نشریه پژوهش سیاست نظری
پیاپی 36 (پاییز و زمستان 1403)

John Rawls (1921-2002) has been rightly recognized as highly influential in contemporary political philosophy. Rejecting utilitarianism according to which just institutions are to maximize the aggregate satisfaction of desires, Rawls formulates a new version of the social contract theory in order to show the possibility of a well-ordered society in which the basic rights and liberties of all citizens as free and equal persons are provided. Although being appreciated by many commentators as highly valuable, Rawls’s theory has been criticized for lacking a clear conception of the political. To examine this view, Rawls’s conception of the political must be fully understood. Moreover, since the idea of a free-standing political conception of justice plays a fundamental role in the Rawlsian theory of justice, the analysis of his conception of the political seems to be necessary and fruitful. The analysis of the fundamental ideas and concepts such as reasonableness and reciprocity, which we view as central to Rawls’s theory of justice, shows that the core of justice as fairness, even before what is called his communitarian turn in Political Liberalism, is Rawls’s conception of the political. Taking the distinction between persons and peoples seriously, he considers the political as a reasonable way in which the preservation of the self and the other at both domestic and international level is ensured. Although this reveals a normative conception, the normative content is not imported from outside the political; that is why justice as fairness can be a normative and moral conception, and yet political, independent of any comprehensive doctrines, liberal or whatever.

Reflecting on the relationship between reason and revelation, philosophy and religion, and, in a sense, Athens and Jerusalem, has been the core of the intellectual efforts of the greatest figures in the tradition of political philosophy. The fundamental question raised in political philosophy is: "How should one live?" The effort to answer this fundamental question in the tradition of political philosophy, especially since it encountered the revelation tradition of Abrahamic religions, became the same as the effort to defend philosophy itself as the highest way of life. In this article, we try to show that reason and revelation, or philosophy and religion, had a fundamental commonality from the very beginning: it is not enough to live, what is necessary is to live well. But the answer of each of them to the question "What is good?" was fundamentally different. Our argument is that this commonality and this difference formed the basis of a dialogue that not only helped to continue the tradition of political philosophy, but also provided possibilities for the revelationists to enrich their revealed theology. However, it seems that modern political philosophy as an essentially immanent way of thought, is the beginning of the end of this dialogue between these two transcendental traditions. This article is an attempt to deal with the relationship between reason and revelation, or philosophy and religion, in terms of its broadest political implications, and the role of modern political philosophy in interrupting that dialogue. Keyword: reason; revelation; political philosophy; Athens; Jerusalem. Main IssueThe contemplation of the relationship between reason and revelation, philosophy and religion, or, in a broader sense, Athens and Jerusalem, has been at the core of the intellectual efforts of the most prominent figures in the philosophical tradition. The fundamental question posed in political philosophy is: "How should one live?" The attempt to answer this foundational question within the tradition of political philosophy—especially since its encounter with the revelatory tradition of the Abrahamic religions—has become an endeavor to defend philosophy itself as the highest way of life. Both traditions emphasize that mere living is not sufficient; rather, what is essential is to live well. However, the answers provided by each of these traditions to the question of the good life carry certain fundamental political implications. This article focuses on examining these implications and analyzing their various dimensions. Analysis The immediate question that arises is: What is "the good"? The inquiry into the nature of the good is, by its very nature, an Athenian question. In the Socratic tradition, in contrast to the revelatory tradition, the inquiry into essence lies at the heart of philosophical activity. This is where the divergence begins. In the revelatory perspective on a good life, the goodness of God and His commandments are taken as given. "Life" and "goodness" have closely related meanings, both denoting something desirable. However, for the Socratic philosopher, reflecting on what something is—including the good itself—and avoiding unexamined assumptions is itself ultimately considered good. Thus, the Socratic philosopher cannot and should not disregard the genuine possibility of revelatory claims. In this context, any form of dogmatism in favor of philosophy itself would contradict the philosophical enterprise. Consequently, within the Socratic tradition of philosophizing, the dialogue between philosophical reason and divine revelation persists, even if tension exists between them. In this sense, philosophy must necessarily take the challenge of revelation seriously.The dialogue between revelation and reason, or between religion and philosophy, in the Socratic sense, is founded on thematic possibilities that bring these two traditions closer together despite their fundamental differences. The first commonality between philosophy and divine law is their shared concern for human beings. Philosophy is a human activity, and divine law also addresses humans rather than animals or angels. The central concern for human beings, their lives, and their attainment of happiness is a shared feature of revelation and Socratic philosophy. The second shared characteristic between divine law and Socratic philosophy is that both call humans to something beyond themselves—something divine or at least quasi-divine, something outside and above humanity. In both traditions, humans are beings with a responsibility that arises entirely from their humanity and their distinction from other creatures. This second shared characteristic is linked to a third, more fundamental one: virtue. In the philosophical perspective, virtue results from rational prescriptions that emerge from human reason and relate to humanity’s natural purpose. In the revelatory view, virtue is understood as obedience to divine law or walking the "straight path."Socratic philosophy emphasizes the necessity of questioning the nature of the good while outwardly acknowledging revelation’s response to this question. This, in turn, does not pose a problem for the philosopher, since, as mentioned earlier, the very effort to answer this question is itself "good." Therefore, for the Socratic philosopher, the good life or happiness is necessarily theoretical rather than practical in nature. This is why, theoretically, it is radical, while practically, it remains conservative. However, with the emergence of modern political philosophers, the story underwent a fundamental transformation. This time, philosophy sought to defeat its adversary—namely, revelatory theology—by providing a clear and dogmatic answer to the question of what constitutes the good. The reason for this shift was that happiness or the good life was no longer understood as a theoretical matter. With the dissolution of the transcendent realm, what remained and was valued was the practical (political) realm. Victory in the political realm required a considerable level of dogmatism and a departure from the Socratic philosophical enterprise in its strictest sense. For this reason, it became necessary for modern political philosophers to portray the revelatory path not as the "straight path" but as a deviation—a deviation that not only fails to lead to the good life but also brings suffering upon humanity. The weakening of individuals through Christian morality (Machiavelli), the prevalence of war, insecurity, and the obstruction of natural and bodily desires (Hobbes), and the hindrance of human intellectual progress by divine law (Spinoza) were among the foundational pillars of liberal-democratic regimes. The triumph of liberal-democratic regimes signifies that these doctrines had already won a spiritual victory. However, this victory ultimately came at the cost of the loss of power for both philosophy and revelation.This article argues that the similarities and differences between reason and revelation provided the foundation for a dialogue that not only sustained the tradition of political philosophy but also created opportunities for proponents of the revelatory tradition to enrich their theology. However, it appears that modern political philosophy, as an essentially immanent mode of thought, marks the beginning of the end of this transcendental dialogue. This article seeks to examine the relationship between reason and revelation, or between philosophy and religion, in terms of its broadest political implications and to explore the role of modern political philosophy in severing this connection. Consequently, we may ask: To what extent did modern political philosophers remain faithful to their professed goal of liberating philosophy? The early modern political philosophers' project of making philosophy the benefactor of political society necessarily required a break from the hard core of Socratic philosophy—namely, its fundamentally critical stance toward political life. The rejection of the epistemic value of revelation as a necessary precursor to rejecting its authority as a theological foundation for political laws could only be achieved through a form of dogmatism. Since the Socratic virtue of doubt was abandoned in the strictest sense, Spinoza and his contemporaries' claim to liberate philosophy must itself be met with serious doubt. This article proposes transforming these doubts into Socratic doubts rather than reducing them to the skepticism of contemporary relativist philosophies. Achieving this requires an effort to revive the dialogue between reason and revelation, or philosophy and revelatory religion.

"Ali Shariati" was a prominent intellectual figure in the public sphere of Iran during the 1960s, embodying both the voice of ideological innovations of his time and reflecting the confusion of the era. Shariati's pioneering role among contemporary Iranian intellectuals in addressing the issue of women in the public domain is noteworthy. This paper aims to analyze the political thought of Ali Shariati as an influential intellectual on the subject of women. In this research, the emergence of women in Shariati's thought will be examined from the perspective of the conceptual evolution of power, and the analysis of the status of women, their vulnerabilities, issues, and Shariati's proposed solutions will be central to the paper, with attention to his critique of both traditional and modern narratives. The hypothesis of this study is that Shariati adopts a leftist approach towards women, attempting to propose a new path by positioning the West—represented as a narrative that objectifies women—and traditional fundamentalists who erase women, as the "other." The research findings indicate that Shariati offers a revolutionary narrative for women's demands and, through ideological teachings, sought to present Iranian women as revolutionary subjects.

According to the prevailing perspective in modern social sciences, national Belongings are a phenomenon associated with the modern era, and extending them to pre-modern periods is an instance of historical anachronism. This article, by critiquing the aforementioned view, seeks to substantiate the hypothesis that, despite significant ruptures, widespread social diversity and fragmentation, and the presence of divergent forces in pre-modern Iran, there has always been a strong awareness of the name, geographical area, historical memory and Iranian culture. This attachment to Iranian identity can be named "patriotism" in distinction from modern "nationalism." However, the main focus of the article is to address another question: What forces were responsible for producing and maintaining this awareness and shaping unity and convergence beyond diversities in pre-modern Iran? The article’s findings demonstrate that a constellation of socio-political forces—including the government and courts, literati (Ahl-e-Ghalam), Sufis, clergies (Ulama), merchants, and their associated networks—while creating and preserving elements of Iranian identity, were also agents of creating connector threads among various regions around shared Belongings. Although the five groups were among the notables and the middle urban strata, their influence was also seen among the ordinary people of cities, villages, and tribes through the presence of poets, storytellers (Naqqālan), and school (maktab) teachers. The survival and continuity of Iranian identity, as well as territorial and social convergence, were both the result of purposeful actions and the unintended result of these groups’ activities.

Recognition has long been a subject of discussion in international relations, primarily due to the significance of sovereignty and its relevance in international law. However, it has received relatively little theoretical attention, particularly from realists and liberals. At the same time, certain international relations theories—most notably the English School, constructivism, and critical theory—have given it special consideration. The English School, constructivism, and a significant portion of conventional constructivist studies on recognition have adopted a conventional state-centric, analytical, and explanatory approach. However, Alexander Wendt, in one of his works, moves beyond this framework and adopts a teleological approach to recognition. Although recognition has been discussed in critical scholarship as a means of emancipation at the societal level, its critical dimension has not been consistently maintained in international relations. Nonetheless, alongside Axel Honneth’s works, certain studies written from a non-Western perspective—such as those by Ayşe Zarakol—exhibit a critical stance toward the practice of recognizing non-Western actors in international relations. This raises the question of how these three approaches can be integrated into a coherent framework. The argument presented in this article is that what connects these three strands of theorizing on recognition in international relations, beyond their explanatory function, is the normative dimension that is more or less implicitly embedded within them.

In the field of political thought, concepts are among the main means of giving meaning to the real world, in other words, the field of praxis, which are always changing and evolving due to the change in their use. Takfir and Jihad in Islam are among the concepts whose meanings and functions have changed and had consequences in the field of opinion and practice, especially for radical Islamists. Based on this, showing how the violent emergence of the radical Islamist current, due to the changes created in these concepts and in relation to the "other", is the concern of the present research. The purpose of the article is to show the evolution of radical Islamists' view of "the other" and the impact of this evolution on the identity and performance of the so-called Takfiri-Jihad movement in the use of violence. The method of the article is John Pocock's historiography, which deals with the interpretation and analysis of language in the political context. The findings of the article show that the linguistic paradigm of radical Islamists is "anti-otherness" or "denial of the other". The final result of the article is that in a hierarchical relationship with "the other", radical Islamists in a global and apocalyptic perspective divide the world into two camps, "Islamic" and "Ignorant", between "themselves" and "the other". Divided and to erase ignorance from the face of the earth, they resorted to violence and demanded the removal of "the other".

Linguistics and its application in the social sciences in the nineteenth century relied on a structuralist perspective and, as a result, was largely fatalistic and rigid. At the beginning of the twentieth century, with the occurrence of the linguistic turn, an opportunity was provided for this rigid approach to become more flexible and also to provide the methodological and epistemological opportunities needed to interpret and explain plural discourses and language games. This opposition itself is embodied in the person of Wittgenstein. In the early phase of his thought, as an analytical philosopher heavily relying on formal logic, he practically considered only one discourse and language game as the opportunity for design, but in the later phase of his thought, he provided the foundations for accepting pluralism in the field of language games. His intellectual legacy and that of all the thinkers who in the twentieth century, in the form of post-structuralist approaches, began to think in the field of language and epistemology, was a methodology that, in the form of "critical discourse analysis", on the one hand, gives the opportunity for plurality and diversity in the field of discourses to human and social agents, and on the other hand, in analyzing the linguistic and discursive games of these agents, it pays attention to both their objective and personal context and interprets their text and language. Through this theoretical struggle, a methodology has been created that seems to be useful and applicable for interpreting and explaining any field of social interaction that is based on power relations.

Most serious studies and sources on how secular intellectuals have responded to modernity and the West either do not pay significant attention to the evolution of their perspectives over contemporary history or assume that their habitus and discursive productions have remained largely unchanged. However, a closer examination reveals that, in different periods of contemporary history, these transformed discursive products have at times drawn closer to religious intellectuals and at other times moved away from them. Studying these fluctuations can shed new light on historical transformations and the role of intellectuals in mobilizing the public politically. Accordingly, the central question of this research is: What transformations have occurred in the discursive products produced within the field of secular intellectualism in response to the West from the Constitutional Revolution to the post-Islamic Revolution period? The study's findings indicate that, during the Constitutional era, secular intellectuals generally viewed the West and modernity with a sense of astonishment and later admiration, considering imitation—and ultimately replication of the West—as the solution to Iran’s underdevelopment. However, due to empirical, historical, and cognitive factors, this positive perspective toward the West and modernity shifted in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, a significant segment of secular intellectuals, by moving closer to religious intellectuals, played a crucial role in reconstructing the field of tradition and religion. Following the Revolution, however, this dynamic gradually shifted again, as religious intellectuals increasingly moved toward secularization and even approached secular intellectualism.This study employs Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice and his structuration methodology as its theoretical and methodological framework.

Identifying and prioritizing the key drivers of a country's economic development is one of the primary prerequisites for policymaking and economic development planning. The main objective of this study is to identify the most significant drivers of the country's economic development. In this study, content analysis and structural analysis methods have been employed to identify and prioritize these economic development drivers.In the first stage, forty economic development factors were identified through content analysis. Subsequently, expert opinions were gathered from nineteen leading specialists in economic development. To analyze the collected data, the cross-impact matrix and MICMAC software were utilized. The findings of the study indicate that the six main drivers of the country's economic development are as follows: (1) improving international and regional interactions and resolving conflicts, (2) reforming the quality of the government bureaucracy, (3) restructuring the decision-making process by enhancing awareness, increasing the application of scientific knowledge, and eliminating institutional capture, (4) improving the quality of the judiciary system, (5) restructuring the economic system, and (6) supporting domestic private sector investment. An examination of the direct effects of these drivers shows that the decision-making system is the most influential driver of economic development, as it directly impacts the reform of the bureaucratic system. Additionally, an analysis of the indirect effects indicates that the decision-making system, as a key driver of economic development, significantly influences both private sector investment support and economic restructuring.

In this article, the aim is not to address the theoretical issues contained in Leviathan, but rather to confront Hobbes’s visual politics from a philosophical iconographic perspective. Introduction Hobbes’s Leviathan, as one of the most prominent works in the field of modern political thought, is depicted in an icon that has metaphorically become the most prominent political figure in the history of modern political thought. This icon, both in its entirety and in its components, contains elements that, by interpreting and dismantling its foundations, reveal Hobbes’s biopolitical system and the extent of his influence in the field of political thought. In addition, the reason for considering Hobbes’s intellectual work as modern and its difference from other thinkers who were thinking during his lifetime will be revealed.The main question of the article is: What idea did Hobbes intend to convey by choosing this symbol for the introduction to his book? And basically, what elements and ideological foundations does the symbol of Leviathan, despite its powerful theological themes, have that have made it the most prominent figure in modern political thought?

The relationship between the traditional Iranian "Self" and the modern Western "Other" in the political thought of JavadTabatabai is the central issue of this article. Chantal Mouffe's theory has been selected as the theoretical framework, and based on it; this issue and its dimensions are examined. The findings indicated that Tabatabai bases his assumptions on the principle of "Rupture" and, like the German Blumenberg, while giving originality to modernity and its inevitability, adheres to the theory of "Rupture." Then, he pursues the relationship between "Self" and "Other" from the perspective of the encounter between tradition and modernity, and unlike the proponents of tradition, he does not place modernity in contradiction and opposition to "Tradition." Also, unlike the proponents of Western modernity, he does not consider the age of tradition to be over and an obstacle to progress and development. From his point of view, historical continuity and connection with the new world are possible not through tradition-avoidance and imitative tradition-acceptance, nor through the uncritical acceptance of Western modernity, but through the revival of the rational possibilities of tradition in connection with the concepts of the new world. Tabatabai understands the logic of tradition in light of the requirements of the new world, and thus, unlike the proponents of tradition and modernity, he avoids other making the "Self" and "Other" between the two.

The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) across various aspects of life necessitates a scientific examination of its consequences for political society. The present article aims to address this research imperative by exploring the central question: In what ways and through which mechanisms does AI technology impact the functioning of democracy? To achieve this objective, the core section of the article focuses on analyzing the challenges democracy faces in the digital era. The study’s conceptual model consists of four dimensions, each identifying and analyzing the challenges AI poses to democracy. The findings indicate that while AI holds potential for enhancing democratic performance, it also harbors challenges and threats that could ultimately lead to the distortion of democracy. The primary challenges AI presents to democracy include the manipulation of public opinion, the distortion of the public information environment, the digital divide and the expansion of inequality and discrimination, and, ultimately, the risk of autocracy and totalitarianism. These challenges interact in a systematic manner, reinforcing one another. Among them, the overarching challenge for democracy is the threat of totalitarianism, which emerges as a consequence of the other three challenges. The theoretical framework of the study draws on contemporary critical theory perspectives that examine the dominative effects of technology in modern society. The research adopts an explanatory (causal-inquiry) approach, employing qualitative data analysis and a library-based method for data collection.