پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال چهارم شماره 1 (پیاپی 7، بهار و تابستان 1385)

Ontological proof is one of the most important proofs for God’s existence, which have been advocated by Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz. Among the prominent critics of this proof we can refer to Thomas Aquinas and Kant. Since Kant’s critique of this proof is based on epistemological principles, so the present article tries to clarify the place of that critique in Kant’s epistemology and ontology in order to make clear that how we can have proper understanding of it in proportionate to its place and then proceed to judge about its validity or invalidity.

As the claim of knowledge without presenting the sufficient ground or evidence is unjustified, the basis of contemporary epistemology is what the foundation of the system of human knowledge is and that from where this system originates and where it ends. According to later Wittgenstein, the description of the word without a number of basic and certain propositions is impossible. Although their certainty does not mean their correspondence with the fact, it relies upon the attitude of the individuals. What is certain and evident for us is determined by a language game in which one partakes. Therefore, the human knowledge in itself depends on his actions and characteristic behavioural patterns. Wittgenstein maintains that justification and rationality rest invariably on context and engage in social activities and language games. Since forms of life, world-pictures and world – views are different, there are various ways of rationality. In this article, elucidating the tripartite definition of knowledge, we have dealt with the analysis of knowledge and its distinctive aspect with certainty from wittgenstein’s view. Then, referring to the structure of epistemological foundations in wittgenstein’s thought, we have mentioned it, why according to him, foundationalism fails to defend the validity of epistemological system and with taking the theory of contextualism, what difference will take place in the foundations of knowledge and the quality of the dependence of other sciences on them. Finally, studying the theory of contextualism and elucidating a number of its advantages, we have explained that this theory allows a version of relativism and is not without some kind of skeptical tendencies.

One of the most controversial topics which is discussed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations is private language argument. According to Wittgenstein, the way in which a language-user categorizes his thoughts, feelings and emotions in the language cannot be talked about personally and privately. Words and Sentences do not gain their meaning in private. Wittgenstein’s argument is based on “correct /seems to be correct” distinction. According to him, if the language-user is authorized to utilize words and sentences privately, the mentioned distinction would be irrelevant and non-sense, normatively speaking. In other words, in such a situation we cannot give an account of the calibration of word use in different contexts. It follows from this that the whole idea of meaning is evaporated. Furthermore, Frege argued in favoure of the objectivity of meaning in his famous article entitled Thought. According to him, the distinction between idea and thought should be taken into account in order to discuss the very idea of ‘meaning’. Idea is entirely private, subjective and associated with mental image, whereas thought is public, objective and associated with meaning. In other words, mental image does not have any role in the formation of meaning, semantically speaking. Frege appealed to Platonic realm in order to give an account of how ideas and meanings can be distinguished from each other, metaphysically speaking. It is said that Wittgenstein is influenced by Fregean account of meaning in formulating his private language argument, although he does not subscribe to Frege’s Platonic ontology.In this article, we are going to give an account of how Fregean account of meaning is utilized in Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Firstly, we formulate and give an account of private language argument in the Wittgensteinian sense. We formulate our argument based on the rule-following argument which has a key role in understanding private language argument. To do so, we try to criticise the anti-realistic account of meaning and justify the realistic account of meaning, according to which the language-user is answerable to patterns of word use. In this way, we can give an account of 'correct /seems to be correct' distinction, semantically speaking. Secondly, we read the private language argument in the light of the realistic account of meaning. Thirdly, Frege’s account of meaning is discussed in details. Finally, Wittgenstein’s private language argument is compared with Fregean account of meaning.

Ability of explanatory is one of the most foundations in philosophical systems. such a way that this characteristic can be cause of difference of philosophical systems and schools from each other. As a philosopher, Shaykh-e Ishraq has presented causally explanations consciously and by using different resources has revealed various explanations in his works. By a methodological approach to his thoughtful collection, five categories of explanations are observable: ontological explanations, epistemological explanations, scientific/ experimental explanations, intuitional/ esoteric explanations and theological /Quranic explanations.Since he puts “light” in center of his philosophy and has a hierarchic cosmology, his explanations are not equal, some of them are longitudinal explanations and the others are latitudinal which themselves are divided to: aggregative and non aggregative. As a fact, Suhrawardi’s pattern in methodology of explanation is a multidisciplinary method, which rescues him from involving in gin of the reduction fallacy and from self contradiction in his systematical thought. Furthermore, it gives his explanations more efficiency.

Among the works of Hakim Rafii Qazvini, just few books have surviued. However, these few embrace certain novel ideas. The present article deals with the following five innovations by this divine philosopher and mystic: 1. Regarding the meaning of divine perfection in the light of divine beauty (Jamal) and majesty (Jalal), Hakim Rafii does not consider it, opposing the dominant view, a combination of the above two. Rather, he counts it a fact beyond divine beauty and majesty consisting of the integrity of divine essence, i.e. the sameness of the essence and attributes along with the identity of each attribute with another. Under the same topic Hakim Rafii Qazvini gives a definition of beauty and majesty combining that of philosophers and maystics. Thus, the definition has a touch of innovation. 2. Commenting on the supplication phrase "Allahumma inniAsaluka bima Tujibuni bihi Hina Asaluk", i.e. O Allah! verily I ask you that by which you are going to answer me when asking you”, Hakim Rafii presents a meaning – other than the common one – which implies his curious and initiative mind. 3. Concerning the negation of composition from divine essence and the fact that composition, whatsoever, requires possibility, Hakim Rafii presents an argument asserting that, “what we mentioned here is not written or found in any book.”4. Commenting on the philosopher's quotation, “Influnce of one body on another requires position (wad) and parallelism (muhadhat), he considers these two as a type of union and link.5. Criticizing the well- known citation, “will (Iradah) is different from desire (shahwah).’’ Thus man may sometimes will something not desired by him, and on other occasions, he may desire something not willed by him.

This article argues that the “Man as Abd” metaphor in Quranic expressions about human situation, has a significant role in framing the cultural attributes of Islamic discourses. After introducing the cognitive value of metaphors, I have discussed anthropologically the semantic elements of the Lord-Abd relation as a social institution and then discussed the semantics of Abd metaphor in Quran. Then I have examined the systemacity of this metaphor in the structure of Quranic concepts and its coherence. In the last part I have discussed the historical background of the metaphor as well as the historical evolution of semantic elements of this metaphor in Islamic tradition.

Understanding of Zoroastrian messianism and sotarology, especially in the Gathas of Zoroaster, keep still Avesta experts occupied. The current view is that although the idea of apocalyptic saviour is something made up in the young Avesta and pahlavi literatures, in the Gathas itself we can find apocalyptic meaning of the»saoshyant «. Hee I like to show that» saoshyant«has in Gathas no apocalyptic or eschatological meaning, though some yasnas of the Gathas may likely refer to the idea of the coming of a person like Zoroaster in the future. Likewise, the idea of frasha-making (= renovation) of the world (or existence) is not equal to eschatology, which has its evidence in the Gathas too. Therefore, as the doctrine of»frasha«-making turned in young Avesta to eschatology and frashkard, also the early meaning of saoshyant, namely the beneficent asha-believer (who benefits the world every times), changed to the eschatological saviour. Saoshyants in Gathas are typical Mazda-worshipers, who try together with AhuraMazda to benefit always the world and make it»frasha«. This beneficence to the world can culminate at the end of the time by the triumph of the Mazda-worshiper over the wicked. Although this doctrine, may overlap eschatology and even the belief in the coming of a feature like Zoroaster, but it is not equal to them.

Assertions on causality- i.e. what could be the cause of what? – are so ubiquitous in our everyday life that we pass them by unconsciously. Why does one thing become the cause of another? what makes a thing the cause of another thing? First, we must make a distinction between the concept of causality relation and that of the things to which this relation applies. What is the causality relation that links a cause with an effect? There arises, however, another question. What sort of entities should cause and effect be if they are to qualify as the two sides of this relation? In other words, what are causes and effects? This is the second question. The present article deals mainly with the first question and partly with the second one.