پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال هفتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 14، پاییز و زمستان 1388)

The present article intends to explain, the epistemological function of factual and external propositions in demonstration figure in the shade of studying the logical conditions and rules of these propositions. About factual and external propositions various viewpoints have investigated, but the outlook in the present article is based on the difference of these propositions in the relation between the confirmation of the subject and the confirmation of the predicate. This relation in the factual proposition is essential but in the external proposition is accidental. This article urges the belief that the conditions of argument propositions are clearly found in the factual proposition. So only the factual proposition can be used in islamic logical method of scientific thought.

Islamic philosophers have determined the philosophy as knowledge of existence and they have introduced the question of existence the basic question of philosophy. Mulla sadra looked at this issue as a special problem and made it his base in the philosophy. But this issue in western philosophy was forgotten or got incorrect interpretations and lost its noetic performance virtually. This issue brought forth again in the past century by martin heidegger, as the main philosophical questions. By reviewing their books, we can find that, in spite of their fundamental difference, both have adopted a new way in the transition from the beings to reality of existence and also in transition from the concept of existence to reality of existence, and both have adopted a different philosophical way from common philosophies. Fundamental difference between these two viewpoints is that heidegger believed that some features of the concept of existence prepared ground for past philosophers to prejudice about recognition of correct answers to question of being. He believes that through this concept, we cannot recognize existence and the only way to know existence is phenomenological review. But mulla sadra despite of transition from the concept of existence to reality of existence believes that this concept has noetic performance, but heidegger's criticism of past philosophers does not apply to him.

In this essay we have tried to research, analyze, and criticize the russell's correspondence theory of truth, considering the philosopher's developments during his intellectual life from his many works. The changes in his theory of truth are matched at every point by changes in his theory of belief. When he thought of belief as a mental attitude which was directed upon propositions, he hold truth and falsehood to be indefinable attributes of such propositions. When he came to think of belief as a relation between the mind and a multiplicity of objects, he adopted another version of correspondence. Later on, when turned propositions into contents of beliefs, he came to hold a correspondence theory of truth, in the most literal sense of the term. Consequently, he was led to adopt a different theory according to which an affirmative proposition of the observational kind is true if the replacement of each word by its meaning yields a fact.In this research we have shown that russell, in spite of the all ups and downs in the stages of his philosophical developments, always, had kept correspondence theory. He, indeed, has given a version of the theory, in accordance with his intellectual system in each stage.

Accepting the concept of “intentionality” in husserl’s philosophy, Sartre maintains that consciousness consists in consciousness of something. Consciousness has always an object and refers to something that is known. He does not believe that there is any reality, “noumenon”, lying behind the phenomena. On the other hand, he does not regard phenomenon as dependent on consciousness or the knowing subject. Phenomena are self-sustaining. Hence, we are confronted with two types of being: consciousness and the objects of consciousness or phenomena. Sartre calls the first type “being-in-itself” and the second type “being-for-itself”. Having dealt with Sartre’s phenomenological approach, this article examines some characteristics of “for-itself” such as nothingness and freedom. In addition, it deals with some structures of “for-itself” such as to be impersonal, to be non-substantial, lack and desire.

In this article, the theory of Parodoxicality of mystical experiences that was proposed by Stace - the author of Mysticism and Philosophy- is being discussed with regard to islamic mysticism issues. Here we show that irrationality of mysticism which is stated in Stace’s theory is not consistent with basics of Islamic mysticism. The main reason of this inconsistency is inappropriate view of Stace in pantheism interpretation in which the deep separation of "Ahadiyat" (divine essence) and "Vahediyat" (appearances of essence) is considered as mystic’s justification and is neglected. This separation, especially islamic mysticism, is due to separation of existence and its appearances.Existence is a single truth and the appearances of existence is multiple. Regarding the unity of existences, entities are completely related to that single existence and don’t have independent existence. Therefore, although theory of unity in multiplicity accepts conflication in divine essence, it is not associated with any contradiction.

Ibn Sina apparently seeks to prove three matters by making a subjective and nonexperimental terms in framework of the idea of «the suspended man in space»; the existence of soul, immateriality of soul, being presential of self knowledge. Nonetheless this idea and the range of its giving knowledge always have been disputed by philosophers. In this article will be shown that one of the most important factors that has caused divagation in analysis of this idea, is observation of this idea through the framework of aristotelian logic. The best framework for analysis of this idea is thought experiment. First time, analytic philosophers dealt with introduction and description of thought experiments. In this article, at first, we deal with short introduction of thought experiments and examination of their status according to islamic philosophers. Then, we introduce the model suggested by sorensen for logical formalization of thought experiments. Sorensen seeks to put thought experiments in the single argumentative framework by introduction of this logical model. Then, we analyze idea of «suspended man in space» based on this model. Based on sorensen’s model, however, the experiment of suspended man keeps aspect of it, and giving knowledge, but, we can’t make uttermost use, rather, its effective extent should be adjusted. In this article, it will be shown that this idea only can be applied to prove immateriality of soul, however, this application will depend on acceptance of some additive assumptions and assistive hypotheses.

This article attempts to consider critical analysis of richard rorty's interpretation on relation between self and world. Rorty believed in three models of relation between self and world. In first model, self and world are dividing to two layers. In second model, self has various layers and it is complex, but world has only one layer and it is not anything but atoms and void, which is subject to mechanical laws. Although there is representational relation between self and world in first and second models but there is not the same relation in the third model because there is not reality for representing. In this model, there is environment that we have causal, and not representational, relation with it. Rorty wants to avoid realism in interpreting of this relation but some traces of realism have been seen in his thought.

Within the islamic philosophy and theology traditions, the very idea of convention is largely discussed. Apparently, except suhrevardi and tabatabaie, nobody has discussed with regard to the concept ‘convention’, on its own. In this paper, tabatabaie’s ethical framework is discussed from the ontological, semantic and epistemological points of view. Finally, in order to shed light on tabatabaie’s view, the similarities and dissimilarities between his and wittgenstein’s ethical position is explored.