نشریه مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
پیاپی 35 (پاییز و زمستان 1403)

Between 2020 and 2024, the South Caucasus experienced numerous geopolitical events that significantly changed the status quo in the region. Components of the South Caucasus security complex, such as social structure, polarity, the nature of actors, anarchy and borders can be explained within the framework of sub-regional security complex centered around Russia prior to the Ukrainian developments of 2022. However, with the changes that occurred between 2022 and 2024, the concept of sub-regional security complex has lost its explanatory power for application in the South Caucasus region. Therefore, the primary goal and subject of this research is to identify the type of security complex that governs the region and to explain how the components of the South Caucasus security complex are affected by new regional and international developments.

Research question:

 How has the South Caucasus security complex changed under the influence of developments between 2020 and 2024?Research hypothesis: Given these developments, components of the security complex – such as borders, the social structure, type of polarity and states influenced by the Second Nagorno-Karabakh and a result of the Ukrainan War. Ultimately, the region is witnessing a shift in trends, from moderate anarchy to increasing anarchy and greater regional autonomy.Methodology and theoretical framework: This study seeks to assess the components of the south Caucasus security complex using a quantitative approach and interpretive structural modeling (ISM). Buzan's original definition of a security complex is as follows: a group of states whose primary security concerns are so interconnected that their national security cannot realistically be considered in isolation from one another. The basic structure of a regional security complex consists of four variables. 1. Borders that separate the security complex from its neighbors. 2. Anarchic structure, meaning that a regional security complex comprises two or more autonomous units. 3. Polarity, which refers to the distribution of power among the units. 4. Social structure, which includes patterns of friendship and enmity among the units. Depending on the configuration of a security complex, three types of evolutionary processes can be observed in each complex: 1. Maintaining the status quo means not making fundamental changes to the fundamental structure of the complex. 2. Internal transformation, indicating that changes in the fundamental structure occur within the existing external boundaries. This could include changes in the structure of anarchy (due to regional integration), changes in polarity (due to divergence, mergers, conquest, low growth rates, etc.) or prevailing patterns of friendship and hostility (due to ideological transitions, wars, leadership changes, etc.). 3. External transformation refers to the opening or closing of external borders, changing membership in the regional security complex, and most likely changing the fundamental structure in other ways.

From 2020 to 2024, the border of South Caucasus security complex has witnessed internal and external developements. Internally, the full restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial sovereignty after the war led to the country's increased border expansion with its two neighbors, Iran and Armenia. Externally, the South Caucasus has transformed from an arena of competition primarily between Russia and the West into a new geopolitical space in which where more than six powers are competing for influence. This shift challenged Russia's monopoly position and the status quo that had dominated the region for 200 years. The decline of Russia’s geopolitical power created a closer connection between the South Caucasus and the greater Middle East and Middle Eastern countries see the South Caucasus as a natural extension of their territories. Regarding anarchic Structure of the region, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, which resulted in a ceasefire agreement, emphasized the Russian military presence as peacekeepers, the restoration of Soviet-era routes under Russia control and the return of refugees. Russia's military presence in Karabakh somewhat moderated the turbulent nature of the region. However, normalization talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to materialize after Azerbaijan fully restored sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh in a one-day war in 2023. By 2024, Russia withdrew its military forces from Nagorno-Karabakh following bilateral agreements with Azerbaijan. This withdrawal, coupled with Russia's planned withdrawal from the border areas of Armenia and Iran in 2025, is expected to exacerbate the turbulent situation in the region. In terms of Polarity, Armenia’s military and economic capacity is incomparable to Azerbaijan's, whose advantage is evident in defense budgets and economic growth. Before the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the regional polarity was balanced between the three countries due to alliances such as Armenia's military partnership with Russia and its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War shifted the regional polarity to a unipolar structure centered on Russia, which lasted until 2022. By 2024, several factors, including Russia’s military withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, the suspension of Armenia’s membership in CSTO and Armenia’s reduction in reliance on Russian arms imports (from 90% to 10%), significantly weakened Russia's central role in the region. Regarding Social Structure, between 2020 and 2024, the Hobbesian nature of hostility in the region has decreased compared to previous years. Historically, the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played a key role in shaping patterns of hostility and friendship in the South Caucasus. After 2020, the processes of resolving these conflicts entered certain stages in the transformation of the social structure of the region.

Regional and international developments between 2020 and 2024—such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Russo-UkrainianWar, the restoration of Azerbaijani political sovereignty in Khankendi in 2023, the Georgian parliamentary elections in 2024, and Armenia's shift from idealistic to realist southern policies—had a significant impact on the policies of the South Caucasus. These events have led to transformations across all structural components of the regional security order. In this context: borders have experienced both internal changes and external developements due to the increasing inter-connectedness of developments in the South Caucasus with West Asia. The social structure has undergone a fundamental change, shifting from a Hobbesian framework of hostility to a Kantian framework driven by changes in Armenian pragmatic politics. The polarity has shifted from a sub-regional security complex after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War to a standard regional structure influenced by the Ukraine War. Anarchy has moved from moderation to escalation, leading to greater regional autonomy. Overall, geo-economic dynamics—such as energy transit routes, trade corridors and transportation networks—have increasingly become the focal point of competition between regional and international powers, surpassing geopolitical factors in importance. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War reinforced this trend, while the Ukraine War and Russia's efforts to replace Western partners with Eastern ones for economic stability further strengthened it.

Tensions and disputes between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia have long plagued the South Caucasus region with constant crises. The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, one of the most significant international crises since the Cold War, has resulted in two decades of conflict between these two countries. During the 2023 conflict, with Azerbaijan's seizure of the Karabakh region, Armenia was forced to accept the new political conditions. However, the differences have not yet fully resolved and conflicts continue. Other issues, such as the Zangezur Corridor and border disputes, have also strained relations between the two countries. The deep-rooted nature of these differences has made the brief periods of peace between the two countries seem like “fire under the ashes” that can flare up at any moment. Official diplomatic efforts in the past decades have been fruitless, and in this situation, using the capacities of informal diplomacy, especially citizen diplomacy, which has had successful experiences in some regions, is noteworthy.Research question: What is the role of citizen diplomacy in deescalating international tensions and how can citizen diplomacy help reduce tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Research hypothesis: 

Citizen diplomacy can lead to the reduction in Armenian-Azeri tensions and create opportunities for cooperation and lasting peace, provided that sufficient support is provided and the historical obstacles are removed.

Methodology and theoretical framework:

 The research method of this article is qualitative with an exploratory-analytical approach. In other words, the data of the article is non-quantitative and the researcher relies more on historical data. It is exploratory because just a few preliminary works have been done in this field and the present study is considered one of the first comprehensive works in this field. Within a theoretical framework, the article examines identity theory in a constructivist way that examines how collective and individual identities influence the political behavior of societies and countries. The article argues that citizen diplomacy serves as an effective tool for changing negative images and reducing tensions between conflicting identities. This type of diplomacy includes direct people-to-people interaction, cultural and educational exchange programs, community-based dialogues, and the use of media and social networks. These tools help build mutual understanding and respect between different individuals and communities, as well as reduce misunderstandings and increase international cooperation.

The national identity of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based on the territorial integrity and retake of Nagorno-Karabakh, while the national identity of Armenia is based on the defense of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. By promoting hatred and a negative image of the other country, the media and propaganda of both countries have helped to reinforce opposing identities and deepen distrust and hostility between the two nations. The emphasis on the historical crimes and nationalist narratives in the educational and cultural systems of the two countries has increased tension and continued conflict.So far, there have been few attempts to reduce tensions between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia through citizen diplomacy, which includes programs by non-governmental organizations, research institute and universities with the support of international institutions. These programs include the European Partnership for the Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, the Conflict Monitoring Center, and the "Letters for Peace" initiative, work through dialogue, cultural and educational exchanges, and joint projects to reduce tensions with the aim of strengthening informal contacts and mutual understanding between citizens and elites of the two countries. However, these efforts have not been fully successful due to political, security, economic and historical constranits. The complex history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, mutual distrust, the promotion of nationalist narratives by the media and the lack of coordination between citizen and governmental diplomacy are among the reasons for the failure of these programs. In addition, regional and international factors and the conflicting interests of interested countries have added to the complexity of the crisis and the continuation of the conflict. The limited participation of ordinary people and an emphasis on national interests have also hindered the effectiveness of citizen diplomacy. For these efforts to succeed, new strategies, greater support, and broader international and local cooperation are needed. This includes strengthening cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries, creating common spaces for inter-governmental dialogues, and making optimal use of traditional and social media to promote a culture of peace and mutual understanding. Increasing awareness, reducing misunderstandings, and promoting peaceful ideas can help strengthen communications and reduce tensions between the two countries.

The findings of this study show that various citizen diplomacy programs, such as cultural exchanges, educational cooperation and joint projects can gradually reduce negative perceptions and create a space for dialogue and understanding. By increasing people-to-people interactions and strengthening cultural ties, hostile identities can gradually be transformed and the ground for cooperation and peaceful coexistence can be created. Citizen diplomacy can act as a bridge for peace and understanding between Azerbaijan and Armenia and help create a new and positive atmosphere in the relations between these two countries. This approach uses various tools and increases human and cultural interactions, including cultural and educational exchange programs, economic and trade cooperation, media and information diplomacy, strengthening the role of civil institutions, holding educational workshops and seminars, developing joint environmental projects, encouraging international and regional dialogues and promoting multi-cultural and multi-lingual education which can play a key role in developing relations between the two peoples and open new horizons for peaceful co-existence.

A national referendum on constitutional amendment was held in Kazakhstan on June 5, 2022, with the adoption of 33 proposed constitutional amendments to garner public support for a “New Kazakhstan”. As a result, the Constitutional Court re-established, a seven-year presidential term was approved, the death penalty was abolished and the close relatives of the president were banned from entering politics or holding senior positions in state-owned companies or regional administrations. In addition, the 2000 law that granted legal immunity to Nazarbayev and his family was also repealed. In this article, the authors attempt to examine the Impact of the 2022 Constitutional Referendum on the Political Structure of Kazakhstan. The understanding of the success and effectiveness of some reforms that pursue higher goals such as achieving democracy and reducing the concentration of power is demonstrated in the medium and long-term based on the performance of political elite.The Constitution of Kazakhstan was adopted by referendum on August 30, 1995 with 90.01 % of the vote.  At the meeting of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan on April 26, 2022, President Tokayev submitted a request to hold a national referendum to revise the Constitution and the referendum was held on June 5, 2022. In fact, as a result of 2022 referendum, 77.18 % of citizens said yes to 56 constitutional amendments in 33 articles of the Constitution; this has changed one-third of the current Constitution.The political structure, reformed  through the referendum, can be examined in three key aspects: Constitutional, Public, and Social Reforms including changes to the ownership of the lands and its subsoil, waters, flora and fauna and other natural resources from the government to the people and re-establishing the Constitutional Court; Presidential System includes changing presidential term to 7 years, banning close relatives of the President of Kazakhstan from holding positions as political civil servants or heading institutions in the quasi-governmental sector, and  removing the President's authority to dismiss Akims (governor) of districts, cities, and rural districts from their positions; and  the Parliament including holding Mazhilis (parliament) elections based on a mixed electoral system, the laws will be passed through the Parliment and the Senate will not approve or disapprove them, reducing the presidential share in appointing deputies in the Senate from 15 to 10 representatives and the appointment of 5 members of the Senate by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.In fact, the main goal of the amendment was to reduce the concentration of power and the authority of the president while increasing the power and the role of the parliament, local representative bodies and the people in Kazakhstan. The only reform to the judicial system is the re-establishment of the Constitutional Court; however, the president still has great influence over the structure of the Constitutional Court as he/she can choose the president of the court and four judges.The aim of this article is to assess the impact of the 2022 Constitutional Referendum on the political structure of Kazakhstan. The main question of this research is how the 2022 constitutional amendment could affect the political structure of Kazakhstan? For this purpose, we collected data from news, articles, reports and analyses in this field. In addition, we have analyzed the latest version of the constitution of Kazakhstan with previous version.Research question: How could the 2022 constitutional amendment affect Kazakhstan's political structure?Research hypothesis: It seems that at the very first moment one can observe the short-term effects of some reforms on the political structure of Kazakhstan. However, the understanding of the success and effectiveness of some reforms that pursue higher goals such as achieving democracy and reducing the concentration of power is demonstrated in the medium and long term based on the performance of political elite. The exploratory method was used in specific content analysis. Data was collected through library sources, official statements, reports, as well as a review of the Constitution of Kazakhstan and the amendment made on June 5, 2022. Kazakh society expressed its desire for fundemental changes in the country's political structure through a referendum held on June 5, 2022. However, it must be acknowledged that reforms alone, such as reforming the presidential term, adjusting the number of representatives in parliament, changing the name of the capital, and re-electing the president, senate, and parliament, cannot guarantee democracy in Kazakhstan. Given the experience of Kazakhstan's first president in maintaining power, there have been concerns and doubts about the effectiveness of Tokayev's reforms. It is still unclear whether Tokayev will implement the approved reforms or prioritize his political survival over them.Over the years, the Constitution of Kazakhstan has undergone numerous revisions and amendments, yet these amendments have not brought about significant changes in the country's political structure or affected the functioning of its political elite. While recent reforms have sparked a glimmer of hope, the actions and intentions of Kazakhstan's political elite still need to be seen moving forward. It is not possible to quickly evaluate and validate all the constitutional amendments of June 5, 2022 through national referendum. These revisions should be monitored and evaluated in three seperate periods: short-term, medium-term, and long-term. Democracy is an ongoing process that requires constant vigilance and commitment. Kazakhstan can achieve its stated goals only if comprehensive reforms continue. The success of these reforms now depends on Kazakhstan’s political elite and future presidents and their response to these changes. To institutionalize a democratic system and change the country’s political structure, Kazakhstan needs the support of its political elite.

The Caucasus region, strategically located between Europe and Asia, has long attracted the attention of regional and global powers due to its geographical importance and abundant natural resources. Its vast oil and gas reserves, along with its role as a key transit hub, have placed it at the center of international trade and investment. The region's integration into global economic corridors has increased its strategic value, as major regional and international powers seek secure routes for the transport of goods and energy. In this context, Iran and Türkiye, two influential players in the region, are pursuing their corridor strategies to expand their influence. Iran prioritizes the North-South Corridor to strengthen ties with Eurasia and circumvent sanctions and offer an alternative trade route. Meanwhile, Türkiye is focused on the Middle Corridor, which connects Central Asia to Europe and China through the Caucasus. This pursuit of regional influence through economic corridors has intensified competition between Tehran and Ankara and has shaped their diplomatic relations. The development of these routes not only facilitates trade but also serves as a tool for geopolitical influence and regional dominance.Research question: The main question of the research is how different interests and goals of Iran and Türkiye in the Caucasus region lead to competition in the corridors passing through this region?

Research hypothesis: 

The hypothesis suggests that the significant difference in the goals and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Türkiye regarding the development of corridors passing through the Caucasus region is one of the key factors in the competition between the two countries in this area.Methodology and theorethical framework: This study uses a qualitative research method with a descriptive-analytical approach, using documentary analysis and library research to examine the dynamics of competition between Iran and Türkiye in the Caucasus region. Additionally, the theoretical framework employs the regional balance of power to analyze strategic interactions between the two countries. According to this theoretical framework, economic corridors play a significant role in the balance of power in two key ways. First, they enable actors to reduce political and economic pressures from rivals by reducing their path dependence, thereby increasing strategic independence. Second, these corridors serve as a tool to strengthen soft power and increase geopolitical influence.

In this context, the competition between Iran and Türkiye over the development of corridors in the Caucasus has beem raised as an important issue in bilateral relations. Fundamental differences in the goals and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Türkiye in terms of their influence in the Caucasus are the main drivers of this competition. While both countries recognize the strategic importance of the region, they have different views on the development of the corridor. Iran aims to strengthen its cooperation with Eurasian countries, especially Russia and India, using the North-South Corridor as a tool to strengthen these partnerships. In contrast, Türkiye has adopted a more West-centric approach, seeking to stenghten its central role in connecting Europe with Central Asia and China through the development of the Middle Corridor. These different strategies have significantly intensified Iran-Türkiye competition in the Caucasus. Both countries are committed to advancing the vision of regional connectivity, deepening bilateral relations and influencing their geopolitical landscape. The findings of this study indicate that framing the North-South Corridor and the Middle Corridor as two competing routes with distinct stakeholders intensifies the rivalry between Iran and Türkiye in the Caucasus. This competition is likely to shape the dynamics of their bilateral relations, affecting not only their interactions but also the broader security and stability of the Caucasus and beyond. As major external powers also compete for influence in the region, the rivalry between Iran-Türkiye could further complicate regional politics. As both countries seek to maintain their positions and advance their interests, the potential for escalating geopolitical tensions increases, emphasizing the need for careful management of this competition to maintain stability in this strategically sensitive region. Ultimately, the interplay of regional and global interests may change the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus and have important implications for both local and international security.

The findings suggest that both countries are actively seeking to expand their influence in this strategically important region. However, fundamental differences in their interests and goals increase competition between them. This growing competitionis not only is rooted in their national interests but is also influenced by significant geopolitical changes in the region and the external interference by major powers. The growing presence of countries such as China and Russia in the Caucasus further complicates the regional landscape and positions the Iranian-Turkish rivalry as a potential catalyst for escalating tensions and instability. As both countries pursue their ambitions amidst these complex dynamics, the implications for regional security and cooperation become increasingly critical. This study shows that the Iranian-Turkish rivalry in the Caucasus is part of a broader geopolitical competition that involvs global powers and has important implications for regional stability. The dynamics of this competition directly affect the development and control of essential transportation corridors in the region. To turn this competition into constructive cooperation, Iran must actively engage with the Middle Corridor. Such interaction will not only strengthen the North-South Corridor, but will also strengthen Iran's relations with its neighbors and help reduce its isolation.

The international relations between Iran and Russia, as two pivotal players in the global political and economic arenas, have long attracted the attention of researchers and policymakers. Both countries, with their strategic geopolitical Locations, have a significant impact on regional and global developments. Throughout history, relations between Iran-Russia have been characterized by fluctuations shaped by a range of factors, including changes in domestic and foreign policies, regional and global crises and economic and security developments. Bilateral relations have entered a new and dynamic stage in recent decades, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting structural changes in the international system. On the one hand, shared interests in areas such as energy, security and trade have led both countries to seek deeper bilateral and multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, persistent challenges, including international pressures, economic sanctions and political differences, continue to pose significant obstacles to advancing a full-fledged strategic partnership.

Research question: 

This study aims to address the question of what opportunities and obstacles exist in Iran-Russia relations for establishing a strategic partnership?Research hypothesis: Despite the inter-connectedness of Iran-Russia relations in various fields and their extensive cooperation on regional and trans-regional issues, structural, political and economic challenges—including competition in the energy sector, economic sanctions and mutual distrust—have prevented the two countries from achieving a full-fledged strategic partnership.

Methodology and theoretical framework:

 This research uses a qualitative and descriptive approach to analyze the content of selected data along with topic analysis. The theoretical framework of this article is based on the construction of strategic relationships in international relations. The goal of these relations is to bring countries closer together on a global stage, enabling them to pursue and achieve their national interests through proximity.

During the Islamic Republic of Iran, it sought to establish strategic relations with selected governments within the framework of the international system and prioritized a structured approach to these partnerships. Russia stands out as a key country in this effort. Several factors, including historical, political and normative commonalities, provide the foundation for strengthening strategic relations. However, despite some progress, significant challenges remain that prevent the full realization of a sustainable strategic partnership. Iran-Russia relations have evolved over the past four decades, shifting from short-term tactical interactions to more comprehensive cooperation in regional and international geopolitical arenas. Trade relations, with significant growth over the past decade, have been one of the main pillars of this partnership. For instance, Russian exports to Iran increased from $770 million in 2011 to $1.58 billion in 2022, while Iranian exports to Russia increased from $350 million to $750 million over the same period. This economic growth is driven by mutual efforts to counter Western sanctions, with key cooperation in the energy, technology, and agriculture sectors. Joint projects, such as developing oil and gas fields, constructing nuclear power plants and participating in technology transfers, underscore the economic interdependence of the two countries. Geopolitical and security cooperation has also played a vital role, especially in conflict zones such as Syria and during the tensions in Ukraine. In Syria, both countries supported the Assad regime and demonstrated their ability to align with strategic goals. Iran’s stance on the Ukraine crisis further reinforces the country's geopolitical alignment with Russia against Western influence. However, fundamental challenges remain. Geopolitical priorities and diverging national interests often cause friction. Russia’s broader strategies sometimes include aligning with countries that Iran consider enemies, complicating their relations. Domestic political dynamics in both nations further limit their ability to fully commit to a long-term alliance. Despite these obstacles, opportunities remain for deeper cooperation. Strengthening economic ties in energy, technology and agriculture, along with mechanisms for building mutual trust and resolving disputes, could pave the way for a more sustainable and enduring strategic partnership.

Despite a long history of cooperation in geopolitical, security and economic spheres, Iran and Russia have not yet reached the level of a sustainable and comprehensive strategic partnership. This situation is shaped by various structural and systemic challenges that affect their relations at the domestic, regional and international levels. On the other hand, competition in energy markets, different approaches to some regional issues and historical mistrust, especially in economic and political spheres, create significant obstacles to deepening these relations. Western economic sanctions against both countries have created opportunities for closer ties; however, structural challenges, such as inefficient trade mechanisms, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure and a lack of technological innovation, limit their ability to fully capitalize on these opportunities. Additionally, geopolitical issues, such as conflicts in the South Caucasus and Russia's engagement with countries such as the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, further complicate their relations. Furthermore, Iran-Russia relations are heavily influenced by external factors, including Russia’s tensions with the West and Iran’s efforts to reduce its dependence on limited partners and their relations are largely opportunistic and tactical rather than strategic. To overcome these challenges and strengthen their strategic relationship, Iran and Russia should focus on several key areas: 1) Building mutual trust through the development of joint institutions and legal frameworks that ensure long-term benefits for both countries. 2) Enhancing economic and trade cooperation by removing structural barriers, improving transportation infrastructure such as the North-South Corridor and strengthening technology-based partnerships.3) Deepening cultural and social interactions to bridge gaps in understanding and create greater social cohesion. 4) Determining long-term and common foreign policy goals with a focus on countering unilateralism and promoting multilateralism in the international system.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly established Central Asian countries sought to expand their political, economic, and security relations beyond their former Soviet allies. With its regional approach, China managed to turn the challenges in Central Asia into opportunities. China's interests in Central Asia include, preventing terrorist activities in Xinjiang province, accessing new markets for goods and infrastructure companies and building transportation networks to support imports and exports. The importance of Central Asia in China's point of view is expected to increase in the 21st century. This shift is related to the strong technological advancements that are occurring in areas such as the Internet of Things, 3D printing, Industry 4.0, and artificial intelligence. Now China has positioned itself as a great power with a vision to become a leader in science and technology. Thus, Central Asia has a significant potential as a suitable region for China's presence and manufacturing technologies.

Research question: 

With special emphasis on China's strategy in Central Asia, this research seeks to answer the question, what are China's goals in the framework of the strategy of using artificial intelligence in Central Asia?Research hypothesis: Through artificial intelligence technology, China seeks to increase its position and influence in a wide range of economic, political and military fields in Central Asia, such as creating a smart city, establishing a large data center, gaining information superiority, fighting cybercrimes and Smart military cooperation, etc.

Methodology and theoretical framework: 

The research method in the article is a qualitative method with a sample study method as well as a process study with a descriptive-analytical approach. In this research, attention has been paid to the subject of artificial intelligence from the perspective of realism. The most important question facing realists with the advent of artificial intelligence is the question of power and security. It seems that based on the logic of realism, artificial intelligence can increase the concern of governments about their security and sovereignty. Artificial intelligence creates many capabilities in the field of decision-making, simulation, war calculations, etc., which cannot be recorded or measured anywhere. Therefore, from the point of view of realism, it is artificial intelligence that gives power to China in the present era so that it can seek to improve its position as a main player in the world arena. 

Based on these data, China is looking for the development and application of artificial intelligence in various fields in order to improve its position in the international system. In this regard, China has presented one of the most comprehensive strategies in the field of artificial intelligence by combining various elements of technologies. China's AI strategy has set ambitious goals to achieve global leadership by 2025 in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), voice and image recognition and to become a global AI innovation center by 2030. China's AI strategy emphasizes the importance of research and development areas and ethical norms, with special emphasis on the concepts of talent development and national security. According to the existing discussion of artificial intelligence technologies, it has played an important role in strengthening China's interaction with the world, especially in the geography of Central Asia. In fact, artificial intelligence, like everything that a country produces in important economic sectors, services, technology, etc., needs a sales market. A country cannot claim to be in the world arena, but use artificial intelligence, which is a product with very diverse capacities, at the domestic level only for the consumption of domestic people.Therefore, based on the data, Chinese technology companies entered the Central Asian market at the beginning of the 21st century, but their real growth as one of the global powers in the field of information and communication technology and digitalization began in the second decade of this century after Xi Jinping came to power. China is systematically integrating new AI technologies into its economic and technological investments and continues to increase smart weapons exports and military deployments in Central Asia. China's advanced position in artificial intelligence is likely to create significant geopolitical implications in the region through an active digital export policy and increased asymmetric dependence in different regions. Overall, according to the data, China has influence in three sectors of political, economic and military in Central Asia using programs and projects such as the Silk Road and Beijing's programs in the field of artificial intelligence.

China's development and use of artificial intelligence technology plays an important role in the country’s active initiatives and policies in the Central Asian region. In this regard, China is following a comprehensive path to integrate artificial intelligence technologies in various fields. China's artificial intelligence strategy serves to reinforce its growing asymmetric dependence with the countries in the region and hence this fact facilitates the risk of vulnerability against China. China is systematically integrating new AI technologies into its economic and technological investments and continues to increase smart weapons exports and military deployments in Central Asia. By skillfully introducing the project of smart cities, China not only strengthens economic and strategic opportunities but also creates information on the issue of exporting digital authoritarianism to the region. In this sense, the tools of artificial intelligence technology have been applied in China to help and facilitate the asymmetric dependence of this country. Despite criticisms of exporting digital authoritarianism, China continues to sell surveillance technologies and increase its share and influence in Central Asia. Therefore, based on the existing hypothesis, China has actively cooperated with regional countries in the field of security-political issues and maintaining the stability of local regimes as well as the economy based on artificial intelligence. This center was at a favorable level (asymmetrically), but according to China's strategy in the field of artificial intelligence, this trend has continued in a new and more favorable way.

To achieve greater geopolitical weight in the region, Iran has always been sensitive to developments in independent countries, especially the countries of the South Caucasus region, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, one important geopolitical area that emerged after the 44-day war in 2020 and that, if developed, would affect Iran's interests, is the Zangezur Corridor. The Zangezur Corridor is a key strategic space that provides the Republic of Azerbaijan with access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in accordance with Article 9 of the Moscow Tripartite Agreement. This access allows for the connection of Turkic-populated territories. The changing geopolitical conditions of today's world, especially after the outbreak of Russia's war with Ukraine, coupled with energy challenges in Europe and global geoeconomic imperatives, make this key piece essential and significant.Research question: What are the impacts of the construction of the Zangezur Corridor and what impact does it have on Iran's geopolitical weight?Research hypothesis: It seems that the construction of the Zangezur Corridor in Syunik Province will have consequences for Iran in the political, economic and military sectors. This article is of an applied type with a qualitative methodology and descriptive-analytical approach, conducted through a targeted snowball interview. In this process, the main themes of this article were analyzed using the content and graphs were extracted using Max QDA software. The statistical population includes experts who have sufficient knowledge of issues related to the Karabakh war and the Zangezur Corridor and have the necessary knowledge of its status and activities. The sample size is 11 commanders, professors of military and civilian universities, specialists and experts in the field of geopolitics and international relations. The Zangezur Corridor is a project whose geopolitical and geostrategic importance was highlighted years ago, even before the conflict began in 2020. In addition to regional countries, trans-regional powers have also acknowledged the importance and role of this corridor. For example, in 2012, the US Strategic Intelligence Publishing Company prepared a report on this subject. The report stated that whoever controls this Corridor could increase Turkiye's geopolitical sphere of influence in Anatolia and Russia's sphere of influence in the Caucasus and gain influence in the region. With the outbreak of the conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, the Iranian government responded positively to the annexation of the Karabakh region to the Republic of Azerbaijan in its political strategy but announced its opposition to the establishment of the Zangezur corridor in the Syunik province of Armenia to establish a land connection between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. In a meeting with Turkish President Erdogan, the Iranian supreme leader announced that Iran will not allow the thousands-year-old border between Iran and Armenia to be cut or closed. Based on the research and interviews with academic and military experts in this field, the construction of the Zangezur Corridor is directly related to the weakening of Iran's geopolitical weight. The geopolitical effect of the construction of this Corridor is the cutting of international borders, which is not in Iran’s interest. Given that the main nature of this corridor is to connect the main territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan region, and the first effect of this corridor is to cut the border between Iran and Armenia in terms of neighborhood, if Iran's communication routes with Armenia are blocked, Iran's dependence on the Republic of Azerbaijan in terms of communication routes with the Caucasus region will increase. This will further strengthen the alliance between Turkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan and prevent Iran from playing a strategic role in the geopolitical region of the Caucasus and Anatolia and these conditions will create the basis for the encirclement of Iran by some extra-regional countries, including Israel. Also, after the construction of this Corridor, the Republic of Azerbaijan will become an ideal location for gathering strategic information for Israeli espionage purposes. The construction of the Zangezur Corridor under the ownership of the Republic of Azerbaijan will pave the way for a change in the geopolitical situation of the region and the presence of regional and trans-regional powers, while at the same time reducing Iran's geopolitical weight. The findings of the article indicate that this Corridor, due to changes in international borders, will reduce the Republic of Azerbaijan's dependence on Iran, increase identity conflicts and weaken Iran on the East-West axis. In the economic sector, it weakens and eliminates energy transmission, and Iran's transportation routes will be monopolized by Turkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan, which will result in Iran's dependence on these countries. Overall, this reduces the importance of the corridor for Iran. In the military sector, strengthening military ties between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkiye will facilitate the growth and spread of ethnocentrism among the Republic of Azerbaijani speakers, which will easily arouse Iranian security sensitivities. This issue could also fuel concerns related to issues such as Pan-Turkism, separatist movements, the transfer of Israeli intelligence-security forces and weapons to the Republic of Azerbaijan via Turkiye and Israel can implement the same model that Iran implemented in the Axis of Resistance in West Asia in this region.

With the occurrence of the September 11, 2001, the activists of the international system inevitably turned to specific directions in dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism. In the meantime, the Russian Federation, as a powerful player in the eastern part of the international system, considered terrorism as a potential and actual threat to its national security. In addition, Russia is always worried about the spread and influence of terrorism and the dangers arising from it in the countries located in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, with a different reading of terrorism, Russia has proposed a kind of anti-terrorist discourse that suits its interests. Therefore, it is emphasized in this article, that Russia's view on terrorism, like other actors of the international system, is derived from the discourse procedures of this country in building itself and the other. On the one hand, Russia's anti-terrorism discourse constitutes Russia's motivations and interests in the fight against terrorism and on the other hand, it causes examples of terrorism to be represented in the foreign policy of this country and the presentation of an anti-terrorist policy in line with Russia's priorities.Research question: This research, seeks to find an answer to the question, what factors caused the development and formation of Russia's anti-terrorism discourse after the September 11 incident?

Research hypothesis:

 In response to this question, the present research claims that after September 11, Russia's anti-terrorism discourse was developed and consolidated around the central idea of Radical Islamism and extremism, and led to Russia's intervention with the aim of providing national security in peripheral regions such as Central Asia and the Caucasus.Methodology and theoretical framework: This article is done using the theoretical framework of discourse analysis of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and its main components. The research method in the article is a combination of descriptive-analytical and causal approach, and the method of collecting research data is based on library and internet sources. This theoretical approach is applicable to communication studies such as political discourses, news analysis and other social communication topics. It can be used to examine a hegemonic discourse and a particular political discourse is shaped by different dominant political forces. In general, this theoretical model can be used to analyze broad issues related to discourse actions. Based on this, this discursive approach and its components have a high explanatory power for analyzing issues in social and political fields. In this article, the principles, and propositions of discourse analysis theory of Laclau and Mouffe are used to detail the field of Russian anti-terrorism discourse.

The most important propositions used are: 

central sign, floating sign, articulation, sphere of discourse, antagonism and hostility. In this way, first, Russia's discursive system against terrorism has been articulated; Then, based on the discourse indicators in the Russian anti-terrorism discourse, an attempt has been made to examine the most important terrorist groups that have been identified by the Russian Federation and Russia's practical actions against these groups.

The findings of this research indicate that Russia, along with the international system, after the September 11th incident, has faced the phenomenon of terrorism and based on its priorities and interests, it has started anti-terrorist discourse. Since September 11th, Russia has put the anti-terrorism policy on the agenda for many security reasons, including maintaining the security of the national borders and ensuring the security of the areas under its influence. Protecting the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus against the risk of the spread and penetration of terrorism is considered one of Russia’s security priorities , because insecurity in these regions is a warning sign for Russia. In other words, these areas are considered as Russia’s gateway because there is a possibility of spreading any security challenges and tensions in these areas to the national borders of Russia. In addition, the Central Asian region as Russia's private life is of great importance for Russia due to security, economic reasons and shared historical and cultural background. In general, separatism as the main factor, along with factors such as radical Islamism, violent extremism and drug terrorism, constitute the discourse indicators of Russia's fight against terrorism, and since any discourse is bound to define "other" and "alienation" in order to continue its existence, therefore, based on its rhetorical signs in the fight against terrorism, Russia has introduced several xenophobic groups such as ISIS, Islamic Party of Uzbekistan and Caucasus Emirate Organization as terrorist groups, and its performance in dealing with these groups was explained in the context of this article.

The activities of Takfiri and Jihadi terrorist groups in the Middle East is a security threat for Russia because it causes the penetration of these groups in the regions under Russian influence, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the emergence of drug terrorism and arms trafficking and endangers the security of Russia. The presence of separatist movements in the North Caucasus region is a cause of concern for Russia. From Russia's point of view, the existence of the Muslim minority in this region provides the basis for the activities of radical Islamists and Salafist ideas. Therefore, the Russian government has adopted a policy of cooperation with the countries of the Central Asian region to fight terrorism. Russia interprets the fight against these separatist movements and suppression of their movements as part of its global straggle against terrorism.

Since the Justice and Development Party came to power, a new cornerstone in Turkish foreign policy has been gradually implemented largely influenced by the thoughts of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu, in his book "Strategic Depth," believes that Turkiye, considers itself an inseparable part of the South Caucasus region historically, culturally, and geographically. Samuel Huntington also points out that Turkiye after the Ottoman Empire, turned away from Mecca and turned westward; however, it did not hear a call from the West and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, one way to ensure its survival was to look to the East (Central Asia and the Caucasus). Accordingly, the South Caucasus, especially Republic of Azerbaijan, received special attention from Turkiye after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The principle of cooperation and expansion of influence in the South Caucasus countries has been the basis of Turkiye's policy towards the the South Caucasus crises, which is pursued both regionally and trans-regionally. In its extraterritorial focus, Turkiye cooperated with the West, especially NATO and the United States. At the regional level, Ankara prioritized its policy in the Caucasus by establishing extensive cooperation with Baku. The concept of power has historically been synonymous with military capacity. However, after World War II, the economy also became important; therefore, power was considered as a component of both military and economic capacity. However, after the Cold War, another aspect of power emerged, introduced by Joseph Nye. This type of power, which does not involve coercive methods, is called soft power. After going through a challenging path of criticism and justification, the concept of soft power, has established its place in the international academic space and has now become one of the main concepts in international relations. Since the rise of the Justice and Development Party, Turkiye has paid more attention to soft power, influenced by the vision of Ahmet Davutoğlu's perspective, with the aim of expanding its sphere of influence. This study first explains Joseph Nye's soft power theory and secondly, it shed lights on the historical relations between Turkiye and Azerbaijan Republic, as well as the role of soft power in strengthening their relations. Research question: What role has soft power played in the development and deepening of the strategic alliance between Turkiye and Azerbaijan?Research hypothesis: Soft power has played a driving and facilitating role in the strategic alliance between Turkiye and Azerbaijan Republic. In this research, the historical-analytical 'process tracing method' was used." This method allows for the investigation of causal mechanisms and changes and allows for the evaluation of the sequence of events and the relationships between variables over time. This method allows for the examination of causal mechanisms and changes, enabling the assessment of the sequence of events and the relationships between variables over time. This method allows for the examination of causal mechanisms and changes, enabling the assessment of the sequence of events and the relationships between variables over time. In this regard, this research describes the strategic alliance between Turkiye and Azerbaijan as a historical process rather than a situation. This means that the process of forming a coalition has a starting point and has reached its peak during a historical journey. By using this method, the authors aim to explain the role of soft power in the development of this alliance. The failure of Turkiye's plans to join the European Union has made the idea of Pan-Turkism and the formation of a "great empire" increasingly more attractive to Ankara than ever before. Alongside the neo-Ottoman idea, which focuses on the Arab countries of the Mediterranean and the Balkans, the unity of all Turkic peoples based on ethnic and linguistic ties, from the Bosporus Strait to China, is also on Turkiye's agenda. The ideas of Pan-Turkism are increasingly becoming a reality in many areas. The concept of unity and a common destiny of Turkic peoples is taking shape more than ever before. Turkiye, relying on its ethnic identity and Turkish element, sought to establish complete solidarity with Azerbaijan. Therefore, the slogan "One Nation - Two States" was the driving force behind Turkish-Azerbaijani relations during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Shushi statement clearly states the overall policy of coordination in military, political, and foreign policy spheres. In fact, this document proves that Turkiye has gained complete influence in Azerbaijan. In previous contracts, there was no mention of the Turkic world; however, this statement clearly indicates the coordination of forces between the two countries for the development of the Turkic world. In previous agreements, there was no mention of the Turkic world; however, this statement clearly outlines the coordination of forces between the two countries for the development of the Turkic world.In general, among Turkiye's multiple soft power mechanisms, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency can be mentioned. In general, the multiple mechanisms of Turkiye's soft power include the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Public Diplomacy Coordination Organization, the Yunus Emre Foundation, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the Anadolu Agency, the Organization of Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Turkish Airlines, the International Turkish Culture Organization, the Maarif Foundation, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority of Turkiye, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Turkish Armed Forces, the Turkic Council, the International Turkic Academy, the Turkish Business Council, the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Union of Turkish Universities, and so on. Turkiye's goal with such measures is to strengthen cooperation between Turkiye and the Turkic republics in the political, economic, cultural and educational fields. On October 20, 2022, during the meeting of representatives of the Turkic Council member states in Bursa, a decision was made to establish a "Commission for the Creation of a Unified Alphabet" within the structure of the Turkic Council. The goal of this commission is to achieve linguistic unity among Turkic countries and to adopt a common alphabet. The overall result of the research indicates that Turkiye's attractiveness to Azerbaijan has played a significant role in the formation of an alliance between the two countries; the cultural cooperation between the two countries has spilled over into geopolitical and geoeconomic spheres, deepening their alliance, which was manifested in the Shushi Declaration. This statement clearly expresses overall policy coordination in the military, political, and foreign policy spheres and emphasizes the alignment of forces between the two countries for the development of the Turkic world. Thus, the Shushi Dclaration reveals the manifestations of Pan-Turkism in the Turkish Azerbaijani relations.

The issue of national identity has always been a fundamental concern among the Russian people and policymakers. Russia has enjoyed a stable national identity that has been sought throughout different periods of Russian history. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, national identity gained more traction among Russians. Given the vast territory and diversity of ethnicities and religions, the lack of a stable national identity could have led to separatist conflicts that would have brought the country to the brink of dissolution. To reverse the situation, Russia needs a strong leadership that can restore the country’s damaged identity, greatness and integrity and provide a clear vision for the future. The identity crisis in Russia has been a major concern for the country's presidents since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a collapse to which they have dedicated their policies to countering. Based on this background, the present article adopts a multidisciplinary cultural approach to first examine the state of national identity in the post-Soviet era and then analyze the initiatives of Russian leaders in the cultural realm to revive the lost Russian identity. For constructivists, understanding the role of national identity in determining the national interests of states and providing guidance for them in international politics is key. Therefore, analyzing the performance of Russian leaders in crisis management will shed light on their approaches to research question. Yeltsin's legacy in managing the identity crisis and its national revival is assessed as destructive in neglecting the historical past and discarding cultural values, with negative effects on the process of collective identification and a sense of belonging, which delays the realization of a coherent Russian identity. The memories of his administration are marked by economic stagnation and separatist turmoil, while Vladimir Putin’s achievements show positive progress. Although his government was by no means flawless, his reforms convinced Russians that he was the one who could reclaim lost glory and build respect from historical humiliation.

Research question: 

How did Putin, as president of Russia, deal with the national identity crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Research hypothesis: 

Vladimir Putin highlighted Russia's historical past as a superpower and emphasized the centrality of cultural heritage to advance a different reformist approach to redefine Russia's global position and provide a compelling response to the identity crisis.

This article is a qualitative, descriptive-analytical study, and its research method is documentary and uses structural analysis.

Vladimir Putin acknowledges that his country is made up of different ethnicities, religions, generations with unique ideals, experiences, and expectations, and that to redefine national identity in the current circumstances, he must take all this diversity for granted. The cultural divide between younger generations, who have no idea what life was like under the Soviet Union and middle-aged people who have completely different values, makes things worse for the policymakers. The young generation suffers from a lack of national awareness, a decline in patriotic sentiment and the increasing grip of cyberspace - which is fundamentally associated with the Western lifestyle - and has failed to fully integrate with its national identity.Putin redefined modern Russian national identity as a combination of Tsarist and Soviet identities; one of the fundamental Soviet values based on contemporary Russian realities that encompasses the values of different groups and can mobilize them as a nation with common symbols, beliefs, values, political culture and national heroes, so that heterosexual tendencies are minimized. He takes the concept of nostalgia and uses it as a device of collective belonging and patriotism. Dedicating specific days on the calendar to commemorate historical events, opening museums, holding events to celebrate the achievements of past leaders and restoring cultural buildings are all part of Putin’s recognition of the importance of nostalgia in reviving identity. Vladimir Putin’s policy of managing the identity crisis and redefining it over the past years has been successful in restoring hope to Russian society by reconciling generations, ethnicities and religions. It is worth noting that Russia still has a long way to go to become a unified society. While governments strive to consolidate national symbols and emphasize the glorious past to resolve the identity crisis, cyberspace hinders the process of national awareness, especially among young people. The widespread influence of cyberspace dominated by the Western culture continues to further alienate the young generation from their cultural heritage and identity, hindering the pace of identity building in Russia.

Yeltsin's legacy in managing the identity crisis and its national revival is assessed as destructive in neglecting the historical past and discarding cultural values, with negative effects on the process of collective identification and a sense of belonging, which delays the realization of a coherent Russian identity. The memories of his administration are marked by economic stagnation and separatist turmoil, while Vladimir Putin’s achievements show positive progress. Although his government was by no means flawless, his reforms convinced Russians that he was the one who could reclaim lost glory and build respect from historical humiliation.

Containing regional threats in US foreign policy and upstream documents has always been considered one of the most important elements of this Great power foreign policy behavior. In all regional networked systems, identifying and confronting state entities that pose a threat to US foreign policy has been placed on the foreign policy agenda. The Eurasian region is one of the regions where regional and global powers are present. This region is important due to its oil and gas resources as well as regional threats. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States are in strategic competition with each other in this region.Research question: What does the US strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran include in the Eurasian security network system?

Research hypothesis:

 Within the framework of the strategy of containing the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Eurasian region, the United States uses a network approach that includes components such as containing threats based on mass creation and concentration of power and preventing growth in the power cycle.

Methodology and theoretical framework:

 The research method of this article is analogical modeling. In this method, using the theoretical foundations of international relations, an analytical model is presented and in the following sections, the field application of the proposed model is carried out. The research approach used in this article is the network approach. In this approach, the order and strategic environment in which states interact are considered as a network of communication nodes.

With the increasing complexity and network nature of the security order in the Eurasian region, the strategy of containing regional threats in US foreign policy has become a network and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a power with a high capacity to expand its influence in this region has been challenged within the framework of the above-mentioned control system. America's foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution has been based on perception of threats. In the US foreign policy documents, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been portrayed as a threat to regional interests and its allies and its containment has been designated as one of the priorities of the US regional policy. By defining its regional identity in the form of a regional power, the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to play an effective role commensurate with its national capabilities in the region to determine the security order. In the Central Asia and the Caucasus region, which encompasses the most important environment and arena of Iran’s strategic behavior, it is considered one of the points of conflict between Iran and the United States. The Eurasian region is one of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s spheres of influence, providing many geoeconomic, geoenergy and geopolitical opportunities to strengthen national capabilities in order to be at the forefront of the regional power cycle. Given the increasing level of complexity of regional interactions and the high degree of permeability against trans-regional powers, the Eurasian region has become a network of interconnected communication nodes that can be categorized into four subject areas: geopolitics, geoeconomics, geoculture and geoenergy. Each subject area is connected to other sub-networks in the form of a sub-network. By manipulating communication nodes in the afore-mentioned subnetworks, it is possible to influence the security order of this region. The optimal security order network of regional and trans-regional units is formulated and reorganized in contrast to the optimal order of competing units.The presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Eurasian security order network has provided this country with a suitable space to strengthen regional cooperation and strengthen national power resources in the fields of hardware and software. The United States, within the framework of a regional control and containment system, seeks to weaken Iran's position in the Eurasian region in order to reduce its regional deterrence. The adaptation of US regional control and containment system to the changing security order of the region is something that has happened in recent years. Containing Iran's network in the Eurasian region requires a complex control system whose principles and components can be identified with respect to US foreign policy documents and its regional behavior.

The American network control system is an environmentally oriented and outward-looking system in which threats are contained and controlled using communication nodes of the regional and global order network at various thematic levels. The network control system consists of two parts: the logical principles that constitute the system and the system components. The logical principles of the network control system are summarized in three principles, based on which the system is designed and operated. The principles of the American network control system are based on three principles, which include a network approach to threats, containing threats and preventing growth in the power cycle. For example containing threats is carried out in the form of policies to create critical mass and concentration of power, which is pursued in the form of strengthening Azerbaijan's military power and escalating border tensions in Aras River. Preventing the growth of the power cycle is also pursued by manipulating communication nodes in the geo-energy and geo-economic layers using regional allies. Placing Iran in a cycle of underdevelopment and depletion of national resources, along with preventing it from achieving regional partneship opportunities are the goals that the United States pursues in the form of regional containment of Iran

The relationship between Iran and Central Asia has a long and complex history. For over a millennium, this region was part of the Iranian/Islamic Empire, leading many Iranians—both scholars and ordinary citizens—to believe that Central Asia remains an integral part of the Iranian cultural and civilizational sphere. As a result, after the occupation of this region by Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union, the people of Central Asia were separated from their cultural and civilizational homeland, a separation they inevitably accepted.From this perspective, despite political borders, it is thought that the people of Central Asia have a positive view of Iranian civilization. However, a closer examination of this historical period shows that this notion is incorrect. In the second half of the 19th century, a negative image of Iran prevailed in the region. This article examines the constructed image of Iran in Central Asia by reviewing the works produced during this historical period, especially the travelogues of Iranians and Westerners who visited the region.

Research questions:

 What was the constructed image of Iran in Central Asia like during the second half of the 19th century? What were the primary factors that contributed to the construction of Iran's image in Central Asia during this period?

Research hypothesis:

 The research hypothesis of this article suggests that during this historical period, Central Asia harbored a negative image of Iran and as a result, the people of Central Asia had a contemptuous view of Iran and its people. 

Methodology and theoretical framework:

Qualitative methods and historical analysis were used to test the hypothesis presented in this article. Historical analysis is particularly relevant when the subject of research concerns events that occurred in the past and have come to fruition now. This method applies a scientific approach to historical research, which involves a systematic search for documents and evidence in the field of study. Consequently, historical analysis focuses on events that occurred before the researcher decided to investigate them.  Therefore, the collection method used in this research is qualitative and based on documentary analysis.

A literature review of the image constructed of Iran in Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century shows that the public perception of Iranians of Central Asia was significantly divorced from reality. Key factors contributing to this negative image include different religious beliefs, contrasting lifestyles, the weakness of the Iranian central government and Russia’s incursion into Central Asia. As a result, the people of Central Asia viewed Shiite Iranians as infidels and tried to avoid interacting with them. At the same time, the nomadic lifestyle of the Central Asian people, along with their warlike spirit, made raiding trade caravans and villages in northeastern Iran one of the important occupations of the Central Asian people. Therefore, it is not surprising that during this period in history, most of the encounters between individuals on both sides of these conflicts were between them. On the other hand, the weakness of the central government of Iran and its inability to provide security for Iranian villagers had caused central Asians to, in addition to attacking Iranian caravans and travelers, plunder villages in the northeast and even the center of Iran, undermining the country’s security. The painful defeats of the Iranian army against poorly organized groups of Central Asian warlords reinforced this weakness and helplessness of the Iranians in the eyes of the people of Central Asia. Moreover, Russia’s entry into the region was the final blow to Iran's image in Central Asia. While the Iranian style of government and life had remained stagnant for the past thousand years, the Russians brought with them many symbols of modern and advanced life to Central Asia. The power of the Russian army, along with their modern governance, caused the Iranian/Islamic style of governance and lifestyle to become a symbol of backwardness and inefficiency and Russia to be considered a symbol of progress and technology.

One of the most critical issues in any country’s foreign policy is its global image. Many factors play a role in shaping a country's image and this process is inherently relational. That is, regardless of how each nation perceives itself, the perceptions of other nations are equally important. In this article, we examined the self-image of Iranians and compared it with the real image of central Asian Iranians in the second half of the 19th century. Our analysis, based on historical evidence and documents left by Iranian and Western travelers and researchers, revealed significant differences between these two images. Contrary to the Iranian perceptions, the people of Central Asia did not have a positive view of Iran during that historical period; instead, their southern neighbors saw themselves as weak and backward. Therefore, we believe that it is essential for Iranian politicians, academics and the general public to develop a clear understanding of how they are perceived by other nations. This awareness will enable them to define and regulate their relations with these countries more effectively.

During the 16th to 19th centuries, the Caucasus region was a battleground for Iran, the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Initially, Iran and Russia sought an alliance after the Ottoman invasion of the South Caucasus in the late 1570s, but internal issues and logistics hindered progress. With the rise of Abbas, I (1587-1629) in Iran and Michael Romanov (1613-1645) in Russia, a new stage in relations began. The treaty of Zuhâb (1639) between Iran and the Ottomans established a new regional order and the thriving silk road through the Caspian Sea attracted many Western delegations to Iran. Armenian merchants negotiated new treaties with the Tsar and strengthened Russian-Iranian trade relations until the 18th century. However, the collapse of the Safavid Empire led to a crisis, with rebel groups plundering Shamâkhī and the Ottomans seizing the South Caucasus. During the reign of Peter, I (1689-1725), Russia occupied parts of Iran, marking a significant turning point in their relations throughout the 18th century.Research question: The main topic of this research deals with the position of the Caucasus in the formation and evolution of relations between Safavid Iran and Moscow Russia. Its goals are to explain the situation in the Caucasus and turn it into a geopolitical issue between Iran, Ottoman and Russia.

Research hypothesis:

 Due to the emergence of a new order in the 16th and 17th centuries, which was the result of global and regional developments, the Caucasus played a fundamental role in the formation, direction, and evolution of new relations between Iran and Russia.

This aim of this historical research is to address the subject from an interdisciplinary perspective. Using a wide range of primary sources, this study employs a descriptive-explanatory method to shed light on this distinct phase of Iran-Russia relations. Simultaneously, geopolitical concepts have also been used to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the main topic. 

The nature of Iran-Russia relations in the new era has clearly been influenced by the two countries positions in the Caucasus region. The beginning of new relations between the two countries coincided with the establishment of the Safavid government and the emergence of Moscow Russia in the first half of the 16th century. In addition to the traditional trade relations between Iranians and Russians, another logic linked these two powers and that was the confrontation with a common enemy, the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire, which emerged on the dead Byzantium empire in the western region of Asia Minor, had become a great and expanding power in the course of the 16th century. This power saw the Safavid state as a geopolitical threat to its influence in Asia Minor, while also claiming sovereignty over the Crimean Khanate, which it considered itself the legitimate heir to the Golden Army. The dismantling of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates by Ivan IV meant, from a geopolitical perspective, that the Russians were gradually approaching the Ottoman sphere of influence in the Black Sea region. Russia was in a superior position, both geographically and militarily, to expand its influence in the North Caucasus, relative to Crimea and the Ottomans. Therefore, Iran and Russia had a specific incentive to establish a relationship based on hostility towards the Ottomans.During the reign of Shah Abbas I, Iran successfully restored its ancient authority in the Caucasus and expanded its administrative territory as far north as Darband in Dagestan. Shah Abbas's achievements in this field increased security and led to the development and prosperity of Iranian and Russian trade through the Caucasus. However, the competition between the two countries to expand their influence in the North Caucasus continued, leading to a passive military confrontation during the reign of Shah Abbas II. Meanwhile, these complex relations led to a significant and unprecedented boom in Iranian-Russian trade at the beginning of the 18th century. However, it also caused the Iranian kings to worry about the gradual expansion of Russia. In the 1720s, with the fall of Isfahan and the campaign of Peter the Great’s, Iran entered a new phase that fundamentally affected the future of relations between the two countries. 

The success of the Safavid government, especially Shah Abbas I, in establishing Iranian peripheral authority in the Caucasus and imposing it on the Ottomans, along with the commercial attractiveness of Iran, led the Russians to develop political and commercial relations with this country. A relationship that included competition for influence in the Caucasus. This relationship continued with pessimism until the end of the Safavid rule. At this stage, maritime trade between the two countries centered on Shamakhi - in the South Caucasus – experienced an unprecedented boom, parallel to the development of Peter I's Asian strategy, prompting the Tsar to strive for a bilateral agreement with Iran. This treaty was intended to provide a specific legal framework for relations between the two countries, the main goals of which were to guarantee the interests of the merchants of the two countries and cooperation against the Ottoman Empire. The crisis of the Safavid government and its collapse forced Russia to fight to prevent the Ottoman advance and complete occupation of the Caucasus. The result was the 1724 treaty of Istanbul, which divided the Caucasus between two rivals. However, the structural ties, the administrative legacy of the Safavid state and Iran's geopolitical advantage in the South Caucasus were still preserved, in case if a new authority emerged, the aggressors would be expelled from Iranian territory and a regional order in the country's favor would be established in the Caucasus.

Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an important milestone and introduce this country as the ninth member of the largest regional cooperation organization. The transformation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from an institution focused on security to an institution that includes economic, industrial, educational, and technological cooperation brings many opportunities and challenges for Iran. This article examines how Iran can use its membership in the SCO to enhance its scientific and technological capabilities in the post globalization era characterized by technological nationalism and geopolitical competition.

Research question: 

How Iran can use the capabilities of the SCO to promote its scientific and technological development?Research hypothesis: Iran’s membership in the SCO, despite existing political, institutional, and cultural challenges, strengthens its technological capabilities and self-sufficiency through regional cooperation.

This research uses a qualitative method, including an extensive review of theoretical foundations, document analysis, and a combination of relevant studies and literature. The analysis focuses on opportunities and potential challenges associated with Iran’s integration within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and examines both historical contexts and contemporary developments.

Iran’s membership in the SCO provides significant opportunities for scientific and technological progress. The key areas of these potentials are:Development of emerging technologies: Iran can benefit from joint efforts in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, Nano-Technology and renewable energy. Joint research projects with SCO member states can accelerate technological innovations and increase Iran’s global competitiveness. For example, partnering with countries like China that have advanced capabilities in AI and biotechnology, can give Iran access to advanced technologies and expertise.Access to joint financial resources: The SCO framework facilitates access to pooled financial resources and enables Iran to finance large-scale research and development projects. Joint financing mechanisms can support the development of advanced research infrastructure and technology parks. Such financial cooperation can reduce the financial burden on individual countries and promote joint technological advances.Enhanced international competitiveness: Regional cooperation can enhance Iran's international competitiveness by promoting the export of advanced technological products. Integration in regional value chains can improve product quality and competitiveness in high-tech sectors. Cooperation with SCO members can help Iran reach wider markets and facilitates economic and industrial growth.Reduction of dependency on foreign technologies: Iran can reduce its dependence on Western technologies and increase its self-sufficiency by using the capabilities of the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Collaborative efforts can foster the development of indigenous technologies, reducing the cost and complexities associated with technology transfer. This self-sufficiency is very important in the context of technical nationalism, where countries seek to minimize reliance on foreign technological inputs. Despite these promising opportunities, several challenges must be addressed:Political conflicts among member states: The longstanding rivalry between China and India, as well as other political conflicts, poses significant obstacles to effective cooperation. Such conflicts can lead to mistrust and decrease willingness to share knowledge and resources. For Iran, navigating these political dynamics requires skillful diplomacy and strategic engagement to mitigate the impact of regional tensions on joint efforts.Institutional and legal disparities: Differences in intellectual property laws, bureaucratic procedures and research governance among SCO members require coordination to ensure smooth collaboration. Iran should harmonize its intellectual property regulations with international standards to facilitate technology transfer and joint research initiatives. Harmonization of legal frameworks can facilitate cooperation and protect innovation and create a more favorable environment for scientific and technological progress.Cultural and logistical challenges: Cultural differences, time zone differences and different national holidays can disrupt coordinated efforts. Effective cooperation requires cultural sensitivity and logistical planning to accommodate diverse work practices and schedules. Educational and awareness programs can bridge cultural gaps, foster mutual understanding and cooperation between researchers from different countries.

Iran’s membership in the SCO is a unique opportunity to leverage regional cooperation for scientific and technological progress. By addressing institutional, legal, cultural, and political challenges through strategic policy interventions, Iran can maximize the benefits of SCO membership. Strengthening research and development infrastructure, harmonizing intellectual property laws, implementing educational initiatives and developing common technological standards are essential steps. These efforts can improve Iran's regional and global position in science and technology and cause sustainable technological growth and economic development.To take full advantage of the opportunities offered by SCO membership, Iran should adopt a multi-faceted strategy that includes following policy recommendations:Strengthening research and development infrastructure: Investing in advanced research facilities and establishing joint research centers with SCO member countries to foster joint innovation. This includes the establishment of technology parks and incubators that facilitate the growth of start-ups and small and medium enterprises in the high-tech sectors. Harmonization of intellectual property laws: Aligning Iran’s intellectual property regulations with international standards to facilitate seamless technology transfer and protection of innovations. This will help build trust among SCO members and encourage more collaborative projects. Educational initiatives: Implementing programs to enhance cultural understanding and logistical coordination between researchers from different countries. Exchange programs, joint workshops and conferences can help bridge cultural gaps and foster a spirit of cooperation.Development of Common Technological Standards: Work with SCO member states to develop common standards and regulations. This simplify technology transfer, increases compatibility and ensure that collaborative projects are mutually beneficial. Strategic diplomacy: Engage in strategic diplomacy to navigate political conflicts in the SCO. Building strong bilateral relations with key member states and participating in multilateral dialogues can help reduce tensions and promote an atmosphere of cooperation.The integration of Iran into the SCO brings important opportunities and fundamental challenges. The SCO provides a strong platform for strengthening regional cooperation in science and technology, which can drive innovation and economic development. However, realizing these benefits requires addressing political conflicts, institutional inequalities, cultural differences and logistical challenges. Through strategic policy interventions and joint efforts, Iran can maximize the benefits of SCO membership, foster sustainable technological advancement and enhance its global competitiveness.

This research aims to investigate the consequences of Turkish hydro-power projects in the upstream Aras basin on Iran's agricultural economy. To do this, after trying to show that the consequences of Turkey's DAP project (Doğu Anadolu Projesi) for Iran could be much greater than the consequences of Turkey's GAP project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi) for Syria and Iraq, we have reviewed previous research to show that there is a research gap in terms of implications of DAP's consequences for Iran's agricultural economy. Then, we have presented the conceptual framework of the research, in which "agricultural economy" "hydro-politic" and "hydro-hegemony" are of particular importance. We then present a picture of the Aras basin to highlight its importance in Iran's agricultural economy. Then, after examining Turkey's hydro-power projects in Aras, we examined two macro/mega trends and five main trends affecting this issue and finally came to a conclusion.Research question: What are the implications of Turkish hydro-power projects in the upstream Aras basin for Iran's agricultural economy?Research hypothesis: Turkey's hydro-power projects in the upstream Aras basin will have major consequences for Iran's agricultural economy, such as the conversion of irrigated lands to (rainy) drylands in Iran’s share of the Aras basin and wasting the investments made in the agricultural sector in the northern regions of the three northwestern provinces of Iran. Given that Turkey's hydro-power projects in the Aras basin have not yet been fully implemented, here we present an explanatory approach for future studies to solve the problem. In examining the implications of hydro-power projects that Turkey has implemented or is seeking to implement in the upstream Aras basin, we argued that the two macro trends that determine Turkey's hydro-politics are global "climate change" and the "competitions between the regional powers" of the Middle East. The first macro trend is causing Turkey's climate to dry out. As a result, the country has sought to manage its consequences by building dams and controlling the water of cross-border rivers. The second macro trend, the competition between regional powers in the Middle East, has led Turkey to use water to gain political and economic benefits from other countries in the region and enhance its position in the region. For this reason, Turkey sometimes talks about exchanging water for oil with Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries and exporting water to other countries through the construction of pipelines. In addition, Turkey has tried to use the Tigris, Euphrates and Aras waters for the "development" of its southeastern and eastern provinces. These regions are less or under-developed compared to other parts of the country, especially the western part. In this framework, dam construction is a means of managing Turkey’s social, political, and ethnic problems in the target regions, which have manifested themselves in the form of Kurdish separatism.Considering the large and small dams that Turkey has built in the Aras basin so far, it can be said that the country will implement more hydro-power projects in the Aras basin, similar to what has been implemented in the Tigris and Euphrates basins. In recent years, the amount of water entering Iran from the Aras has decreased significantly and it can be predicted that the water in this river will decrease even more significantly in the future.Therefore, given the macro/mega and major trends we have discussed in this article and what we know about Turkey's hydro-political approach and hydro-hegemony strategy, it can be said that Turkey is determined to control as much of the Aras water as possible which will have numerous consequences for the countries downstream of this border-crossing river, including Iran. These consequences can manifest themselves in various forms and harm the "human security" of the people in the region. One of the components of human security is "economic security" in which agriculture plays an important role. Therefore, Turkey's dam construction in the upstream Aras basin river will have negative consequences for the agricultural economies of the countries downstream of this river. Our studies in this research show that the consequences of Turkey's dam construction on Iran's agricultural economy will be different: on the one hand, with the reduction of Aras water, Iran's ability to produce agricultural products will decrease especially in the three provinces of West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan and Ardabil - parts of which are in the Aras basin. In addition, the reduction of Aras water will definitely harm its quality, especially since a lot of urban and industrial wastewater enters the river. Therefore, agricultural products produced with the reduced water of the river will be of lower quality and may even cause health problems. This will also reduce the competitiveness of Iran's agricultural products in the market. Similarly, reducing the Aras water will waste the investments that Iran has made in its share of the Aras basin in areas such as the Mughan Plain. In addition, the construction of Turkish dams in the upstream Aras basin and the inevitable reduction in the water reaching downstream countries such as Iran will also have environmental consequences, which endangers some other components of human security for the people of the region.

Researchers have divided the cause of the 2014 and 2022 Crises in Ukraine into three categories. Some have attributed the 2014 and 2022 crises in Ukraine to Russia's efforts to prevent the expansion of the European Union and NATO and the bordering of these institutions with this country and another group links the cause of these crises to Russia's desire to gain power and return to the greatness of Soviet era, as well as Ukraine's western policies. But from the authors' perspective, the cause of these crises should also be examined from another perspective, which is the role of the West in the emergence of these crises and their prolongation. Accordingly, this article attempts to analyze the West’s role in the occurrence of the 2014 and 2022 crises in Ukraine and their prolongation, using the propositions of the theory of offensive realism.

Research question:

 What role did the West play in the outbreak and prolongation of the 2014 and 2022 crises in Ukraine?Research hypothesis: The research hypothesis is because the West, through three strategies of baiting, balancing, interventon, prepared the ground for the 2014 and 2022 crises in Ukraine and their prolongation in order to prevent Russia from gaining power.

Methodology and theoretical framework: 

A qualitative multiple case study method was used to answer the research question and test the hypothesis. The data was collected using a library resource and analyzed using a descriptive-analytical approach within the  framework of the theory of offensive realism.

The results indicated that the diferent strategies have been used by west to prevent Russian from prolonging presence of Russia on Ukrain territory and impact the sitiation. However, sofar results are not in faveore west and Russia has upper hand in Ukrain. Of course, the futre of Ukrain crisis is not so clear and has comelications for both sides. In fact, Ukraine has effectively played the role of two poles of power, a victim of the competition between Russia and the West and a prey and tool for the West's goals against Russia.

According to the propositions of offensive realism, achieving a position of hegemony is the goal of great powers. Great powers always try to become hegemon by increasing their power and when they become hegemons, they use various strategies to increase their power and manage and control their rivals to prevent the hegemony of other powers. In fact, the West has always tried to take full advantage of the country's desire to get closer to the West by inciting and encouraging Ukrainian officials to join Western institutions in line with its strategic goal of expanding its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and geopolitically encircling Russia, in this regard Ukraine has been a tool in the hands of the West to use this country's card to counter its traditional threat. Therefore, after independence, this country has always been the scene of competition between the West and Russia and has witnessed serious conflicts and various political-security crises.