نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 55 (بهار 1388)

In this paper, by intuitive philosophy, the writer means an ontological system which is based on a rational-inferential method in the individuation of which intuitive findings play a significant role. In other words, it is a metaphysical philosophy which, while depending on rational arguments in the affirmation and rejection of its propositions, benefits from intuitive findings in the formation of its teachings.In contrast to those who believe that intuitive philosophy is a controversial combination of various theories and, as a result, an impossible issue, the writer has tried to show that intuition can have a significant effect on an ontological system without damaging its conceptuality – i.e. methodological reliance on rational reasoning when judging its propositions. In doing so, he has referred to various ways of a philosopher’s use of his or others’ intuitive findings (such as determining the direction of research, opening new horizons, posing new problems, helping in the formulation of philosophical hypotheses, etc.), which are all out of the domain of the judgment and evaluation of the truth or falsity of philosophical propositions.Moreover, by presenting some examples of the above-mentioned types of the effects of intuition on Suhrawardi’s Ishraqi philosophy and, particularly, Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy, the writer has considered these two philosophical systems as actual examples of intuitive philosophy. He has also referred to the superiorities of this kind of philosophy to a purely discoursive one, which is void of intuitive perceptions and findings.

One of the most important theological principles is the principle of the necessity of the observance of the best to Almighty God. It is in close relationship to the principle of favor. The theological picture of the observance of the best is mainly related to God’s servants and their religious affairs. Its arguments are also based on essential and rational goodness and evil. Both the Ash‘arites and philosophers have criticized this theory from different angles. The former do not consider goodness and evil as the criteria for divine acts, and the latter, while accepting the essential goodness and evil of acts, believe that this theory applies to divine acts. Philosophers have also criticized the picture making of the principle of the best, which lacks a comprehensive view of creation. In this paper, the writer will first deal with the picture of this principle and its arguments and then criticize and examine it.

Aristotle’s definition of imagination is the beginning of philosophers’ conceptualizations of this issue. Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Suhrawardi have greatly extended this concept. Farabi defines imagination with three types of function: preserving the pictures of sensibles, manipulating them, and imitations of sensibles and intelligibles by pictures. Ibn Sina conceptualizes what Farabi called imagination and imaginal faculty in four distinct faculties called the faculty of imagination, imaginal faculty, the faculty of estimate, and memory. Suhrawardi believes that imaginal perception is a kind of Ishraqi presential knowledge and clarifies it based on the observation of suspending images. The most perfect theology of imagination for the conceptualization of creativity is that of Farabi, based on which the four different levels of the creativity of imagination are definable. However, these levels are also realized in Ishraqi or Illuminative imagination, which differs from Peripatetic imagination only in the way it is clarified.

The issue of being as the best order has always attracted the attention of many thinkers and Islamic philosophers and theologians in particular. Moreover, for a long time, there have been several extensive discussions in this regard between two groups of thinkers: those who deny it, and those who agree with it. This subject is also the center of attention today considering man’s philosophical and scientific growth concerning the complicated and accurate order of the world of being. The discussion of the best order, on the one hand, depends on the knowledge, wisdom, and purpose beyond divine acts and, on the other, can be a response to the ambiguities regarding the defects and evils that we observe in the world of being. Therefore, research in this respect can play an essential role in the growth and promotion of religious knowledge and a rational view of religion. Moreover, the necessity of believing in divine perfection, knowledge, and power pushes rational and religious defenders to respond to the various questions which are posed concerning the existence of evils, defects, and shortcomings of the system of creation relying on rational and philosophical principles, as well as clarify and demonstrate the philosophical and the best order of creation and the justness of the order of being and Shari‘ah by means of rational arguments.The writer of this paper, through a study of the concept of “the best order”, has paid attention to the necessity and background of propounding this discussion in philosophy, explained Mulla Sadra’s view in this regard, and examined the reasons of those who are for and against this theory. This is because this issue is of great importance from both theological and religious aspects and can also have certain functions in the consolidation of the theoretical bases of Islamic theology as a completely philosophical issue. Besides, it can be of great significance in important theological discussions regarding such topics as the evils, teleological nature of divine acts, the argument of order and cosmology, and the knowledge, power, and wisdom of Almighty Truth. Accordingly, the writer has tried to clarify this issue and pose its philosophical design and basis. In doing so, he has developed and presented some ten reasons and, finally, criticized and examined some of the ambiguities concerning the issue of “the best order”.

In the system of the individual unity of being certain seemingly immanent aspects are attributed to God. These include qualifying Him with the attributes of created and contingent beings, and assuming the identity of the Truth with objects, God as the entire world, and the world as the quality, direction, configuration, and mode of the Truth, which imply an immanent relation between contingent beings and the essence of the Truth, such as the immanence of accident for place. In this paper, the objections concerning the ambiguity of immanence in the individual unity of being are quoted from Mulla Sadra, and the writer has tried to provide some responses to them based on some of his ideas and philosophical fundamental principles in this regard. These basic responses include the following: the distinction between the existence of the non-conditioned as the source of division and the non-conditioned divided existence (unfolded existence), the attribution of immanent features to unfolded existence, possible quiddities as the origin of immanent aspects depending on which the unfolded existence, due to its relation with determined existence, develops comparative aspects. Moreover, the impossibility of the generalization of the judgments of possible things, such as the opposition between proximity and distance, to the Necessary is one of the fundamental responses according to which the opposition between proximity and distance, as well as the necessity of proximity and immanence, and the necessity of distance and diversity concerning Almighty Truth are negated, so that His proximity is not in the form of immanence and His distance is not in the form of diversity. In addition, non-associational transcendence, the classical associational transcendence, the individual associational transcendence (or modal transcendence), and epistemological transcendence are introduced as different forms of transcendence, according on which the mode of God’s transcendence in relation to possible things in philosophy based on Sadrain individual unity of being is clarified.

The present paper intends to provide a correct explanation of the relation between intellectual and traditional sciences by means of studying the semantics of the intellect and its various levels, intellectual sciences, traditional sciences, and its conceptual difference from transmitted sciences. Apparently, many thinkers have talked about the relation between them and demonstrated the incompatibility and contrast between intellectual and transmitted sciences. However, since their conclusions have been reached without paying any attention to the semantic difference between the two terms “transmitted” and “traditional” sciences, they might not be completely correct. This paper explains that, as a result of the personal hearing of the words of the infallible model of religion (not only quoting him without being present at the time he said his words) and benefiting from his teachings, the realm of the intellect is illuminated by the divine light, and in this luminous atmosphere the truth of divine words and transmitted sciences is perceived.In other words, we can say that traditional sciences are a grace for the actualization of the higher levels of the intellect until reaching the level of intuition (and even observation) and the growth of intellectual perceptions. Reaching the higher levels of the intellect itself is the main factor in the perception of transmitted sciences (the Qur’an, hadith, and narrations) and a higher understanding of traditional sciences. The importance of this issue becomes clear when we do not limit the meanings of the Qur’an, hadiths, narrations, and traditional sciences to their external meanings and believe that it is necessary to understand the internal meanings of these texts and words, as the greatest internal gift given by Almighty God, and as emphasized in the two noble verses of the Qur’an, “Do ye not see that Allah has subjected to your (use) all things in the heavens and on earth, and has made his bounties flow to you in exceeding measure, (both) seen and unseen? Yet there are among men those who dispute about Allah, without knowledge and without guidance, and without a Book to enlighten them!” (Luqman: 20) and “Then, shall ye be questioned that Day about the joy (ye indulged in!)” (al-Takathur: 8).

Mulla Sadra (979-1050 AH) and Parmenides (510-340 BC) are two of the most distinguished figures in the field of philosophy who have influenced philosophical thought with their innovations concerning the most important philosophical issues.Although one belongs to the era of the beginning of philosophical thought in ancient Greece and the other rose in a period in which his different thought was in its culmination, their theories of “being” are sometimes very close to and sometimes far from each other.Here, the writer first deals with the approaches, worldviews, and methods of the two philosophers regarding “being”. Then she reveals what the meaning of this issue for each of them is and describes how they sometimes come close to and sometimes go far from each other in this regard. Firstly, both of them agree that “being” is real, base phenomena on “being”, and maintain that anything other than it is unoriginal. Secondly, both believe that it is possible to demonstrate the principiality of “being” by means of logical reasoning. Thirdly, although their analyses are different, knowledge enjoys an ontological basis in their philosophies. For them, there is an agreement between thought and being; thought perceives being, which is not an abstract and mental issue. Nevertheless, Mulla Sadra and Parmenides move away from each other when they explain the kind of “being” and the mode of its principiality and actualization. This is because each of them follows a specific purpose.