn al–Rāzī – are not very strong. But the claim of the proponents can philosophically be strengthened and reconstructed.

I collect and review various perspectives using the historical method, then analyze and assess them using the philosophical method and through logical tools.

While Plato’s Timaeus suggests that not just one time but various times can exist, it does not address the relativity of time and the slowness and fastness of these times. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and also claimed that time cannot be described as fast or slow; Otherwise, this would create a vicious circle: a fast time would be one that occurs in a short time. In critique of Aristotle's argument, we can show that:(1) By distinguishing between the time per se and the relational time, no circularity arises. For instance, in a one–hour contest, since the rabbit's motion is faster than the turtle's, the rabbit motion’s time per se – subordinate to the fastness of its motion – must be more than the turtle motion’s time per se. This distinction is not, of course, incompatible with the fact that the relational time of both of them to be the current one–hour compared with, and related to, the current time of todays.(2) This argument would work only if there were no other way to understand a fast time, but there is. Because, one of the descriptive definitions (Rasm) of "fast" is for something to reach and exceed something else. By such a definition, we see that the rabbit reaches and exceeds the moving turtle. To grasp, here, the meaning of reaching and exceeding, we do not need to understand the time. Thus, at least in this example, understanding fastness does not require an understanding of time.(3) If the fast time involves circularity, then the fast motion, just in the same way, would also involve circularity, as a fast motion is defined as a motion occurring in a short measure of motion (= in a short time).Likewise, other claims of Aristotle about the unity of time and its lacking fastness and slowness can be challenged. For instance, in the case of time, he conflates the typical and numerical unity.After Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al–Rāzī, who presented objectionable views on the problem at hand, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī argued that there are as many times as there are motions, and Jawādī Āmulī explicitly discussed the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the multiplicity of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness: since motion is numerous, measure of motion (time) is also numerous. And since motions are fast or slow, their measures, namely times, too are fast or slow subordinate to themselves. Nevertheless, the neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have connected other views to this theory, which I believe are unnecessary and even mistaken, such as the general substantial motion and the uniform general time. The general substantial motion cannot be established through the general and common time.Firstly, since time is the measure of motion, so assuming the existence of time already presupposes the existence of motion. And from an epistemic point of view too, we, as Aristotle notes, can experience no time if we are aware of no motion. Hence, it is question–begging to establish motion through time. Similarly, assuming the existence of general and common time presupposes the existence of general motion, making it question–begging to prove general motion (whether substantial or non–substantial) through general time.Secondly, I believe that if time is considered as the measure of motion, then to prove the uniform general and common time, we must establish the existence of a permanent or long–lasting motion uniform without acceleration. However, since such a uniform motion has not been proven in the exact sense of the term, the uniform general and common time, whether substantial time or accidental one, cannot be proven in the exact sense of the term either.

Throughout history, some have argued that there is only one time, presenting its fastness or slowness as a hypothetical possibility that they subsequently reject. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and dismissed, due to the problem of circularity, its fastness or slowness as well. After critically addressing the circularity objection, I also challenge his other claims about the unity of time and its lack of fastness or slowness. The main point of Plotinus's objections concerning the relationship between the time and the measure of motion, if it is correct, is the fact that it would only challenge the specifically Aristotelian version; Otherwise, there is no issue with having multiple motions and multiple times as well, where each time is subordinate to its own specific motion.Due to the regress argument against the existence of time, Ibn Sīnā rejects the existence of the plurality of times. However, I have showed that no regress would occur if the essential time and per se one be distinct from the accidental and relational time. I even, in defense of the plurality of time, present several other objections to Ibn Sīnā's position.After reviewing and criticizing the arguments by Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Rāzī regarding the rejection of time as the measure of motion and the denial of the multiplicity of time, I show that Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī was the first Muslim thinker to explicitly support the idea that there are as many times as motions. Similarly, Jawādī Āmulī explicitly advocates for the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is to show that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the plurality of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness, although this differs from the treatment of time in the relativity physics.

From Fārābī’s perspective, one of the most important, and perhaps the most pivotal, aspects of metaphysics is the discussion of theological issues—namely, the study of God as the origin of the universe and His attributes. Fārābī often defines metaphysics in his works in terms of theology, describing it as the study of the first existent and other existents insofar as their existence is caused by the first existent.Thus, in Fārābī’s view, God is not only the existent on whom all other existents depend, but other existents merit metaphysical examination only insofar as they are connected to God. Therefore, a proper understanding of the first existent, His attributes, and His relation to other existents is among the most important and pivotal research issues in the study of Fārābī. While the first existent and His attributes have been discussed in another article (Kiankhah 2022b), due to its limited scope, that article did not address the proof or proofs for the existence of God in Fārābī’s view—an essential issue in Fārābī’s theology. In continuation of my research on Fārābī’s theology,this article primarily focuses on the proof or proofs for God’s existence in Fārābī’s works. It analyzes and examines Fārābī’s approach to proving God’s existence and addresses a crucial philosophical question that has concerned thinkers for a long time: Why does God exist?In the fourth chapter of Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm (Enumeration of the Sciences), which is dedicated to natural science and theology, Fārābī divides theology (metaphysics) into three parts. The first addresses existents and their accidents insofar as they are existents. The second deals with the preliminaries of proofs and the definition of substances (primitive definitions), while the third is devoted to the study of existents that are neither physical nor associated with physical objects. Fārābī then outlines the general issues of this third part, mentioning the proofs presented for its problems, such as the proof for the existence of detached (immaterial) existents, the proof for the multiplicity of detached existents, the proof for the finitude of detached existents, and the proof for the hierarchical degrees among these existents, where this hierarchy ultimately leads to an existent that is the most perfect, free of any imperfections, and from which other existents derive their existence, unity, and truth (Fārābī 1996, 75–79).According to this text, Fārābī holds that the existence of the first existent and non-physical existents is not self-evident. Thus, a key problem in theology (metaphysics) is to prove the existence of immaterial beings and demonstrate that the hierarchical chain of these beings culminates in the first origin. Like Avicenna, Fārābī does not consider God’sexistence self-evident and regards the proofs for His existence as a metaphysical issue. However, a closer examination of Fārābī’s works reveals that his approach to proving the first existent is more complex than Avicenna’s, requiring deeper scrutiny.

As with other research on Fārābī, it is essential, before embarking on a study, to distinguish between the works attributed to him in terms of their authenticity and then examine their content. Regarding the central issue of this article, there are profound and fundamental differences between the authentic and non-authentic works attributed to Fārābī, and failing to distinguish them would result in a conflation of various views and imprecision in reporting and analyzing Fārābī’s thought. As I suggested in the article “The First existence and its attributes in Fārābī’s view” (Kiankhah, 2022b), many historical books and research papers have attributed the ideas presented in treatises such as al-Daʿāwī al-qalbiyya, Sharḥ risālat Zīnūn al-kabīr, and ʿUyūn al-masāʾil to Fārābī without scrutinizing their authenticity, simply because these treatises contained significant material on theology and proofs of God’s existence. However, these treatises often align with an Avicennan intellectual approach. The author or authors of these three treatises, and similar works, emphasize the distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as necessity and possibility, proving God’s existence based on possibility and necessity. In contrast, an examination of the views presented in the definitively authentic works of Fārābī shows that, unlike Avicenna, he did not consider the distinction between essential necessity and essential possibility in his metaphysics, and, in fact, he never describes God as the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd).Thus, when examining the proofs for God's existence in Fārābī’s view, it is crucial to consider such proofs separately in his definitively authentic works and in more doubtful ones, in order to avoid conflating the differing views presented in these two groups of writings.

Overall, after examining the proofs for God’s existence in the works attributed to Fārābī, the following points can be noted.An examination of Fārābī’s works reveals that those doubtfully attributed to him present clear-cut proofs for God’s existence based on the distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as necessity and possibility. The fact that these proofs are grounded in principles that contradict Fārābī’s theoretical foundations, along with other evidence in the texts, strengthens the hypothesis that these works were not authored by him. Many researchers, without acknowledging this, have cited these works to argue that Fārābī was the first philosopher to view God as the essentially Necessary Existent and to present the proof from necessity and possibility for God’s existence, thus rejecting Avicenna’s role as the originator of these arguments.A review of Fārābī’s definitively authentic works reveals that al-Ḥurūf, Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Falsafa Arasṭūṭālīs, and Fuṣūl muntazaʿa contain a version of the causal proof for the existence of the first existence when establishing the necessity of the third branch of the theoretical sciences, namely theology.While Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya contain the most extensive theological discussions among Fārābī’s works and provide detailed presentations of the proof from the unity of the first existent and the proof from the negation of opposites, they do not explicitly offer a clear-cut proof for the existence of the first existent. However, there are passages in Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila where it appears that Fārābī seeks to establish the existence of the First Existence through an analysis of its essence.It seems that the reason Fārābī does not present a proof for God’s existence in his two major works, Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya, is that he assumes God's existence, having already somewhat established it in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda and similar works. Thus, he begins his discussions with an explanation and analysis of the problems concerning God and higher principles. In Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, he emphasized the necessity of addressing theology without fully engaging with it.One contribution of this article is the examination of evidence for rejecting the attribution of three treatises to Fārābī: ʿUyūn al-masāʾil, al-Daʿāwī al-qalbiyya, and Sharḥ risālat Zīnūn al-kabīr. This helps researchers of Fārābī avoid errors in attributing philosophical views to him and accurately assess Avicenna’s innovations in presenting proofs for God’s existence.

Symbolism has long been applied to religion, mysticism, and philosophy. Shaykh al-Isrāq, al-Suhrawardī, through his symbolic language, portrays transcendent themes that are beyond the reach of ordinary language and demonstrative reason. Al-Suhrawardī views the pre-Aristotelian tradition, particularly Plato, as the Western representative of the primordial tradition of wisdom. The fundamental problem addressed in the present article is an analysis of al-Suhrawardī's symbolist perspective and its impact on interpreting Platonic wisdom based on the primordial tradition. The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and comparative approach, referencing the works of both philosophers—al-Suhrawardī and Plato—to analyze the characteristics of symbolic language and its fundamental connection to transcendent truths and the primordial tradition of wisdom, and doctrines such as the purification and detachment of the soul, divine illumination (al-ishrāq) and inception, revelation (al-kashf), and intuition (al-shuhūd). The results indicate: first, a symbol is connected to and arises from transcendent truths. Second, the primordial tradition of wisdom has two aspects: a universal aspect (historical) and a divine aspect (nonhuman and trans-historical). Third, understanding transcendent truths and the shared divine foundation is possible through elements such as the detachment and purification of the soul and inner insight. Fourth, symbolic language enters the realm where experience and intuition serve as its dynamic elements. Fifth, Plato, as a divine sage, is a man of mystical experience and intuition who attained the state of detachment from the body (khalʿ al-badan); his wisdom is filled with transcendent truths. Sixth, symbolism is the means through which Plato and other philosophers expressed themselves. Thus, al-Suhrawardī employs a symbolic approach based on the primordial tradition when interpreting Plato. Through this approach, he conveys the profound meanings of the wisdom of illumination, seeking wisdom not in history but beyond it, in his interpretation of this tradition and others..

In Classical Logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are considered theorems and have proof. Recently, Morteza Hajihosseini has written a book titled Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic (2017) and also published the second edition (2023) of it. In this book, he established two truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems in logic. In this logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are in the form of a rule that every line of the argument is written based on them and are therefore considered unprovable. Asadollah Fallahi has recently written several criticisms on this book in the form of separate articles and the author of the book has responded to each of these articles separately. Fallahi, in his last review of the book titled "Philosophical Foundations of Hajhosseini's Logics" Volume 14, Issue 2, February 2024 in Contemporary Wisdom Journal, critiques the philosophical foundations of the truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems, including the author’s views on the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle and their consequences, without clarifying his stance on whether a non-formal language is presupposed or not. In this article, we first explain the philosophical and epistemological foundations of logical systems and compare these systems with respect to these foundations. Then, we respond to Fallahi’s criticisms one by one.

The "Theory of Grace" is one of the innovations of Plotinus and serves as a response to the issue of the emergence of multiplicities from the One. Throughout history, various explanations of grace have been provided by philosophers, but Ibn Arabi's interpretation is notably different. This research aims to examine the issue of the semantic coordinates of the system of grace by balancing the views of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi, utilizing the method of Aristotelian description and analysis, and evaluating it at two levels: components and foundations. The goal of this research is to discover and infer the components of the system of grace within the two epistemological frameworks of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi, in such a way that the relationship between the foundations and views of these two thinkers is demonstrated. The findings of the study indicate that the system of grace in Plotinus and Ibn Arabi has fundamental and structural differences in terms of both foundation and structure. Specifically, Ibn Arabi has been able to present a more precise and comprehensive analysis of grace by situating the theory within the context of the personal unity of existence. The most significant achievement and characteristic of Ibn Arabi's grace can be seen in his transition from the multiplicities of being and his profound explanation of the relationship between the Divine and creation, as well as the degree of presence and activity of the Divine.

The problem of the soul’s perfection and the attainment of human happiness held immense significance among Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq. These thinkers outlined the stages, conditions, and prerequisites for the soul's perfection, which indicates the emphasis Muslim philosophers place on practical mysticism and spiritual wayfaring. Given that research on the soul, its ultimate purpose, and its perfection profoundly impacts one's worldview and leads to the correction of behavior and practices, this article employs a descriptive-analytic method to compare the perspectives of Ibn Ṭufayl and al-Suhrawardī on the soul’s perfection and the path to attaining true happiness. Research findings show that, according to the views of Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq, the perfection of the human soul requires passing through three stages, some of which bear similarities, though there are distinctions. Both philosophers consider the first stage to be self-awareness. For Ibn Ṭufayl, the second stage involves acquiring a resemblance to celestial bodies and heavenly souls as part of the soul’s perfection and the attainment of happiness. In contrast, al-Suhrawardī views the second stage as seeking guidance from a spiritual healer. While Ibn Ṭufayl sees the third stage as direct contact with the Necessary Existent, Shaykh al-Ishrāq takes it as a connection to what he calls the “world-illuminating sun,” which can be construed as both the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) and the Necessary Existent.