فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و نهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 116، زمستان 1403)

The goals of the research are to clarify the way to reach the definition of thinking according to Deleuze. To reveal the difference in his definition of thinking compared to other definitions. To realize these goals, the following question is asked: What is problem-oriented thinking according to Deleuze. with the descriptive-analytical method, the result is that, Thinking in philosophy occurs when the presuppositions of dogmatic thought face chaos. The flow of those presuppositions is interrupted. This calls for new concepts. Unthinkable is the condition of thinking; takes it out of the territory; constitutes deterritorialization. With new concepts, it returns to the territory of philosophy. The process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization for thinking in philosophy replaces the movement from the unknown to the known, and the logical level of recognizance is close to Kant. Horizon-oriented, path-oriented and questioning thinking has paid attention to the recalling of signs in Heidegger's view. The force of the problem of deterritorialisation and reterritorialization in Deleuze adds to Heidegger's discussion. As a result, Deleuze, by defining philosophy as a logic of multitude instead of a single and unique logic of Being, changes thinking from the the possibility of fact into the fact itself.

Al-Farabi was the first thinker in the Islamic world to engage philosophically with the translation of Greek philosophical thought and the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian metaphysics. As he himself states, he learned the path of renewing and interpreting philosophy directly from the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. In his unique interpretation of the meanings of being (mawjūd) and quiddity (māhiyya), he categorizes being in its third sense—that which is distinct as a quiddity in external reality—into necessary and non-necessary beings. He elaborates on the characteristics of the First Necessary Being and argues that the non-necessary being is, in its very existence, impoverished, requiring fulfillment by the Necessary and Self-Sufficient Being. Al-Farabi emphasizes that all beings in the universe emanate from the First Being. Through his distinctive and theologically compatible interpretation of certain Aristotelian concepts, he shifts the focal point of Aristotelian metaphysics from being to God, laying the philosophical foundation of the Islamic intellectual tradition. His interpretation of being and quiddity clearly paves the way for their metaphysical distinction and facilitates the synthesis of Platonic illuminationist wisdom (al-ḥikmat al-ishrāqiyya) and Aristotelian philosophy in the Islamic world. This study, adopting a problem-oriented approach, seeks to examine, through textual evidence, how al-Farabi integrates a foundational interpretation of God as Being within Aristotelian metaphysics. Using content analysis, the paper concludes that al-Farabi, by offering a unique interpretation of the existential mode of beings and their quiddities or essences, establishes a distinct philosophical outlook within the Islamic intellectual tradition.

Dualistic schools of thought believe in two governing principles that oversee good and evil. Throughout history, dualism has manifested in various forms, shaping traditions such as Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism. Dualists and Magians each offered distinct explanations for this duality until Islam, with its strict monotheistic ideology, engaged in a fundamental confrontation with these beliefs. This article, employing an analytical-critical method and drawing upon Islamic hadiths, examines and critiques the doctrines of dualistic traditions. Its primary aim is to elucidate the responses of the Shiite Imams in addressing dualistic worldviews and to demonstrate the superiority of Islam’s monotheistic framework over these doctrines. The findings indicate that Islamic hadiths challenge dualistic beliefs with rational arguments, presenting monotheism as the only logical path. Islam’s decisive reasoning was so intellectually compelling that, over the centuries, dualistic doctrines faded into obscurity, and notions of duality disappeared from the theological discourse of various traditions. From the perspective of Islamic hadiths, all forms of dualism—whether Iranian, Magian, Gnostic, or otherwise—share fundamental characteristics. A comprehensive analysis allows for a comparative assessment of these commonalities while also distinguishing the unique aspects of each tradition. This study, by examining hadiths that critique dualistic and mythological beliefs, identifies fourteen hadith-based critiques of mythological dualism, reaffirming monotheism as the sole rational worldview.

Applied theology is a newly emerging term in theological studies that examines how theoretical theological concepts manifest in human life. This branch of theology explores the processes through which religious beliefs and theological doctrines take shape in both individual and social contexts. It seeks to actualize theoretical concepts in real-life settings by elucidating the processes of belief formation, providing practical indicators for theological doctrines, analyzing the factors that contribute to the emergence and persistence of these beliefs in human life, assessing their effects and implications, and addressing obstacles to religious commitment. Applied theology is an interdisciplinary challenge that requires clinical and empirical methods to analyze concrete expressions of faith and offer solutions for strengthening them. Consequently, this study employs qualitative and analytical research methods, combining the analysis of theological texts and empirical evidence with clinical approaches as its primary tools. Ultimately, applied theology focuses on the connection between theological concepts and real-life conditions, aiming to remove barriers to faith and reinforce religious beliefs.

The proposition that "everything has become meaningless" serves as the code phrase for life in the contemporary era. This judgment is based on a comparison with the past, as it is assumed that the past was meaningful while the present age is devoid of meaning. To explore this issue, this study, adopting a historical-philosophical approach, seeks to answer the question: Was the past meaningful, and has our era become meaningless? The findings indicate that the past was indeed meaningful, as human beings encountered a wealth of meaningful experiences. However, with humanity’s dominance over nature, the changing of seasons and interactions with the natural world now exert little influence on human life, rendering the passage of time meaningless. The expansion of individual choice in all aspects of life—an outcome of modern advancements—has made people less susceptible to being deeply affected by anything. The creation of more opportunities to appear different has led to an increase in distinctions, making sustained distinctiveness more challenging. The erosion of experience—resulting from the dominance of routine and the prevalence of gradual experiences over singular, impactful ones—has diminished its significance. Moreover, the strengthening of human agency, which has reduced the everyday challenges that once generated meaning, and the expansion of human perception and the world itself, have contributed to the rapid forgetting of experiences. These transformations and achievements have rendered life meaningless—meaning understood as impact.

One of the key concepts introduced into the domain of moral ontology, expanding the notions of realism and anti-realism, is the concept of supervenience. In this framework, moral properties are predicated on non-moral properties, incorporating the nature of value into the natural domain to provide an argument for moral naturalists. At the same time, non-naturalists can also employ it to support a form of non-naturalistic realism. This study, using a descriptive-analytical approach, aims to further develop the supervenience argument and apply it in favor of moral naturalism, addressing one of its most significant implications—defending realism and critiquing Mackie’s anti-realist stance. Numerous interpretations of supervenience have been proposed, encompassing necessity, reduction, and dependence. However, Wielenberg, drawing on the concept of construction, offers a distinctive account of supervenience to counter anti-realist objections, including those posed by Mackie. According to Mackie, the attribution or predication of moral properties to natural properties is metaphysically peculiar. Wielenberg’s response posits that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties in a structured construction relation rather than a causal one. This relation, while not causal in the traditional sense, follows a form of consciousness-based causality.

The main question of this article is Plantinga’s claim to have resolved the problem of traditional epistemology, analyzed through a descriptive-analytical approach. The aim is to demonstrate the inaccuracy of Plantinga’s claim regarding the concept of deontologism in epistemology. In his epistemology, Plantinga attempts to resolve the challenges of contemporary epistemology by eliminating the components of duty and internalism. He traces his analysis of justification and internalism back to the deontological theories of Descartes and Locke, who defined the justification of beliefs in terms of duty and obligation. Although Plantinga criticizes internalist epistemology and the element of duty, his critique of deontologism does not amount to a denial of epistemic obligation. Rather, he rejects the confinement of epistemic duty to the framework of evidentialism. In fact, the core of his warrant theory remains compatible with a different form of deontologism. Moreover, his view that belief does not require evidence or argument is framed within a normative interpretation of justification. His foundational beliefs emerge from a deontological understanding of justification. However, Plantinga does not specify criteria for the content of basic beliefs; instead, he defines their foundational status in terms of not violating epistemic duties. Thus, he remains bound to the fulfillment of epistemic obligations. The implications of this perspective include the possibility that his position could lead back to internalism—ironically, the very problem that Plantinga sought to overcome ultimately confronts him in his own theory.