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سال هفدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 91، پاییز و زمستان 1403)

According to the theory of different fields of ontology in Lacan, which consists of the imaginary, the real, and the reality, the ego and the subject find a relationship with reality, and the attribution of this relationship to ethics leads to a distinct moral model. But Lacan needs to go beyond reality to present the moral model of reality. Transcending reality is achieved through the doctrine of Beyond the principle of pleasure. Lacan tries to explain the gap and lack of reality through the unconscious to extend the theory of pure desire to the field of ethics. Based on this, Antigone's moral model is the only model that, from Lacan's point of view, is loyalty to pure desire that can describe unconscious desire. Antigone is loyal to her will until the last moment, and her loyalty comes from ignoring and passing through the visible realm. Antigone not only acts according to her desire, but also pushes desire to the end until it reaches pure drive, a drive that insists on the object of desire until the end and on a specific object. According to Lacan, this model can be a suitable model for the ethics of self-centered desire and against any kind of reactionary and alternative ethics, including the law of the superego and the ideological matter.

The purpose of this article is to examine two seemingly contradictory views on the home of partial souls from Mulla Sadra’s perspective. In the series of discussions on philosophical psychology proposed by Mulla Sadra, the issue of the home of partial souls in the arc of descent does not appear to have a single foundation, and two different views can be identified in his works. According to the first approach, which is based on substantial movement, partial souls originate from partial bodies, and therefore, the material world is the first home of both in the arc of descent. Partial souls have no prior realization before the material world except as a general soul in fixed objects. However, according to the second view, which is based on a specific, skeptical unity, Mulla Sadra holds that man is a single reality with four levels: divine man, spiritual man, heavenly man, and earthly man. In this view, apart from being realized as a general soul in the world of reason (ʿaql or power), man also exists as partial souls in numerical plurality in the world of example (ʿalam al-mithal), and partial souls never descend into the world of matter.

Over the past three decades, many philosophers of language have concluded that traditional theories of propositions fail to adequately explain how propositions represent the world as being certain ways. As a result, alternative theories are necessary. One such theory is the act-type theory, which posits that a proposition is a type of predication. Peter Hanks is a prominent advocate of this theory, arguing that predication is a committal act. However, this raises the Frege-Geach problem. Hanks proposes a cancellation maneuver to address this issue. In this paper, I introduce the act-type theory, clarify how predication is committal, explain the Frege-Geach problem, and outline the cancellation maneuver. I then raise two concerns regarding this maneuver and conclude that it, in its current form, does not satisfactorily resolve the Frege-Geach problem. Finally, I suggest two alternative approaches that a proponent of this maneuver might pursue to address the Frege-Geach problem.

Within the framework of Aristotelian ontology, being is understood as a result of two vectors: determinacy (actuality) and indeterminacy (potentiality). In this paper, we aim to clarify the specific meaning of Dasein's determinacy, which Heidegger refers to as "facticity" (Faktizität), within this ontological context. We will demonstrate that Dasein's facticity is ontologically-existentially crystallized in its Befindlichkeit (dispositional attunement) and ontically-existentiell in its Gestimmtheit (moodedness). We then endeavor to map out the general coordinates of moods through the specific case of "fear" (Furcht) and explore the intrinsic connections between facticity, thrownness (Geworfenheit), and understanding (Verstehen). This will allow us to delineate the semantic field of Dasein's facticity as a conceptual network centered on moodedness. In the first part, we outline the facticity of Dasein within the framework of an Aristotelian ontology centered on potentiality and actuality as a paradigm for understanding the determinacy of Dasein. In the second part, we show that the facticity of Dasein manifests ontologically-existentially in 'attunement' and ontically-existentiell in its 'mood.' In the third part, to achieve a general structure of moods, we focus on Heidegger's analysis of the phenomenon of 'fear' in order to derive the general coordinates of moods from it. In the fourth part, for a deeper understanding of the structure of facticity, we examine the intrinsic connection between attunement, understanding, and thrownness. Finally, in the fifth part, we endeavor to enumerate the general characteristics of moods and delineate a diagram of the semantic field of Dasein's facticity.

In Descartes' epistemological system, God is the foundation and basis for the duration of knowledge and its certainty. He is not merely a transcendent and passive being but an active entity who continuously intervenes in the structure of the world, ensuring the continuity of phenomena and, as a result, the coherence of knowledge. The dependence of certainty on God confronts Descartes' epistemology with one of its most fundamental challenges, the "Cartesian Circle." Proving the existence of God is necessary to validate clear and distinct perceptions, while these very perceptions serve as the basis for proving God's existence. This article offers a way to resolve this circularity by linking Descartes' theory of time to the notion of continuous creation. Descartes does not believe in the intrinsic continuity between different moments. The continuity of time and the survival of each moment of the world are the results of God's constant action. According to this interpretation, Descartes' epistemological system is not separate from theology, and the validity and foundation of knowledge are tied to the existence and will of God.

In recent decades, naturalism in metametaphysics has manifested through debates surrounding both the methodology and subject matter of metaphysics. One significant point in these debates is the criterion proposed by Ladyman and Ross (2007) for distinguishing naturalized metaphysics from non-naturalized metaphysics. McLaurin and Dyke (2012), while critiquing Ladyman and Ross’s proposal, offer an alternative approach to naturalized metaphysics. According to them, a metaphysical theory qualifies as naturalized if it can, in principle, have observational consequences. McLeod and Parsons (2013) challenge this proposal by pointing to long-standing objections against the verifiability criterion of logical positivism. They argue that the distinction between naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics cannot hinge on a semantic connection between theoretical content and observational statements. In their critique, they briefly mention the B-theory of time. This article first explains McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion for delimiting naturalized metaphysics, McLeod and Parsons’ critique, and McLaurin and Dyke’s subsequent response (2013). We then focus on the A-theory vs. B-theory debate in contemporary metaphysics to highlight additional issues with McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion. We argue that their approach (1) risks circularity, (2) undermines the possibility of naturalizing metaphysical debates, and (3) fails to address the relationship between metaphysical theories and future scientific developments.

This article uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the nature of ignorance and its types in Mulla Sadra's works. Sometimes, ignorance is referred to as (1) lack of knowledge, sometimes (2) lack of true belief, and sometimes (3) lack of knowledge or true belief. Mulla Sadra's view on the relationship between knowledge, imagination, and affirmation shows that, from his perspective, ignorance cannot be limited to a lack of knowledge (imagination) or a lack of belief (affirmation). Mulla Sadra classifies ignorance into three categories: (1) simple ignorance, (2) compound ignorance, and (3) ignorance opposed to reason. In Mulla Sadra's intellectual system, different types of ignorance exist in contrast to justified true belief: (a) false belief, or belief in things that are contrary to reality; (b) unjustified true belief, such as imitative true beliefs without justified reason; (c) disbelief—the failure to acknowledge and denial of justified true belief due to prejudice, stubbornness, or concealment of the truth; (d) suspension of judgment regarding a true belief in a state of doubt and uncertainty; (e) light inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that can be resolved with attention; (f) heavy inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that cannot be resolved with attention (deep ignorance); (g) lack of talent or ability to pay attention, understand, and acknowledge a true belief (complete ignorance). Based on the doctrine of transcendental wisdom regarding doubt, the types of ignorance can be considered as different levels and degrees of severe and weak ignorance.

Leo Strauss, according to the author, is one of the most important interpreters of modern and classical political philosophy, and his interpretations have been very useful and enlightening for understanding philosophers who have created profound ruptures in history. In this article, the author discusses Strauss's complex position toward the founder of modern political thought in the West, namely Niccolò Machiavelli. On the one hand, Strauss speaks of Machiavelli’s irreversible rupture in numerous articles and books, and on the other hand, he considers Machiavelli to be the beginning of theoretical thinking that marks the decadence of the West. Strauss believes that if Machiavelli appeared innovative, it is only because he lowered the intellectual horizon of classical philosophers and made their goals appear unrealistic and imaginary. In this article, the author first explains Greece from Strauss's point of view and then, based on the texts of important philosophers from both traditions, explores how one can not only gain a deeper understanding of Machiavelli by using the tools of classical philosophy but also, in addition to recognizing his rupture, introduce objections and criticisms using the same tools, ultimately providing a more realistic depiction of him.

Existential thinking is a key concept that contrasts with metaphysical-conceptual thinking, which does not rely on representation or imagery, nor does it seek to uncover truth through conceptualization and logical categorization. This mode of thinking is directed toward the truth of existence and invites us to remain open to Being and its manifestations. Existential thinking, described as poetic, can be articulated in light of the teachings of both Ibn Arabi and Heidegger. Hence, the main issue of this paper is to provide a comparative study of poetic existential thinking from the perspectives of Heidegger and Ibn Arabi. This study employs an analytical-comparative approach and yields the following results Both thinkers regard poetic perception as a way of encountering the truth of existence, a perception through which one gains access to a reality beyond the mere appearance of phenomena. Heidegger asserts that art, especially poetry, is the site where truth happens—a poetry in which truth reveals itself and leads to the opening of new horizons in human thought. Similarly, Ibn Arabi introduces art as craftsmanship that reflects the manifestation of divine names in the world. He believes that poetry, as the highest form of art, is a path to the realm of the unseen and can assist humans in their encounter with the truth of existence.

The dialogue between Heidegger and Buddhist philosophy around the concept of “understanding’’ is studied in this article. Heidegger and the Buddhist schools agree that “man” is part of the phenomenal world. Encounters with Taoism and Zen Buddhism led Heidegger toward a space beyond the limits of understanding—a space that was not hermeneutical or phenomenological, but poetic and meditative. The results of the research indicate that, on the one hand, Heidegger's existentialist thought is in some way consistent with the fundamental doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, that form is Śūnyatā and Śūnyatā is form. And it was essentially the affinity of this Mahāyāna doctrine with Heidegger's view that being and non-being are, in effect, “the same” that attracted the Kyoto School thinkers to Heidegger's thought. On the other hand, contemporary Indian philosophers, in agreement with Buddhist and Heideggerian philosophies, considered understanding to be the inherent nature of consciousness and regarded the most important element of achieving it to be the removal of obstacles created by conditioning. The research was conducted using a comparative approach, and its data were collected through library resources and analyzed using a descriptive-analytical method.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between Buber’s and Levinas’s ideas by emphasizing the concept of otherness. Research has been conducted on various topics related to Buber’s and Levinas’s ideas in the field of moral philosophy. However, the relationship between them remains an ambiguous area of study. This research seeks to provide a comparative reflection on the concept of otherness according to the thoughts of these two philosophers. Based on the studies conducted, while Buber’s thoughts emphasize an I-Thou relationship that fosters a symmetrical, close, and reciprocal connection, Levinas highlights a face-to-face encounter characterized by an asymmetrical distance. Levinas criticizes Buber’s I-Thou relationship as insufficiently ethical because it prioritizes the self over the other in a self-centered process of formation. In fact, Levinas argues for the irreducible distance between the I and the Other, where the Other is no longer assimilated into the I or the self. According to Levinas’s thought, if, in encountering another, there is an expectation of reciprocal and equal treatment from the Other, one steps outside the ethical realm.