فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال هفتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 26، زمستان 1384)

In the arduous discussion of the principality of existence (asālat al-wujūd) or the principality of essence (asālat al-māhiyya), it is necessary first to examine the proposition which is the cornerstone of this discussion; second, it should be discussed how its conception can cause its acknowledgement; then we can clarify the significance of existential proposition; and finally, setting forth the meanings of the word “existence” and those of the word “essence” or “quiddity”, it would appear the signs of confused discussion of epistemology and ontology.

Since the word “treasuries” has been mentioned in the Koran and Hadiths, scholars of the interpretation of the Koran and Hadiths as well as theologians, philosophers and Gnostics have discussed it from several aspects. In this paper, we first interpret it literally, formulating the scholars’ opinions about it; then, we develop the discussion to the “key of treasury” and “treasurers”; finally, to make clear the philosophical-theological perspective in addition to the interpretation of the issue. we attempt to discuss the points mentioned among the scholars’ utterances.

In describing Metaphysics and its main theme, Mullā Sadrā has remarked a weighed word that is among the distinguished characteristics of his philosophy. While dealing with both the existent and existence as well as making a transition from the existent to existence, he doesn’t consider knowledge of existence as a merely mystical intuition at all, but presents a viewpoint which contains both the intuitive cognition and the rational analyses. He doesn’t accepts Ibn Sina’s and Fārābi’s opinions about the existence being accidental, and claims that the signification and real referent of a proposition such as ‘ man is existent’ is different from those of other propositions. In addition, in Mullā Sadrā’s view, the real thing is existence to which the concept of existent refers, but quiddity is no more than a property by which this single reality takes on the form of various objects. Furthermore, he holds the identity of knower and known which plays an important role in the discussion of subject-object relationship. The present paper’s goal is to deal with this principal truth, its roots and Mullā Sadrā’s special approach towards the subject.

Using probability calculus, David Hume attempts to judge religious beliefs properly. He, in using this calculus, relies on especial views about causation and causal inference. For him, specific causal relationships between phenomena appear to us through frequent observation of the succession or coexistence of certain phenomena. The result of this observation is a natural, unavoidable association between those phenomena. All associations of this sort are not of the same force and intensity; they are forceful if the observations occur incessantly and steadily, otherwise they are less forceful. The probability calculus helps us to show the probability of the occurrence of a certain phenomenon in case of observing each of the coexisting phenomena. To do this calculation, Hume pays special attention to variables such as posterior probability (or conditional probability) and prior probability, which can be considered as the primitive form of a law or formula known nowadays as Bayes’ theorem. Using Bayes’s theorem, Hume arrives at the conclusion that the Argument from design can not be fruitful, nor can be the Argument from miracles. The present article, which indeed deals with a discussion of Hume’s philosophy of religion, proves that Hume, in this conclusion, is subject to fallacy and begging the question.

Morteza Mutahari is well-known as the exponent of ‘Allamah Tabātabā’ī’s viewpoints; however, reflecting on his works, one can find different aspects of his personal understandings, some of which are in contrast to ‘Allāmah Tabātabā’ī’s views. The present article seeks to figure out some challenges of these two thinkers in the field of philosophical discussions. Some of the challenges are concerned with: mediating movement, necessity of subject in motion, motion by subordination, motion and evolution, motion and conflict, bearer of potentiality, essential contingency, ontological argument, divine wisdom, purposefulness of creation, employment principle, universality of moral judgments, immortality of moral judgments, and necessity of community.

In the 2oth century, the important developments in the history of philosophy of science are: the first debate, Positivism and Inductivism; the second debate, Karl Popper’s Refutationism and Lakatos’s research program; the third debate, Thomas Kuhn’s Structuralism and relativism; and the forth debate, Hermeneutics. After dominating Hermeneutics in the field of philosophy of science, a fundamental development occurs in its methodology. One can classify the types of Hermeneutics from two points of view: 1) its application; 2) its historical period. This paper is going to deal with the influential backgrounds of Hermeneutics as well as to present a brief account of the types of Hermeneutics.