فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
پیاپی 3 (بهار 1383)

Philosophy has been influenced by the argument about the five worlds in theoretical mysticism, namely the world of Divinity, the world of forms, the world of bodies, the world of abstracts, and the world of intellect. Addressing this question, the author first explains the special (or individual) (mode of) existence of quiddity, as well as its collective existence. Then he discusses the longitudinal cases of quiddity on the basis of the gradation in quiddity, and the longitudinal existences of quiddity on the basis of the gradation in existence.Both the longitudinal cases of quiddity, which form the ground for Plato’s idea of “forms,” and the longitudinal existences of quiddity, explain the theory of the conformity of the worlds one way or another. Since the gradation in quiddity, is not acceptable, the longitudinal existences of quiddity, in fact, accounts for the conformity of the worlds. Finally, the article reviews the principle of “the stronger a thing is in its existence, the stronger is its hold of meanings and quiddities,” which stems from longitudinal existences of quiddity. Also, the principle of “simple (non-composite) reality is everything,” which is a particular state of the first principle, has been dealt with. The article goes on to supplement the issue of, “the necessary being’s lack of quiddity,” which is the product of the last principle.

In different interpretations of the conventionality of quiddity, there is a gap between regarding quiddities identical with their particular existences and marking quiddities as merely a mirage. The conventionality of quiddity can have three interpretations, each one of which has two sub-interpretations: 1. Quiddity is identical with existence, like the attributes of God, and quiddity, through such a union with existence, becomes existent. 2. Quiddity is identical with existence, the same way God's attributes are identical with Him. The difference is that quiddity does not become existent through this union, but only the existent is veritably qualified by it. 3. Quiddity is the boundary of existence; it is the positive quality of existence, like surface and mass which are qualities of substance. 4. Quiddity is the boundary of existence; it has no positivity, and is utterly negative, like zero, which is nothing. 5. Quiddity is a mirage (delusion), but it is not an absolutely mental product, rather it is the outcome of an interaction between mind and the quality of what exists. 6. Quiddity is utterly a mirage; it is totally a mental construct, which has no objective reference outside the mind.

One of the issues in the field of modern religious studies is the nature of revelation and religious experience. Here, the discussion revolves around the question as to whether the Qur’anic revelation can be considered as a religious experience by the Prophet. This essay seeks to clarify the relation between the two. To do so, it firstly addresses the Christian viewpoint about the “whatness” of revelation and religious experience. In this regard, it examines two views about revelation and three views about the nature of religious experience in order to reach a soundly based view. Next, it inquires into the Qur’anic revelation. The use of revelation in different Qur’anic contexts is surveyed, and the notion of revelatory Qur’anic teachings is explained. Finally, it introduces some observations about the kind of relation between the Qur’anic revelation and religious experience.

The article by Graham Priest, the contemporary logician and writer, seeks not only to deny the widely-held logical principle of non- contradiction (the principle that the conjunction of a proposition and its negation is impossible), but also to assert both the possibility and existence of contradictions. To affirm his position, he brings to light some paradoxical cases (propositions), which belong neither to any specific time nor place. He gives some examples from both western and eastern philosophies. On the other hand, he states that all arguments for the principle in question are prone to objections, and concludes that some contradictions are possible, or in other words, some propositions are both true and false. The author makes some remarks on Priest's view of contradictions, insisting that the conjunction of a proposition and is negation is impossible. To prove this, he examines some arguments given by Aristotle and considers them as hints at a self-evident matter instead of technical arguments. Elaborating on some propositions Priest uses to establish his position, the author concludes his discussion by stating that the impossibility of contradictions is self-evident to any mind or common sense, at any time or place. The only difficulty arises from the fact that it has been misconceived by some thinkers and much of its denial comes from the very misunderstanding.