نشریه کلام اسلامی
پیاپی 129 (بهار 1403)

The functionalism of religion is one of the issues that has been the subject of discussion and debate in various trends in theology and religious studies, including philosophy of religion, modern theology, sociology, and psychology of religion, and various perspectives have emerged in this field. Among the researchers in this field are the pioneers of modern atheism, who, with a negative view of the functions of religion, have considered it the main cause and foundation of human suffering and misery, and have introduced religion as a teacher of ignorance and ignorance, a suppressor of freedom of belief, and an increase in aggression and terrorism. Given the importance of this issue, the present article aims to examine the logic of this attitude, its claims, and its documentation using a library method and to evaluate it by exploring and analyzing the content of religious data. The result of the research is that modern atheism's depiction of religion lacks credible support, is extremely biased, and is incompatible with religious teachings and historical realities.

“The Eclipse of God in the Modern Era” is one of the most important theological challenges of the modern age, which examines the extent of God’s epistemic presence and how contemporary humans encounter Him. Martin Buber (1878-1965), a prominent theorist in this field, presented a new interpretation of the doctrine of the eclipse of God with the aim of reviving spirituality in the modern era. The present essay, understanding the importance and necessity of this issue and its influential position in modern theology, and with the aim of examining this doctrine in Buber’s thought, attempts to explain and evaluate the what, why, and how of the eclipse of God using a descriptive-analytical method. Through this research, it becomes clear that the “eclipse of God” is an epistemic-experiential theory pertaining to the modern era that has taken shape following factors such as rationalism, a focus on religious law, secular humanism, and the phenomenon of the Holocaust, in the shadow of which the “I-It” relationship has been replaced by the “I-Thou” relationship. Among the strengths of Buber’s theory, one can mention comprehensiveness, systematicity, coherence, a concern for the revival of religious spirituality in the contemporary world, attention to the element of witnessing, and emphasis on the connection between theology and self-knowledge. However, it also suffers from shortcomings such as internal inconsistency in the realm of inexpressibility, denial of the epistemic value of intellectual knowledge, the lack of a philosophical system for the eclipse of God, and the conflation of adherence to religious law with the sufficiency of religious law.

The issue of the world’s origination ( huduth) and eternity (qidam) has long occupied the minds of humankind. This issue is linked to numerous topics in rational and transmitted fields. Among them is the issue of the origination of the Divine Will, which has been emphasized in numerous narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt. Mulla Sadra, by proposing the issue of the unity of will with Divine Knowledge, divides Divine Knowledge into two types: essential knowledge and active knowledge. Similarly, he considers will to be present in the realms of essence and action, and in fact, considers will as a common attribute between essence and action. While accepting the eternity of the essential will, Sadra considers narrations related to the origination of Divine Will to refer to will in the realm of action. In the present research, an attempt has been made, using a descriptive-analytical method mixed with critique, to analyze Mulla Sadra’s views in the explanation of narrations on the origination of Divine Will. The results of the research indicate that although his views justify some narrations, cases such as the incompatibility of his justification with some narrations of this chapter and other chapters, the rejection of views aligned with this interpretation in narrations, the abandonment of the apparent meaning of many narrations, and the deviation of will from its original meaning, make the validity of his interpretation questionable.

Sunnah (tradition) and Bid’ah (innovation) are two widely used concepts in various fields of Islamic sciences, with numerous rulings regarding them in beliefs and jurisprudence. Most attention around this issue has been focused on its instances, and less on its theoretical foundations and with a nature-oriented approach. In this article, by referring to narrations from the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) on the subject of bid’ah, the theoretical dimensions of sunnah and bid’ah such as: nature, typology, types, origin, formation process, and consequences of creating sunnah and bid’ah have been examined. In the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.), sunnah is divided into two types: religious and customary, and good and bad sunnahs fall under the category of customary sunnah. In contrast, bid’ah is also divided into religious bid’ah and customary bid’ah, where all instances of religious bid’ah are blameworthy, and the commendable instances of customary bid’ah are recognized as good customary sunnahs. The result of this research is that the infallible Imams (a.s.) have shown special attention to sunnah-centrism and avoidance of religious innovations, and have called any innovation in religion a misguidance. However, to encourage Muslims to create customary sunnahs with social extension and in line with religious teachings, they have considered numerous rewards, and in contrast, have predicted the sin of those who act upon the disliked customary sunnahs for the founder of that bad sunnah.

This article examines Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on “Sunnah” and “Bid’ah,” and analyzes his definitions, classifications, and the criticisms leveled against his viewpoints. The importance of this issue stems from the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah’s perspective in considering some religious practices of Muslims as innovations by Wahhabis. Ibn Taymiyyah defines Sunnah as a belief or action that the Prophet (pbuh) and his companions continuously adhered to. He divides Sunnah into “Sunnah in action” and “Sunnah in abstention” (Tarkiyyah Sunnah), emphasizing that the Prophet’s (pbuh) abstentions also have a legal ruling. In defining Bid’ah, he applies it to any new action without a prior religious basis and any practice that lacks a legal justification. He also divides Bid’ah into “Bid’ah in words and beliefs” and “Bid’ah in actions and worship,” considering any kind of innovation in religion as Bid’ah. The findings of this research reveal some flaws in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, such as the unjustifiable expansion of the scope of Bid’ah, the failure to accurately outline the pillars of Bid’ah, and opposition to the famous opinion of Sunni Muslims regarding the division of Bid’ah into good and bad.

This article examines Ibn Taymiyyah’s views on “Sunnah” and “Bid’ah,” and analyzes his definitions, classifications, and the criticisms leveled against his viewpoints. The importance of this issue stems from the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah’s perspective in considering some religious practices of Muslims as innovations by Wahhabis. Ibn Taymiyyah defines Sunnah as a belief or action that the Prophet (pbuh) and his companions continuously adhered to. He divides Sunnah into “Sunnah in action” and “Sunnah in abstention” (Tarkiyyah Sunnah), emphasizing that the Prophet’s (pbuh) abstentions also have a legal ruling. In defining Bid’ah, he applies it to any new action without a prior religious basis and any practice that lacks a legal justification. He also divides Bid’ah into “Bid’ah in words and beliefs” and “Bid’ah in actions and worship,” considering any kind of innovation in religion as Bid’ah. The findings of this research reveal some flaws in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, such as the unjustifiable expansion of the scope of Bid’ah, the failure to accurately outline the pillars of Bid’ah, and opposition to the famous opinion of Sunni Muslims regarding the division of Bid’ah into good and bad.