نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 54 (زمستان 1387)

In this paper, the writers argue that, when speaking of God, otherworldly affairs, the Hereafter, and, in general, non-material issues, the Qur’an adopts an allegorical language. They also emphasize that allegorical language is the only means by which one can discuss these issues and understand the Qur’anic verses and metaphorical expressions. The perception of this language requires understanding the ontology of the world and attaining the knowledge of the spirit and reality of meaning and its allegory in different worlds. Through the spirit and truth of meaning, which is present in all of its manifestations and allegories, this language leads us towards a univocal language. Mulla Sadra calls it the language of true economy as opposed to Ash‘arites’ language of economy. When discussing the language of the Qur’an, Mulla Sadra also criticizes the “literal” language and the language of “code and allusion”.

Ibn Khaldun followed Ghazzali in his theological criticism of philosophy, attention to religious beliefs, and considering formal logic as a science independent from the Peripatetic metaphysics. However, he stood at a distance from him in terms of his epistemological criticism of philosophy. He believed that philosophy was not enough for man’s eternal and supernatural happiness and limited it to the domain of physics. His criticism of philosophy was based on empirical knowledge, and he avoided abstract concepts in this regard. In this way, his ideas are similar to William of Ockham, the English thinker of the 14th century. Nevertheless, unlike Ockham’s criticisms, which created an independent philosophical trend in Western philosophy, Ibn Khaldun’s critical ideas of philosophy remained incomplete in Islamic philosophy.

The concepts embedded in the tripartite division of being – necessity, possibility, and impossibility – are posed in logic in relation to propositions. In philosophy, these three-fold concepts are used to divide existents into two types, the necessary being and the possible being, and, following it, to divide non-beings into two types: possible beings and impossible beings. This paper demonstrates that, based on the theory of the principiality of existence, the above divisions are refuted, and indicates that each being is a necessary being; each concept is a possible being, and each non-being is an impossible being. Even the distinction between the “by essence” and “by another” considerations of the tripartite division of being in attributing existence to the three groups of existent, concept, and non-existent cannot create a change in the above analysis. In this way, employing the concepts of the tripartite division of being lacks the expected efficiency in classifying existents (and also non-existents). The Transcendent Philosophy has replaced them with the concepts of indigent possibility and ontological richness, which will be discussed in this paper.

Mulla Sadra has referred to his specific argument concerning the demonstration of the Oneness of Almighty Necessary as the celestial argument. He has also emphasized its superiority to the other arguments propounded by early philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, in this regard. While scrutinizing them to a great extent, he does not consider any of them as a perfect argument free from any kind of defect. He believes that if we wish to view them as perfect arguments, we should try to remove their defects. Therefore, he suggests certain reasons in order to improve and complete them and argues that even Ibn Sina’s argument needs some correction. In this paper, the writer has tried his best in order to show that, unlike the arguments of other philosophers, that of Ibn Sina, along with its various interpretations, is needless of Mulla Sadra’s correction and modification. In fact, he intends to demonstrate that Ibn Sina’s argument enjoys the necessary efficiency for demonstrating the Oneness of Almighty Necessary.

One can view the political issues propounded in Ibn Sina’s works from different perspectives and, considering the methodological approach adopted, possibly arrive at various conclusions. The present paper discusses some of the political aspects of Ibn Sina’s philosophy from a specific point of view. The writer has tried to highlight his place in the history of Islamic political philosophy by mainly focusing on the issue of imagination. The plan of devising a “prophetic philosophy” with Farabi particularly began with writing his book Madina fadilah. Here, by expanding the functions of the imaginal faculty, Ibn Sina tried to explain the phenomenon of prophethood and its relationship with philosophy and politics. His philosophy must be studied within a framework which Farabi founded and, after Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi developed by devising the Illuminative philosophy. The role of Ibn Sina, as a philosopher who expanded Farabi’s thoughts and posed the two issues of “conjecture” and “imagining the souls of the spheres”, is quite noteworthy in this regard. In this way, he opened the window to a way which two centuries later led to the development of Illuminative Philosophy, one of the basic concepts of which is the world of imagination.

Undoubtedly, Dawani is one of the most prominent figures that came to the world of being after the Mongols’ attack on Iran (which led to the annihilation of philosophy and culture in this country) and in the time interval between the development of the illuminative School of Philosophy and the formation of the Transcendent Philosophy (by Mulla Sadra). Dawani’s significance lies not only in his numerous writings but also in his benefiting from a kind of independence in his thoughts, which led to the development of a number of innovative ideas. In addition to being famous as the commentator of Shaykh al-Ishraq’s works, he had also complete dominance over Ibn Sina’s works and, in many case, he sought help from his words in order to explain his points. The other point that we will deal with in this paper is the effect of accepting gnostic works on his thoughts.Perhaps, we can say that the most important of Dawani’s ideas is the one related to the unity of being (which he himself refers to as dhawq ta’alluh or the theologian’s taste). He has tried to not only bring his other thoughts in harmony with it but also use it to demonstrate other issues. When discussing the issues of existence and quiddity, cause and effect, etc., Dawani argues based on dhawq ta’alluh. He also resorts to it when demonstrating the other aspects of oneness (oneness in the necessity of existence, oneness in acts, and oneness in attributes). Accordingly, after explaining the unity of being in his view, we will present his words concerning the other types of unity.

The study of the history of the development of the issue of intellect is one of the most important issues in the history of philosophy for all philosophers and researchers in related fields. As we know, in Greece, Aristotle was called the intellect of Plato’s classes and his name was inseparable from intellect.Aristotle’s ambiguous interpretation of intellect motivated the commentators of his works to present a number of innovative solutions when reviewing the issue of intellect from the viewpoint of Aristotle. The high station of this issue in the works of Muslim philosophers as the axis of wisdom and philosophical thoughts reveals the same conditions. This is because the discussion of intellect and its levels is closely related to determining man’s station in the world, the soul’s destiny in eternal life, the relation between the Truth and creation, reviewing man’s knowledge and the soul-body relation, and solving the issue of resurrection.