مجله رهیافت های سیاسی و بین المللی
سال شانزدهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 80، زمستان 1403)

Among the 196 countries worldwide, 134 actively engage in basic space technology and services. Governments annually allocate $117 billion to space technology development. As of this writing, over 9,900 satellites orbit Earth, with telecommunication satellites comprising the largest segment at 3,135. The United States leads with 2,926 satellites, and an average of 197 launches occur annually to maximize space utilization. By 2028, over 15,000 active satellites are projected to be in Earth's orbit. Despite economic challenges like poverty, inflation, and unemployment, many countries continue to invest in national space programs. Some nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, leverage their financial resources to participate in extensive space programs led by countries like China and the United States. This research aims to explore the reasons behind countries' investments in national space programs, even in the face of economic constraints. It argues that not only are the costs of investing in space programs lower than the costs of not investing, but there are no viable alternatives.

This article analyzes the political economy of space technology through analytic eclecticism, an approach that integrates causal mechanisms from multiple theories, models, and explanatory narratives across competing research traditions. The goal is to create a coherent and adaptable research framework capable of addressing complex problems, concepts, methods, and causal arguments. The study employs abductive reasoning, beginning with observations and then proposing the simplest and most plausible explanations.

Using an integrated approach to political economy, this research examines space technology through the lens of four theoretical frameworks: economics, management, political economy, and international relations. According to the theory of multilateral monopoly, nations invest in developing indigenous space technology to escape dependency deadlocks caused by monopolistic control. Weaponized interdependence theory highlights how interdependence can be exploited, enabling governments controlling key nodes to wield their position as a tool of power. This poses threats to national security, driving countries to localize space technologies—such as satellite television, telecommunications, and navigation systems—to reduce reliance on external powers and mitigate risks of exploitation. Another critical dimension of space technology is its role in forming networks of influence, ranging from ordinary citizens to institutions, universities, and military centers. Space technology cascades through interconnected sectors, significantly influencing national authority, international prestige, and credibility.

Space technology, with its dual-use capabilities for both civilian and military applications, impacts diverse aspects of human life. Considering intergovernmental interactions and the role of these technologies in international relations, space technology encompasses social, security, and political dimensions. Nations that invest in this domain achieve multiple objectives simultaneously, enhancing economic, political, and strategic advantages. Given the broad utility and transformative potential of space programs, investment in this sector remains a priority for both developed and developing nations. Space continues to be one of the most promising and beneficial areas of investment, with its significance expected to grow in the foreseeable future.

State fragility in African countries is a critical and pressing issue, particularly in the Sahel and West Africa region. Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have become emblematic of fragile states due to a combination of internal challenges and the influence of regional and international intervening powers. This fragility has created conditions conducive to the growth and expansion of extremist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. One significant contributor to state fragility is political instability. Over the past four years (2020–2024), these three West African countries have experienced recurrent political crises. Key political indicators of fragility include weakened government legitimacy, failure to provide public services, violations of human rights, and the erosion of the rule of law. Additionally, the West African region has been a hotspot for terrorist activity. The operations of Al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates in the Sahel countries have steadily expanded, undermining the stability of governments in this region. Many Sahel governments struggle to effectively control their territories, with some being classified as "failed states." Political crises in the region are further exacerbated by ethnic and cultural pluralism, weak national identity, failures in nation-building, and disputes over the distribution of resources and justice. The emergence of weak and fragile states in West Africa has triggered crises that extend beyond their borders, affecting neighboring countries and adjacent regions. A central issue in fragile states is the crisis of authority, which is closely tied to ethnic, tribal, and religious divides. These divisions often fuel coups and intensify the activities of extremist group. This research seeks to explore the relationship between key political indicators of state fragility and the growth of terrorism. Its aim is to establish or refute the existence of a link between these phenomena.

The study employs a descriptive-analytical approach, relying on library resources and the conceptual framework of state fragility to analyze the subject.

The findings reveal that governments in West African countries, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, lack the capacity to ensure security and stability within their societies. These governments are plagued by political crises, including diminished legitimacy, inadequate public services, human rights violations, and weak adherence to the rule of law. Extremist groups, such as affiliates of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, as well as separatist movements, have exploited the political vacuum created by fragile states in the region. These groups have expanded their activities, leveraging the lack of effective governance to ensure their survival and growth.

Governments in this region are continuously confronted with the threat of political instability. The activities of fundamentalist movements are among the most significant factors contributing to political crises and the fragility of governments in this area. Analyzing the state-building crisis, particularly in the Sahel region of Africa, reveals that the failure of state-building and the inability to transition from governmental fragility are linked to four key factors: persistent disputes over power, intense struggles for political dominance, loss of trust in political leadership, and the subsequent breakdown of the political socialization process.

This article critiques the prevalent perception within Iran's decision-making apparatus and among some academic elites that Iran-China relations are progressing at a high level with no significant limitations. To challenge this notion, the article presents statistical data and figures on the volume of Chinese investment in Iran and China's unexpected positions on certain sensitive issues concerning Iran. The central question posed is: why are relations between the two countries facing significant obstacles? The article argues that, although various factors contribute to China's lack of motivation in deepening ties with Iran, a key reason lies in the differing approaches of the two nations toward the liberal international order. While Iran adopts a revolutionary revisionist stance, China takes a reformist revisionist approach. To explore this issue, the article is structured into three main sections. First, it defines the liberal international order and its key components. Second, it examines the perspectives of Iran and China on these components to identify the differences and similarities between their views. Finally, it analyzes how these divergences and commonalities have impacted the stagnation in relations between the two nations.

This study employs a comparative method with a descriptive-analytical approach. The liberal international order serves as the central framework for analysis. The perspectives of Iran and China toward this order are compared to assess how their differences and similarities influence the dynamics of their bilateral relations.

Differences in how Iran and China perceive the liberal international order are a key factor contributing to the slowdown in their bilateral relations. Iran adopts a revolutionary revisionist stance, fundamentally challenging the structure of the liberal order, whereas China takes a reformist revisionist approach, seeking to adjust and improve the existing framework rather than overthrow it. This divergence has led China to exercise caution at critical junctures in its relationship with Iran. The findings of this article indicate that China's success on the global stage is largely attributed to its strategic alignment with the liberal international order. As a result, Beijing is unwilling to compromise its broader interests to accommodate Iran's more radical stance toward the international system.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has placed significant emphasis on its partnership with China as part of its foreign policy strategy, driven largely by its ideological and geopolitical conflict with the West. However, China’s perspective on the liberal international order differs fundamentally from Iran’s. Moreover, China often views Iran’s revolutionary approach to the global order as counterproductive to its own interests. China's positions on issues such as Iran’s nuclear program, its conflict with the United States, and its relationships with other Middle Eastern nations underscore the limits of Sino-Iranian cooperation. While Iran views China as a counterbalance to the West, Beijing prioritizes its pragmatic and globally aligned approach, which frequently results in policies unfavorable to Iran.

Despite the growing body of literature on the advancement of authoritarian tactics and tools in competitive authoritarian regimes, we still lack sufficient knowledge about the discourses and strategies that the opposition creates and uses against populist-authoritarian governments. With the case study of Turkey, this article introduces "transnationalization" as one of the innovative discourses and strategies based on which the opposition bloc succeeds in exploiting its tactics and tools in order to maintain its political position in the political arena. And it has become an identity. Introducing the governance methods and techniques of authoritarian regimes is one of the other goals.

Method and theoretical framework:

The method of this research is based on qualitative research with the approach of "process tracing" technique. The content of this research is based on documentary-library sources and analysis of Twitter accounts and is presented in the form of the theoretical framework of "transnationalization".

Transnationalization is defined as a discourse and strategy through which local leaders under the leadership of the opposition change local and global boundaries by creating a conscious link with the liberal-democratic world to expand their space for maneuver. Based on this, the question that is raised is that the opposition bloc of Turkey, focusing on the performance of the mayor of Istanbul, uses which methods and mechanisms to operationalize the discourse and strategy of transnationalization? The answer to this question, which was mostly obtained by analyzing the content of the international Twitter accounts of the mayor of Istanbul, seems that the municipality of Istanbul, in order to maintain its position and credit the political nature of the opposition bloc and to deal with the political threats of the ruling structure, uses material and symbolic tools. And this political strategy and rational and normative motivations have been exploited to the maximum and successfully.

Based on the study of the situation in Turkey, which is considered an example of competitive authoritarian regimes, transnationalization as a discourse and strategy of opposition struggle has been implemented by the municipal institution under the leadership of the opposition bloc (independent variable). Is. So that the mayor of Istanbul belonging to the opposition bloc became a transnational identity materially, symbolically and politically through establishing international relations, showing commitment to global and liberal norms and increasing his agency over foreign policy programs. (The dependent variable) Also, this research highlights the role of international and global forces in supporting democracy and how they can provide effective assistance to democratic agents in authoritarian regimes. As conventional efforts to promote democracy have generated backlash and strong anti-Western sentiments in many countries, international democratic forces no longer have the power or desire to engage in democracy promotion, competing authoritarian leaders like Erdogan in Turkey, a long-standing tradition. They inflame nationalist sentiments by accusing the opposition forces of being in alliance with international "enemies". Nevertheless, this article showed that in Turkey, local leaders under the leadership of the opposition struggled to establish a link with the West as a result of their rational and normative motivations and were in dire need of support from international institutions. Through the symbolic, material, and political means of transnationalization, the mayor of Istanbul aimed to build international credibility and enhance his ability to govern, which is especially important when opposition-controlled municipalities are subject to central government discrimination.

International order has been undergone structural changes during past decades: the collapse of communist bloc, which turned the theoretical field of international relations into futuring speculations about the post-Cold War order, also rise of emerging powers, which led to the idea of changing the international order. According to "structuralism", the new international order leads to a change in state's foreign policy, especially one involved in systemic conflict such as the Islamic Republic. It should redefine its international role and status. Assuming the continuity of the polarity, the article is focused on question of which probable structure will determine the new international order and what requirements will it impose on the foreign policy of Iran? Purpose is to explain the most probable international order, and to prescribe the strategic requirements of Iran's foreign policy. The article uses TIA based on the "international order", explaines the continuities and changes of international polarity and its most probable perspective. The methodology founds on structuralism approach (Neorealosm and Neoliberalism), and consists two components. First, future-looking TIA that deals with the exploration of international trends and events and the driving forces of international politics and draws the probable future of the international order (bi-multipolarity). The second, future-writing TIA aimed at scenario-making for Iran's interest, and it address the normative inference of Iran's strategic requirements within bi-multipolar structure as a tolerable order. By examining international events and trends and inferring the drivers of international politics, the present article has assumed the continuity of polarity as the main component of the international order and has introduced the bi-multipolar structure as the most likely future form of the international order and model of a tolerable order for the Islamic Republic. In this probable order, the United States and China will have the upper hand in the international system far from other powers, and their competition-cooperation will determine international procedures and behavior patterns. It is in this structural context that the normative implications of Iran's foreign policy can be deduced. The findings indicate that Iran's foreign policy based on a realistic and consensus understanding of the new international structural and institutional arrangement requires international social capitalization, passing from the role of a disorderly actor to an orderly and order-building one, Passing from a negative participant to a positive participant in regional and international affairs and finally and the coexistence of a balancing foreign policy with a balanced foreign policy. Results show that the redistribution of wealth, power and ideology in international politics promises the gradual structural changes in international system. The preference of rising powers for improving their international role and position, and some old traditional powers, is irreversibility of bipolar and unipolar orders. Regardless of which type of international order is desirable for states including Iran, international trends and events show the formation of a bi-multipolar order with US-China polarity. Strong point of Iran's foreign policy is that it has already established harmonious relations with China. The policy seems important in two ways. Firstly, this policy is considered a strategic choice due to structural changes; secondly, it is considered a strategic necessity due to the possibility of continued confrontation between Iran- America. Despitely, Iran's foreign policy needs to diversify its foreign relations so that the rising powers don't become unrivaled activists in its foreign policy.

This study examines the reproduction of discursive and political conflicts in contemporary Iranian society and the necessity of reevaluating their intellectual heritage. Given that these conflicts are an integral part of social and historical processes, analyzing the socio-political positions of influential groups and movements in modern Iranian history is of particular importance. The Liberation Movement of the People of Iran (JAMA) is one such influential movement that, during a critical period in Iran's history, presented specific views and strategies for socio-political and economic changes within a distinct discourse. Therefore, analyzing the positions of JAMA not only addresses the academic need to gain deeper insight into this movement but also serves as a tool for understanding and interpreting historical and intellectual transformations in modern Iran. The main focus of this research is to analyze JAMA's socio-political positions and to study the transformations these positions underwent within historical and discursive developments. This study aims to identify and explore the roots, characteristics, and impacts of JAMA’s discourse in modern Iranian history. Additionally, the research seeks to explain the evolution of these positions from a theistic-socialist discourse to an Islamic one during the period leading up to the Islamic Revolution.

This study employs a historical research method to collect and verify data, while adopting Quentin Skinner’s contextualist and intentionalist hermeneutics for the analysis and interpretation of texts. Following Skinner’s approach, which argues that interpreting a text and understanding its meaning is only possible through studying texts in their social and political context with an emphasis on “speech acts” or “performative acts,” this research endeavors to elucidate JAMA’s positions and the transformations they underwent. Skinner’s context-driven and intentionalist hermeneutics hold that the meanings of terms, concepts, and propositions are dependent on and limited to their specific historical period. To achieve this, intellectual currents, prevalent arguments, and the questions and answers of that era must be thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, attention has been given to historical events, as well as the intellectual and practical backgrounds of the movement’s organizers as historical subjects.

Based on its periodic analysis, JAMA assessed Iranian society as being on the brink of a social transformation and promoted a program centered on an ideology aimed at realizing this transformation. The ideology in question was theistic socialism, which emphasized moral and humanistic socialism while grounding itself in a religious identity with a monotheistic framework. Politically, JAMA sought to overthrow the monarchy and establish a democratic system characterized by justice and labor. Socially and economically, it aimed to achieve a socialist transformation that prioritized securing the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people. Its strategy for transition was rooted in the belief that the old regime was incapable of meeting the people's demands and that traditional social classes were unable to seize power through conventional means. Therefore, it proposed that a revolutionary political group must, through widespread and sustained armed struggle, seize political and governmental power from the ruling class, replace it, and bring about comprehensive social transformation. In the final years leading up to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, during the second phase of its activities, JAMA redefined and pursued its stated socio-political positions within an Islamic discourse framed by revolution and Islamic governance.

The socio-political and intellectual transformations in JAMA’s positions were significantly influenced by the linguistic-discursive and intellectual-social context, as well as the prevailing political-historical conditions. Key factors included the failure and overthrow of the national government via a coup, escalating political tensions, polarization between supporters and opponents of the monarchy, traditional-modern discursive conflicts, the ineffectiveness of conventional political approaches, suppression of protests, the pivotal events of June 5, 1963, the turn to assassination plans by revolutionary groups, the establishment of radical organizations, the spread of armed struggle ideologies, and the growth of the clerical movement. These elements collectively shaped and transformed JAMA's socio-political positions over time.

The establishment of the Islamic Republic following the 1979 revolution (1357 in the Iranian calendar) marked a new chapter in the history of political parties in Iran, endowing them with a distinct identity. By combining Islamic values with democratic principles, this system defined a unique framework for party activities. However, despite the existence of party laws and the formation of numerous political organizations, these entities have failed to play an effective role in advancing political development and achieving the ideals of Islamic democracy. This study, focusing on the period from 1997 to 2023 (1376-1402), seeks to explore the factors contributing to this ineffectiveness within the context of the Islamic Republic. The central research question is: why, despite the presence of a legal framework and the large number of political parties, have they been unable to secure their proper place within the Islamic democratic system or deliver the expected outcomes? This research is significant because a systematic and scientific analysis of the obstacles and challenges confronting political parties can pave the way for practical solutions to enhance their role in political development and the realization of Islamic democratic goals.

Data collection was carried out in two phases: library research and fieldwork. The fieldwork involved conducting semi-structured interviews with two groups: university professors and party-civic activists. This was supplemented by an extensive review of existing literature and the theoretical framework of the study. The semi-structured interview protocol consisted of fifteen open-ended questions, which formed the basis for open and axial coding and qualitative content analysis, facilitating the extraction of research categories. After gathering and compiling the responses, in-text codes were identified and categorized. These categories were then developed into subcategories, which ultimately led to the formation of main categories. The results for each group were presented in separate tables. Throughout this process, the principle of theoretical data saturation was applied to ensure comprehensiveness and prevent redundancy.

The findings, derived from expert opinions, indicate that party and civil activism in Iran faces multifaceted, deeply rooted structural challenges, which can be categorized into four main levels: 1) Legal and Structural Challenges: These include limited space for party activities due to biased legal interpretations, the absence of comprehensive party laws, legal restrictions, government-imposed limitations, a security-driven perspective on political activism, the lack of recognition of parties’ roles in elections, restrictions on freedom of expression, and the inefficiency of legal mechanisms. 2) Internal Organizational and Behavioral Challenges: These encompass weakened party performance and declining public trust due to the lack of party maturity, insufficient engagement with society, reliance on individual leaders, opportunistic behavior, hostile rivalries, disregard for legal norms, lack of financial transparency, absence of internal democracy, poor accountability and conflict management, contradictory actions, overreliance on slogans, weak organizational cohesion, dependence on government or foreign entities, and inadequate training of party members. 3) Challenges in Communication with Society: These involve diminished legitimacy and public acceptance due to a disconnect from the populace, weakened ties with the social base, neglect of public opinion, failure to address societal issues, lack of solidarity with protests, public distrust of political parties and civil institutions, discrediting of intellectual elites, and ineffective networking. 4) Challenges in Relations with the Ruling Establishment: These include a growing gap and lack of constructive interaction caused by insufficient efforts to promote dialogue, the absence of institutionalized communication mechanisms, party conservatism, the closure of electoral channels, suppression of independent civil institutions, and the ruling establishment’s disregard for civil demands.

The analysis of solutions proposed by university professors, researchers, and party-civic activists suggests that overcoming the challenges faced by political parties and civil activism in Iran requires a comprehensive, multidimensional approach encompassing structural, legal, behavioral, and communicative reforms. Key recommendations include: Strengthening Communication with Society and Party Members: This can be achieved by ensuring continuous engagement with the public, representing public demands, promoting transparency in party operations, and establishing local branches. Enhancing Transparency and Accountability: Legal obligations, internal mechanisms for accountability, transparent performance, and oversight processes are essential to improve party credibility. Removing Legal and Structural Obstacles: This involves eliminating restrictive laws, financially empowering political parties, institutionalizing party politics, and ensuring media access. Changing Government Attitudes and Promoting a Culture of Party Politics and Democracy: Political will, fostering dialogue with parties, respecting diverse opinions, and amending constitutional provisions are necessary steps. Other Recommendations: These include ending negative rivalries, providing political education, ensuring financial independence for parties, promoting ethical practices, and fulfilling election promises. This comprehensive approach aims to reform existing structures and laws, strengthen political parties and civil institutions, and foster changes in societal attitudes and the political culture.

Before 2016, fake news typically revolved around topics that were difficult to verify using sensory evidence, images, or videos. However, during the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK and Donald Trump's presidential election in the US, a new form of fake news, termed post-truth, emerged and was effectively utilized. This led some observers to claim that we have entered an era where evoking emotions in audiences has become a decisive factor in the acceptance of political news, rendering the truthfulness of claims increasingly irrelevant. The central question of this article is: Why do audiences in the post-truth era accept emotionally charged fake political news? The main hypothesis proposes that emotions stem from deeply held values. In the post-truth era, when news resonates with an audience’s values, emotional defense of those values takes precedence over fact-checking. This study aims to test this hypothesis and identify the key factors that make some outrageous fabrications believable.

Since discourse analysis of post-truths in Iran had not previously been conducted, the first step was to compile a list of Iranian fake news stories that fit the criteria for post-truths. A preliminary survey was conducted with 370 participants, resulting in the identification of 10 emotionally charged fake news items that had been widely accepted by audiences.Next, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 ordinary Iranians, using these 10 fake news items (intermixed with legitimate news stories) as discussion prompts. The interview data were analyzed using Discursive Psychology, focusing on the linguistic patterns and discourse structures in the participants' responses. This analysis aimed to develop and validate a hypothesis explaining the perceived believability of post-truths.

On the one hand, upon hearing each news item, three emotional indicators — heart rate, body language, and self-reported emotions — were collected from the interviewees. By triangulating these emotional indicators and considering the possibility of emotional regulation, we found that the data did not support the dominant hypothesis in the literature. Specifically, only 13 out of 120 possible instances showed emotional responses, which was significantly lower than expected. On the other hand, the discourse analysis of the interviews led to the development and confirmation of a hypothesis suggesting that the believability of post-truths increases if they validate or challenge the audience's values. This hypothesis was further refined through the observation that most interviewees who accepted a post-truth immediately recognized that one of their identities, along with the corresponding values and beliefs (which were evident in their statements), was being either affirmed or challenged by the post-truth. To convince the interviewer of the validity of their evaluations and beliefs, the interviewees constructed a version of reality using sentences with varied yet cohesive functions, along with interpretive repertoires employing metaphors and discursive strategies familiar to members of their community. In these constructed versions of reality, contradictory or problematic data were disregarded, rival perspectives were marginalized, and the interviewees' values, ideologies, and beliefs were emphasized. All five factors — values, the subject's position within identity spectrums, functions, interpretive repertoires, and, most importantly, the construction of reality — were identifiable in the interviewees' statements and collectively formed a coherent and effective justificatory framework.

By refuting the dominant hypothesis in the literature and confirming the central hypothesis of this study, it can be concluded that an individual’s values and beliefs significantly influence their perception of reality. Although truth has not yet "died," it remains under serious threat. Preventing the political consequences of post-truths — such as the erosion of trust in institutions and critical thinking — requires addressing how values shape perceptions and discourses. Strengthening media literacy and promoting value-based dialogue could mitigate the acceptance of fake political news.