فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال بیست و ششم شماره 4 (پیاپی 102، زمستان 1403)

The article demonstrates that technology is a product of the complex interaction between humans and natural, artificial, and social structures, which enables the creation of various forms of technology. It strives to provide a deeper philosophical understanding of what technology is. This understanding reveals that one cannot be passive when confronted with technology; instead, individuals can play an active role in shaping it. Consequently, the content of the article does not present a favorable view of technological determinism. What is Technology?In this article, a definition of technology is presented based on the ontology discussed in the philosophy of science by Bhaskar. Understanding what technology is, serves as a serious prerequisite for addressing key questions in the field of philosophy of technology; these questions pertain to the interaction between technology and society, ethics and technology, technology and knowledge, freedom and democracy in relation to technology, among many other topics. The article utilizes Bhaskar’s ontology and analyzes natural, artificial, and social structures to define technology as the interaction of humans with a composite structure aimed at achieving specific functionalities. According to this definition, technology is not a neutral entity but rather value-laden and substitutable; this means that its development path and functionalities can change based on social values and choices.The article demonstrates that technology is a product of the complex interaction between humans and natural, artificial, and social structures, which enables the creation of various forms of technology. It strives to provide a deeper philosophical understanding of what technology is. This understanding reveals that one cannot be passive when confronted with technology; instead, individuals can play an active role in shaping it. Consequently, the content of the article does not present a favorable view of technological determinism.

Some ethical issues related to artificial intelligence relate to the nature of autonomy and the problem of the responsibility gap; autonomous AI systems have behaviors that would be called “decisions” if humans made them, and humans would be held responsible if those “decisions” caused harm. However, when an “action” is performed by autonomous technology, although there is still a need for responsibility, nothing may be held responsible for it. Therefore, it is suggested that autonomous technologies remain under human responsibility if they meet two (design) requirements: 1) the ability to “track” human reasons and 2) by following the chain of human reasons, a human agent can be “traced.” These conditions will create many ambiguities for autonomous AI systems; for example, the moral reasons that need to be tracked are often agent-neutral, but tracing a human agent is only possible through agent-dependent reasons. In this article, by analyzing the interpretations of the two conditions, an interpretation that has not been proposed before will be defended as the least problematic interpretation. To this end, it is argued that the responsibility gap is solved when the history of events produced by autonomous systems involves a process by which the agent takes responsibility for an agent-neutral normative reason-responsive mechanism.

Various theories about technical function can be classified as: 1) Theories that reduce the function to the structure of the artifact, or 2) Theories that consider the function to be intention-dependent. The structural interpretation of technical function is in favor of the Value Neutrality Thesis (VNT), while according to the intentional interpretation, the intentionality of the designer/user is necessary for technical function to be determined. The main issue of this article is assessing the approach of Neo-Sadrian philosophers (Allamah Tabatabai and Motahhari) to the function of artifacts. It is shown that the function of technical artifacts is a Constructional Perception (eʿtebār), although its realization depends on the structure and physical properties. Therefore, Allamah Tabatabai's “Eʿtebāriyāt” (constructional perception) Theory is among the intention-dependent interpretations and can be considered as an approach against the value-neutrality thesis.

The advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and the emergence of intelligent and superintelligent machines have significantly blurred the traditional boundaries between humans and machines. These technological developments have raised critical philosophical and ethical questions about the possibility of attributing moral agency to these systems. Can intelligent machines act morally, or should moral responsibility for their actions remain solely with their designers and operators? This paper aims to analyze these questions through a conceptual and analytical lens, focusing on the meaning, criteria, and philosophical implications of moral agency in the context of intelligent machines.

This paper investigates an adequate methodology for examining the social and ethical dimensions of technology, highlighting the significant role of intentionality in the ontology of technology. The paper argues that since technology is deeply embedded in socio-technical systems, it is influenced by artifacts, human actors, values, norms, practices, and institutions. Explaining the social and ethical aspects of technology requires a methodology that respects its intentional aspect and accounts for the interactions between artifacts, institutions, and human agents. We propose that institutional individualism, which emphasizes the significance of individual agency within institutional frameworks, serves as a suitable approach. Additionally, we explore the philosophical implications of adopting this methodology, including its impact on moral responsibility. The paper concludes that although moral responsibility still rests on individuals, a balanced approach to the ethics of technology should not overlook the influence of institutions on individual actions. Ethical education should be promoted both at the individual level and within the institutions involved in technology.

One of the most significant developments in molecular biology in the last few decades has been the genetic modification of various organisms with different genetic engineering technologies. In particular, biotechnology companies and research centers have developed multiple genetically modified (GM) crops by inserting genes or editing the genome of existing crops to enhance their productivity or nutritional value. However, these products have faced strong opposition from those who consider their potential risks to human health or the environment seriously. Many opponents of GM products appeal to the precautionary principle. A serious objection to the principle is the following dilemma: any version of this principle either is so weak—so ineffective that it will not probably be accepted by its proponents—or it results in conflicting policy prescriptions. The latter situation is known as the precautionary paradox. In this article, after examining the precautionary principle, the dilemma objection, and the precautionary paradox, the considerations related to applying the principle to GM products are discussed, and a solution to the dilemma objection is proposed, which seems to be particularly successful in the case of GM products.

Is the good design of technology sufficient for its moral evaluation? This article, grounded in virtue ethics and informed by science and technology studies, argues that it is not. While ethical design—ensuring technology does not discriminate, violate rights, or cause foreseeable harm—is crucial, it is insufficient on its own. We must also consider whether the technology promotes user flourishing or, conversely, fosters habits that detract from it. A technology that is morally well-designed might still encourage harmful habits and undermine virtuous qualities, thereby impeding one’s path to flourishing from a virtue ethics perspective. This consideration leads to a different approach to evaluating the technology-user relation. As a case study, we will examine certain features of the Instagram social network in the framework of virtue ethics to explore how they impact users’ flourishing.