نشریه اندیشه فلسفی
پیاپی 15 (تابستان 1403)

The characteristics of epistemic collections are divided into two categories: accuracy (hard) and perfection (soft). The soft criterion focuses on the desired perfection; for example fluency and eloquence. This research considers the seven features of simplicity and clarity, proportionality and balance, correspondence, reciprocating, transition, symmetry and self-generation to be the most important components of soft criterion. This criterion is founded on a philosophical explanation based on transcendent wisdom. To achieve a further explanation of the components of this criterion, this indicator is included in some tables of logic, for example the table of co-true propositions. First, it is evaluated with the components of the soft criteria and while identifying some weaknesses and through philosophic analysis, in order to solve these cases, proposals are presented, implemented and improvements made to address them. The result was meaningfully positive and the suggestions increased the performance and beauty of the main tables. All the steps are descriptive-logical and the result is that with these revisions, the efficiency and usefulness of this table have increased.

Relying on the psychological theories of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, this argument examines the movement of the human soul in two stages: “when the soul is connected to the natural body” and “after its separation from the natural body”. By demonstrating the possibility of movement in the immaterial soul, it is also possible to prove and explain the movement of other non-material beings. When the soul is connected to the natural body, the unified human soul can move and change independently of the power and matter within the body. This independence suggests that other non-material beings can also undergo movement without reliance on matter. However, after the soul is separated from the material body, Ibn Sina considers the possibility of the soul’s evolutionary movement but lacks sufficient grounds to prove it. In contrast, Mulla Sadra explicitly denies the evolution of the soul in the intermediate state but provides psychological foundations that support the possibility of the soul's evolution. These same principles can also demonstrate and explain the movement of other immaterial beings.

We will argue against formulating the propositional unity as a problem of Order, Combinability, or Recognition. We find the issue of Representation surprisingly biased to the Correspondence theory of truth, and we show how wrong it may be to read the question of having truth conditions as a question of truth conditions itself. Finally, we demonstrate how certain structured propositions may escape the arms of the question of unity. We find the problem of having truth conditions to be the most to-the-point question of the nature of propositions.

From the perspective Islamic of Philosophers, particularly the Peripatetics, cognition is primarily an act of the soul rather than the body. While conventional philosophical approaches often view cognition as entirely separate from the body, this article employs an analytical-descriptive methodology to explore how the body might influence cognition within Avicenna's philosophical and medical frameworks. Despite Avicenna's dualistic view that soul and body are distinct entities and his identification of the soul as the primary agent of cognition, his understanding of the soul-body relationship allows for a form of embodied cognition. In this view, variation or changes in the body at any level of perception can affect the soul, thereby altering the cognition of a single known object. However, Avicenna's concept of embodied cognition is fundamentally different from physicalism, as the soul retains its role as the essential principle in the emergence of cognition.

Since so many people are constantly trying to find sufficient evidence for the existence of God, but fail to attain that evidence, though they are not at fault, the issue of divine hiddenness takes form. Some contemporary philosophers have conducted investigations on this issue by various means, but the philosopher who first took steps to investigate this issue more comprehensively is the Canadian philosopher J.L. Schellenberg. In 2015, he proposed the argument for divine hiddenness in his book The Hiddenness Argument and presented it as a counterargument in favor of atheism. This argument claims that if there was a God, he should have provided sufficient evidence and reason supporting this belief at least for those in search of him, but this is not the case and thus, God does not exist. The aim of this paper, in addition to explaining Schellenberg's argument for divine hiddenness, will be to examine the view of Michael Rea, an American philosopher of religion, on this issue.

Allameh Muhammad Taqi Jafari has many and varied discussions on ethics, and by searching through these discussions, one can arrive at a coherent theory about moral value from his perspective. He has an aesthetic interpretation of moral value, and he believes that moral value at its highest level negates any utilitarian view. According to Allameh, Jamal Mutlaq, the beauty of God, is incapable of any explanation, but at a lower level, on an abstract level, a single explanation can be provided for different types of beauty based on the concept of harmony. The theory of existential fitness on moral value has significant similarities with Allameh Jafari's theory of moral beauty, and the important distinction between the two is in the issue of explicability of God's moral beauty. In this paper, a formulation of Allameh Jafari theory of moral beauty is presented and the extension of that theory in the theory of existential fitness is clarified.