فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال سی‌ام شماره 1 (پیاپی 117، بهار 1404)

The primary challenge in addressing the problem of evils is the limitation of human knowledge in comprehending its intricate dimensions. This challenge arises from the significant role that God is perceived to play in either causing or permitting certain evils. While human beings lack the epistemic capacity to fully grasp God''''s purposes and the manner of divine intervention, God is understood as omnipotent and omniscient. Consequently, the limitations of human knowledge prevent a precise and comprehensive understanding of the complex dimensions of the evils we encounter in life. Some scholars have referred to this perspective as skeptical theism. Advocates of this approach seek to counter atheistic arguments that reject God''''s existence on the grounds of the apparent absence of rational justifications for evils—particularly gratuitous evils. They argue that our epistemic limitations in discerning God’s reasons for allowing certain evils do not imply that such reasons do not exist. This study employs content analysis to demonstrate that, while emphasizing our epistemic limitations in understanding the problem of evil is somewhat effective in challenging atheistic arguments, excessive reliance on epistemic skepticism regarding divine intervention leads to a broader form of epistemic skepticism. As a solution, this paper proposes recognizing the diverse epistemic capacities of human beings, emphasizing the significance of a God endowed with absolute attributes, and utilizing these attributes to engage with the problem of evils.

Despite the extensive critiques of Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts and doctrines, a methodological examination of his works remains largely absent. This study employs a descriptive-analytical approach to answer the question: What was Ibn Taymiyya’s method of establishing religious doctrines based on transmitted evidence (naql), and what criticisms can be made of it? In many cases, he relies on the statements of the Salaf in proving doctrines and interprets Sifāt Khabariyya (transmitted divine attributes) in their apparent meaning by appealing to their consensus. However, the major premise of relying on the statements of the Salaf lacks a solid foundation, and the minor premise—that the Salaf were unanimous in their approach to Sifāt Khabariyya—is flawed. Additionally, while Ibn Taymiyya, like others, upholds the authority of apparent meanings (ẓuhūr), his reliance on the literal meanings of words extends to the point of disregarding rational principles and contextual indicators (qarāʾin). Furthermore, his use of hadith in doctrinal proofs lacks a consistent method; in cases where hadiths highlight the virtues of the Ahl al-Bayt, he sometimes challenges their authenticity, and at times, even when the issuance of a hadith is unanimously accepted by scholars of Islamic sects, he dismisses it as fabricated.

To elucidate the idea of "mental existence" and understand the concerns of its critics, it is crucial to distinguish between “existence in the mind” and “mental existence.” The former refers to the fact that when a person encounters a new object, something is imprinted in their mind that was previously absent. However, the Sadraen interpretation of the theory of “mental existence” suggests that the quiddity (māhiyya) in the mind corresponds to the quiddity in external reality. This study examines the background of Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on this issue and the critiques leveled against it by Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī. Employing a library-based research approach and emphasizing primary sources from renowned philosophers, this study demonstrates that most thinkers preceding Ṣadrā understood the first meaning within the framework of the “phantasm” (shabaḥ) theory. In contrast, the second meaning is unique to Mullā Ṣadrā, with only some antecedents found in the Shiraz school. With his Neo-Peripatetic discourse, Tabrīzī challenges the theory of mental existence in terms of both its foundations and implications. The refutation of Ṣadrā’s premises in formulating this theory can be inferred from Tabrīzī’s ontological discussions, whereas his critique of Ṣadrā’s conclusions is explicitly presented in the works of Tabrīzī and his students. According to their view, the separation of a quiddity’s concomitants—such as the separability of fire from its burning property—is impermissible in any domain, whether external reality or the mind.

The concepts of individuality and solitude have been largely overlooked in the philosophy of education. In fact, the notion of individuals as solitary subjects has often been treated as a taboo in education, rendering the process of human development seemingly impractical and culturally alien. However, Kierkegaard,  in his educational thought—consistent with his overall philosophical framework—seeks to highlight both the possibilities and limitations of human growth that have remained unaddressed. From his perspective, individuality is a fundamental reality that has been neglected in the course of human development and self-actualization. At its core, Kierkegaard’s educational principle is nothing but creating the possibility of an internal transformation based on religious faith and self-activity. In his view, contemplation and reflection, when devoid of inner passion and faith, fail to effectively shape the authenticity of the individual. Therefore, this study employs a descriptive-analytical method to examine Kierkegaard’s views on individuality, solitude, and religious faith, ultimately identifying their educational implications.

This study examines the critical issue of organized hypocrisy—a phenomenon that played a significant role in many pivotal events in Islamic history and had a profound impact on governance following the Prophet’s passing. Organized hypocrisy is of such importance that numerous Quranic verses and hadiths warn Muslims about its emergence. One of the key findings of this article is that hypocrisy manifests in two dimensions: individual and organized. While individual hypocrisy exists across all times and places without being confined to specific circumstances, organized hypocrisy arises exclusively within an Islamic society. Given this distinction, the study does not focus extensively on individual hypocrisy. The hypothesis of this research is that organized hypocrisy only develops within a sociopolitical framework where leadership is vested in an infallible or just ruler. Consequently, this article explores the causes behind the emergence of subversive hypocrisy and the mechanisms of its expansion within an Islamic government. The study employs a library-based research method and adopts a descriptive-analytical approach.

In recent decades, findings from cognitive sciences—particularly in neuroscience, psychology, and related disciplines—have led to diverse perspectives on the nature of language and meaning. These developments have opened a new horizon in understanding meaning, offering a fresh perspective on reality. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to explore cognitive semantics as a novel approach to meaning analysis. It argues that the emergence of contemporary scientific inquiries occurs in contexts where traditional methodologies fail to provide adequate and satisfactory explanations. Since historical context and the developmental trajectory of a concept are among the best means of revealing its essence, this study seeks to deepen the understanding of cognitive semantics by examining its origins and foundational background. The findings indicate that, according to the cognitive approach, language is one of the cognitive functions of the mind. Investigating language can, therefore, provide insights into the workings of the brain, neural circuits involved in language processing, and other cognitive functions of the mind—especially mental mappings inherent in language. As a major branch of cognitive linguistics, cognitive semantics views meaning formation as dependent on mental and cognitive structures, which arise through the conceptualization of external data within the mind rather than outside it. Since these cognitive and mental structures are reflected in language, meaning should be examined within the mechanisms and conceptual content embedded in linguistic structures.

he challenges in interpreting Quranic verses related to women—particularly concerning justice in the modern era—have long been a subject of debate among scholars and exegetes. This article explores whether the hermeneutics of suspicion can serve as a tool for resolving existing interpretive conflicts and opening new pathways for reinterpreting these verses. To examine this question, the study first reviews the application of the hermeneutics of suspicion in reinterpreting biblical passages related to women, utilizing a comparative theological approach aimed at deepening the understanding of one’s own religious tradition. Next, by analyzing the similarities and differences among various Quranic exegetical methods, the study evaluates the potential of applying the hermeneutics of suspicion to generate new interpretive solutions. The findings indicate that this approach can effectively address the challenges in interpreting Quranic verses on women and justice. By emphasizing the critique of presuppositions, the multilayered meanings of the text, the influence of power dynamics on interpretations, and its parallels with certain Islamic exegetical mechanisms—such as the principles of muhkam and mutashabih, naskh, and asbab al-nuzul—the hermeneutics of suspicion can provide a valuable framework for rethinking and developing alternative readings of Quranic verses concerning women and justice.