نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 60 (تابستان 1389)

The school of Shiraz deserves to be studied for several reasons. It links the School of Maraghah (or, according to some people, School of Tabriz) and the School of Isfahan. Moreover, it has revived the Ishraqi tradition and the Iranian-Islamic identity in philosophy. In contrast to some orientalists who believe that Islamic philosophy died with Ibn Rushd, the School of Shiraz managed to continue this philosophical tradition and introduce a number of prominent philosophers in the intellectual history of Iran to the world.One of the distinctive characteristics of this school which has not been studied as it should have is the Illuminationist tendencies of some of its important philosophers such as Jalal al-Din Dawani and Qiyath al-Din Dashtaki. Both of them had reacted to the grand book of Hayakil al-nur and wrote commentaries on it following two different approaches. This work is one of the important books of Suhrawardi on Iranian-Illuminationist philosophy which connects him to the Shi‘ite-Isma‘ilite’s point of view. During the period of decline after the 6th century (AH) ‘Allamah Dawani and the Dashtaki family paid attention to this work as the reviver of Iranian-Illuminationist philosophy and identity and extended Suhrawardi’s important ideas which had been presented in three fields of Illuminationist philosophy, the theory of Imamat (leadership), and Iranian identity. This paper is a study of Suhrawardi’s Hayakil al-nur and its commentary by ‘Allamah Dawani.

The Principle of the One is one of the universal and useful principles of Islamic philosophy which plays a basic role in interpreting the problem of the regular appearance of existents from each other, particularly the rise of the first effect. Through analyzing and demonstrating this principle, Islamic philosophers have introduced the creation of the first effect by Almighty Necessary as its main application. They believe that based on this principle, only one effect is emanated directly from the simple Necessary Being.Although the above principle is certain and has no exception in terms of its content and arguments, some deliberation over them and the fundamental principles that Islamic philosophers believe in reveals that their theory concerning the application of this principle to the problem of the first creation does not seem consistent with their theories and principles regarding the continuity of the emanation of Almighty Necessary, the need of effects to causes in their survival, the inclusion of the truth of all effects in the essence of their first cause in a superior and simple way, and the principle of the truth in its simplicity contains all things.

Although Mulla Sadra followed the early theological and philosophical theories concerning the discussion of time, he still tried to create a tight relationship between time and being. By doing so, he corrected many of the ideas and theories of early philosophers in this regard and brought time from the domain of quiddities to the domain of being; he moved it from the soulless world of the body into the vast dimension of being and, finally, brought it into the domain of human mind and wisdom. In this way, human beings will be able to understand and experience changes not in the external world but in their own existence and all over the world of being. A study of the strong and weak points in his view of time is of importance to us because it provides us with a great insight into the future.

There are many paths to reach God because He enjoys an infinite number of perfections and directions, and each person follows his own path to move towards Him. Men of God, believers, and mystics all speak of the same truth; however, they use different languages, words, and proofs.In terms of firmness and perfection, the noblest of all arguments on demonstrating the existence of God is one in which the middle term is nothing but He Himself. In other words, it is one in which the end and the aim are the same. This is the same path and method of the righteous, who demonstrate the Necessary Being by means of the Necessary Being Himself. The unique feature of the “argument of the righteous” is that there is no mediator for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being in it.It was Ibn Sina who used the term the “argument of the righteous” for the first time. However, it was Mulla Sadra who explained it on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Transcendent Philosophy in an innovative and most solid manner. His interpretation is superior to those of Ibn Sina and others in certain respects.This argument was interpreted and presented in different ways after Mulla Sadra; however, the writer believes that, given its philosophical premises, Sabziwari’s interpretation is the shortest, and, given its objective reality and needlessness of philosophical premises, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i’s is the most direct one. The interpretations known as the arguments of the people of knowledge and theology (kalam) suffer from formal and content-related problems. Moreover, most of their discussions refer back to the principles and consequences given by Ibn Sina and Shaykh al-Ishraq. These interpretations did not create a basic change in the presentation of arguments on the demonstration of the Necessary Being. Therefore, Mulla Sadra’s is the soundest, firmest, and most problem-free argument on the demonstration of the existence of God.This paper has accomplished two tasks: 1) A study of the different interpretations and explanations of the argument of the righteous; 2) a comparison, critique, and examination of these interpretations in terms of their solidity and comprehensiveness to be used for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being based on the same argument.

Prime philosophy or metaphysics is one of the ancient sciences in the field of human thought. Since it was introduced and explained in a disciplined manner in specific and prominent books, its related theories have always been studied and criticized by the scholars of this field. Of course, research on the nature of the subject of this science has not remained untouched by philosophical critical views and analyses. After Aristotle, due to some of his apparently opposing statements, a debate started on the nature of the subject of metaphysics. On the one side, some introduced a number of immaterial divine affairs as the subject of metaphysical deliberations, and, on the other side, some believed that the study of existents in an absolute form was the main concern of this science. Nevertheless, in the middle of such opposing ideas, some thinkers moved towards a unifying theory based on which we can say that there are no contradictions and differences among Aristotle’s statements. A unique interpretation of this unifying theory can be found in a consistent manner in Ibn Sina’s works.On the one hand, he believes that the subject and main focus of metaphysical deliberations is existent qua existent, and, on the other, he introduces existent qua existent as the same divine and immaterial affairs. He is of the view that the limit and definition of universal science is the same definition of divine science. In Ibn Sina’s view, prime philosophy is a single science with only a single subject which is absolute existence. However, the domain of this subject is limited to immaterial affairs. Careful attention to Ibn Sina’s words reveals that one should pay attention to the specifity of the self and essence of “existent” in his philosophy. The specifity of the “existent” means its decline from its station of absoluteness and the appearance of some natural or acquired characteristics in it which are only possible when non-existence accompanies it. A material thing is an existent which has dramatically been demoted from the station of the essence of “existent” and approached the borderlines of non-existence. According to Ibn Sina, the subject of philosophy is not a mental affair; rather, it is an external thing which, while enjoying external realization, possesses breadth and inclusion. This theory clearly explains Ibn Sina’s viewpoint, which is based on the principiality of existence.

Seyyed Mustafa Khomeini had been trained in the school of the Transcendent Philosophy and had several innovations in Islamic philosophy. His ideas had been propounded in a big book called al-Qawa‘id al-hakamiyyah, which has been lost. The writer of this paper has collected his new theories by reviewing 29 of his books. From among his 50 new philosophical ideas, 32 are related to problems in theology in its general sense which are also discussed in philosophy, existence and quiddity, mental existence, the tripartite division of being, motion, substance and accident, ontology, and cause and effect. This study deals with his theories and also refers to the ideas of philosophers before him, particularly Mulla Sadra, so that, while comparing them with each other, the place of each theory is clearly revealed. The classification of Mulla Sadra’s ideas in the table of contents of the book al-Hikmat al-muta‘aliyyah is a great step towards compiling the history of contemporary Islamic philosophy.

Given the epistemological features of the principle of “essences of causes”, Ibn Sina claims that the certain knowledge of those affairs which require a cause can only be attained through the knowledge of their causes. Accordingly, the other possible ways for attaining this knowledge, such as resorting to “absolute posteriori demonstration” or the argument of “cause”, are apparently invalid. However, he explicates that whenever the middle term and the positiveness of the major premise for the minor premise are two necessary premises for the minor term, it is possible to adduce a kind of certain posteriori proposition. Thus emphasizing the epistemological role of the cause does not negate the attainment of any kind of certain knowledge through other ways. Moreover, he maintains that particular intellection in general is similar to perception through relying on causes and concomitants and believes that it is useful for universality and certainty. On the other hand, according to Ibn Sina, the knowledge of the cause does not necessitate the presence of the actual knowledge of the effect. He asserts that, in order for potential knowledge to become actual knowledge, two conditions are necessary: 1) the necessary relation between the cause and effect must be stated based on the predication and convention and in the form of a proposition, 2) in addition to the knowledge of cause, other types of knowledge must be provided in the propositions so that a certain conclusion can be derived. The present paper investigates the epistemological role of the cause in various discussions in Ibn Sina’s philosophy.