نشریه جستارهای اقتصادی ایران
پیاپی 47 (پاییز 1404)

 Economic growth is generally regarded as one of the most important macroeconomic variables that reflect the overall performance and welfare of a nation. Among the key drivers of growth, production expansion occupies a pivotal role in enhancing economic stability, job creation, and social welfare. Since 2019, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly emphasized “production growth” in his annual New Year mottos, highlighting its strategic importance for national progress and economic independence. Production growth is not merely a quantitative goal but a multidimensional process that contributes to reducing inflation and unemployment, strengthening purchasing power, and promoting exports. These dynamics collectively improve the foreign exchange balance and enhance the stability of financial and currency markets. Moreover, production growth increases the tax revenues of the government, thereby helping to reduce budget deficits — a chronic challenge in many developing economies.In line with the Leader’s guidance, achieving sustainable production growth requires harnessing internal capacities and national resources. Various aspects of these capacities have been underscored in his speeches and annual meetings with state officials. Consequently, policymakers and economic planners must adopt a multidimensional and capacity-oriented approach to stimulate production. The present study seeks to identify and empirically evaluate the factors influencing production growth in developing countries, with particular emphasis on the domestic capabilities and principles emphasized by the Supreme Leader in previous years.

To achieve this goal, the study examines the effects of several explanatory variables—namely, oil rent, research and development (R&D) expenditure, physical capital, labor force, rule of law, foreign direct investment (FDI), and inflation—on economic growth. The empirical model is formulated as follows:gri,t=β0+ β1ori,t+ β2rdi,t+ β3ki,t+ β4li,t+ β5lawi,t + β6fdii,t+ β7infi,t+εi,tThis research is based on both documentary and library methods and employs econometric techniques using panel data analysis. The model is estimated for 19 oil-exporting developing countries over the period 2010–2020, using Stata 15 software. Two complementary analytical approaches are adopted:Panel data regression analysis to determine the quantitative effect of each explanatory variable on growth; andGraphical analysis to visualize long-term relationships based on ten-year average indicators (2014–2023) for 26 developing countries.In accordance with economic theory and previous empirical literature, foreign direct investment and inflation are incorporated as key explanatory variables. FDI is measured by the net inflows of foreign investment, while inflation is proxied by the GDP deflator index.Results and

The estimation results reveal that oil rent, physical capital, rule of law, and foreign direct investment have positive and statistically significant effects on production growth, whereas inflation exerts a negative and significant effect. The coefficients are interpreted as follows:Oil rent: A one-unit increase in oil rent raises economic growth by approximately 0.48 units. This positive short-term effect suggests that oil revenues stabilize exchange rates and provide financial support for producers. However, excessive dependence on oil rents may create vulnerabilities in the long run.Physical capital: A one-unit increase in physical capital enhances growth by 0.37 units, consistent with neoclassical growth theory, which posits that capital accumulation drives productivity and output.Rule of law: An improvement of one unit in the rule of law index increases growth by 3.97 units, indicating that institutional quality and effective enforcement of production-supportive laws are crucial for sustained development.Inflation: A one-unit increase in inflation reduces economic growth by 0.16 units. High inflation erodes purchasing power, discourages investment, and generates macroeconomic instability, which collectively hinder productive activity.Foreign direct investment: A one-unit increase in FDI inflows boosts growth by 0.89 units. FDI contributes to technology transfer, management expertise, and capital inflows, though its effectiveness depends on institutional quality and absorptive capacity.For R&D expenditure and labor force, no statistically significant relationship with growth was found within the studied period, possibly due to inadequate R&D spending and structural inefficiencies in the labor market across developing economies.Discussion and Interpretation: The dual-phase analysis—covering econometric estimation (2010–2020) and graphical assessment (2014–2023)—provides comprehensive insight into both short-term and long-term dynamics of growth. The graphical results demonstrate a positive association between people’s participation, physical capital, human capital, and R&D activities with economic growth, while confirming a negative association between rent-seeking behavior and growth performance.These findings imply that while oil rent may contribute positively to growth in the short run through fiscal expansion and liquidity support, its long-term effects may turn adverse by fostering rent-seeking incentives, dependency, and reduced innovation. Therefore, achieving sustainable production growth requires a deliberate shift from rent-based to knowledge-based and productivity-driven growth models.The results further emphasize the importance of institutional quality (rule of law) as a catalyst for effective policy implementation. A robust legal framework ensures that production-oriented policies are not only legislated but also enforced in practice, thereby promoting private sector confidence, investment, and fair competition. Similarly, inflation control remains vital to maintaining macroeconomic stability and preserving the real value of savings and investments.

 This study provides empirical evidence that oil rent, capital formation, the rule of law, and foreign direct investment play significant roles in promoting economic growth among oil-exporting developing countries. Conversely, inflation acts as a major impediment to growth. The absence of significant effects for R&D and labor force variables highlights the need for stronger institutional and policy frameworks to enhance human capital development and innovation capacity.In conclusion, the path toward sustainable and inclusive growth lies in reinforcing domestic capacities and reducing reliance on rent-based revenues. Policymakers are therefore encouraged to:Strengthen human capital through education, training, and skill development.Increase investment in research and development to stimulate technological innovation.Enhance physical infrastructure and capital formation to support productive sectors.Foster institutional quality and rule of law to ensure the effective implementation of production-supportive policies.Control inflationary pressures and discourage rent-seeking activities that distort resource allocation.By prioritizing these areas, developing economies can lay the foundation for a resilient, knowledge-based, and sustainable production system consistent with the strategic visions emphasized by the Supreme Leader.

 The development of effective monetary policies within an Islamic economic framework necessitates grounding policy design in the core principles of Shari’ah. One such principle, introduced and examined in this research, is the “Principle of Connectivity and Fluidity of Money.” This principle asserts that money should continuously facilitate real economic activity and must be safeguarded from two forms of deviation: hoarding (Kanz) and entrapment in speculative financial cycles. Consequently, for monetary instruments to be compatible with Islamic jurisprudence, they must inherently possess both potential and actual liquidity.The jurisprudential basis for this principle is derived from several interrelated concepts: the Theory of Vicegerency (Istikhlāf), which frames human stewardship over wealth; the notion of barakah or blessing in productive assets (nama’); and the Shari’ah objective of promoting wealth circulation, facilitating trade, and supporting production. The principle of monetary fluidity is operationalized via two pillars: (1) the prohibition against removing money from the productive economic cycle, clarified through the detailed jurisprudential analysis of Kanz (hoarding), and (2) the obligation of Zakāt (alms) as a mechanism to enforce circulation.The main aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive examination of Kanz from both jurisprudential and exegetical perspectives, to analyze Qur’anic verse 9:34, and to identify contemporary manifestations of hoarding in modern economies. Additionally, the study explores the implications of these findings for the formulation of monetary policy within an Islamic system. The primary question addressed is whether the prohibition of Kanz is absolute or conditional upon the payment of Zakāt.

This research employs an Ijtihādī qualitative methodology, combining interpretive jurisprudential reasoning with economic analysis. The methodology involves systematic engagement with Shari’ah texts, supplemented by rigorous linguistic and exegetical techniques. Key methods include:Arabic Linguistic Analysis: Using morphology, syntax, rhetoric, and lexicology to ensure precise interpretation of primary sources, including the Qur’an and Sunnah.Hadith Evaluation: Applying biographical evaluation (‘Ilm al-Rijāl) and critical hadith methodologies (Dirāyah) to determine the authenticity and applicability of narrations.Principles of Usūl al-Fiqh: Employing foundational jurisprudential rules to derive legal propositions from textual evidence.Economic Reasoning: Integrating economic theory to contextualize the jurisprudential deductions and to evaluate real-world monetary implications.The research follows four stages:Stage 1: A literature review of classical and contemporary Islamic economic and jurisprudential scholarship (e.g., Mirmoezi, Hosseini, Shahid Sadr, Allamah Tabataba’i) to identify areas of consensus and dispute regarding Kanz and its interaction with Zakat.Stage 2: Etymological and exegetical analysis of the term Kanz in classical Arabic lexicons and its interpretation in Qur’anic exegesis, revealing broader semantic dimensions beyond the narrow “buried treasure” understanding.Stage 3: Critical examination of three main interpretive positions regarding Qur’an 9:34:o Kanz as wealth on which Zakat has not been paid (majority opinion).o Kanz as any surplus wealth beyond personal needs, regardless of Zakat.o Kanz as wealth not utilized in Fi Sabil Allah (path of God).Historical evidence, including the position of Abū-Dharr al-Ghifāri, is analyzed to support the second and third perspectives, while resolving apparent contradictions in textual sources.Stage 4: Comparative analysis linking jurisprudential concepts of Kanz to modern monetary theory, including Keynes’s speculative demand for money, idle money, and Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, with the aim of identifying contemporary equivalents of Kanz in modern economic systems.

The findings demonstrate that Kanz, in both linguistic and exegetical terms, is substantially broader than the accumulation of wealth subject to Zakat exemption. Kanz refers to any stagnant accumulation of wealth that removes resources from the productive economic cycle. This includes cash hoarding, non-invested bank deposits, and financial assets trapped in speculative, zero-sum cycles.Exegetical analysis of Qur’an 9:34, coupled with the historical stance of Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, establishes that payment of Zakat alone does not suffice to lift the prohibition of Kanz. Thus, the prohibition is absolute, applying to any wealth accumulation that exhibits:Concealment from the oversight of Islamic authorities (Wali al-Amr).Withdrawal from circulation despite societal needs and available avenues for Fi Sabil Allah “in the cause of God” expenditures.From a modern economic perspective, the manifestations of Kanz are:Cash hoarding and idle liquidity.Bank deposits not allocated for productive investment.Speculative trapping of financial resources in non-productive markets.Such behavior disrupts supply-demand dynamics, suppresses production, elevates unemployment, and contributes to financial instability. These effects are consistent with classical economic warnings on the macroeconomic consequences of hoarding.Discussion and Policy Implications: This research confirms that Kanz represents an absolute jurisprudential prohibition, not merely a moral injunction. Consequently, monetary policies in an Islamic system must prioritize the connectivity and fluidity of money. The central bank cannot remain passive; it has an active duty to channel liquidity into productive sectors. This requires:Monitoring velocity of money across economic sectors.Utilizing targeted instruments such as smart reserve requirements to prevent systemic hoarding.Ensuring compliance through combined efforts of individuals, society, and state institutions.Emerging financial technologies, particularly Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), facilitate precise tracking of money flows. Policy instruments could impose costs on idle money, similar to Gesell’s “stamped money” concept, thereby aligning incentives with the jurisprudential mandate of circulation. Implementing these measures ensures money actively contributes to the real economy, mitigates financial crises, and reduces rent-seeking behaviors associated with capital scarcity—a principle termed the “euthanasia of the rentier.”By integrating jurisprudential insights with modern monetary theory, this study bridges the gap between Islamic legal precepts and contemporary policy frameworks. It demonstrates that traditional economic models that separate monetary policy from the real sector are inadequate for Islamic systems, highlighting the necessity of an Islamic monetary framework rooted in fluidity, productivity, and social welfare.

The absolute prohibition of Kanz underscores a foundational principle in Islamic economics: money must serve the productive economy and social welfare. This principle has both normative and operational consequences, mandating that monetary authorities actively prevent stagnation and hoarding, while leveraging modern technologies to enforce compliance.The research provides:A jurisprudential foundation for anti-hoarding monetary policies.Guidelines for monetary authorities to maintain liquidity circulation.A bridge between classical Islamic thought and contemporary macroeconomic policy, ensuring the effective implementation of Shari’ah principles in modern financial systems.

 Income inequality has emerged as a critical challenge for many developing economies, including Iran, where disparities in income distribution can have significant socio-economic consequences. In this context, government policies such as taxes and subsidies are central instruments that can influence the degree of inequality within society. Taxes provide the financial resources necessary to fund social programs and subsidies, while subsidies themselves aim to redistribute income more equitably, particularly to support lower-income households. The interplay between these two instruments, commonly referred to as the tax-subsidy cycle, has the potential to reduce income disparities, improve living conditions for vulnerable groups, and enhance their participation in economic and social life. Understanding the effectiveness of these instruments is essential for policymakers, as it informs whether the intended reforms are achieving their redistributive goals and what potential future adjustments could yield in terms of inequality reduction.This study aims to provide a comprehensive, micro-level analysis of the determinants of income inequality in Iran, focusing on three main components: primary market income, taxes, and subsidies. While previous research has largely focused on macro-level data, there is a notable gap in the literature regarding micro-level household analysis. This study utilizes household-level data from the Iranian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) for the period 2011 to 2023 to evaluate the redistributive impact of the existing tax and subsidy system on income inequality. By dissecting the relative contributions of these income components, the study seeks to provide evidence-based guidance for policy formulation aimed at reducing inequality efficiently and sustainably.

The analysis relies on raw household survey data from 2011 to 2023 provided by the Statistical Center of Iran. To control for household size and allow for meaningful comparisons across households, the study employs an equivalence scale, dividing total household income by the number of household members to calculate per capita equivalent income. This adjustment ensures that variations in household size do not bias inequality measurements.The study employs the factor decomposition method developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) to quantify the contribution of each income source to overall income inequality. The generalized Gini coefficient is decomposed according to income sources (l), allowing for a detailed analysis of the distributive role of market income, taxes, and subsidies.Additionally, the elasticity of inequality with respect to each income source is calculated, capturing the sensitivity of total income inequality to a 1% change in each income component. Computational implementation involves iterative algorithms, covariance calculations, and cumulative distribution functions to obtain values of Sl, Gl, and Rl for each year and income source.It is important to note that the factor decomposition performed in this study is cross-sectional for each year, meaning that it evaluates the impact of each income source on measured inequality in a given year. This approach provides insight into the annual redistributive effects of taxes and subsidies, as well as the structural dominance of market income.

The decomposition of the Gini coefficient for the period 2011 to 2023 is presented in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1. These results highlight the contribution of each income source to overall inequality. Positive values indicate that the income source increases inequality, while negative values reflect a redistributive effect, reducing the Gini coefficient.Table 1 – Decomposition of Per Capita Income Gini (2011–2023)Income SourceYearShare of Income Source Inequalities in Total InequalityYearShare of Income Source Inequalities in Total InequalityYearShare of Income Source Inequalities in Total InequalityMarket incomeSubsidies. Percentage share of market income, subsidies and taxesin the Gini coefficient of per capita income in 2011-2023Analysis of the results indicates that subsidies in the early years (2011-2014) contributed positively to income inequality, suggesting that subsidy distribution during this period exacerbated pre-existing disparities in market income. Subsequent reforms, including the removal of subsidies from higher-income households and targeting of lower-income groups, gradually reduced this effect. The declining contribution of subsidies over time reflects a slow but steady shift towards more targeted and efficient redistribution. However, the overall magnitude of the redistributive effect of subsidies remains limited.Similarly, taxes demonstrate a modest redistributive effect, reducing market income inequality but failing to significantly lower the per capita Gini coefficient. Despite fluctuations in the Gini coefficient due to taxes and subsidies, their overall contribution to reducing inequality is relatively small compared to the dominant role of market income. This finding underscores that the current design and implementation of fiscal policies in Iran do not achieve the expected redistributive outcomes.Market income consistently accounts for the largest share of overall income inequality, indicating that, in the absence of taxes and subsidies, the Gini coefficient would be substantially higher. To gain a more nuanced understanding, market income is further decomposed into sub-components, including non-employment income, self-employment income (both agricultural and non-agricultural), and wages in public and private sectors (Figure 2).Figure 2: Percentage share of non-labor income, wage and salary income in the public, private and cooperative sectors, and agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment income in the Gini coefficient of market income in 2011-2023The decomposition reveals that non-employment income contributes the most to market income inequality, averaging 37.4% of the total. Non-agricultural self-employment income follows with an average contribution of 23%, and public-sector wages account for 22%. These results indicate that structural characteristics of market income, rather than post-market redistributive policies, are the primary drivers of income disparities in Iran.

 The findings provide critical insights into the limitations of current redistributive policies in Iran. The decomposition of per capita income into market income, taxes, and subsidies demonstrates that these fiscal instruments collectively influence only approximately 3.6% of the Gini coefficient for market income. This modest impact indicates that current fiscal policies exert a limited redistributive effect, highlighting the need for more progressive and effective interventions.Moreover, the structural dominance of market income as a driver of inequality underscores that the roots of income disparities lie primarily in pre-market mechanisms. The disproportionate contribution of non-employment income suggests that income concentration in certain asset classes is a major source of inequality, and mid-term trends suggest that private-sector wage growth will increasingly shape overall income inequality. Wealth accumulation and the dynamics of compensation in the private sector may exacerbate disparities traditionally associated with the public sector, reinforcing structural inequalities.The study contributes to the literature by providing robust micro-level evidence of the limited effectiveness of current tax and subsidy policies in addressing income inequality in Iran. By highlighting the structural underpinnings of inequality and the relatively minor role of fiscal instruments, the research informs policymakers that enhancing the redistributive capacity of taxes and subsidies alone is insufficient. Comprehensive reforms addressing the structural sources of market income disparities are required to achieve meaningful reductions in inequality.In conclusion, while taxes and subsidies have a measurable but limited effect on mitigating income inequality, the dominant influence of market income, particularly non-employment and private-sector wages, emphasizes the need for policies that target structural sources of disparity. Effective redistribution in Iran requires a combination of targeted fiscal interventions and structural economic reforms to reduce inequality sustainably and promote inclusive economic growth.

 Game theory has emerged as a rigorous analytical and mathematical framework for studying strategic decision-making, wherein the success of each actor depends not only on their choices but also on the decisions and behaviors of others. It has been applied across a broad spectrum of disciplines, including economics, social sciences, management, and even politics. The actors in game theory can encompass individuals, firms, governments, and social institutions. Classical game theory is grounded in four primary ethical assumptions: utilitarianism, self-interest, consequentialism, and secular notions of justice. While these foundations provide predictive power for competitive and interactive behaviors, they exhibit substantial ethical and social limitations, failing to account for moral cooperation, intent and motivation, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and spiritual dimensions.From an Islamic economic perspective, humans are not merely self-interested or profit-driven agents; they are ethically conscious, accountable, and oriented toward the afterlife. Economic behavior must be guided by principles such as justice, cooperation, honesty, altruism, and respect for the rights of others. Islamic economics emphasizes not only individual welfare but also collective well-being, intergenerational equity, and sustainability of resources. Sharia-based institutions such as Zakāt, Khūms, Sadaqah, and Waqf serve as practical mechanisms to realize these objectives. The primary aim of this study is to critically examine the ethical foundations of classical game theory from the standpoint of Islamic economics and to propose an analytical framework that models human socio-economic behavior in line with ethical, legal, and spiritual criteria. The central research question is: how can game theory be adapted within an Islamic economic framework to predict behavior while simultaneously reflecting social justice, ethical responsibility, afterlife-oriented motivations, and economic-ethical equilibria

This study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach grounded in theoretical comparison. Data sources include classical and contemporary game theory literature, behavioral economics studies, articles on economic ethics, and Islamic references. The analytical framework focuses on the four core pillars of classical game theory—utilitarianism, self-interest, consequentialism, and secular justice—and critically evaluates each through the lens of Islamic ethical and legal principles.In analyzing utilitarianism, the study examines valuation criteria, the concept of utility, and the role of justice in decision-making. It demonstrates that maximizing material benefits without consideration of intent and fairness may yield unethical and short-term outcomes. Critique of the self-interest assumption is based on the conceptualization of humans as committed, responsible, and ethically guided agents, with analysis extending to interactive games, repeated games, and social cooperation. Consequentialist assumptions are critiqued for focusing narrowly on material outcomes, offering short-term analysis, and neglecting the legitimacy of means and the moral intent of actors. The evaluation of secular justice incorporates anthropological underpinnings, redistributive institutions, intergenerational equity, and spiritual dimensions.A comparative analysis highlights divergences and overlaps between classical game theory and Islamic economics. Analytical insights, including tabular representations integrated into the text, elucidate the ethical and institutional limitations inherent in classical models. The study proposes a novel framework termed “Islamic Interaction Theory,” which redesigns utility functions, defines Sharia-based and institutional constraints, and integrates ethical, social, and afterlife-oriented motivations into economic behavior analysis. This framework enables comparative assessment of economic efficiency, social justice, afterlife-oriented incentives, and respect for individual and societal rights.

The findings indicate that, despite its analytical rigor, classical game theory has fundamental limitations in predicting human economic behavior. Pure utilitarianism, devoid of justice, ethical intent, or social responsibility, can result in inequitable, short-term outcomes. The self-interest assumption—even in repeated and interactive games—can undermine social efficiency and cooperative behavior, highlighting an ethical insufficiency. Consequentialist analysis, while a predictive tool, emphasizes material and short-term results, neglecting legitimacy, moral intent, and long-term social and spiritual outcomes. Justice in classical game theory is often mathematically modeled, omitting redistributive institutions or Sharia-compliant constraints.Conversely, Islamic economics offers a multidimensional, goal-oriented framework. Utility in this paradigm encompasses material, ethical, and afterlife dimensions, while justice is both a Sharia-based constraint and an intrinsic objective. Economic-ethical actors consider individual welfare alongside social and divine responsibilities, embedding cooperation, honesty, respect for rights, and altruism into their behavior. Redesigning utility functions and incorporating Sharia and ethical constraints in game models allow identification of equilibria that are economically efficient, socially just, and morally sustainable.Furthermore, Sharia institutions such as Zakat, Khums, Waqf, and various ownership models play a pivotal role by redistributing resources, ensuring intergenerational justice, and promoting socio-economic sustainability, thereby influencing game outcomes. Comparative analysis demonstrates that Islamic economic principles enrich classical game theory with ethical, social, and spiritual values, emphasizing intent and divine motivation. This framework also enables prediction of cooperative and collective behavior according to ethical and Sharia-based norms, a capacity absent in classical models.

 The discussion underscores that classical game theory, despite its analytical sophistication, has inherent ethical and institutional limitations, potentially leading to undesirable economic outcomes, inequality, and neglect of social responsibilities. Islamic economics, by revising human assumptions, redefining utility, and incorporating Sharia constraints, provides a comprehensive ethical framework that accounts for economic efficiency, justice, cooperation, and afterlife-oriented motivations. Critiquing utilitarianism reveals that maximizing collective welfare without distributive justice and ethical intent may produce immoral outcomes and social harm. Revising the self-interest assumption enables redefining equilibria based on cooperation, collective responsibility, and public good. Critique of consequentialism emphasizes that legitimacy, actor intent, and long-term and spiritual outcomes must be included in game-theoretical analyses.In terms of justice, Islamic economics leverages Sharia institutions, intergenerational equity, respect for individual and societal rights, and ethical and afterlife-oriented motivations to align game structures with justice. Development of the “Islamic Interaction Theory” allows redefining utility functions, institutional structures, and decision-making processes, ensuring that game equilibria are both economically efficient and ethically and legally sustainable. This framework is applicable for market analysis, economic policy, and resource management in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies that value justice, cooperation, and social responsibility.In summary, “Islamic Interaction Theory” bridges mathematical-economic analysis with ethical and social values, addressing classical game theory’s moral limitations. It also aids in designing fair market policies and mechanisms, aligning economic decisions with social and ethical objectives to achieve simultaneous economic efficiency and social justice.

 Money, as one of the most important elements in any economic system, plays a crucial role in shaping social, economic, and even cultural relations. In the contemporary world, the functions of money have become highly diversified, ranging from official and state-backed currencies to digital and decentralized instruments such as cryptocurrencies. These developments have not only created opportunities for innovation in financial systems but also introduced challenges such as instability, speculation, unequal wealth accumulation, and threats to social justice. In Islamic economics, the importance of this issue is heightened, as money is not merely a technical or economic instrument but an institution that must be designed and managed in accordance with religious principles, ethical values, and public welfare.Allameh Tabatabaei’s Theory of Creditive Notions (Iʿtibāriyyāt) provides a philosophical and epistemological framework that offers new perspectives for analyzing money and the possibility of monetary pluralism. According to this theory, money is formed as a contractual and creditive institution within the domain of practical reason (ʿaql-e ʿamali) and possesses a dynamic, goal-oriented, and socially adaptable nature. The main objective of this study is to extract and analyze the Islamic components of a monetary pluralism model based on Allameh Tabatabaei’s creditive theory and to examine its capacity for implementing the principles of resistance economy in Iran. The resistance economy emphasizes justice-orientation, self-reliance, people-centeredness, outward-looking policies, and flexibility, requiring theoretical and practical frameworks to enhance economic resilience and financial independence. This paper focuses on linking the philosophy of creditive notions with concrete monetary issues, aiming to propose an indigenous and Islamic model to address contemporary financial system challenges.

This research adopts a qualitative and analytical approach based on library studies and content analysis of philosophical, economic, and jurisprudential texts. Initially, sources related to Allameh Tabatabaei’s Theory of Creditive Notions and other Islamic scholars were examined to extract a conceptual framework regarding the nature of money in Islamic thought. Subsequently, contemporary economic literature, including studies on monetary pluralism, complementary and local currencies, and resistance economy issues, was reviewed to allow comparison and integration of perspectives. Selected sources included authoritative philosophical and jurisprudential works in Islamic thought, peer-reviewed domestic and international research articles, and empirical reports from countries such as Switzerland, Japan, and the United Kingdom regarding local currency applications. Data were analyzed using interpretive analysis, aligning foundational concepts of creditive theory—such as enactment (wa’az‘), credibility (īʿtibār), right-based orientation (haqmadārī), and practical reason (ʿaql-e ʿamalī)—with concrete monetary system issues. Through conceptual inference, the necessary components for designing an Islamic monetary pluralism model were extracted. These components were then classified into four dimensions: epistemological, functional, institutional, and governance, ensuring theoretical coherence. Comparative analysis was employed to validate findings, juxtaposing experiences of local and complementary currencies in developed countries with the proposed Islamic model. Finally, results were redesigned into a coherent framework linking philosophical foundations with macro-level resistance economy policies. The methodology thus combines theoretical analysis, philosophical interpretation, and applied comparison, enabling the development of an indigenous, practical model.

Findings indicate that in an Islamic system, money is not merely an intrinsic commodity or physical object; rather, it constitutes a social and goal-oriented creditive institution created by practical reason to organize social and economic relations in accordance with religious and ethical values. Legitimacy of money is contingent upon its service to public welfare, social justice, and human dignity. Key components identified for an Islamic monetary pluralism model include: creditive dynamism, right-based orientation (haqmadari), social positing (wa’az‘-e ījtimāʿī), legitimization mechanisms, justice-orientation, and multifunctionality of money. Creditive dynamism implies that money and other social creditive instruments must be adaptable to changing societal conditions, yet this principle alone does not confer legitimacy and must align with religious and ethical norms. Right-based orientation emphasizes that no monetary instrument should result in the deprivation of rights or domination and oppression. Social positing indicates that public acceptance is a necessary condition for monetary credibility, although it is insufficient for religious legitimacy. Comparative analysis shows that local and complementary currencies in developed countries, such as Switzerland (WIR), Japan, and the UK (Bristol Pound), while enhancing local economies, social cooperation, and reducing dependence on financial capitalism, have impacts proportional to their share in national economies. Hence, evaluating the economic consequences of Islamic monetary pluralism requires careful examination of these currencies’ share in liquidity and potential influence on inflation.

 The analysis demonstrates that Allameh Tabatabaei’s Theory of Creditive Notions offers a robust framework for explaining the nature and functions of money within an Islamic context and can serve as a theoretical basis for designing a monetary pluralism model. This model, by emphasizing the contractual and creditive nature of money, enables acceptance of monetary diversity while providing clear criteria based on justice, right-based orientation, and public welfare to assess the desirability of monetary pluralism. Within the resistance economy framework, the model can promote people-centered economic policies, strengthen micro-monetary institutions, enhance financial resilience, and reduce dependency on international monetary systems. Nevertheless, this framework provides the necessary theoretical and philosophical foundation only; empirical and quantitative studies at the macroeconomic level are essential for final evaluation. Lessons from local currencies in other countries indicate that their effects on liquidity and inflation depend on their scale and integration within the broader economy. Therefore, designing thematic or local currencies in Iran requires careful assessment of their impact on variables such as inflation, liquidity, and social justice. Future research should focus on empirical validation of the proposed model and development of operational frameworks within policy-making contexts, thereby leveraging the theoretical capacities of creditive philosophy to address practical issues in Islamic economics and provide a sustainable, just, and indigenous model for contemporary monetary systems.JEL Classification Codes: B31, P51, E50, O12.Acknowledgment: The authors express their gratitude to the editorial board and reviewers of the Journal of Islamic Economic Studies for their insightful comments and guidance, which contributed significantly to enhancing the quality of this paper.

 The persistent imbalance in Iran’s housing finance system reflects deeper governance shortcomings beyond cyclical economic constraints or funding shortages. Central among these weaknesses are the lack of credible investor protection, recurring conflicts of interest, and the absence of institutional trust-building mechanisms. In contrast, common-law jurisdictions use Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to address these problems through an independent trustee, whose legal responsibility is to safeguard beneficiaries and enforce transparency, auditing, and disclosure.Under Iran’s civil-law system, the concept of trust does not exist as a separate legal entity. However, similar functions may be carried out by boards of trustees within public or semi-public bodies. This paper proposes a trusteeship-based housing finance model that utilizes this institutional feature. The model places the National Housing Fund (NHF) at the center as a fiduciary board of trustees with oversight responsibilities, while provincial housing funds act as operational agents through private sector participation.The model has four

(1) Translate trustee duties into Iranian legal and administrative practices via boards of trustees; (2) Align investor protection with broader social goals, including affordable and rental housing; (3) Delegate project execution to provincial funds while maintaining unified standards; and (4) Develop both market-based and non-market instruments under NHF supervision. Ultimately, the paper recommends revising the bylaw of real estate and property investment funds (1404) to formally embed the NHF’s fiduciary role in Iran’s capital-market and off-market financing framework.

The study employs a three-phase methodological design integrating document analysis, comparative study, and institutional modeling.Phase 1 – Legal Review: Iranian statutes and bylaws were examined to identify institutional contexts in which boards of trustees perform fiduciary or oversight functions. Examples include the National Housing Fund, the Innovation and Prosperity Fund, and pension fund management structures. The analysis illustrates that Iranian law already recognizes the capacity of trustee-like bodies to act as guardians of stakeholder interests.Phase 2 – Comparative Study: The research then examines REIT structures in selected countries such as the United States, Singapore, and Malaysia. These models demonstrate how fiduciary principles—investor protection, independent auditing, conflict-of-interest management, and systematic disclosure—form the backbone of real estate finance. The goal here is not to import these systems but to distill transferable governance principles adaptable to Iran’s legal and institutional environment.Phase 3 – Institutional Design: Drawing from both Iranian and international experiences, the study formulate a two-tier fiduciary model: Tier 1: The NHF functions as a central board of trustees responsible for investor protection, financial oversight, and strategic coordination. Tier 2: Provincial housing funds implement projects with private-sector partners under NHF’s licensing and supervision. Operational mechanisms include transparent financial reporting, regular audits, risk management committees, and anti-speculation safeguards to ensure stability and credibility.

The findings confirm that it is feasible to achieve the governance and accountability benefits of a trustee system without importing the common-law trust form. When fiduciary duties are embedded within the NHF’s legal and operational framework, the institution gains a clear and credible mandate to protect investors, manage risks, and oversee compliance.First, centralizing fiduciary authority in the NHF enhances institutional clarity and investor confidence. By explicitly defining fiduciary responsibilities—such as risk control, auditing, and transparency—the NHF becomes a trusted intermediary capable of mobilizing private and institutional capital into housing projects.Second, decentralizing implementation to provincial housing funds strengthens local responsiveness. These funds can leverage local information and partnerships to design and execute projects tailored to regional housing needs. Meanwhile, the NHF ensures coherence and accountability through licensing, reporting, and performance evaluation. This balance of central oversight and local execution minimizes inefficiencies and ensures equitable regional development.Third, the model introduces a dual financial architecture: exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to attract private investors and support market-oriented projects, and non-tradable funds to channel resources into socially mandated programs such as affordable housing, urban renewal, or rental housing development. Both types operate under NHF supervision with identical fiduciary safeguards, ensuring that expanded access to finance does not compromise transparency or governance quality.

 This research demonstrates that the fiduciary discipline traditionally associated with common-law trusts can be operationalized in a civil-law context through institutional adaptation. By empowering a central fiduciary entity (NHF) and embedding trustee-like obligations within its bylaws and oversight mechanisms, the model provides a legally sound and administratively feasible solution to Iran’s chronic housing-finance inefficiencies.The model’s contextual approach avoids legal transplantation and instead focuses on functional equivalence—ensuring that investor protection, transparency, and accountability are embedded as enforceable governance practices. Centralization ensures consistency, while decentralization promotes agility and regional relevance.Potential implementation challenges include political influence over fund allocation, managerial capacity gaps at the provincial level, and limited financial literacy among participants. To mitigate these risks, the model recommends transparent reporting systems, independent audits, merit-based appointment of fund managers, and continuous monitoring of key performance indicators.Future studies should test pilot projects in selected provinces to assess how the model performs under varying governance capacities. Metrics should include investor confidence, cost-efficiency, risk-adjusted returns, and social outcomes such as affordability and access. Empirical evaluation would also enable fine-tuning of legal frameworks and supervisory practices.In conclusion, the proposed National Housing Fund trusteeship model offers a viable, indigenous framework for real estate financing in Iran. It builds institutional credibility, encourages private-sector participation, and supports sustainable and inclusive housing development. By embedding fiduciary principles into national governance structures, Iran can enhance transparency, attract investment, and deliver long-term stability in the housing market—achieving both financial efficiency and social equity within a unified institutional design.