نشریه علوم سیاسی
سال دهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 38، تابستان 1386)

This paper is to present a coherent and rational interpretation of the concept of ‘leader’s absolute sovereignty’ [Wellayat-e Motlaqeh] in Imam Khomeini’s political thought. The paper studies the absolute sovereignty of the Prophet (pbuh) and his successors, i.e. the infallible Imams on the basis of the belief that the Prophet and the infallible Imams enjoyed a relatively absolute and relatively limited sovereignty rather than a completely absolute sovereignty in administering the Islamic society.

The new middle class are considered as a major force in the socio-political changes whether before or after the Islamic revolution. The paper, after explaining the concept of “new middle class” and its features, deals with the formation and development of this class and its influence on the socio-political life in Iran in the Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic era.

The present political system in Iran arouse to some extent out of Imam Khomeini’s thoughts which are rooted in his jurisprudential ideas. Not only is Imam Khomeini considered as an intellectual support for the Islamic Republic system, but his practical role is also noteworthy. Thus, unfamiliarity with his thoughts would prevent us from having a true understanding of the current situation in Iran. Studying his thoughts and the developments they underwent, this paper tries to answer two important questions in this regard. First, did his thoughts encounter any radical inconsistencies during the course of time? In other words, can one see any fundamental changes in different stages, such as before and after the revolution, in his ideas? Did he completely abandon any of his principal beliefs (e.g. belief in the capability of Islam in regulating man’s political and non-political life)? Second, what is the nature of people’s role in his thought system in different stages?

The Islamic Revolution of Iran, a social revolution in 1979, has so far been studied from various perspectives by different Iranian and non-Iranian scholars. The present paper, written by Nikki Keddie, is to answer the question whether the Iranian revolution was predictable or not. In other words, if the staff of the American Embassy in Tehran had not put aside the domestic information agents and had contacts with more people, wouldn’t their behavior and, as a result, the Islamic revolution, have been predictable? What were the differences between Iran and other Islamic countries?

It seems that Fārābi’s purpose behind writing about political philosophy was Tadbīr al-Madīna [society]; on the contrary, Ibn-i Bājah’s ideas were based on Tadbīr al-Motevahhīd [individual]. As a result, it is said that Fārābi is a pluralist but Ibn-i Bājah an individualist. Fārābi’s starting point is the utopia whereas Ibn-i Bājah’s starting point is non-utopia. Since their starting points of discussion are different, they are considered separate from, or even opposed to, each other. But an evaluation of their works shows that both have an individualistic perspective. The individual they try to introduce has important characteristics. First, Fārābi, Ibn-i Bājah, and all Muslim philosophers intentionally or unintentionally make a distinction between the individual as a philosopher and other members of the society, thus, believing in a strong philosophical individualism. Second, this individual does not have a social nature. This paper discusses over their ideas and their political implications. Ibn-i Sīnā’s ideas in this regard will also be mentioned. In fact, their philosophical attempts in regard with the individual and his relationship with the society represent three inevitable positions about the philosophical individual: society’s being sacrificed for the philosophical individual from Fārābi’s perspective; the philosophical individual’s exiting society from Ibn-i Sīnā’s perspective; and the coexistence of the philosophical individual and the existing non-utopian society from Ibn-i Bājah’s perspective. What is important is that the distinction between the civil and philosophical individual makes it difficult to walk in the way of democracy.

Religion is considered as a part of tradition. As opposed to modernity, the question is what kind of relationships can be postulated between modern and traditional concepts. Assuming that modern political concepts are different from concepts existing in tradition, this paper is to demonstrate that there is no contradictory relationship between these two sets of concepts and that, through contrasting the features of modern concepts with traditional ones, it is possible to estimate the capacity of tradition to tolerate these modern concepts.

This paper presents a theological [kalām] explanation of ‘enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil’ and its conditions and levels on the basis of reason [‘aql], divine law [shar’], and sufficiency [kifāya]. Then, the political thought of the Mo’tazilites is explained on the basis of the relationship between ‘enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil’ and concepts such as imamate, rebellion against Imam, the land of the pagans and the land of Islam, concealment [taqiyyah], reform, revolution, freedom, and the Marwanid and Abbasid governments. The paper also studies the political behavior of the Mo’tazilite with respect to ‘enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil’, concentrating on the behavior of some Mo’tazilites holding administrative positions according to this principle from the reign of Ma’moon till Wathiq. Finally, the paper studies Mo’tazilite as movement with respect to the same principle and mentions three approaches of positive resistance, negative resistance, and participation in the power structure with an emphasis on the pseudo-ideological nature of the Mo’tazilite government.