پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 6، پاییز و زمستان 1384)

This article discusses John McDowell’s ethical realism. It first gives a definition of realism in its broad sense and then gets to its particular meaning. Afterwards, Mackie’s view about the negation of the reality of values and ethical properties due to their not being involved in causal explanation is given. This is followed by McDowell’s response to the previous claim. McDowell, while rejecting Mackie’s understanding of secondary qualities, demonstrates that both secondary qualities and ethical properties are somehow introversive and depend on humans, but this dependency doesn’t contradict their reality. Ultimately, McDowell by giving a non-causal explanation of values and negating the exclusiveness of criteria for the reality of things in causal explanation, tries to expand the scope of the reality of things, and there fore to prove the reality of ethical properties.

Triadic matters (i.e necessity, possibility and impossibility) and modal propositions hold a special place in logics and Islamic philosophy. Meanwhile, due to the lack of a refined system of semantics, we are facing some ambiguities in some forms of modal propositions. This article analyzes these ambiguities after a general survey of modalities in logics and Islamic philosophy and a reference to some kinds of necessary propositions. In the second phase, there has been an attempt to utilize some of the modern systems of modalities, logics for giving suggestions about determining the rules of the semantics of these propositions.

One major discussion in Mulla Sadra’s transcendental philosophy is the division of existence into fixed and changeable. Belief in fluid existence is a consequence of substantial motion principle which next to issues like principality of existence, gradation of existence and poverty possibility, has transformed many of philosophical problems of transcendental philosophy.This latter has provided a new notion of body and matter by raising the theory of substantial motion. According to Mulla Sadra, the fluidity of change and movement is the mode of existence of unfixed beings. Here, motion is not an accidental matter but their essence and substance are in motion. By substantial motion and fluid existence, the once fixed picture of the world is shattered. Contrary to pre-sadraian theories in which substances had fixed forms and differentia and logical limit was defined on that basis, in transcendental philosophy, every fluid being has a fluid identity which possesses a series of forms and differentia and therefore logical limits are transformed on this basis. This article first analyzes the forms, differentia and essence of material being in peripatetic philosophy and then deals with the developments of the same notions in transcendental philosophy.

Unity of existence is one of the major claims and at the same time a much debated and challenging issue of mystics. Among the philosophical systems of the Islamic world, Mulla sadra who was specifically interested in mystical notions, believed he was the first to give a philosophical explanation of the unity of existence. Later on, controversies occurred in interpreting Mulla Sadra’s intention. His ability to prove the gradation unity of being was indisputable, but the controversy was whether this conformed with unity of existence as intended by mystics. Some advocates of this philosophical system were of the opinion that the only rational explanation of unity of existence is the same gradation unity of being. A second group believed that the basic claim of mysticism goes well beyond this and Mulla Sadra could transcend the gradation unity of being and reach the core of mysticism, i.e individual unity of existence. One way to judge these opinions is the philosophical consideration of arguments and prerequisites set by pros and cons of the possibility of individual unity of existence in transcendental philosophy. The article first speaks about three reasons given by the advocates of transition from gradation unity of being to individual unity of existence. Then the reasonings presentable for disputing the acceptance of individual unity of existence in transcendental philosophy are examined. Finally, it is assessed whether one can accept individual unity of existence as something beyond gradation unity of existence by utilizing philosophical and intelligible arguments in transcendental philosophy.

Understanding the essence of knowledge and perception and the manner of acquiring perceptions in general, and rational perceptions in particular has had a special place in Moslem philosophers’ thought from antiquity. Mulla Sadra is among Moslem philosophers who have extensively and differently dealt with this issue. This article first explains the basic principles of Mulla Sadra’s thought about knowledge and then explicates three seemingly different theories of his concerning the quality of acquiring rational perceptions or intellection. Finally, there is a synthesis of these three theories and its reference to different transformations of the soul.

Ibn Rushd has critiqued Ibn Sina’s philosophical ideas especially in five areas: 1- the problem of emanation and the rule of the one, 2- explanation of creation and the problem of celestial spheres, 3- origination of the world and Ibn Sina’s method of its affirmation, 4- perception of the soul, 5- the issue of the augmentation of being quiddity.One of the main arguments is that some of Ibn Sina’s opinions are not rooted in Aristotelian philosophy. Another refers to conflicts introduced in Ibn Sina’s thought. Ibn Rushd tries to demonstrate these conflicts and inconsistencies.

One of the arguments for proving God’s existence and the intelligibility of religious beliefs is that which is known as Pascal’s Wager. According to this highly disputable argument, in the absence of sufficient theoretical and rational evidence for proving God’s existence, the only intelligible and cautious option is belief in God, the afterlife, and shaping our lives thereon. A prudent and expedient mind necessitates the consideration of God and the justification of religious beliefs when it comes to decision-making and practice.This argument is polished by the decision-making theory and by considering discourses on “rules of probability”, “expected utility” and “risk-taking”, and had led to four new expositions: the argument from dominance, argument from expected utility, argument from dominating expected utility, and argument from strong dominance.

This article is a translation of causation entry from Paul Edwards’s Encyclopedia, beginning with a definition of the word, and the difference between generation and qualitative motion in the view of Aristotle. Then Aristotelian four causes i. e. efficient cause, final cause, formal cause and material cause are discussed and it is maintained that today, what is exclusively mentioned in various sciences and humanities is the efficient cause. The article is then divided in to two main sections dealing with old and new problems related to efficient cause respectively. The old issues consist of: the utility of the concept of causality, causality and change, inclusiveness and identity, the conception of power, the conception of necessary connection, priority of causes over their effects, direction of necessity. The new discussed issues are: necessity versus invariable sequence, the question of similarity, relevant similarities, laws of nature and the concept of causality, laws as necessities, laws as uniformities, revision of necessary connection, causes as necessary conditions, causes as sufficient conditions, plurality of causes, causality and induction, distinction between cause and effect, causes as "levers", causality and time, contemporaneous causes and effects. The important point here is the predominance of positivism in all discussions such as the elaboration on positivist philosophies. Those have attempted to reject the metaphysical dimensions of causality, such as necessity and the necessity of the emanation of effects from the cause. The article, however, avoids an explicit critique of positivism, despite the insufficiency of the above opinions in explaining causality. The article ends up with this statement:»Here, then, as in many areas of philosophy, Our advances over our predecessors appear more illusory than real.