فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردی
سال بیست و هفتم شماره 3 (پیاپی 105، پاییز 1403)

The governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran must align with its legitimizing discourse and demonstrate a coherence between this theory and practical governance. However, governance in Iran often wavers and oscillates between liberal and religious discourses. No political system can achieve long-term legitimacy through governance frameworks that are inconsistent with its core discourse. Therefore, this study aims to explore the concept of freedom within Iran's governance pattern. The Islamic Revolution in Iran achieved victory with the key slogan 'Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic,' yet some supporters see freedom as a disruptive concept and are unwilling to embrace it. On the other hand, critics often accuse this pattern of being in conflict with the notion of freedom.Here, we try to demonstrate the desirability of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to answer the question, "What is the philosophy of freedom in this governance pattern, and why is it desirable?" The aim is to prevent theoretical mistakes in the discourse. Given the prevailing influence of liberalism and its discursive demands, in the absence of an alternative Islamic theory, it risks imposing itself on Iran's socio-political structure. Therefore, elucidating the philosophy of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic helps prevent incorrect theoretical and practical choices in governance.

In this study, a "descriptive-analytical" approach was used for data collection through the "documentary" method. The data analysis was performed using the qualitative method of "text-based hermeneutics.

This paper presents a coherent and interconnected discursive framework that reflects the philosophy of freedom and the intricate balance between the dos and dont's in this context. Firstly, it discusses Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation), demonstrating that from an ontological perspective, the belief in Ma'ad (Resurrection Day) and God's system of reward and punishment necessitate human freedom, as freedom is essential for "spiritual trial." Additionally, within the Islamic Revolution's discourse on anthropology, the belief in human "free will" and the "inherent nature of freedom" make freedom a valued concept. Thus, in religious rules, freedom is defined as liberation from servitude to anyone other than God and liberation from tyranny and oppression. In this regard, freedom is understood as a "right," "duty," and "value."

 Conclusion:

In the Islamic philosophy of freedom, "Tawhid" (monotheism) stands as the central principle and foundation. There is a seamless connection between Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation) and Nizam-e-Tashri (The Order of Religious Legislation), forming a unified system. This linkage in Shiism is established through the belief in the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions. Such a belief ensures that the moral quality of actions is rational and aligned with Nizam-e-Takwin, creating an integrated order where the dos and don'ts are interconnected.In this framework, the philosophy of freedom within the governance pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran is rooted in "Tawhid" (monotheism) principles. Freedom is regarded as a "right," "duty," and "value." This signifies that freedom is valuable because it is an inherent right. Furthermore, respecting and advocating freedom is a religious duty, which enhances its desirability. Additionally, freedom is recognized as a religious virtue. According to the Islamic worldview, humans possess free will and an innate inclination toward freedom. The system of rewards and punishments in Ma'ad (Resurrection Day) also necessitates human freedom, as the possibility of a spiritual trial depends on it, thus making the system logical.Overall, this paper seeks to illustrate the philosophy of freedom within a cohesive and integrated system, emphasizing the link between Nizam-e-Takwin (The Order of Creation) and Nizam-e-Tashri (The Order of Religious Legislation) in the context of freedom. This represents a significant innovation in the study.

This article proceeds in three steps: First, we attempt to show within a conceptual-theoretical framework that development in our era, the information age, has found a new dominant mode, which is called the Informational Mode of Development. While explaining this new mode of development, we attempt to show the driving role of this type of development to other aspects of development, such as economic development and human development. In the second step, by presenting a very concise picture of Iran's situation in some key indicators of information development, we show that despite the availability of conditions, Iran has not been able to provide the infrastructure and grounds required for informational development and the blessings that come from it, due to the defective way of dealing with ICTs and emerging technological phenomena on the one hand and neglect of the field of education and knowledge in recent years on the other. In the third step, we present a very concise analysis of the obstacles to informational development in Iran. Then in the conclusion section, we will point out some strategic imperatives for development within the framework of the informational mode of development.Our conceptualization of the informational mode of development and informational development is largely indebted to Manuel Castells, Pekka Himanen and their colleagues in the book "Reconceptualizing Development in the Global Information Age"; However, we will use the discussions of people such as Klaus Schwab, William Brian Arthur and his discussion on "Economic Evolution Following Technological Evolution" and the findings of various researchers for further explanation.

In the theoretical and conceptual part of the article, we rely on the meta-synthesis of existing research literature in this field. To measure Iran's status in the fundamental indicators of informational development, we use documentary studies and secondary data from existing global reports.

Today, the competitiveness of territories and companies depends largely on their ability to follow the rules of the information economy. Research literature in this field shows a positive and synergistic relationship between informationalism and the productivity and competitiveness of countries, regions and companies. The realization of this synergistic relationship is conditional on the existence of three factors; factors that can be considered the three fundamental aspects of informationdevelopment:Adequate and optimal infrastructure in ICTs (technology diffusion)Organizational transformation in the form of networking (for example, networked enterprise and e-governmentIncreasing the quality of the human workforce, which depends on education and quality of life.Accordingly, a country that wants to benefit from the blessings and advantages of information development in today's world must first have strong, extensiveand comprehensive ICT infrastructures and constantly update and strengthen them at the level ofthe most developed countries in the world; second, companies and organizations in that country (both private and public, including the government itself) must be managed in a networked manner and also have strong links with global financial and commercial exchange networks; and third, there must be a knowledge-based and capable human resource to support this entire ecosystem of informational development. Emphasis on infrastructure and technical dimensions and neglect of network dimensions, especially human and knowledge dimensions, will cause the information development cycle to remain incomplete and unstable. Even if economic growth is achieved in the short term, the country may move away from holistic development due to increasing inequalities, poverty, and the digital-income gap.This is while Iran's situation in global indicators related to the development and application of ICT is improving slowly overall, but it is clearly lagging behind the leading countries of the world and all the rich and stable countries of the region and is in some cases regressing. Even where growth is observed, the growth rate is so slow and the growth process is so steep that it seems as if the country has no intention of competing and excelling in regional and international competition. In addition, even the current technological infrastructure has not been optimally used to network the government and society and improve the quality of governance. The unfavorable trend of indicators related to human capital is also alarming and may challenge one of the important aspects of the country's informational development in the near future.

Reliable statistics and documents indicate that informational development in today's world is related to economic growth, productivity growth, poverty and inequality reduction, job creation, overcoming climate change and environmental degradation, and even administrative and political efficiency and the quality of governance. The capacity to produce wealth has never been as dependent on the intensity of informationalism as it is in our time, but informational development is not only the main driver of economic development, but it has also found a close relationship with human development. The fundamental and contextual role of ICTs for the emerging technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution indicates that this situation will intensify in the future.Therefore, if Iran wants to have a central position in the structure of power and wealth of the world today and in the future, it is bound to make major decisions and strategic choices to rethink its approach to emerging information and communication technologies on the one hand and to make urgent efforts to facilitate the country's macro-environment of informational development on the other. The future of the country's development in the current development paradigm depends to a large extent on the level of acceptance and support for the informational mode of development and the level of provision of platforms for its leapfrog growth. In Iran, however, the prerequisite for any policy and strategy in this area will be a change in the dominant intellectual framework and approach to new ICTs.

While it may seem that ancient thinkers didn't explicitly discuss the concept of security in isolation, the constant concern for security among humankind ensured it was addressed in their works, albeit using different terminology. For example, the authors of "Andarznameh" (political Books of Advice) were focused on preserving governance and kingship. This paper, through a case study of Siyar al-Muluk (also known as Siyasatnameh/Book of Politics) by Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, aims to reconstruct the "logic of politics" as understood by these thinkers. By exploring their "intellectual world," we seek to show what meanings the themes associated with the contemporary concept of "security" could have held within their framework and worldview.

Analyzing the ideas in Siyar al-Muluk, it's clear that Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk identified three main pillars of security: the king (malik), the kingdom (mulk), and the realm (mamlakat). These three elements form an interconnected whole. The concept of justice (adl) for Khwaja wasn't just about modern-day fairness; it included this tripartite framework. Under this notion of justice, values like moderation, adherence to traditions, avoiding religious innovation, oversight of officials' performance, defending against enemy threats, and avoiding extravagance were crucial. Khwaja's idea of "good kingship" was a well-ordered system where everything had its place. In this system, all officials were chosen based on merit and capability, and the king would intervene if any deviation or misconduct was detected. This "ideal" state or "good times" was synonymous with a "just kingship," ensuring the well-being of the subjects and the prosperity of the world. Any departure from this justice was seen as a path to decline and downfall.

From Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk's perspective, all forms of policymaking are intrinsically tied to security policymaking, as the ultimate goal is to preserve power, governance, and kingship. Security policymaking focused on preventing threats from emerging, neutralizing them in their early stages, and eliminating any actual and critical threats. It seems that Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk identified three main types of threats: 1) threats from foreign enemies and rival kings; 2) "hard" threats from internal enemies, which he often referred to as "Khawarij"; and 3) threats arising from "deviation from justice," or in modern terms, system malfunctions or dysfunctions.It seems that Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk devised strategies to counter each type of threat. For external threats, he emphasized the need for a ready army and the expenses for maintaining it, a well-stocked treasury, the king paying soldiers' salaries, keepingsubjects content, and showcasing the Sultan's majesty and greatness. According to Khwaja, internal "hard" threats, like uprisings and rebellions, stemmed from the gradual growth of latent or invisible "soft" threats. These were often caused by the spread of false religions and bad beliefs, which laid the groundwork for rebellion and sedition against the government. To counter these threats, Khwaja recommended continuous examination of religious affairs, strengthening true religion, purging the government and bureaucracy of heretical influence, and combating the Khawarij and heretics.When it comes to the third aspect of security, maintaining "justice," he highlighted several necessities: fulfilling royal duties and establishing good governance, preserving and expanding desirable royal qualities, continuously overseeing officials' work and punishing misconduct, preventing multiple job holdings, avoiding delegation of authority without supervision, creating and maintaining a network of informants, ensuring subjects’ access to the Sultan, monitoring and supervising the army, and basing jobs and titles on merit.

While the modern concept of security isn't explicitly outlined in Siyar al-Muluk, it serves as the cornerstone and unifying thread connecting the various aspects of Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk's intellectual framework. This perspective sheds new light on his intellectual world.

Today, due to the expansion of human societies and the complexities in human behavior and relationships, the concept of security has become broader and more complex. According to Friedman, the simplest idea of security is the absence of anxiety and the ability to counter any potential threat from others. In line with this concept, in the later stages of Western society, the states envisioned by Hobbes and Locke emerged to provide security for citizens under the social contract. In the East, political thought texts, such as the Letter of Tansar, also discuss governance styles and the application of security. Based on existing documents, one of the duties of governments in the Iranian Empire was to establish and maintain security. During the Sassanid Era, they were able to reunite Iranian society and, by relying on the Ahuric principles of the Zoroastrian religion, establish order and security. Therefore, in the Sassanid state, security was grounded in religious legitimacy, which can be observed in the political Books of Advice of that era, including the Letter of Tansar. Based on this, the present paper, utilizing Quentin Skinner's interpretive approach, seeks to answer the question: What is the meaning and concept of security in the Letter of Tansar?

This study is organized around Skinner's interpretive approach and John Morrow's teleology-legitimacy model. Skinner finds textual and contextual readings insufficient for understanding political texts. He believes that, in addition to reading the text and considering its context, one must also understand the author's intention and purpose. In addition, Morrow's model, which stands as one of the most credible philosophical approaches for understanding the political order governing human societies, aims to identify the goals and functions of a political system. To achieve this, he specifies criteria to serve as a basis for political evaluation and norm-setting.

The most compelling evidence for the security-centric nature of the Letter of Tansar lies in its association of religion and kingship. The letter asserts that the alignment of these two elements results in security, justice, and public satisfaction. Tansar further emphasizes that the structure and organization of social classes form the foundation of societal security. He adds that the breakdown of the social and hereditary class system leads to insecurity, attributing this disorder to the absence of a king. Political and social security, governmental security, economic security, and religious security are among the most critical issues addressed in the Letter of Tansar. He views the monarchy and the king as the security referent objects and the ones responsible for ensuring it. Just as he believes in one God, he envisions a centralized system with a single king. Thus, based on the doctrine of one God and one ruler, He considers Ardashir to be the only individual capable of aligning earthly order with divine order through his possession of divine grace, thereby establishing security.

Drawing on the teachings of Zoroastrianism and the concept of Asha, Tansar highlights three crucial elements: cosmic order, true religion, and social order. He uses Zoroaster's ideas as the basis for establishing legitimate security in society. Tansar places the king at the pinnacle of society, responsible for maintaining security. He believes that the government's and the king's legitimacy stems from divine grace, which cannot be challenged. Tansar asserts that disrupting the earthly order - connected to the divine order - leads to various security risks, and the king must address these issues, even if it involves the killing of many people. Overall, the Letter of Tansar offers several recommendations for enhancing security in society through the legitimate rule of a religious king, resulting in the public good and the elimination of security threats. Key security issues in the letter include maintaining social order, responsibility, the vital role of the king, religion's role in legitimizing the government, utilizing secret operatives to oversee society, punishing offenders, and confronting heresy and religious innovations.

Recognizing the importance of understanding the peripheral realm of the intellectual territory of Shi'ism, this paper aims to explore the challenges and opportunities in Iran's relations with Sufism as a significant intellectual and social player in the Sunni world. Throughout the history of Sunni religious-political movements, Sufism has consistently been positioned against two other main schools of thought: Rationalists and Formalists. However, the contemporary alliance between these two, manifesting in neo-Salafism and embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot be fully explained through their internal dynamics. This is because the inherent inclination of the rationalist movement, oscillating between formalism and esotericism, has always gravitated towards esoteric theology.This study explores the ties between Sufism and other Sunni sects, such as Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, and their impact on Iran's regional policies. The primary question is how Iran can manage its ties with Sufism. Additionally, the study delves into identifying other Sufi sects and analyzing the historical and epistemological relations between them.

This study adopts a qualitative approach, drawing on theoretical and historical analysis. The theoretical framework integrates social epistemology, intuitive epistemology, and Ferdinand Tonnies' Theory of Community and Society. These frameworks facilitate a multidimensional examination of the ties among various Sunni sects and their interaction with Shi'ism. The historical section delves into the relationships of Sufism with Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood across different periods. Data for this study were gathered and analyzed from written sources, academic articles, and relevant reports.

This paper reveals that Sufism within the Sunni world, due to its unique epistemological and social characteristics, has consistently either clashed with or engaged with Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Findings indicate that Sufism and the Muslim Brotherhood have maintained close ties at times; however, over the years, especially with the rise of political Islam, their relationship has grown more distant. Despite this, certain individuals and groups have successfully bridged the gap between the two. Conversely, the relationship between Sufism and Salafism has remained hostile due to fundamental epistemological differences, with Salafism emphasizing formalism and Sufism focusing on esotericism. The paper also examines the UAE and Saudi Arabia's role in using Sufism to counter political Islam, a strategy that has largely been unsuccessful due to overlooking the internal dynamics and cultural nuances of Sufism. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite its historical and epistemological differences with Sufism, has taken a complex approach towards it. Nonetheless, there are opportunities for constructive interaction between them, which could help reduce sectarian tensions and strengthen unity in the Islamic world.

This study highlights that managing Iran's relationship with Sufism requires deeply understanding its epistemological, historical, and social foundations. Additionally, this calls for understanding the position of Sufism within Sunni Islam. As an esoteric and anti-Salafist movement, Sufism can play an influential role in fostering convergence between Sunnis and Shi'ites. However, this will only occur if Iran can leverage the ties among the three main Sunni sects (Sufism, Salafism, and the Muslim Brotherhood) and avoid confrontational policies. It is recommended that Iran strengthen cultural and intellectual interactions with Sufism and support unifying discourses to help reduce sectarian tensions and enhance Islamic unity in the region. Also, employing multidimensional theoretical frameworks to analyze and predict future developments in the relationships among these sects could aid Iran's regional policy-making.

The rise of China as a major power is one of the most significant developments in global politics in the 21st century. As a result, this has sparked concerns from the United States and Southeast Asian countries. In response, Washington has implemented its grand strategy to enhance deterrence and maintain the balance of power in Asia through the "Pivot to Asia" and "Indo-Pacific" strategies. Chinese leadership, on the other hand, views these American strategies as intensifying the security dilemma in the region, which not only increases the likelihood of direct confrontation, but also poses a serious challenge to China's growth trajectory.Given the current situation and China's desire for economic development and strategic engagement with Washington, the question is “What strategy should Beijing adopt to avoid being harmed by pressure from the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia?” China's actions suggest that it has adopted what is known as a "hedging" strategy to secure its strategic interests while avoiding confrontation with the US. Indeed, it seeks to foster its development by leveraging its strategic engagement with the US. In other words, Beijing has endeavored to respond decisively but with strategic caution, to avoid conflict with the US, prevent anti-balancing coalitions (by Southeast Asian countries), and ensure the continuation of its power growth.The hedging strategy is a thoughtful approach that manifests as a cautious response to risks in a constructive, peaceful, and non-confrontational manner. It closely aligns with Beijing's peaceful diplomacy in the region, aimed at maximizing benefits and minimizing threats. In general, China's hedging strategy is based on two pillars: first, reassuring its surrounding environment (Southeast Asia) regarding the benign consequences of Beijing's growing power; and second, indirectly balancing the US through soft competition.

The article's hypothesis is examined through a descriptive-analytical method and involves two main variables: First, the independent variable, which includes the "Pivot to Asia" strategy—a form of rebalancing by the United States against China—and the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, which represents an aggressive policy by the United States towards China. Second, the dependent variable is China's hedging strategy.

The relationship between China and the United States, as two major powers, has ranged from cooperation to competition over the past two decades. Throughout this period, Chinese political leaders (from the second generation of leadership to the present) have sought to secure their interests and respond to threats by addressing structural and domestic factors. In essence, China's foreign policy has been based on economic growth aimed at peaceful development and strategic caution in the face of security risks. This approach has enabled Beijing to take steady steps towards continued economic growth and, in parallel, enhance and stabilize its power in the region as it entered the new millennium.In the meantime, China's increasing role in Asia and its high potential to become a hegemon prompted the United States to operationalize its strategy to enhance deterrence and contain Beijing through the "Pivot to Asia" and "Indo-Pacific" strategies. In response, Beijing adopted the hedging strategy as its Asian policy.

Beijing's hedging strategy is structured in two layers. The initial layer itself has two dimensions. The first pertains to the mutual dependency between Beijing and the United States, which China seeks to maintain and exploit to sustain its power growth. The second relates to China's growing security concerns regarding threats from the US, which may lead to a confrontation. These considerations have driven China to manage its relations carefully and avoid geopolitical competition with the US. The subsequent layer concerns Beijing's response to US actions in its surrounding environment, namely Southeast Asia. In this regard, Beijing has attempted to overcome challenges posed by the US by adopting a "reassurance approach" to weaken any coalitions against China.