مجله الهیات تطبیقی
پیاپی 31 (بهار و تابستان 1403)

This article examined the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern thought, tracing its origins from the Renaissance period through the Enlightenment. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, it explored the philosophical foundations of Orientalism and the underlying principles it shared with modernity. The analysis revealed that the rise of the human subject in the modern era was accompanied by a shift in perspective. Pre-Renaissance religion and culture were approached with an "objective understanding" by the modern subject. This same subject then went on to apply an "Orientalist understanding" when engaging with non-Western cultures and belief systems. The nature of Orientalism could be located in this novel relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. The "objective understanding" embodied the Kantian epistemology, wherein the subject, relying solely on its own prior information and independent of any external or divine referent, did not recognize anything beyond itself. By subsuming objects within its own framework, the subject imposed its own understanding upon them. This process of objectification and imposition characterized the Orientalist worldview, which emerged as a core feature of modern thought. The article thus elucidated the deep historical linkages between the ascendance of the autonomous human subject, the principles of modernity, and the rise of Orientalist modes of understanding non-Western cultures and belief systems.

Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sadra.

The term Ebda (innovation) as one of God’s attributes has attracted the attention of a group of philosophers, theologians, and Quranic commentators, while others have shown less interest in it. Among the Quranic commentators, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Allameh Tabatabai have given special attention to the term Ebda, considering it one of God’s actual attributes and deeming its application to contingent beings incorrect. They identify creation, lack of precedent, timelessness, placelessness, and instantaneous realization as components of Ebda. They do not view Ebda as merely a term and provide rational and narrative reasons to prove its instantaneous nature. Allameh and Fakhr Razi differ in their views on the distinction between Ebda and creation (Khalg), Ebda and origination (Ijad), and Ebda and invention (Ekhtera). The main objective of this research is to uncover Fakhr Razi and Allameh’s perspectives on the term Ebda and their differences and similarities. The aim of this study is to compare their views on the term Ebda and to pave the way for organizing Imami and Ashari terminology based on conceptual relationships, facilitating transfer and education, simplifying translation, indexing, and categorizing God’s attributes. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical method and a library-based approach. In this method, the term Ebda is explained, its similarities and differences with other terms are examined, and its components are stated.

The difference in researchers’ attitudes towards human nature is not only the background and foundation of describing and explaining personality traits but also a platform for identifying and introducing new emotional states in humans. The purpose of this study is to identify the features of anthropology from Allameh Tabatabai’s point of view on the emergence of fear of God. The research method is qualitative. The qualitative analysis of the content of religious texts with a focus on description, explanation, and analysis has been used. The findings of the research showed that fear of God is a normal issue. In addition, fear of God has two types, fear in balance with hope and fear of divine position. Moreover, the phenomenon of fear of God is based on four characteristics in humans: 1) purposefulness, 2) the existential characteristics of man, 3) man with the motivation to avoid harm, and 4) the levels of man's knowledge of monotheism. The results showed that the origin of fear of God is not only external natural factors (such as lightning); rather, it is dependent on some characteristics of the disabled nature of the human being, the principle of orientation, and the lack of independence of an individual.

One of the doubts about Noah's innocence is how this Holy Prophet asked to save his child, while God Almighty had previously forbidden him from such a request. Doesn’t such a request contradict the innocence of Prophet Noah, while he knew that his son was a disbeliever? Doesn't paying attention to relative relationships even in the case of disbelief contrast with the innocence of Prophet Noah? This research, with the method of collecting data, analyzing them, and comparing opinions aims to prove the innocence of Prophet Noah based on the appearances of the verses. In order to defend the innocence of Prophet Noah, Tabatabai as a religious scientist has given interpretations in this regard, including that Prophet Noah did not protest at all, while this is inconsistent with the appearances of the verses, and as long as the appearances of verses do not have any intellectual or narrative problems, it is necessary to rely on the authenticity of appearances.

The design argument is one of the simplest and most common arguments that connects humans to the material world. Since a long time ago, humans have acknowledged the existence of wise and intelligent moderators through thinking about the structure of creatures and their purposiveness. Various expressions of this argument with different degrees of strength and accuracy are seen in the talk of Islamic and Western thinkers who through argument, analogy, or induction and with dependence on partial or general instances of design in nature are trying to prove an intelligent moderator. Correct perception of this argument and a correct analysis of its preliminaries based on intellect can increase its validity and reliability in proving divine moderator and help us to answer the main part of doubts attributed to it. This descriptive-analytical study considers doubts attributed to this argument from an epistemology viewpoint and tries to eliminate and answer them by explaining the position and role of intellect in this argument relying on conditions of various logical reasons, and defending its validity and reliability in proving meta-matter moderator and abrogating materialists’ opinion.

In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra, one of the mystical philosophers, and in Western philosophical thought, Alvin Plantinga, a theistic philosopher, have both explored the issue of evil with distinct foundations and solutions. Mulla Sadra’s primary basis lies in the existence of essence, and his solutions adhere to the model of the non-existence of evil and its being contingently willed. Plantinga, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate the non-contradiction of the logical issue of evil in light of God’s absolute power by using possible worlds and the relationship between human free will and divine omnipotence. These two thinkers share common ground in their belief in God as knowledgeable, powerful, and benevolent, but they differ in their approach to inherent sinfulness, defense of theodicy, and overcoming logical challenges. The objective of this study is not merely to explain and compare the intellectual foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga regarding the issue of evil; rather, it aims to critically examine their premises and proposed solutions, ultimately presenting a comparative approach to resolving the issue of evil. The research methodology employed in this study is fundamentally theoretical and rational, analyzing the arguments of both philosophers and providing a comparative assessment.

The word affair has not been given due attention in the books of advanced theologians, but its related topics have been discussed as the nature, benefit, philosophy, or necessity of prophecy and Imamate. However, contemporary theologians have recently paid attention to this term. Motahari and Asgari have defined affairs and mentioned their examples. Affair means status and great deeds, and in terms of the Qur'an and hadiths, it means great things that the Prophet and Imams are responsible for. They are proportional. Motahari has used the term ‘affair’ in close meanings such as great works and merits. Asgari's view on the meaning of affairs is similar to Motahari's view. Of course, Askari considers the Prophet's main duty to preach the religion, which is different from the Prophet's affairs. Motahari in his various books believes that the affairs of the Prophet include religious authority, judgment, government, and guardianship. But Asgari believes that preaching the Quran, caliphate, congregational prayers, implementation of Islamic rules, and the formation of an Islamic society and a just government are the affairs of the Imam. Therefore, both theologians agree on examples such as government and religious authority as the affairs of the Imam.

The topic of religion in the history of relations between the two civilizations of Iran and China is an issue that has not been addressed much. According to Chinese sources and other documents, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism were introduced to China by Iranians. So far, some studies have been conducted on Buddhism and Zoroastrianism in China, but these works have only explained how these religions entered China, but the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism from the middle of the 9th century onwards in China have not been considered. Therefore, the present study, relying on the library method and the comparative analysis of the historical data obtained from China, tries for the first time to address the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism in ancient China. The claim of the authors is that Buddhism has survived until today due to its compatibility and assimilation with Chinese thought and society and not having a political approach, especially from the 9th century onwards; on the other hand, due to the heterogeneity of its teachings and religious rituals in China, the Zoroastrianism could not adapt to this land and the cultural characteristics of its people.

Mu'tazila put forward the theory of the objectivity of nonexistent to prove God's eternal knowledge of possible beings before creation. The criticisms of Ash'arites and Islamic philosophers are the eternity of the world, denying the contradiction and its ineffectiveness in proving God's eternal knowledge of creatures. According to the semantics of objectivity and non-existent, there is no criticism in Mu'tazila's point of view of the denying of contradiction and the eternity of the world. In this theory, objectivity means a constant that can be reported. The non-existent in this theory is something that does not exist on the outside. Therefore, objectivity of non-existent is the stability of things that do not exist outside, but exist in God's eternal knowledge, and this does not mean the eternality of objective beings. Similarly, stability is external existence and is not in contradiction with the negation of external existence. Therefore, the principle of this opinion is rationally acceptable. On the other hand, the requirement of this theory is the contradiction between existence and essence, mental existence and the belonging of counterfeit to the existence. This study examines this theory and its criticisms using a descriptive-analytical method.